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Introduction 
 
Language, however we construe it precisely, is used by people in everyday communication. It 
is sometimes used in a very systematic way. Often it is adequate enough. But sometimes it is 
not quite clear whether a particular noise or a string of signs may count as language use at all. 
Still, language use seems to be stable enough for most purposes and its use is certainly not 
completely arbitrary. The present thesis is about why and to what extent that is so. 
 One common proposal has it that language use is not completely arbitrary because 
linguistic expressions are usually meaningful expressions. And the meaning any expression 
has, so the proposal continues, is a matter of fact. It is with this proposal that I shall begin part 
A of the present thesis. Or rather, I shall begin with an argument which questions the picture 
behind it and which seeks to establish that meaning is completely arbitrary. It will emerge that 
the argument for the arbitrariness of meaning is a serious threat to common intuitions. The 
upshot of part A will be that only a handful of strategies for rejecting the argument have good 
prospects of fending off the argument for arbitrariness. 
 In part B of the thesis, the different strategies for rejecting arbitrariness will be 
assessed in a more thorough manner. It will be asked whether they can explain the difference 
between merely thinking that language is used correctly and it being the case that language is 
used correctly. Part B is thus about objectively correct language use. One of the major 
questions will be on what objective grounds speakers can claim that they are using language 
correctly and that they are not merely thinking that they do. 
 In part C, the focus will be on the capacities, which enable humans to use language. 
And as this is also a central research topic in linguistics, the relation between philosophical 
and empirical investigations into language use must be clarified as well. 
 This introductory overview is very abstract and covers much ground. Throughout the 
thesis, the arguments will remain at a level of considerable abstraction and many more issues 
will be touched upon without being treated comprehensively. But I do nevertheless hope that 
the details provided in the body of the text will show why the set-up presented here is fruitful 
for a philosophical study of the nature of language use. And even though I shall endorse a 
specific account of the nature of language use, I do not purport to provide a conclusive proof 
of it. Instead, I shall be happy enough if most readers find the set-up illuminating and 
conducive to their own thought.  
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1) Kripke’s Wittgenstein 
 
The question whether language use could be completely arbitrary is a rather recent one. It 
mainly emerged from independent exegetical works by Saul Kripke (1982) and Crispin 
Wright (1980) on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s views on rule-following. For present purposes, I 
shall concentrate mainly on Kripke’s work.  
 Saul Kripke’s Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language is a very influential book. 
During the last 30 years, more than 500 articles have been written about it and many of its 
central topics are still debated today.1 The topic presently under discussion is sometimes 
called ‘metalinguistic correctness’. Kripke takes metalinguistic correctness to be concerned 
with the correct usage of linguistic expressions based on what those linguistic expressions 
mean.2 In addition, accounting for metalinguistic correctness centrally involves explaining 
how an indefinite number of new language uses can be based on a finite number of preceding 
ones. In order to make the notion of metalinguistic correctness clearer, Kripke contrasts it 
with arithmetic correctness. Computing 125 as the sum of 57 and 68 is correct in the 
arithmetic sense, because 125 is the sum of 57 and 68. On the other hand, computing 125 as 
the sum is metalinguistically correct if ‘plus’ in ’57 plus 68’ picks out the arithmetic function 
which yields 125 as an answer when it is applied to the numbers expressed by ‘57’ and ‘68’.  
 One should not be mislead by Kripke’s terminology. Metalinguistic correctness 
merely explains the usage of linguistic expressions in terms of what these expressions mean. 
And making correct language use the central topic of the present thesis hence suggests that 
the present discussion is to a large extent about issues surrounding the concept of meaning. 
Now, when Kripke distinguishes metalinguistic from arithmetic correctness, he also 
insinuates that the meaning of a linguistic expression alone is not always sufficient to 
determine correct use. Making arithmetically correct statements, then, might not only turn on 
what one’s words mean, but also on whether one calculates correctly. Even if the meaning of 
the words used to talk about arithmetic do determine the correct result or establish which 
result is correct, that would be something that must be argued for and cannot be presupposed.  
 There are also other cases in which the meaning of linguistic expressions do prima 
facie not suffice to determine the correct use of those expressions. Getting the facts right, for 
example, does often not only depend on meaning, but also on what is the case. And having a 
good warrant for the claims one makes might not only depend on meaning, but on what 
counts as a justification. So we should at least distinguish between language use which is                                                         1 In May 2012, Google Scholar counted 2085 academic works citing it. 2 Kripke 1982:8 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correct by virtue of meaning, correct by virtue of the facts and correct by virtue of warrant. 
Instead of Kripke’s notion of metalinguistic correctness, I shall henceforth speak of language 
use that can be semantically correct and in addition to that I shall also presuppose that 
language use can be correct or incorrect in a factual or epistemological sense. A complete 
account of correct language use distinguishes these three kinds of correctness and provides an 
explanation of how they are related. 
 In order to see how Kripke approaches semantic correctness and its relation to factual 
and epistemological issues, two kinds of question are raised. First, there are metaphysical 
questions. What constitutes language use? What sort of fact determines what linguistic 
expressions mean? Second, there are epistemological questions. How can we know that a 
particular use of a linguistic expression is correct? How can we justify that we do know 
whether a particular use is correct or not? Any account of the relation of meaning and 
language use must answer these metaphysical and epistemological questions and an account 
passes muster only if it provides suitable answers. 
 In Kripke’s book, the issues surrounding the relation of meaning and use are 
introduced via sceptical doubts concerning the very possibility that the metaphysical and 
epistemological questions can be answered. Kripke takes his cues from Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
yet develops them independently of Wittgenstein’s texts. The result is a serious challenge for 
any attempt to explain meaningful language use, because the doubts suggest that language use 
can never be either factually or epistemologically correct. This also questions semantic 
correctness, for if an expression’s meaning does never count as a fact constituting correct 
language use or as justifying a particular use as correct, the concept of meaning appears to be 
a completely arbitrary concept. 
 The sections below are about sceptical doubts along these semantic, metaphysical and 
epistemological lines. The question concerning the extent to which Kripke’s Wittgenstein––
commonly called ‘Kripkenstein’––is identical with Wittgenstein will be partially neglected. 
Another issue that will not be discussed much is whether there can be a completely 
naturalistic account of correct language use.3 
 A point to be noted is that the reading of Kripke’s book proposed below develops the 
sceptical doubts solely on the basis of issues surrounding linguistic extrapolation: any 
                                                        3 There is, however, a widely spread consensus that such accounts collapse into the dispositionalist proposals Kripke discusses and that they share their fate; see Boghossian’s 1989b for discussion. I shall, however, discuss naturalistic accounts of some specific aspects of what it is to know a language in part C. 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admissible account of language use should explain how an indefinite number of new language 
uses can be based on a finite number of preceding ones. That is controversial. Some 
commentators have claimed that further assumptions are made (or required) to get scepticism 
off the ground. The reading of Kripke’s book proposed below offers corrosive sceptical 
doubts without any such further consideration. Recent claims that further assumptions are 
needed will be assessed and rejected after the sceptical scenario has been introduced. 
 
1.1) The Sceptical Scenario 
 
Paradoxical Language Use? 
 
Kripke writes that the sceptical paradox cannot be understood as presenting either his own or 
Wittgenstein’s point of view, even though the book is meant to convey an essential point of 
Wittgenstein’s later work. Rather, it should be seen as ‘Wittgenstein’s argument as it struck 
Kripke’.4 The sceptic was henceforth called ‘Kripkenstein’s sceptic’. In order to set up the 
sceptical scenario, I shall say more about how Kripke understands semantic correctness and 
address some preliminary issues concerning it. After that, I shall introduce Kripkenstein’s 
sceptical scenario. 
 By ‘+’ I refer to addition, a mathematical function. In expressions containing two 
integers separated by a plus, such as ‘12 + 5’ or ‘57 + 68’, ‘+’ is used to refer to the addition 
function with two positive integers as arguments. The addition function is easy to compute for 
small integers and produces one integer for every pair of arguments. 
 Note that ‘+’ is a linguistic expression and that semantic correctness is concerned with 
the correct usage of linguistic expressions based on what those linguistic expressions mean. 
Now, grasping the meaning of ‘+’ involves grasping how ‘+’ is used correctly. Intuitively, 
this seems also to involve that I grasp how to use ‘+’ in indefinitely many new cases and 
based on a finite number of preceding occasions of having used ‘+’. This naturally leads to 
the assumption that by grasping the meaning of ‘+’ I also grasp a rule which determines how I 
compute indefinitely many additions the expression of which involve ‘+’.5 
 We should be careful not to jump the guns here. We must insist that ‘indefinitely’ is 
simply used to express a concession that we do not know how many particular uses of ‘+’ are 
based on a finite number of preceding uses. For if we do not add this caveat, ‘indefinitely’ 
may be read as expressing an assumption that there are possibly infinite particular uses of ‘+’                                                         4 Kripke 1982:5 5 Op. cit. p. 7‐8 
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which are based on a finite number of preceding uses. This second reading suggests that we 
must also ask how something finite can determine something infinite at all. If we do not add 
the caveat, we find ourselves in a quandary that has no literal basis in the text. 
 The two readings of ‘indefinitely’ also lead to two distinct notions of a rule. First, if 
‘indefinitely’ simply means that we cannot count the number of cases determined by the rule, 
the rule can be said to govern the use of ‘+’ but does not determine it rigidly, because there 
need not be a definite set of correct applications of the rule. Second, if ‘indefinitely’ means 
something like ‘infinitely’ or ‘possibly infinitely’, the rule governing the use of ‘+’ can still be 
thought to determine rigidly––there might be a definite set of correct applications of the rule. 
In the first case, rules merely provide directions and in the second case, they are more like 
rails.  
 The first notion of a rule, where we have relaxed determination, is more appealing, 
because we can easily make sense of the idea that rules have exceptions and that those 
exceptions do not prove in any way that the rule is defective––rather, the existence of an 
exception in a particular case may prove that there is a general rule. If public drinking is 
forbidden in an area unless it is a national holiday, the exception on national holidays proves 
that public drinking is generally forbidden in that area. It is quite difficult, on the other hand, 
to find rules for which every exception must be counted as a defect. Such rules can hardly be 
called rules at all, because they do not allow for exceptions that prove them. The notion of 
rules as rigidly determining hence seems to confuse the concept of a rule with the concept of a 
law. 
 There is also a second aspect to why we should be careful not to understand rules as 
rigidly determining. Following rules is a conscious activity and the agent can explain why she 
follows a rule or which rule she follows. It is thus natural to hold that rules are followed 
intentionally. If rules did, however, rigidly determine a possibly infinite number of particular 
actions, an agent’s intentions must comprise, in a sense yet to be explained, such possible 
infinitudes. It is hard to show how a finite mind can form intentions comprising possible 
infinitudes. We should therefore be wary not to read too much into the term ‘indefinitely’, 
because it may lead us to make claims which require justification and for which justification 
is not easy to come by. Those drawn to the idea that rules determine rigidly are well advised 
to allow the weaker reading of ‘indefinitely’ as well and be prepared to provide arguments if 
they want to read their preferences into the issues at hand. 
 This makes clearer in which sense we speak of rules in the present context. It is 
preferable to regard them as providing directions rather than rails. It thus becomes innocuous 
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to claim that any rule requires that my intention to follow it determines what is to count as 
following that rule for indefinitely many cases in the future, even though there may be 
exceptions. We can now also formulate a more precise notion of semantic correctness, 
according to which the correct use of a word depends on there being a rule and a language 
user, whose intention to follow the rule determines indefinitely many cases of semantically 
correct language use. In other words, accounting for the relation between meaning and use 
means, first and foremost, accounting for how semantically correct language use involves 
extrapolating from a finite number of preceding occasions. The explanandum is therefore 
called ‘grasping as extrapolating’: 
(Grasping as Extrapolating) 
Grasping a rule for the usage of a meaningful expression centrally involves extrapolating 
a possibly indefinite number of new applications based on a finite number of known 
cases. 
Uneasiness about the notion of a rule might lead one to replace ‘rule for the usage of a 
meaningful expression’ through ‘meaning of an expression’. For unless we find independent 
reasons that necessitate speaking of rules, the concept of meaning can be used to explain the 
sort of extrapolations at stake here just as well. 
 Note also that grasping as extrapolating is not necessarily confined to purely linguistic 
cases. The application of concepts in general requires extrapolation as well. It makes perfect 
sense to treat concept application along the lines of semantic correctness. If I have the concept 
of a cat, that concept can be applied to indefinitely many cats, but we must hold that the 
concept does not determine its applications rigidly. After all, the concept of a cat cannot be 
applied to a black cat in a dark alley at night, because the circumstances make it impossible to 
apply the concept at all. Exceptions hence play a similar role in concept application as when 
rules are applied or linguistic expressions are used. This finding can be condensed into the 
following definition––the primary explanandum of Kripkenstein’s considerations: 
(Grasping as Extrapolating) 
Grasping a rule, a meaning of a word or a concept centrally involves extrapolating a 
possibly indefinite number of new applications based on a finite number of known cases. 6 
With these clarifications in the background, let us move on to the introduction of 
Kripkenstein’s sceptical scenario. Consider the quaddition function, which works just like the 
addition function for arguments smaller than 56. But if one of the two arguments is larger 
than 56, the function always yields ‘5’ as a result. Accordingly, it is conceivable for some 
curious circumstances that ‘+’ signifies ‘quus’, which denotes the quaddition function.                                                          6 Cf. Kusch 2006:6 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 Now, imagine that I have never computed any addition function with arguments larger 
than 56, but several with arguments smaller than 56 and I was always right. Suppose I 
encounter a situation where I am asked to compute 57+68. As I understand addition by ‘+’, I 
compute 125 as an answer. I probably rely on how I have computed the function for smaller 
arguments in the past. Let us grant that I perfectly remember how I did it back then––assume 
extended epistemological powers as you will. Reminding myself that I have only computed 
smaller arguments before, I check the answer again and still get 125. Now I am confident and 
answer ‘125’. 
 Kripkenstein’s sceptic walks in on me and objects that the correct answer is 5, not 125. 
Note that he does not question 125 to be the correct answer in the arithmetical sense, he 
questions correctness in the semantic sense. The reason why I am wrong, he claims, is that I 
am––due to some adverse circumstance like having a hallucination (and not knowing it) or 
being under the influence of a malign spirit––mistaken about what I formerly meant by ‘+’. 
He claims that in the past I referred to the quaddition function by ‘+’, but just now I 
mistakenly thought that I always meant addition by ‘+’. Given that meaning of ‘+’ I should 
indeed answer ‘5’ and not ‘125’. Kripke is aware how crazy this objection sounds: 
 Now if the sceptic proposes his hypothesis sincerely, he is crazy; such a bizarre 
hypothesis as the proposal that I always meant [quaddition] is absolutely wild. Wild it 
indubitably is, no doubt it is false; but if it is false, there must be some fact about my 
past usage that can be cited to refute it. For although the hypothesis is wild, it does not 
seem to be a priori impossible.7 
So, if we want to answer the objection, Kripke insinuates, we must show that scepticism is a 
priori impossible. But there are other strategies to counter the objection. A simpler way of 
answering the sceptic involves turning the tables and asking the sceptic himself to show why 
the particular case of language use he doubts to be correct is actually incorrect. Turning tables 
like that involves rejecting the idea that the mere conceivability of incorrectness is enough to 
successfully question whether a speaker uses language correctly when it appears to the 
speaker that he actually does use language correctly. In order to put the strategy into action, 
one must argue that a speaker is authoritative about what he counts as correct language use, 
unless some fact obtains that overrides such claims. What sort of fact counts as appropriate 
remains yet to be determined, but the mere conceivability of incorrectness will not do as a 
reasonable basis for sceptical doubts. An answer along these lines does still allow the sceptic 
to raise his objection in other particular cases, because the answer does not rule out the very 
possibility of scepticism. Despite this drawback, such a simpler answer is easier to come by,                                                         7 Kripke 1982:9 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for it evades very abstract and complicated reasoning due to having to explain what ‘a priori 
impossible’ means. It is, at any rate, wrong to think that answering the sceptic necessarily 
leads to a discussion of a priori possibilities concerning semantic correctness.  
 No matter what way of answering the sceptic I choose, I need a suitable fact to counter 
the sceptic’s doubts. The fact––if there is one––must constitute my meaning addition by ‘+’ 
and the same fact must also justify my answer ‘125’. It may settle a priori that there is such a 
thing as correctness and it may also explain why I know it when I answer the sceptic. But 
alternatively, it may merely settle that I am authoritative about what counts as correct in this 
particular case and that the sceptic does not have the appropriate evidence to overthrow this 
authority.  
 Unfortunately, for whatever fact I cite the sceptic will question me in a similar vein: if 
I cite the justified and true belief that 125 is correct, the sceptic will object that I actually 
meant to cite a schmelief, which is the justified true belief that 125 is correct if neither 
argument of the addition function is larger than 56 and that 5 is correct for larger arguments. 
Or if I cite the fact that my calculation behaviour was correct and prove it by showing my 
written calculations, the sceptic will say that I actually meant to cite the fact that my 
calculation schmehaviour was correct, where a calculation schmehaviour is just like my 
behaviour in calculating correctly for arguments smaller than 56, but which yields 5 as the 
correct answer for larger arguments.  
 Whatever I can think of that could serve as the appropriate fact, the sceptic can go on 
with his game and transpose the objection. He applies his global scepticism about meaning 
whenever I try to rise to the challenge and he seems to succeed no matter what sort of fact I 
come up with. And at this point the sceptical paradox emerges: on the one hand, we are sure 
that there is an appropriate fact and that we are authoritative about what we mean; on the 
other hand we cannot, it seems, pin it down in a way that finally silences the nagging sceptic. 
Taken for granted that issues concerning language use are basically semantic issues––which 
may involve factual or epistemological issues at the periphery––we can formulate the 
sceptical conclusion that there is no fact of the matter about what any expression means. 
 Note that calling the conclusion ‘sceptical’ is not entirely accurate. It is not only the 
case that nobody ever knows a fact of the matter about what any expression means, but that 
there is no such fact. Scepticism is generally understood to be an epistemological problem. 
The sceptical conclusion presented here is, however, also a metaphysical problem, for even 
allowing for extended epistemological powers does not change the situation. Kripkenstein’s 
sceptic thus expresses a nihilism about meaning. 
-12- 
 
Some Possible Replies 
 
There are obvious candidate facts which we can consider to test the soundness of the sceptic’s 
conclusion. Kripke mentions several of them and emphasises that there are no limitations on 
what sort of fact may be considered.8 It will be worthwhile to look at some candidate facts 
from Kripke’s text.9 Letting ‘S’ stand for some arbitrary speaker and ‘x’ and ‘y’ denote 
arbitrary integers, some of the candidate facts are: 
1) the totality of S’s previous behaviour with the ‘+’ sign 
2) the fact that S’s use of ‘+’ is governed by a counting rule 
3) the fact that the hypothesis that S meant addition by ‘+’ is the simplest such     
hypothesis 
4) the fact that when S uses ‘+’ he has an irreducible experience, with its own special 
quale, known directly by introspection 
5) the fact that meaning addition by ‘+’ is ‘a primitive state, not to be assimilated to 
sensations or headaches or any “qualitative” states, nor to be assimilated to dispositions, 
but a state of a unique kind of its own’10 
6) the fact that S grasps an objective and abstract entity––the sense of ‘+’––and that this 
determines the addition function as the referent of ‘+’ 
7) S’s past mental history, construed in terms of episodic mental states 
8) the fact that S is disposed, when asked to compute ‘x+y’, to reply with the result of 
adding x and y 
Let us turn to the first candidate fact. According to it, the totality of S’s previous behaviour 
with the ‘+’ sign is supposed to determine language use.11 That proposal builds on the idea 
that one’s intention to follow a rule is to be accounted for in terms of how one behaves. But 
considering the sceptical scenario, we find that nothing in the totality of S’s previous 
behaviour involving ‘+’ settles whether S intends to follow the rule for addition or the rule for 
quaddition, because both rules were by definition indistinguishable until now. They were also 
indistinguishable in how one is to behave when following them and this shows that the first 
candidate fact is not helpful at all. 
 The second candidate fact is the fact that S’s use of ‘+’ is governed by a counting 
rule.12 Kripke considers a case where the use of ‘+’ is governed by a specific counting                                                         8 Kripke 1982:14 9 The list follows Miller 2010. 10 Kripke 1982:51 11 Op. cit. pp. 14‐15 12 Op. cit. pp. 15‐16 
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procedure with marbles: count out 57 marbles and form a heap, count out 68 marbles and 
form another heap, put the heaps together and count out the new heap––the resulting number 
of marbles is the correct answer to ‘57+68=?’. The problem here is that the sceptic can 
question the correctness of ‘count’ just as much as he questioned that of ‘plus’. He may object 
that I formerly meant to quount by ‘count’ where to quount means counting out heaps with 
less than 56 marbles or directly answering ‘5’ if one heap has more than 56 marbles. The 
problem will not be solved by simply explaining addition in terms of counting, because 
counting is subject to the same sceptical doubts. 
 One might want to buttress the claim with a metaphysical consideration along the 
following lines. Mereology, the study of part-whole relations, may play a role if we allow an 
Aristotelian conception of those relations. Such an Aristotelian conception of mereology 
holds that a whole is always more than the sum of its parts.13 Applying this idea to the 
addition case, we may be tempted to say that the intended result of my counting procedure is 
to be independent of how I compose it from sub-heaps.14 That strategy can be generalised, we 
might want to claim that the result of going through a rule-following process is to be 
independent of its composition in terms of process-stages, for there are infinitely many ways 
of cutting such a process into stages. This seems to be a good idea if one understands the 
sceptic as questioning one’s rule-following through drawing one specific process-stage into 
doubt. But that construal of the paradox is wrong. The sceptical doubts concern the whole 
process, because if they did not, no general claims about correct language use and meaning 
would be forthcoming. It does, for present purposes, not matter whether the rule is somehow 
more general than (and therefore independent of) any stage of complying with it. This appears 
clearly if we consider that the sceptic does not care how S dissects the rule-following process 
into particular stages. Recall that he even allows that S can perfectly remember how he 
followed the rule in the past. The sceptic did not restrict either what candidate facts are 
available to answer his scepticism and this rules out the possibility that the sceptical doubts 
are meant to be restricted to specific stages of a rule-following process. 
 Next is the fact that the hypothesis that S meant addition by ‘+’ is the simplest such 
hypothesis. This third candidate fact also fails to rise to the challenge, because it only gives an 
account of why S is justified to claim that he meant addition by ‘+’. The proposal does not 
answer the metaphysical challenge which is about what fact constitutes that S meant addition 
by ‘+’.15                                                         13 Fine 1999 proposes a contemporary account (but not as a solution to the sceptical doubts). 14 Kripke considers this strategy in op. cit. p. 17. 15 Op. cit. p. 39 
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 The fourth candidate fact is the fact that when S uses ‘+’ he has an irreducible 
experience, with its own special quale, known directly by introspection. Meaning addition by 
‘plus’ or ‘+’ feels one way and meaning quaddition feels another way. Introspection allows S 
to know what he felt when he used ‘+’ and that same way of knowing is not open to the 
sceptic. But how can appealing to such a quale justify S’s claim to the sceptic? After all, the 
sceptic has no way of assessing such grounds for the claim––so why should some irreducible 
experience justify S’s answer to him? 
 Kripke questions whether it is intelligible anyway that a quale helps me figuring out 
whether ‘125’ or ‘5’ is the correct answer to ‘57+68=?’.16 It remains unexplained how a finite 
singular state with a distinct quale can determine an indefinite range of ways of employing a 
word. After all, a finite singular state is supposed to be finite, because it draws its content 
from having determined only a finite number of language uses so far. It is hence completely 
unclear how such a quale can justify or constitute semantic correctness as long as grasping as 
extrapolating remains unexplained. 
 The quale proposal can be elaborated in a way that directly leads to an alternative 
candidate fact. As a fifth candidate, consider the fact that meaning addition by ‘+’ is ‘a 
primitive state, not to be assimilated to sensations or headaches or any “qualitative” states, nor 
to be assimilated to dispositions, but a state of unique kind of its own’.17 The idea, in other 
words, is that the relevant fact is not to be explained in terms, which eschew semantic or 
intentional vocabulary, but that the relevant fact is sui generis instead. According to this 
proposal, the sceptic suggests an illicit reduction of meaning-facts to something else, as that 
amounts to asking for a further fact that constitutes and justifies semantic correctness. 
 Stretching Kripke’s own reasoning a bit, the objections against this fifth candidate fact 
are straightforward: the proposal is ad hoc and mysterious. The proposal is mysterious, 
because if we assume that any mental state is finite, we have not explained how it can 
determine an indefinite number of language uses as semantically correct.18 And adding that 
such states are primitive does not explain it either. The proposal is also ad hoc, because its 
proponent apparently resorts to the ad hominem sophism that the sceptic has not understood 
what primitive states really are in the first place. 
 Many commentators have, in order to defend their anti-reductionist views, objected 
that Kripke does not sufficiently argue for the reductionism that they detect behind the 
sceptic’s doubts. While that might be right, this objection must still not be taken to license an                                                         16 Op. cit. p. 42 17 Op. cit. p. 51 18 Mental states are here said to be finite in the sense that they do not last forever. 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evasive attitude towards the central problem for anti-reductionism: how can such a sui generis 
state (which must be finite) determine an indefinite range of particular language uses? Kripke 
invites anti-reductionists to say more about how they think that this can be made to work and 
why their proposal does not fail for the same reasons as the quale-proposal. Grasping as 
extrapolating remains the central explanandum even if the anti-reductionist strategy is 
adopted. Bemoaning Kripkenstein’s alleged reductionism alone does not entail any suggestion 
on how to solve this issue. Anti-reductionists have to do better. 
 The sixth candidate fact is the fact that S grasps an objective and abstract entity––the 
sense of ‘+’––and that this determines the addition function as the referent of ‘+’. One first 
problem is, obviously, that we need an account of how any objective and abstract entity can 
be grasped by S. But even if we waive that objection for the sake of argument, we would still 
need an account of how an abstract entity, such as the sense of ‘+’, can determine an 
indefinite number of uses of ‘+’. The sense of ‘+’ must be an entity which has governed only 
a finite number of applications of ‘+’ by one individual person so far. It is completely unclear 
how simply insisting that senses are abstract entities clarifies how such entities can govern 
new applications of an expression like ‘+’ by the person. The proposal does not explain how 
grasping a finite number of correct uses of ‘+’ through grasping a sense can constitute and 
justify an indefinite number of new uses of ‘+’. Rather, the problem appears again in a context 
in which we allow senses as abstract and objective entities and nothing seems to be gained by 
this. More must be said about what senses are, how we can apprehend them and how they can 
determine an indefinite number of language uses based on a finite number of correct language 
uses. If no further explanations along these lines come forth, the suggestion must be rejected. 
 The seventh candidate fact is S’s past mental history, construed in terms of occurrent 
mental states. S’s past mental history, it is presumed, governs new cases of language use 
through occurrent mental states of some sort. Unfortunately, this is not an answer to the 
sceptical challenge, but it provides the basis for an alternative wording of the central 
explanandum. The approach considering S’s past mental history—construed in terms of 
occurrent mental states––simply proposes to reduce the finite number of semantically correct 
uses to what is contained in S’s past mental history. If the finite number of correct uses is 
available as occurrent mental states of some sort, the question how an indefinite number of 
new uses can be extrapolated from it pops up again. The proposal does hence not answer the 
sceptical challenge, but simply provides a way of framing the issue that may make it more 
acute for some readers. 
 The eighth candidate is the fact that S is disposed, when asked to compute ‘x+y’, to 
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reply with the result of adding x and y. This proposal is a reaction to the failure of the seventh 
candidate fact. If occurrent mental states cannot determine language use, one might try non-
occurrent mental states. According to this line of thought, to mean addition by ‘plus’ is to be 
disposed to add and to mean quaddition by ‘plus’ is to be disposed to compute the quaddition 
function instead. There are two problems with this. What, Kripke wonders, justifies that I 
know how I am disposed? And what does settle whether what I am disposed to say is indeed 
correct?19 Surely, no disposition can justify a speaker’s knowledge of this very same 
disposition and it is hard to see how a disposition can settle whether that which it determines 
is semantically correct. This already means failing to answer the sceptic’s doubts, because the 
sceptic wants to know why I am justified to answer ‘125’ rather than ‘5’ and he also wants an 
account of semantic correctness which settles whether what I am disposed to say is what I 
ought to say. In other words, the dispositionalist strategy has severe problems to explain the 
justificatory and the normative aspect of semantic correctness. 
 It has often been argued that these objections to the dispositionalist strategy are not 
convincing. The next section contains arguments to the contrary. It will be shown in detail 
that some of Kripke’s objections are very convincing once one perceives how the justificatory 
and the normative aspects of correct language use are connected.  
 
Dispositions 
 
The dispositional strategy is not exotic. Kripke writes that it is a response he often 
encountered in conversations about the topic.20 The strategy is based, as we have seen, on the 
claim that one might simply be disposed to mean addition by ‘+’ and one or several 
dispositions constitute what semantically correct language use is. Analogously, the intention 
to follow the rules governing addition when computing ‘57+68=?’ need not be constituted by 
an occurrent mental state, one might simply be disposed, due to training or the biological 
design of human minds or whatnot, to answer ‘125’. A simple dispositional account of 
semantic correctness for arithmetic discourses runs like this: 
First, we must state the simple dispositional analysis. It gives the criterion that will tell 
me what number theoretic function φ I mean by a binary function symbol ‘ƒ’, namely: 
The referent φ of ‘ƒ’ is that unique binary function φ such that I am disposed, if queried 
about ‘ƒ(m,n)’, where ‘m’ and ‘n’ are numerals denoting particular numbers m and n, to 
reply ‘p’, where ‘p’ is a numeral denoting φ(m,n). The criterion is meant to enable us to                                                         19 Op. cit. pp. 23‐24 20 Op. cit. p. 22 
-17- 
“read off” which function I mean by a given function symbol from my disposition. The 
case of addition and quaddition above would be special cases of such a scheme of 
definition.21 
The scheme of definition can be fleshed out through adducing explanations familiar from the 
natural sciences. This can be done by explaining my apprehension of the binary function φ 
through the function symbol ‘f’ in virtue of one or several dispositions to do so, which only 
work under specific conditions. There is a wide range of dispositions to choose from and there 
is also a wide range of conditions under which such dispositions work optimally. The more 
interesting proposals along these lines come from biological considerations, because they 
adduce a variety of circumstances in which some relevant dispositions are triggered. 
Specifying suitable circumstances may involve considering things like stimuli on nerve 
endings, electrochemical events in the brain or survival strategies of hominidae. Nevertheless, 
it remains to be shown how a dispositionalist can, even if he adduces such further 
considerations, successfully meet the requirements set by Kripkenstein’s sceptic. 
 If we go back to the paradox, we see that the dispositionalist has more work to do than 
just to point out the right disposition (i.e. the one which constitutes semantic correctness). It 
must be emphasised that the first––and most powerful––objection Kripke raises is that the 
relevant constitutive fact must also justify me in meaning addition rather than quaddition; the 
relevant constitutive fact must hence also justify that ‘125’ is the correct answer and ‘5’ is 
not. The dispositionalist has not done that and, it seems, dealing with this further issue is not a 
straightforward matter.  
 Must a disposition, one may ask, not occur in some form of behaviour or mental state 
that I am aware of when I mean this rather than that? If the answer is ‘no’, we end up with no 
way to answer the justification-question––the disposition, we must then admit, magicked 
correctness into meaning addition by ‘+’. If the answer is ‘yes’, the sceptic points out that he 
had already questioned such occurrences and that the dispositionalist is in the same dialectical 
situation as anybody else. Note that this point remains if we hold that only experts can 
successfully track dispositions through evidence––the proposal that the only plausible 
dispositions are those accounted for in our best scientific theories does not change the 
situation. The justification-question cannot be answered along these lines. 
 There are further issues connected with the justification-question. We are usually 
authoritative about what we mean and intend and so are other people about what they mean 
and intend individually. It follows that we should not question other people’s self-ascriptions                                                         21 Op. cit. p. 26 
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of meaning or intending something, unless we can provide convincing reasons, which throw 
doubt on such self-ascriptions of meaning or intending something. 
 But what does follow from this for the dispositionalist strategy? That we are justified 
in answering ‘125’ rather than ‘5’ appears to be conceptually intertwined with the sort of first-
person authority just mentioned––at least as long as semantic correctness and not arithmetical 
correctness is concerned. It is difficult to see how such intuitions can go together with a 
dispositional analysis of meaning and intention. This is so, because the same disposition 
should justify different people to answer ‘125’ and still, all of them should have a first-person 
authority when it comes to self-ascriptions of meaning and intention, but not when it comes to 
ascribing meaning and intention to other people. So, a disposition to answer ‘125’ should, on 
the one hand, determine ‘125’ as the semantically correct answer for any speaker and, on the 
other hand, the disposition should allow that self-ascriptions of meaning and intending are 
reasonable by default. How can a disposition determine language use for many speakers and 
still allow that self-ascriptions of meaning and intending are reasonable by default? Simple 
dispositionalism has no means to meet both requirements at the same time. 
 More sophisticated proponents of dispositionalism can argue that a speaker knows 
better than the sceptic what her disposition determines as semantically correct language use, 
because the default reasonableness of self-ascriptions of meaning and intending is simply 
built into the disposition. This manoeuvre ultimately amounts to invoking some sort of 
primitivism again. For what the sophisticated proposal comes down to is to say that the 
dispositions governing language use are primitive and that the sceptic can therefore not 
question them without violating them at the very same time. Such a primitivist 
dispositionalism is just as desperate as the anti-reductionism encountered in the previous 
section. But it is not necessarily as mysterious as the sui generis states of anti-reductionism, 
because the dispositionalist might be able to explain how a disposition determines an 
indefinite number of semantically correct language uses. Nevertheless, adducing primitive 
dispositions certainly is a hopeless move, because it means resorting to the ad hominem 
sophism that the sceptic has not understood in the first place what primitive dispositions (or 
primitive dispositional states) really are. 
 Kripke mentions yet another issue in connection with the justification-question which 
sheds more light on the differences between what dispositionalism offers and what is required 
to answer the sceptic.22 Assuming that I mean addition by ‘+’ and that my disposition to 
respond ‘125’ when asked to calculate ‘57+68=?’ secures that I am correct, does that not                                                         22 Op. cit. p. 24 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amount to illicitly equating correctness and performance? After all, no matter what one is 
disposed to say, it will always be possible to assess what was said as correct or as incorrect. 
Such assessments are normative and they are especially common in situations where 
somebody says something for the first time. Pronouncing ‘125’ as the result of a calculation 
one has never made before is very likely to be assessed as correct or incorrect no matter what 
dispositions made one pronounce ‘125’ and not ‘5’. Explaining correct language use means, 
first and foremost, explaining on what grounds (viz. semantic, factual or epistemological) 
such normative assessments are made and it is hard to see how invoking dispositions can fully 
handle this demand. Downplaying the import of such assessments means downplaying the 
fact that language use can be (and often is) corrected. Downplaying the importance of 
correction means downplaying the natural assumption that the entire complexity of 
semantically correct language use is at least partially acquired through interaction.  
 It is especially difficult to explain away the importance of normative assessments for 
meaningful language use if concrete examples of nonsensical language use are brought forth. 
Consider the following two utterances: 
- This vixen is not a fox.  
- He has already cut three inches off the board and it is still too short. 
One might come up with situations for which we can hold that a speaker was disposed to 
make these utterances and, after having been corrected, realises that he had made a mistake 
(or, if he meant to tell a joke, that his punchline had failed). Both utterances are always 
incorrect language uses––even though they may sometimes be funny––because both involve a 
misunderstanding of at least one word. One might not understand that vixens are female foxes 
or one might not understand that cutting off three inches means making something shorter by 
three inches. Yet, language users are not infallible and mistakes do happen. We should thus 
hold that, on a dispositionalist analysis, speakers can (in principle) be disposed to make such 
mistakes. And it is also natural to hold that it emerges later in an exchange whether making a 
particular utterance was a mistake, because assessing such utterances as correct or incorrect is 
independent of what dispositions constitute them. Nevertheless, the two examples just 
mentioned are always incorrect language uses and there are, hence, no meaningful uses for 
them––provided, of course, that merely having a comical effect does not make them 
meaningful. If this is right, then the dispositional account cannot fully explain what 
meaningful language use is, because a full explanation of meaningful language use requires 
an account of the normativity of language use. 
 A further objection to dispositionalism, one that commentators of Kripke’s discussion 
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of dispositions have often found unconvincing, is this:  
 The dispositional theory attempts to avoid the problem of the finiteness of my actual 
past performance by appealing to a disposition. But in doing so, it ignores an obvious 
fact: not only my actual performance, but also the totality of my dispositions, is finite.23 
The problem of finiteness directly emerges from the sceptical scenario. If I intend to follow a 
rule, like the one governing addition, and I come into a new situation where I have to apply 
the rule, the past performances, being finite, need not determine how to follow the rule in the 
new situation. That was our way into the sceptical paradox and the so-called problem of 
finiteness is nothing else than the problem of grasping as extrapolating again. 
 Now, appealing to dispositions is meant to solve the problem of grasping as 
extrapolating. But it is not clear how appealing to dispositions can effectively solve the 
problem. Consider, for example, adding integers with dozens of digits in your head. What 
disposition can effectively solve the problem and provide the adder with a justification? 
Kripke claims that there are many such cases; no matter how the disposition which constitutes 
meaning addition by ‘+’ is construed, we can easily come up with an addition problem that 
nobody can solve straightaway––and for those cases we do have no clue how to use ‘+’ 
correctly. If the disposition cannot be said to be infinite, i.e. to determine rule-following for 
any new case, the sceptic may simply find a new case where rule-following is indeterminate 
again. By doing this, the sceptic seems to show that appealing to dispositions does not at all 
solve the problem of grasping as extrapolating. 
 But Kripke is too quick here. A witty dispositionalist can argue that all he needs are 
dispositions which determine an indefinite number of new cases. There is no need for 
dispositions that determine an infinity of cases.24 Most dispositions in the natural world have 
circumstances under which they work optimally and circumstances under which they do not 
work at all. Salt’s disposition to dissolve in water is readily actualised in circumstances in 
which pressure or temperature are increased, but it is slowly (or not at all) actualised if it is 
too cold, because the water will have a lower capacity to dissolve salt and any dissolution 
eventually stops when water is frozen. 
 One can hold that something similar is true for the dispositions determining language 
use. These dispositions also have optimal circumstances and under those they do work well: if 
the circumstances are right, the dispositions determining semantic correctness allow one to 
use language correctly in an indefinite number of new cases. Therefore, as soon as we do 
away with the idea that dispositions have to determine an infinitude of new language uses, we                                                         
23 Op. cit. p. 26 24 This point is widely accepted; cf. Blackburn 1984, Boghossian 1989b and Haukioja 2004. 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can hold that––given the right circumstances––dispositions can determine an indefinite 
number of new language uses. And such a proposal is immune to Kripke’s worries about 
finiteness, as long as the dispositionalist does not abuse the concept of optimality by putting 
into it everything it takes to make the proposal work. All the dispositionalist has to do is to 
define the range of optimal circumstances in a way which blocks the sceptic from demanding 
that an infinitude of extrapolations be possible.25 A more elaborate dispositionalism along 
these lines will still have to deal with the justificatory question and it will have to explain how 
language use can be assessed as correct or incorrect no matter how one is disposed to use 
language. But Kripke’s worries about finiteness are surely not insurmountable for the 
determined dispositionalist. 
 It is still not clear how invoking dispositions can help explaining the epistemological 
and normative issues involved in language use, but it seems that a proper analysis of meaning 
and intention can. Quite unlike dispositions, meaning and intention are not meant to settle 
what we will do or are likely to do, but what we are supposed to do if we want to count as 
meaning or intending something at all. Meaning and intention determine what is meaningful 
or what counts as intentional––whether rule-followers and speakers actually comply with it is 
another question. On that view, dispositionalism just shifts the lights from the real constitutive 
question, namely from ‘what constitutes the meaningfulness or intentionality of doing it like 
this rather than doing it like that?’ to a completely different constitutive question, namely 
‘what determines that I will do this rather than that?’. In order to explain where the 
dispositionalist proposal goes wrong in the first place, we must pin down precisely the 
difference between dispositions on the one hand and meaning and intention on the other. 
 Let us focus on meaning. What we find now is the following idea: the way meaning 
addition by ‘+’ leads to uttering ‘125’ as an answer to ‘57+68=?’ seems to be different under 
a dispositional analysis than it is under an analysis which aims at settling meaningfulness, i.e. 
under an analysis which aims at settling what one is supposed to do in contrast to what one 
will do by virtue of some disposition. Fully understanding this point about normativity 
requires understanding why Kripke thinks that a dispositional analysis is not something 
Wittgenstein himself endorsed. It will be shown that this also requires understanding what 
exactly the normativity of language use comes down to for Kripke. 
 In Philosophische Bemerkungen Wittgenstein rejects Bertrand Russell’s views on how 
desire and its objects are related.26 The reason why Russell is deemed wrong is because he 
thinks that between a desire and its object we need something further in order to explain the                                                         25 Cf. Forbes 1983‐4 26 Wittgenstein 1984b:63 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relation. For Russell, as Wittgenstein writes, we would have a desire to eat, and an object, 
maybe a slice of bread, and something else like a feeling of satisfaction when the hunger 
ceases. That is what Wittgenstein called an external relation between thought and fact (in the 
example we have a desire to eat and a slice of bread), because the relation needs something 
external to get established (in the example we had the satisfaction that installs itself when the 
desire to eat ceases). In other words, an external relation requires a mediating link between 
such relata like thought and fact, or desire and object. An internal relation, on the other hand, 
is one, which poses only a thought and a fact and construes them as immediately related. An 
internal relation is also constitutive of its relata and there is nothing further which grounds 
them. When we wonder about how thought and fact, or desire and object are related, we 
should not assume that they are externally related. We have an adequate explanation if we 
understand the internal relation between thought and fact, or desire and object; if we expect 
some mediating link, we are searching too far and miss the essential point of the issue. 
 Now, Kripke claims that something like the distinction between ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ can still be found in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations and other writings 
which are relevant to the rule-following debate. The only difference is that, in those later 
works, Wittgenstein would have refrained from explaining internal relations in terms of how 
thought and fact are related.27 The reason why Wittgenstein must not be read as endorsing 
dispositionalism is that a disposition that constitutes meaning addition by ‘+’ would require 
an external factor (something like satisfaction in the example) in order to make somebody 
answer ‘125’ to the problem ‘57+68=?’.28 But Kripke does not introduce the lesson from 
Wittgenstein in terms of external and internal relations between meaning addition by ‘+’ and 
answering ‘125’. He phrases it in terms of “normativity” and “description” and points out the 
general philosophical importance of the distinction: 
 The moral of the present discussion of the dispositional account may be relevant to 
other areas of concern to philosophers beyond the immediate point at issue. Suppose I 
do mean addition by ‘+’. What is the relation of this supposition to the question how I 
will respond to the problem ‘68+57’? The dispositionalist gives a descriptive account of 
this relation: if ‘+’ meant addition, then I will answer ‘125’. But this is not the proper 
account of the relation, which is normative, not descriptive. The point is not that, if I 
meant addition by ‘+’, I will answer ‘125’, but that, if I intend to accord with my past 
meaning of ‘+’, I should answer ‘125’. Computational error, finiteness of my capacity, 
and other disturbing factors may lead me not to be disposed to respond as I should, but                                                         27 I shall say more about internal relations below, where I compare Kripke’s reading of Wittgenstein with the account of Baker & Hacker 1984c. 28  Kripke 1982: 25‐6, footnote 26 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if so, I have not acted in accordance with my intentions. The relation of meaning and 
intention to future action is normative, not descriptive.29 
Some commentators have completely missed the point of this passage, because they ignore 
that the distinction between the normative and the descriptive is to mirror Wittgenstein’s 
distinction between internal and external relations. It has sometimes been suggested that the 
distinction between the normative and the descriptive boils down to a distinction between 
prescriptive and constitutive rules.30 Note that the first distinction is one between relating 
meaning and intention to later action and that the second distinction is one between two kinds 
of rules. We have already talked about the distinction between internal and external relations, 
so we should see what the distinction is between prescriptive and constitutive rules.  
 Prescriptive rules evaluate some action or state as mandatory in some situation. It is 
important that the action or state can be specified independently of the rule. If the rule holds 
that one should not leave the office before one’s boss does, then not leaving the office before 
one’s boss does will count as a mandatory comportment. But what counts as a mandatory 
comportment has got no influence on what counts as leaving the office. Constitutive rules, on 
the other hand, stipulate that some thus-and-so does count as such-and-such. The rules of 
chess describing castling stipulate what moves count as castling in chess. And the rules 
specifying castling also constitute what castling is––without the rules there would be no such 
thing as castling.31 To wit, without the rules there would not only be no such thing as correct 
castling, but no such thing as castling tout court. 
 So, does the distinction between the normative and the descriptive boil down to a 
distinction between prescriptive and constitutive rules? No, Kripke does not draw a 
distinction between two kinds of rules; he distinguishes two relations between what words 
like ‘plus’ or symbols like ‘+’ mean and how they are applied. When philosophers like 
Anandi Hattiangadi argue that semantic normativity is all about prescriptive rules, they 
neglect the point that normative relations––qua internal relations––are constitutive of their 
relata; even though they correctly hold that prescriptive rules are not constitutive of what they 
govern.32 And when such philosophers go on to ask whether the term ‘correct’ in an 
expression like ‘”+” is correctly applied to addition’ is normative or merely descriptive, they 
have not understood that the relation between ‘+’ and its application is not to be mediated by                                                         29 Op. cit. 1982: 37 30 Anandi Hattiangadi 2007:57 and Glüer & Wikforss 2009 explicitly claim that the distinction between the normative and the descriptive mirrors the distinction between prescriptive and constitutive rules. They hence conflate normative relations and prescriptive rules. 31 These distinctions were taken from Glock’s 2003 and his 2009. 32 Hattiangadi’s claims are in her 2007:200‐206. 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any sort of ominous correctness-conditions if it is to be internal at all. Neither Kripkenstein 
nor Wittgenstein base their normativism on an analysis of the word ‘correct’.33 
 There is, nevertheless, an important difference between Wittgenstein’s internal and 
external relations on the one hand and how Kripke understands normativity on the other. For 
Wittgenstein, internal and external relations are categorically distinct.34 But Kripke does not 
need to argue for such a categorical distinction between normative and descriptive accounts in 
order to fend off the dispositionalist. He may simply hold that the distinction is sufficiently 
settled by saying that dispositionalism cannot explain how speakers and rule-followers are 
justified in doing what they do, but that any normative account does (at the very minimum) 
cater for this explanatory need.35 If Kripke is read this way, all issues surrounding normativity 
get absorbed in the justificatory question. Answering ‘125’ when asked to compute ‘57+68=?’ 
counts as correct and meaningful, because the answer is justifiable; answering ‘5’ in the same 
situation counts as incorrect, because the answer is not justifiable. Saying what fact 
constitutes meaningful language use will also settle what fact constitutes justifiability. 
Actually justifying ‘125’ as an answer means citing that fact. 
 If this absorption of normative issues into the justificatory question is accepted as a 
possibility, there may be no further questions concerning the status of prescriptions for 
language use and no argument for a categorical distinction between internal and external 
relations will be required. This does, however, not mean that a more substantial notion of 
normativity––one which drives a bigger wedge between the normative and the descriptive––is 
unavailable. The proposal simply has it that answering the sceptic does not require such a 
substantial notion.  
 We may still wish to hold, for reasons independent of the sceptical challenge, that 
constitutive rules settle what counts as meaningful language use and, hence, as justifiable 
language use. On such a view, normativity has got something to do with constitutive rules and 
mere descriptions do not. Constitutive rules will then be taken to indicate the sort of facts we 
may cite when attempting to reject the sceptical challenge. It is, however, not immediately 
clear how such a more sophisticated take on normativity can effectively explain grasping as 
extrapolating or how it provides a better basis for such an explanation than the simpler take on 
normativity which does not involve constitutive rules, but accounts for normativity in terms of 
justification only. 
 This ends the more detailed discussion of dispositions. The reason for zooming in on                                                         33 But some Wittgensteinians like Daniel Whiting 2007 argue for such a curious view. 34 Compare the entry on internal relations in Glock 1996. 35 This important point was first brought up by Zalabardo 1997. 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these issues was that I wanted to convey a good sense of what the dispositionalist has to 
supply and how Kripke’s views should be understood. The pivotal finding is that Kripkenstein 
can use Wittgenstein’s distinction between internal and external relations to add bite to the 
justification question posed by his sceptic. The main idea is that Kripkenstein models a 
distinction between normative and descriptive relations between words and their use on 
Wittgenstein’s distinction between internal and external relations. But Kripkenstein is only 
committed to a deflated conception of normativity which settles the justification issue––even 
though he may be entitled to a more substantial claim. For Kripkenstein, a normative relation 
between a word and its use obtains if that relation justifies a particular use of the word. It is 
licit, from that point of view, to equate the sort of normativity relevant to the question of 
semantic correctness with epistemic entitlement.36 With this aspect of the sceptical paradox 
clarified, we can move on and consider two exegetical approaches to Kripke’s book which 
have gained influence in recent years and which commit, as will be shown, several mistakes. 
My discussion of them is of course not meant to pillory the approaches, but to clarify 
Kripkenstein’s paradox. 
 
George Wilson’s Alternative Reading of the Sceptical Paradox 
 
In a series of influential articles, George Wilson has argued for dissecting the sceptical 
argument in a specific way, because this can allegedly help us to come to a more accurate 
understanding of the paradox.37 He has, based on his dissection, claimed that what he deems 
to be the standard reading is misconceived and that he has a better alternative.38 I shall only 
talk about Wilson’s reading of the paradox, not about the consequences of this reading for 
Kripke’s sceptical solution. The sceptical solution will be introduced and scrutinised 
independently in a further section below. 
 The so-called standard reading of the paradox has it that Kripkenstein’s sceptic illicitly 
demands a reduction of facts constituting semantic correctness to something that can be 
specified independently of semantic or intentional vocabulary. Answering the sceptic then 
requires showing that an anti-reductionist proposal need not be desperate or mysterious. 
Against this reading Wilson holds that it misconstrues the kind of fact the sceptic wants 
specified. The allegedly wrong view summarises the sceptical challenge as follows:  
Kripke’s Wittgenstein is deemed to start out from an assumption about the kinds of                                                         36 It will appear at the end of part B that Paul Boghossian and I both subscribe to this. 37 Cf. his 1994 and his 2006. 38 Wilson mainly refers to Wright 1984 and Boghossian 1989b. 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potentially relevant facts that exist and then to seek to “locate” among these a suitable 
subject matter for ascriptions of meaning. But, given the types of facts that the skeptic 
appears willing to countenance (e.g., ‘facts about your previous behaviour and previous 
mental history’) locating a subject matter for such statements can involve nothing less 
than some form of reduction of meaning to the already accepted factual base. This has the 
consequence that it is open to the skeptic’s opponent to reject the presupposition that a 
reduction is either possible or required. Why not say from the outset that, among the facts 
that exist for X to recall, is, e.g., the fact that X meant addition by ‘+’, and that fact is just 
what it is and not another thing.39 
The reading expressed in this paragraph does not pay sufficient heed to Kripke’s objections to 
anti-reductionist readings of the paradox. It is obviously not enough if the sceptic’s opponent 
simply rejects the presupposition that a reduction is possible or required. The sceptic’s point 
is that even if there is no reduction, grasping as extrapolating must be explained. For an anti-
reductionist, this means answering the following question: how can a sui generis fact 
determine an indefinite range of correct applications of a linguistic expression or a concept? 
Wilson is right when he objects that the standard reading downplays the problems the sceptic 
finds with any anti-reductionist strategy. He is also right in claiming that anti-reductionists are 
not prima facie in the best position to answer the sceptic, because they exploit a seeming 
weak spot of the sceptical scenario. That much is clear. But it is a completely different 
question whether Wilson’s own reading fares any better than the reading he criticises. That it 
does not will be argued here. 
 Wilson starts out by explaining in general terms what sort of account of meaningful 
language use the sceptic wants to attack.40 When a speaker applies any general term or 
predicate, so Wilson’s rendering of the sceptic’s target, such terms can be applied correctly or 
incorrectly to objects. It is assumed––somewhat in the fashion of model theoretic approaches 
to formal semantics––that facts about a relevant domain of objects determine what counts as 
semantically correct and incorrect uses of a term. What the sceptic now demands from his 
opponent is an account of how the relevant domain of objects provides a standard of 
correctness for her language use. A natural idea would be to say that the objects in the 
relevant domain have properties, which are independent of a speaker’s beliefs and language 
use. The standard of correctness, it can then be assumed, will be constituted by those 
properties. The sceptical challenge is thus understood as requiring an explanation of how 
these mind- and language-independent properties can govern a speaker’s correct application                                                         39 Wilson 1994: 250‐1 40 Op. cit. p. 238 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of a term.  
 All this suggests a specific conception of the normativity of language and that 
conception comes with a constraint on what counts as an adequate answer to the sceptic: If an 
individual speaker means something by a term, then there is a set of properties that govern the 
correct application of the term for the speaker. This is Wilson’s normativity constraint. 
 It is also important for Wilson’s picture of the sceptic’s target position that 
semantically correct language use is grounded in facts about the relevant domain of objects. It 
is the properties of the objects, which constitute what counts as correct language use. More 
specifically, a speaker’s past mental or social history, as well as his psychological powers, 
determine which properties within the domain count as constituting the standard of 
correctness relevant for the speaker. So, facts about correct language use must be grounded in 
the right way: If there is a set of properties that govern the correct application of a term for a 
speaker, then there are facts about the speaker that constitute the set of properties as the 
conditions that govern the speaker’s use of the term. This is Wilson’s grounding constraint. 
 The two constraints allow Wilson to rephrase the sceptic’s challenge from the 
defendant rule-follower’s point of view: the sceptical scenario is designed to show that the 
grounding constraint––that there are facts about the speaker that constitute the set of 
properties as the conditions that govern language use––cannot be fulfilled. Wilson holds that 
we get a basic sceptical conclusion (BSC) from this: 
(BSC)  
There are no facts about a speaker that constitute any set of properties as conditions that 
govern the speaker’s use of a term. 
The reason why we must infer from BSC that nobody can ever mean anything by a term is 
that there is nothing about any arbitrary speaker which constitutes a set of properties as the 
conditions which govern the speaker’s correct use of the term. Thus, the more radical 
sceptical conclusion (RSC) follows straightaway: 
(RSC) 
No one ever means anything by a term. 
The distinction between BSC and RSC now might serve as the basis for answering the 
sceptic. One might try to concede BSC and reject one of the two constraints in order to reject 
RSC. Now, if we reject Wilson’s normativity constraint, language use becomes arbitrary, 
because there would be no such thing as correct or incorrect language use anymore. This is 
obviously not tenable as a solution, because we sought an account of correct language use. 
What we would get then is therefore just as bad as RSC. So, the grounding constraint has to 
go instead. This amounts to conceding BSC and to retaining the normativity constraint. We 
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reject, in other words, the requirement that there are facts about any speaker which constitute 
a set of properties as a standard of correctness, i.e. as conditions governing the speaker’s use 
of a term. Whether this picture is a viable one independent of Kripkenstein’s sceptical 
challenge is not important here. The relevant question is whether Wilson’s picture contains a 
correct rendering of the sceptical challenge and whether it is, therefore, an account of 
meaning and language use which passes muster. 
 It seems hard, prima facie, to find grounds for an objection to how Wilson presents his 
more generally worded scepticism. After all, the sceptical challenge does indeed suggest that 
something is fishy about any attempted grounding of correct language use examined so far. 
But the picture changes if we ask whether the idea that properties constitute standards of 
correctness is something that Kripke would accept as being part of all targets against which 
the sceptic argues. We see this more clearly if we recall that the properties at stake are 
assumed to be independent of a speaker’s thought and talk. And if we go back to the 
candidate facts Kripke considers, we find discussions of ways of construing correct 
applications which are by no means committed to such properties. Wilson’s properties cannot, 
for example, accommodate the intuitions that behaviour alone or mental states alone might 
determine correct applications. So Wilson’s way of recasting the argument illicitly downplays 
the fact that Kripkenstein’s sceptic also targets possible accounts of language use which are 
not committed to autonomous properties constituting a standard of correctness. In other 
words, Wilson illicitly narrows down the range of positions against which the sceptic 
launches his attack. The upshot is that Wilson’s reconstruction of the sceptical challenge is 
not as radical as Kripkenstein’s original. 
 And there is more along these lines. Any conception of meaning that is based on the 
intuition that the relation between meaning addition by ‘+’ and answering ‘125’ does not need 
anything further to work does not appear questionable on Wilson’s reading. In other words, 
Wilson’s picture does not pose a challenge for anti-reductionists. The reason is that, according 
to Wilson’s reading of the sceptic’s target, the relation between meaning addition by ‘+’ and 
answering ‘125’ must always be mediated through the properties of the objects in a domain. 
So meaning-facts which are sui generis hence appear unproblematic, because they reject 
Wilson’s particular grounding constraint anyway. According to anti-reductionism, meaning-
facts take care of themselves and do not require mind- and language-independent properties 
which constitute a standard for them. But Kripkenstein’s sceptic presents us with a paradox 
which does successfully question anti-reductionist accounts of meaning and intending. 
 Consider again the conception of semantic correctness Kripkenstein started with: the 
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correct use of a word depends on there being a rule and a language user whose intention to 
follow the rule determines indefinitely many cases of semantically correct language use based 
on a finite set of examples. It is hard to see where in Wilson’s story anything similar to the 
problem of grasping as extrapolating––which is a major problem for anti-reductionism––
shows up. Reminding ourselves that Kripke’s discussion is all about this specific conception 
of correct language use, Wilson should have provided readers with an explanation of where 
Kripkenstein’s initial conception of semantic correctness comes in in his reconstruction at all.  
 As things stand now, Wilson does not discuss semantic correctness as Kripke has 
introduced it, but rather how language users can successfully track properties which provide a 
standard of correctness for them. So, by offering an alternative to the reading of the sceptical 
scenario that anti-reductionists prefer, Wilson has crippled the sceptical doubts to a degree, 
which makes it lose its teeth and actually invites anti-reductionist proposals along the lines he 
originally wanted to reject. 
 It now appears that Wilson is confused about the scope of Kripkenstein’s challenge 
and its essential elements. But can we retain some distinctions that Wilson has drawn to 
analyse the sceptical paradox into smaller chunks and, thus, enable a more detailed 
understanding of the problem it presents us with? 
 We may indeed find the distinction between BSC and RSC helpful, because it allows 
us to attempt a solution which grants BSC and rejects RSC––that is something that the 
standard reading did not allow.41 But if my assessment is correct, our reason to accept the 
distinction should be independent from Wilson’s two constraints, because they misconstrue 
the target of Kripke’s sceptic. If no such independent reason can be found, the strategy against 
the sceptic, which we may want to adopt from Wilson, cannot lead far. However, if there is 
such a reason, we might see more clearly how BSC can be conceded without committing 
ourselves to RSC. This would, I surmise, be to the advantage of every future reader of 
Kripke’s who needs a nifty and definite interpretation of the sceptical scenario. And I cannot 
imagine any serious philosopher of language who does not understand herself as belonging to 
that group of readers. But still, we must not simply help ourselves to the distinction between 
BSC and RSC. 
 
Martin Kusch’s Alternative Reading of the Sceptical Paradox 
 
Kripke, when introducing the ground rules for formulating the problem, only presupposes                                                         41 Compare Ebbs 1997 where such a strategy is explored independently of Wilson’s proposal. I cannot go into this here. 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semantic correctness to play a role for the defendant.42 The sceptic thus attacks one general 
idea and the candidate facts are adduced to demonstrate how that general idea can be 
concretised. But those concretisations, on which commentators often draw, are not to be 
projected back into the general notion of semantic correctness.  
 The correct use of words depends on there being a rule (or a meaning) and a language 
user whose intention to follow the rule (or whose grasping of the appropriate meaning) 
determines indefinitely many cases of semantically correct language use. That is the 
conception of semantic correctness at stake. The terms ‘rule’, ‘intention’ and ‘determine’ can 
be spelled out in different ways, as the 8 candidate facts show. Some of the different ways of 
spelling out those terms may be mutually exclusive––but that does not play a role. What does 
play a role is that any opponent of the sceptic and the sceptic himself are committed to what 
has been called ‘grasping as extrapolating’. Once a rule is grasped, an indefinite number of 
semantically correct language uses are determined. 
 One recent commentator who is led astray by mixing various passages from Kripke’s 
book is Martin Kusch. Instead of taking semantic correctness as it stands as the starting point 
of his interpretation, Kusch defines an alternative target of the sceptical challenge––he calls it 
‘low-brown meaning determinism’. Low-brow meaning determinism is defined as follows: 
’Person x means Y by sign ‘z’’ is true if, and only if, x has a certain mental state (MS) that 
constitutes x’s meaning Y by ‘z’.43 
Bound up with low-brow meaning determinism are commitments to three ideas which deserve 
special mention: 
- a speaker’s mental state that constitutes the meaning of an expression is an intrinsic 
state that the speaker knows immediately and certainly 
- the meaning of a declarative sentence is the proposition it expresses; the proposition has 
truth-conditions which fully characterise it, as it corresponds to an obtaining fact if it is 
true 
- the justification of meaningful language use must come from ontological 
considerations44 
There are two main problems with this interpretation of the sceptic’s target.45 First, the 
sceptical scenario need not be formulated in terms of truth––Kripke’s own formulation and 
the one given above do not involve truth. Second, the sceptic’s interlocutor is not necessarily 
committed to the idea that some mental state constitutes meaning. Evidence for this is readily                                                         42 Kripke 1982:11‐12 43 Kusch 2006:11‐12 44 Ibid. 45 There are also many small problems with this interpretation. I shall not mention them in particular, as they have parallels in Wilson’s and Hattiangadi’s misreadings. 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available. Behaviourism, a proposal Kripke mentions explicitly at several places, is not 
committed to the proposition that the intention to follow a rule involves being in a certain 
constitutive mental state; nevertheless, behaviourist ways of fleshing out semantic correctness 
are also subject to sceptical doubts. Sceptical doubts apply to behaviourist proposals, not 
because they are committed to the idea that a certain mental state constitutes meaning, but 
because they are committed to the idea that an intention or meaning determines an indefinite 
number of meaningful language uses, construed as behaviours. If the appropriate behaviours 
are not forthcoming, the relevant intention or meaning cannot be ascribed to the rule-follower 
or language user. This shows that Kusch’s reading of the scenario is too complicated and that 
he misses the general character of what is at stake as well. Instead of semantic correctness, 
Kusch suggests that the sceptical challenge is about attitudinal correctness, i.e. about how 
mental states govern language use. 
 Furthermore, it emerges as bitter irony that Kusch objects to other commentators that 
they read the sceptic’s interlocutor as being committed to interpretationalism––the idea that 
grasping a rule means interpreting a rule.46 Sure, they do claim (albeit in different terms) that 
the sceptic’s interlocutor is committed to the idea that some specific mental state constitutes 
grasping a rule. But that is something that Kusch is also committed to with his low-brow 
meaning determinism. This is, of course, a pernicious inconsistency affecting the tenability of 
Kusch’s construal of the primary target. After all, Kusch’s low-brow meaning determinism is 
a more general version of interpretationalism, because it is merely concerned with attitudinal 
correctness instead of semantic correctness tout court. 
 This ends the discussion of the sceptical paradox. We have considered how the 
sceptical conclusion is established, what possible objections to it Kripke considers, what role 
normativity and dispositions play, and how Wilson and Kusch misread Kripke’s scenario. 
With these issues settled, we can move on to discussing Kripke’s sceptical solution. 
 
1.2) The Sceptical Solution 
 
Various strategies for dealing with the sceptic have been discussed so far, but all of them fail 
and it is not clear how they can be amended without conceding anything to the sceptic. Most 
proposals either miss what the sceptical challenge is about or they move towards a sort of 
primitivism which cannot explain the central explanandum at stake in the scenario. The 
central explanandum is that we extrapolate semantically correct uses of language in an                                                         46 See Kusch 2006:201‐5/219‐28 where he attacks McDowell 1984 and Baker & Hacker 1984c. 
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indefinite number of cases, which we have not encountered previously. And if we focus on 
concepts and their applications, we perceive an analogous problem: how come that we 
extrapolate correct applications of concepts in an indefinite number of cases which we have 
not encountered previously? The explanandum has been dubbed ‘grasping as extrapolating’, 
as it questions how grasping or remembering anything finite––a concept, the meaning of a 
linguistic expression, a rule or a set of previously correct language uses, or something more 
elusive––can constitute and warrant extrapolating an indefinite number of correct actions, 
beliefs or language uses. The primitivist does not answer this question, he even rejects it, 
because he insists that we simply do extrapolate correctly. Kripkenstein’s sceptic, on the other 
hand, forces us to recognise the importance of the question and shows that answers are not 
easy to come by. 
 It has been conceded to the sceptic that grasping as extrapolating must be explained. 
Can we concede more to him? It seems so, because all the answers to the sceptic considered 
so far attempted to completely eradicate scepticism about how grasping as extrapolating is 
possible. But we might hold that it is useful to allow scepticism about grasping as 
extrapolating for some cases and that we should therefore not attempt to come up with an a 
priori argument against these sceptical doubts. After all, most rules have exceptions and we 
should sometimes want to question whether somebody really follows a rule if he or she does 
not know a relevant exception. Scepticism about grasping as extrapolating is sometimes 
demanded in everyday life. 
 As I have already mentioned above, an alternative strategy against the sceptic involves 
shifting the burden of proof onto him. We may agree that a priori arguments lead nowhere, 
but still we may invite the sceptic to show why the particular case of language use he doubts 
to be correct is actually incorrect. After all, it is natural to assume that a normal speaker is 
authoritative about what she means by the words she chooses. It is likewise natural to assume 
that peoples’ claims about which concepts they apply in their judgements are correct, unless 
something is seriously wrong with the claimant’s psychology. The sceptic has done nothing to 
show that such avowals––here construed as self-ascriptions of concept-possession, meaning, 
rule-following and intention––are incorrect; he merely held that it is conceivable that they are 
so. 
 While all of this might indeed be enough to parry sceptical doubts about the 
correctness of avowals in most circumstances, a caveat must be added. We may not content 
ourselves with simply shifting the burden of proof to the sceptic. That in itself is not helpful, 
because it does not explain grasping as extrapolating. In order to account for semantic 
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correctness, more has to be said about how extrapolations are effected. This is, with sceptical 
doubts about meaningful language use lurking in the background, not a straightforward 
matter. The only hint we have so far is the observation that the sceptic did not rule out that 
avowals are usually not incorrect. Do we have to explain grasping as extrapolating in terms of 
exclusion, i.e. by what is not incorrect? 
 In Kripke’s book we find a so-called sceptical solution to the sceptical paradox. It will 
be argued below that this solution must be understood as an attempt to give an exclusionist 
account of grasping as extrapolating. It will, however, also be argued that this exclusionist 
account fails. This then raises the question whether an alternative account of grasping as 
extrapolating is possible and that will then be affirmed. 
 
Kripkenstein meets Berkeley and Hume 
 
In order to introduce his reading of Wittgenstein’s own reaction to the sceptical paradox, 
Kripke suggests parallels with Berkeley and Hume. For the sake of brevity, I shall neglect 
considering whether Kripke’s discussion of Berkeley and Hume are exegetically adequate.  
 The Berkeleyan claim Kripke compares with his Wittgenstein’s is the denial of 
matter.47 It might seem at first as if that claim runs counter to common belief, but for 
Berkeley, Kripke argues, the affirmation that there is matter derives from ‘an erroneous 
metaphysical interpretation of common talk’. Philosophers misconstrue common language 
use, because they take it too literally and read a commitment to external matter into it. 
 According to Kripke, Wittgenstein proposes a similar reaction to the idea that we need 
a fact which constitutes and justifies meaning addition by ‘plus’. He concedes that it is natural 
to think that our ordinary concept of meaning demands such a fact, but it is nevertheless a 
philosophical misconstrual of common language use, just as in Berkeley’s case. 
Kripkenstein’s Berkeleyan proposal therefore has it that the search for a metaphysical 
foundation of semantic correctness (and other cases of correct extrapolation) is 
misconceived.48 
 This parallel between Kripkenstein and Berkeley does not help much, if it is not 
spelled out properly. Kripke decides to spell it out in terms of rules and writes that it is 
essential to our concept of a rule that we somehow construe it as containing a conditional. Let                                                         47 Kripke 1982:65‐65 and Berkeley 1999: §§29‐34. 48 McNally & McNally 2012 correctly argue that the idea that there is no fact which forces a particular use of an expression or an application of a concept onto us can be found in Wittgenstein PI §140 and RFM I:§118. 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us call this the ‘modus ponens model’ of rule following:49  
 Rule: If A+ is the case, φ.50 
 Premise: A+ is the case. 
 Conclusion: φ. 
For Kripkenstein, A+ in the premises contains a set of criteria and if (depending on how these 
criteria are related) one or several of them are fulfilled, the rule is followed. This is evident 
from how Kripke discusses criteria.51 φ can be thought of as specific actions or behaviours, 
but it can also include the formation of intentions, beliefs or other mental states. Last but not 
least, φ refers to correct language use in situations not encountered previously. So, if Joanna 
knows that polar bears are white and fluffy bears, which have black noses and sharp teeth and 
if she applies this knowledge to call any polar bear ‘polar bear’, then she can refer to polar 
bears with the name ‘polar bear’. Now, the criteria Joanna uses are (at least together) 
sufficient, but not all of them need be necessary. Nevertheless, these criteria are enough for 
her purposes. So, she follows a rule for correctly naming polar bears. 
 It is assumed that a straightforward reading of rule-following along these lines invites 
asking for a metaphysical foundation of A+. An alternative picture of rule-following, which is 
also a modus ponens model of sorts, is then proposed to undermine metaphysical musings 
along the lines Berkeley had suggested. The allegedly crucial point of the Berkeleyan 
suggestion and Kripkenstein’s reaction to the sceptic is that the conditional embedded in the 
rule is to be inverted.52 While an ordinary rule determines what counts as correct, an inverted 
rule determines what counts as incorrect. Ordinary rules employ criteria of correctness and 
inverted rules employ only defeasibility-criteria, which are criteria with which one can 
identify what counts as incorrect. So, Kripkenstein’s proposal forges together Berkeley’s 
metaphysical anti-foundationalism and some sort of exclusionist approach to correctness––i.e. 
an approach which has as a leitmotif that the sceptic cannot claim that ‘125’ is not the correct 
answer to ‘57+68=?’, because no defeasibility-criteria that can be used to identify incorrect 
language use have been met. An example should make this clearer. Ordinarily, we would 
expect a rule like 
 Ordinary Rule: An arbitrary speaker S means addition by ‘+’ if he answers ‘125’ to the 
 question ‘57+68=?’. 
Such rules are seen as open to the sceptic's attack, because they determine correctness and                                                         49 Kripke 1982:94, see also Wright 2007. 50 The rule should, for present purposes, be read as determining what counts as φ‐ing and not as prescribing anything. 51 Kripke 1982:100 52 Op. cit. p. 94 
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suggest that there is a fact of the matter––namely answering ‘125’ to the question ‘57+68=?’–
–which constitutes such a determination. Kripkenstein’s solution is centrally based on an 
inversion (i.e. a contraposition) of the rule that replaces it 
 Inverted Rule: If an arbitrary speaker S does not answer ‘125’ when asked ‘57+68=?’, 
S cannot be said to mean addition by ‘plus’. 
There is no general form of inverted rules in Kripke’s text, but letting A- stand for a set of 
defeasibility-criteria and S for an arbitrary speaker, one might stipulate 
 General Inverted Rule: If A- is the case, S cannot be said to φ. 
This proposal is a form of exclusionism, according to which language users just use the 
languages and get corrected if they do not comply with the rule. The relevant criteria in A- are 
defeasibility-criteria, which, if only one of them obtains, warrant a falsification of statements 
ascribing meaning, intention, mental states or concept-possession to people in particular 
cases.53 
 Exlusionists suggest that ordinary rules be replaced by inverted rules and that any 
verification of a claim about correct language use be replaced by the falsification of a 
corresponding claim about incorrect language use. So if, for example, S is hallucinating in the 
desert and claims that he knows that there is water in front of him, we cannot say of him that 
he correctly claims that there is water in front of him and we cannot say either that he knows 
that there is water in front of him. In such a case, S’s self-ascription of knowledge does not 
hold and we can formulate a rule, which excludes such claims as incorrect: 
 If an arbitrary speaker S is hallucinating in the desert, S cannot be said to know that 
there is water in front of him or her. 
The upshot of this exclusionist strategy is clear: language users are justified in saying what 
they say if nobody objects and that justification does not require metaphysical foundations. 
 If every member of a community is in principle allowed to falsify claims about 
language use based on such inverted rules, rule following and concept-possession in general, 
we obtain the following picture for the conditional embedded in the general inverted rule: 
 The rough conditional thus expresses a restriction on the community’s game of 
attributing to one of its members the grasping of a certain concept: if the individual in 
question no longer conforms to what the community would do in these circumstances, 
the community can no longer attribute the concept to him. Even though, when we play 
this game and attribute concepts to individuals, we depict no special ‘state’ of their                                                         53 The Indian philosophers Dignāga and Dharmakīrti have founded an influential school based on an exclusionist account of concepts which is strikingly similar to this. Issues surrounding this account are discussed in Siderits, Tillemanns & Chakrabarti 2012. The parallel with Kripkenstein’s solution has, as far as I know, not been explored yet. 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minds, we do something of importance. We take them provisionally into the 
community, as long as further deviant behavior does not exclude them. In practice, such 
deviant behavior rarely occurs.54 
One may, however, protest that this sort of exclusionism is misleading or even downright 
wrong. A possible reason for such an objection draws on Kripkenstein’s rejection of the 
candidate fact that the hypothesis that S meant addition by ‘+’ is the simplest such hypothesis. 
As we have seen, Kripke has argued that any viable notion of hypothesis is blocked by the 
sceptic and it seems to entail that we cannot simply help ourselves to falsifiable hypotheses in 
the sceptical solution: 
 The sceptic argues that there is no fact as to what I meant, whether plus or quus. Now 
 simplicity considerations can help us decide between competing hypotheses, but they 
 obviously can never tell us what the competing hypotheses are. If we do not understand 
what two hypotheses state, what does it mean to say that one is ‘more probable’ because 
it is ‘simpler’? If the two competing hypotheses are not genuine hypotheses, not 
assertions of genuine matters of fact, no ‘simplicity’ considerations will make them so.55 
There is, however, a difference between understanding a falsifiable hypothesis and 
understanding a verifiable hypothesis, because only verifiable hypotheses required ‘asserting 
genuine matters of fact’ to mean that some definite matters of fact are pointed out. Falsifiable 
hypotheses, on the other hand, assert by excluding what cannot count as such––they need not 
point out anything definite (i.e. a metaphysical basis), which can be referred to in order to 
answer the sceptical challenge. 
 Furthermore, Kripkenstein cannot rule out that hypotheses are available right from the 
beginning of his sceptic’s challenge, it is only after his sceptical doubts have warranted the 
sceptical conclusion that hypotheses may count as meaningless. The point of the solution just 
presented is, however, that self-ascriptions of meaning (qua falsifiable hypotheses) are subject 
to inverted rules, which determine incorrect language use, and for such self-ascriptions the 
sceptical conclusion does not hold.56 
 Therefore, the exclusionist strategy which plays on the idea that there are inverted 
rules, which determine what counts as incorrect language use (and thus form a basis for 
falsifying ascriptions of meaning, rule-following and concept-possession), is probably 
innocuous. It is, however, possible that introducing inverted rules is not necessary in order to 
pursue an anti-metaphysical agenda. Orthodox Wittgensteinians endorse an anti-metaphysical                                                         54 Op. cit. p. 95 55 Op. cit. p. 38 56 Crispin Wright mentions this reason why we can indeed help ourselves to a notion of hypothesis and why the sceptic cannot effectively argue against such a move on our part; see his 2001:109, footnote 6. 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agenda, but do not propose any sort of inverted rules. Instead, they argue for the more elegant 
proposition that the rules have defeasibility-criteria without committing themselves to the 
modus ponens model of rule-following.57 I shall discuss this view below in more detail. Let us 
now turn to the Humean portion of Kripkenstein’s reaction to his sceptic’s doubts. 
 Hume has in his Enquiry a chapter containing ‘sceptical doubts concerning human 
understanding’ and offers a ‘sceptical solution to these doubts’ in the chapter following it. 
Kripke distinguishes, inspired by Hume, between two kinds of solutions to sceptical 
paradoxa.58 Straight solutions give reasons to dismiss a sceptical challenge by providing 
arguments which establish the thesis the sceptic doubted. In a strict manner of speaking, 
straight solutions are the only responses, which can be said to answer sceptical doubts. On the 
other side, there are sceptical solutions. Sceptical solutions concede to the sceptic that her 
doubts are unanswerable. Note that sceptical solutions do not concede to the sceptic that 
merely some doubts are unanswerable while others are unwarranted––that sort of cherry 
picking is not allowed. But, Kripke writes, what sceptical solutions may involve is, as in the 
case of inverted rules, 
 a sceptical analysis or account of ordinary beliefs to rebut their prima facie reference to 
a metaphysical absurdity.59 
This is also how Kripke reads Hume’s basic idea. He reads Hume as holding that common 
sense provides us with ways of using language and that it also provides some basic beliefs, 
which we must take for granted. Hume is also read as rejecting that reference to something 
metaphysical is to secure this.60 
 What matters at the moment is Kripke’s construal of Hume’s treatment of causality, 
because it provides us with an analogy with which Kripkenstein’s sceptical solution can be 
understood. The crucial passage in Kripke’s text is the following one: 
Only when the particular events a and b are thought of as subsumed under two respective 
event types, A and B, which are related by a generalization that all events of type A are 
followed by events of type B, can a be said to ‘cause’ b. When the events a and b are 
considered by themselves alone, no causal notions are applicable. This Humean 
conclusion might be called: the impossibility of private causation.61 
Similarly, Kripke writes, we must not consider S in ‘An arbitrary speaker S means addition by 
‘+’ ‘ (i.e. the antecedent of the ordinary rule) in social isolation, for language users must in                                                         57 Cf. Baker & Hacker 1984c: 110ff. 58 Kripke 1982:66‐67 59 Ibid. 60 Kripke cites Hume’s 1888:124/187. This reading of Hume has been contested by Blackburn 1984:§1 and Baker & Hacker 1984c:7‐9. I shall abstain from trying to defend Kripke. 61 Kripke 1982:67 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principle remain open to other people’s criticisms.62 We, it seems, need adequate criteria in 
the antecedent (i.e. A+ in the ordinary rule) to license one or several actions or intentional 
states (i.e. φ in the ordinary rule). Now, the sceptical paradox shows us that such adequate 
criteria cannot be had for ordinary rules in accord with the modus ponens model. Ordinary 
rules are dismissed by the sceptical conclusion, but inverted rules are allegedly in order, for 
they do not require any specific fact of the matter to ground semantic correctness. 
Understanding the role of rules in semantic correctness (along the lines exemplified by the 
general inverted rule) is thought to do away with the issue. Furthermore, inverted rules make 
it possible for other members of a community to falsify claims to correct language use or to 
correct ascriptions of concept-possession. The rule-follower in question, so the proposal goes, 
must hence not be considered in social isolation if an account of what warrants his rule-
following is to be given at all. 
 According to Kripke, Wittgenstein proposes to flesh out the defeasibility-criteria for 
inverted rules through answering two questions: 
(i) Under what conditions may this form of words be appropriately asserted (or 
denied)? 
(ii) What is the purpose in our lives of our practice of asserting (or denying) the form 
of words under these conditions?63 
The specification of the set of defeasibility-criteria (i.e. A- for inverted rules) states under 
what conditions an individual’s behaviour cannot be said to be in accord with the answers to 
(i) and (ii). Individuals use language as they please, unless somebody else disputes the 
correctness of their language use based on a rule, because words have (evidently) been 
applied incorrectly or no purpose of using some words in a specific way obtains. And 
although Kripke focuses on assertion here, we can readily reformulate this for other speech 
acts. But not only other speech acts are concerned. The general point is about ascribing the 
possession of concepts and about how members of a community agree in how they do it: 
The entire “game” we have described––that the community attributes a concept to an 
individual so long as he exhibits sufficient conformity, under test circumstances, to the 
behavior of the community––would lose its points outside a community that generally 
agrees in its practices.64 
The role of the community and the importance of the sort of agreement we find in the game of 
concept-ascription become fully clear if we consider Kripkenstein’s Private Language 
Argument, which is supposed to follow from this.                                                         62 Op. cit. pp. 68‐69 and 110 63 Op. cit. p. 73 64 Op. cit. p. 96 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Kripkenstein’s Private Language Argument 
 
Recall that, in analogy with what he called ‘private causation’ when discussing Hume, Kripke 
considers a private model of language use to consist of focusing on S in ‘An arbitrary speaker 
S means addition by ‘+’ ‘ in isolation. He does not argue against the idea that physically 
isolated individuals can follow rules, he argues against the idea that an individual considered 
in isolation can be said to follow rules. An individual in isolation cannot, so the idea goes, by 
herself settle correct rule-following and because rule-following must always be correct or 
incorrect, individuals cannot be said to follow rules at all. That is, obviously, a form of 
communitarianism, where the community ultimately and exclusively determines matters of 
correctness. But it is not clear what, in detail, leads Kripkenstein to this view. The issue 
becomes even more pressing if we ask why the community, taken as a unity, is immune to 
worries appertaining to individual language users considered in isolation.65 
 The summary Kripke gives of the private language argument features 6 elements, all 
of which we have already seen in the preceding sections above.66 It is thus also a good 
summary of the sceptical paradox cum sceptical solution. 
(1) The first element of the argument is semantic correctness as defined at the beginning 
of the discussion of the sceptical paradox. It is Kripke’s default conception of 
language use, according to which the meaningful use of a word depends on there 
being a rule which determines indefinitely many cases of correct language uses. 
(2) The second element of the argument is that the sceptical paradox doubts semantic 
correctness in a way which makes the prospect of ever finding a straight solution 
look bleak. Only a sceptical solution can be had and that means reassessing our 
ordinary language use concerning (i) how we actually assert that an arbitrary 
individual is actually following a rule and (ii) how we actually use conditional 
assertions of the form ‘if an individual follows such-and-such a rule, he must do so-
and-so on a given occasion’. In other words, we ‘must look at the circumstances 
under which these assertions are introduced into discourse, and their role and utility 
in our lives’.67 
(3) If we consider individual rule-followers in isolation, we cannot fully consider (ii). It 
remains unexplained on what basis such conditionals can be justified. 
(4) The picture changes––and (i) and (ii) can be adequately reassessed––if we consider                                                         65 See Blackburn 1984 and Glock 1996 (entry on privacy) for this worry. 66 Op. cit. pp. 107‐109 67 Loc. cit. 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that individuals partake in communities. In particular, we gain an explanation of how 
justification works in the case of (ii): ‘When the community accepts a particular 
conditional (ii), it accepts its contraposed form: the failure of an individual to come 
up with the particular responses the community regards as right leads the community 
to suppose that he is not following the rule’.68 
(5) The acceptability of any individual rule-follower’s claims thus depends on whether 
any other member of the community disputes the correctness of these claims based 
on a relevant conditional. Kripke speaks of agreement if any such disputation is 
absent and emphasises that the sceptical conclusion prevents us from claiming that 
acceptability or agreement can be explained in terms of a fact that the members of 
the relevant community grasp the same concepts. 
(6) (2) and (3) show that a private model of language use or rule-following is impossible 
and (4) and (5) show that a communal model of both is possible. 
All of these 6 elements of Kripkenstein’s private language argument have been challenged 
during the last 30 years. And whereas the purposes of the presentation so far have prevented 
most critical remarks, we can now start considering objections to Kripkenstein’s solution. The 
main problem is simply that Kripkenstein has not effectively shown why we should suppose 
that a community (as a unity) is not subject to the same worries as individuals (possibly in 
isolation) are.69 If this worry cannot be answered, the Humean portion of the sceptical 
solution falls flat and the only good ideas of the solution are the metaphysical anti-
foundationalism and the idea that defeasibility-criteria play a special role, which are the two 
central ideas of the Berkeleyan portion. 
 In what follows, I shall build on a different objection. The objection is that 
Kripkenstein’s communitarianism does not provide an adequate notion of objectivity, because 
it neglects a basic observation on how the truth-predicate is used. 
 
1.3) Objectivity 
 
How the Humean Consideration Fails 
 
The idea that Kripkenstein is committed to a deflated conception of truth is uncontroversial. 
Kripke writes that Wittgenstein accepts a redundancy theory of truth and that this commits 
him to hold that ‘P’ is true if and only if P is the case.70                                                         68 Loc. cit. 69 Cf. Blackburn 1984 and Glock 1996:309‐15 70 Kripke 1982:86 
-41- 
 We have also seen that the central tenet of Kripkenstein’s Humean consideration is 
that semantic correctness is to be explained in terms of conditions under which members of a 
community are justified in asserting a claim as correct or as incorrect. It immediately follows 
from this that the Humean consideration commits Kripkenstein’s sceptical solution to 
conflating truth-conditions and assertion-conditions. That conflation is, however, a gallows 
rope for the entire proposal. 
 From ‘“P” is true if and only if P is the case’ we can easily derive a negative statement 
type which runs as follows: 
(1) ‘It is not the case that P’ is true if and only if it is not the case that ‘P’ is true 
Now, if ‘P’ is true, we are justified to say so. Otherwise, we would not get a conception of 
meaning which meets Kripke’s standards. Thus, based on Kripkenstein’s Humean 
considerations, substituting ‘is true’ for ‘is warrantedly assertible’ should yield a statement 
type which is coextensive with (1): 
(2) ‘It is not the case that P’ is warrantedly assertible if and only if it is not the case that 
‘P’ is warrantedly assertible. 
But (2) is not coextensive with (1), as it fails if read right-to-left. Consider an example to 
make this clear. When I am in a dark alley in the middle of the night and I see something 
moving in front of me, it might not be the case that ‘there is a rat’ is warrantedly assertible 
(for it may be a mouse or a cat). But this does not necessarily entail that ‘it is not the case that 
there is a rat’ be warrantedly assertible. On the other hand, ‘there is a rat’ being false does 
indeed entail that ‘it is not the case that there is a rat’ is true. Applied to this example, the 
biconditional (2) is invalid while (1) is valid. This simply means that the Humean 
consideration makes the original sceptical solution inconsistent.71 
 From this we must conclude that the extension of the truth predicate (viz. ‘is true’) can 
diverge from the extension of the warranted-assertibility predicate (viz. ‘is warrantedly 
assertible’). The possible divergence between the extensions of the two predicates does not 
only appear on the level of the individual, but also on the level of the community. So it 
emerges that the truth predicate can be used to mark semantically correct language use which 
warranted assertibility cannot capture. This means that if anything like the sceptical solution 
is to pass muster, the original Humean considerations must be superseded by an alternative 
conception of objectivity. This amounts to forfeiting Kripkenstein’s communitarianism and to 
retaining a notion of truth, which is at the same time deflationary and substantial. The notion 
is deflationary, because we still subscribe to the disquotation principle “‘P’ is true if and only                                                         71 The original argument stems from Wright 1992:ch.1, but he does not apply it to counter the Humean portion of the sceptical solution. 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if P is the case”; and the notion is substantial, because the extension of the truth predicate may 
diverge from the extension of the warranted-assertibility predicate.  
 
From Objective Judgements to Objective Claims 
 
In order to forge an alternative sceptical solution, we only have the Berkeleyan considerations 
of Kripkenstein’s proposal and the corollary that truth can diverge from warranted 
assertibility. Can a suitable conception of objectively correct language use spring from this? 
And if it can, will that conception help explaining grasping as extrapolating? 
 Recall that, according to the Berkeleyan considerations, self-ascriptions of meaning 
and intention are said to have defeasibility-criteria. These defeasibility-criteria determine the 
circumstances under which self-ascriptions of meaning and intention are incorrect. If the 
criteria are not fulfilled, a speaker’s self-ascriptions count as true––and therefore also as 
warrantedly assertible––by default.72 For such cases, the rules for language use––to which the 
defeasibility criteria belong––need not be cited by competent users of the relevant language. 
So the truth of self-ascriptions of meaning and intention does, in most cases, not require any 
further justification or buttressing to count as objectively true. But is there a way to explain 
this more precisely?73 
 A first idea that one might come up with focuses on how we extrapolate. After all, the 
sceptic got his challenge off the ground by questioning the possibility of new correct 
extrapolations from a finite set of semantically correct language uses. So, when I extrapolate a 
new application of the term ‘+’ in order to answer a new arithmetical problem like ‘57+68=?’ 
and the sceptic questions whether ‘125’ is the correct solution based on what I mean by ‘+’, 
the judgement that I mean addition by ‘+’ cannot be called into doubt by the sceptic if 
ordinary circumstances prevail. The judgement that I mean addition (and not quaddition) by 
‘+’ cannot be called into question unless some relevant defeasibility-condition has actually 
been breached. I must, in other words, not be subject to self-deception (maybe due to peer-
pressure or due to cognitive problems of a relevant sort). Note that assessments of whether I 
am deceiving myself are, to boot, positive-presumptive, i.e.  
 one is entitled to assume that a subject is not materially self-deceived, or unmotivately                                                         72 Recall the result of the previous section: warranted assertibility can be derived from truth, but truth may not always be derived from warranted assertibility. 73 This question obviously follows the spirit of Crispin Wright’s take on the issue when he asked in his 1989a:114: ‘How is it possible to be effortlessly, non‐inferentially, and generally reliably authoritative about psychological states which have no distinctive occurrent phenomenology and which have to answer, after the fashion of dispositions, to what one says and does in situations so far unconsidered?’ 
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similarly afflicted, unless one possesses determinate evidence to the contrary.74 
A first problem with this proposal is that my judgement that I mean addition by ‘+’ in new 
cases cannot constitute an extrapolation from correct uses of ‘+’, because it presupposes the 
extrapolation. We can judge that an extrapolation is correct (or not) only if there already is an 
extrapolation for which the question of correctness can arise. So the proposal requires that 
extrapolations be constituted independently of the judgement and appealing to judgements 
alone cannot settle the issue.75 
 A second problem consists in the fact that we can explain the positive-presumptive 
status of claims with which speakers self-ascribe meaning and intention in most normal cases 
and without having to adduce a specific notion of judgement. I am entitled to believe anything 
somebody tells me about what she means or intends (or about the concepts she possesses) if 
there is no determinate evidence to the contrary. This need not have anything to do with 
positive-presumptive judgements, but is simply a fact about communication. It is, on such a 
view, an a priori constraint on communication, of which self-ascriptions of meaning and 
intention are instances. (This presupposes, of course, that ascribers and avowers should have 
little use in ascriptions and avowals which are never uttered or, when tacit, never influence 
actions.)76 
 So, extrapolations are probably not entirely judgement-dependent. There are, however, 
also some pitfalls when we bring in facts about communication as an alternative. It is facile to 
think that self-ascriptions of meaning and intention are instances of the same fact about 
communication. More subtle differences between the two kinds of self-ascription can be 
perceived if we focus on the internal relations between meaning and intending on the one 
hand and what counts as doing so on the other. So, the assumption we want to test is that self-
ascriptions of intention and meaning are perfectly analogous, because the fact about 
communication determining how they are ascribed is basically the same. 
 Consider two unique twins who have been brought up together, went to the same 
schools and always spend their time together. We can assume that these twins use language in 
almost the same way, we can also assume that they understand very well what the other 
means by what she says on specific occasions when both are present. 
 Now, imagine two different situations. In the first, one twin bakes a cake for her                                                         74 Wright 1989b:137 who defends a judgement‐based proposal along the lines described here. 75 This is the standard objections to such proposals. Cf. Boghossina 1989b:§§29‐30 and Hattiangadi 2007:158‐161 76 Donald Davidson (1980) has argued that this fact is the very basis for interpreting what other people say.  
 
-44- 
mother’s birthday and takes eggs out of the fridge. The other twin enters the room and asks 
her why she is doing that. The first twin replies: ‘Because I want to bake a cake for mum’s 
birthday.’ She thus self-ascribes the intention to bake a cake for her mother’s birthday.  
 In the second situation, one twin asks for the sugar pot lying next to the flour by 
saying: ‘Pass me the pot next to the flour, please’. The other twin enters the room and asks her 
what she means. The first twin replies: ‘I need sugar and I meant the sugar pot when I asked 
you to pass me the pot next to the flour’. She thus self-ascribes meaning the sugar pot by ‘the 
pot next to the flour’. 
 The strong analogy one might be inclined to draw between intention and meaning 
breaks down if we consider whether the self-ascriptions entail something specific about what 
counts as a semantically correct extrapolation. On the one hand, carrying out a series of 
actions according to an intention can only be distributed over several individuals if that is part 
of the intention, i.e. if the intention is one to act jointly. The first twin might want to bake the 
cake herself and it may run counter to her intention that the second twin helps––on that 
reading the first twin’s intention disables the possibility that the second twin helps actualising 
the intention. On the other hand, saying something in accord with a particular meaning can 
always be distributed over several individuals––competent users of a language understand an 
expression in the same way; if this was not the case, one could hardly make sense of a shared 
understanding of language at all. So it appears that self-ascriptions of meaning do entail 
something about what counts as a semantically correct extrapolation for any competent 
speaker of the same language, whereas self-ascriptions of intention do not necessarily have 
that upshot. 
 One might object to this that it should be likely that one twin can sincerely mean 
something particular by saying ‘the pot next to the flour’ without it ever having to be 
understandable by the second twin (or anybody else). But such an objection runs counter to 
the natural contention that there must be a difference between that twin using language 
correctly and merely seeming to use language correctly, because correctness in this case is 
solely determined by what the first twin means. Such a conception of meaning––that one twin 
can sincerely mean something particular by an expression without it ever having to 
understandable by anybody else––would surely be nonsense, as it jeopardises a perfectly 
natural view of objectivity in language use. 
 Nevertheless, we must add a caveat here. The assumption that self-ascriptions can be 
understood along the lines just presented is controversial. It assumes that an intention and 
what satisfies it are internally connected, just as a meaning of a word and its use, a rule and 
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what counts as following it and concepts and what counts as possessing them. That may be 
perfectly intelligible from a Wittgensteinian point of view. But it remains to be shown that 
internal relations can be used to fully characterise semantically correct extrapolations and that 
epistemological factors––regulating correct belief-formation independently of meaning––or 
factual considerations––adducing some allegedly extra-linguistic facts––are not necessary for 
semantically correct extrapolations. This is why the status of factual and epistemological 
correctness for extrapolations in language use still remains to be clarified. 
 
2) The Rule-Following Debate 
 
The literature commenting on Kripke’s book is vast. But the reading of the sceptical paradox 
and of Kripkenstein’s solution introduced above warrants neglecting many contributions to 
the debates. I shall, in the remainder of this first part of the present thesis, address three 
further questions: 
1) To what extend is my alternative sceptical solution a Wittgensteinian proposal? 
2) How do orthodox Wittgensteinians understand the sceptical paradox and can they 
explain grasping as extrapolating? 
3) Are there responses to the sceptical challenge which explain language use (at least 
in part) through factual correctness and what are the prospects of such responses? 
Below, I shall first discuss the contributions by Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker. This 
responds to questions 1 and 2. It will emerge that, concerning question 1, my alternative take 
on a sceptical solution is a heterodox Wittgensteinian proposal. And I shall argue that, 
concerning question 2, all Wittgensteinians must yet find a way to fully explain grasping as 
extrapolating. 
 As an answer to question 3, I shall introduce the proposals by Paul Boghossian and 
Anandi Hattiangadi, who argue that correct language use can be explained in terms of truth- 
or correctness-conditions which anchor meaning in a factual basis that is (at least in principle) 
independent of human thought and talk. Such proposals are usually labelled ‘semantic 
realism’ and they are the most important and interesting alternatives  to Wittgensteinian 
approaches to language and mind. 
 At the end of part A, when the three question will have been addressed, we will have 
established the topics for the remainder of the thesis: in part B, the issues between 
Wittgensteinians and the semantic realists are to be settled; in part C, an account of linguistic 
competence is to be given which explains grasping as extrapolating. 
 
-46- 
2.1) Wittgensteinian Views 
 
Was Wittgenstein an Exclusionist? 
 
Kripkenstein’s sceptical solution is an exclusionist proposal: language users are justified in 
saying what they say if nobody objects and such justifications do not require metaphysical 
foundations. Every member of a community is in principle allowed to falsify claims about 
language use, rule following and concept-possession in general once appropriate defeasibility-
criteria are met. So, the sceptical solution employs a form of falsificationism about such 
claims. It is an interesting question whether Wittgenstein himself puts the concept of 
falsification to a similar use and contrasts it with verification just like Kripkenstein does. 
 At a first glance, there is not much in Wittgenstein which suggests that he thinks that 
(at least sometimes) falsification enjoys priority over verification. Running searches in the 
electronic edition of the Bergen Nachlass for ‘falsification’, its cognates and the German 
‘Falsifikation’ (plus cognates) yields only few results. Most of them appear in discussions 
about probability and prediction (e.g. TSS 215A:6, 215b:16, 209:132, 211:640, 211:660), 
expectations (TS 209:4, MS 108:59) or––most important for present purposes––extrapolations 
into infinity (MS 133:77-8, TSS 211:660, 211:637-8, 215a:4-5, 215b:16). It is most 
significant that Wittgenstein only distinguishes falsification from verification when he 
discusses extrapolations of some sort. In all other examples, no such distinction is made.  
 The distinction is made when it comes to extrapolations because, as Wittgenstein 
argues in these passages, it is possible to falsify statements about extrapolations into infinity 
whereas it is impossible to verify them. He mentions three examples in particular. The first is 
the statement that there is no end to the integers succeeding 1 in the series of natural numbers 
(TSS 215b:16, 211:660). The second is the statement that there is an infinitely long row of 
trees (MS 133:77-8, TSS 211:637-8, 215a:4-5) and the third (obtained from the same 
passages) is the law of inertia, which says that an object continues a movement in a straight 
line infinitely if friction and other interferences are absent. All three statements are found 
falsifiable but not verifiable. It is therefore exegetically warranted to infer that the semantic 
correctness of the extrapolations in these examples is, according to Wittgenstein, to be 
characterised in exclusionist terms. The passages do, however, not support Kripkenstein’s 
claim that all understanding must be explained in exclusionist terms. 
 This evidence for how Wittgenstein discusses extrapolations into infinity is an 
important finding, because the sceptical solution is footed on the idea that only an exclusionist 
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explanation can handle extrapolations from a set of finite examples to indefinitely many new 
cases. Wittgenstein’s point about extrapolations does not necessarily require that 
understanding be construed in terms of exclusion. But it shows that defeasibility-criteria play 
an important role for at least some extrapolations: some claims can only count as correct, if it 
cannot be shown that they are incorrect. And for those extrapolations, understanding may 
indeed be construed in terms of exclusion. No positive criteria can allow a verification of such 
claims’ correctness––there are only defeasibility-criteria which settle what counts as a 
falsification of such claims’ correctness. And Wittgenstein’s point here is that defeasibility-
criteria can indeed play a special role when it comes to extrapolations and we can easily 
extend the idea to what understanding claims about the infinite come to by holding that such 
cases are best explained in exclusionist terms. 
 So, that should suffice to support the idea that at least part of the so-called Berkeleyan 
portion of Kripkenstein’s sceptical solution is––at least with a small pinch of salt––genuinely 
Wittgensteinian. Whether the anti-metaphysical attitude of the sceptical paradox is also 
genuinely Wittgensteinian will be assessed in the next section. 
 
Baker & Hacker on Kripkenstein 
 
The most detailed discussion of Kripkestein from an orthodox Wittgensteinian point of view 
is Scepticism, Rules & Language by Gordon Baker and Peter Hacker. But it is the recent 
publication of an extensively revised edition of their Wittgenstein. Rules, Grammar and 
Necessity. Volume 2 of An Analytic Commentary on the Philosophical Investigations which 
presents a more definitive assessment of the topics surrounding Kripke’s book. Due to the 
restricted scope of the present thesis, I shall concentrate on systematic issues and consider 
exegetical ones only insofar as the systematic ones demand it. 
 Baker & Hacker’s Scepticism, Rules & Language is arguably also the first monograph 
which offers an adequate discussion of Kripke’s book. Its main purpose is to distinguish 
Kripkenstein from the historical Wittgenstein. The evidence they offer has probably 
encouraged subsequent commentators (e.g. Boghossian 1989a and Hattiangadi 2007) to 
neglect Wittgenstein’s contributions to the issue. Only recent works by Hans-Johann Glock 
and Martin Kusch have turned the tide and now provide a basis for a reassessment of what 
ideas Kripkenstein and Wittgenstein share about critical issues of contemporary systematic 
philosophy.77 Baker & Hacker’s contributions to systematic aspects of rule-following have,                                                         77 I shall say more about Glock’s views below. Kusch (2006: ch. 8) provides an extensive list of objections 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however, often been neglected in the debate. And where they have not been neglected, they 
have been misread. In what comes below, I shall focus on explaining how certain contributors 
misconstrue central aspects of Baker & Hacker’s account and it will be shown that the 
sceptical paradox can be used as an argument for a perfectly Wittgensteinian point. The only 
grave shortcoming of Baker & Hacker’s account will turn out to be that they missed the 
chance to enlist an important ally. 
 Although I shall not spend much time on Baker & Hacker’s reading of Kripkenstein’s 
sceptical solution, let me quickly point out first what is wrong with it. The problem is that 
they propose a non-factualist reading of the sceptical solution, i.e. they write that 
Kripkenstein’s sceptical solution makes no use of the concept of a fact (or of the concept of 
truth).78 This is not true, Kripkenstein does still allow deflated notions of fact and truth in his 
sceptical solution. Those notions mirror PI §136, where Wittgenstein himself writes that ‘p’ is 
true if and only if p is the case. Baker & Hacker neglect this point. This does, however, not 
bar them from a clear view on what is wrong with the communitarianism of Kripkenstein’s 
original sceptical solution: 
 It is the world that determines truth; human agreement determines meaning. A correct 
 account of rules and their relation to their extension, a proper Übersicht of 
understanding and following rules, must do justice to the fact that what we call 
‘following a rule’ presupposes a certain constancy in the results of following a rule, 
without collapsing truth into consensus, abrogating the internal relations between rules 
and their applications, or detracting from the objectivity of rule-following. This the 
community view fails to do.79 
Baker & Hacker show that Kripkenstein’s sceptical solution is both wrong and not 
Wittgenstein’s, but they do not discuss whether an alternative sceptical solution is possible. 
This is, as we shall see, because they do not emphasise enough the affinity between 
Kripkenstein and Wittgenstein when it comes to identifying appropriate targets for sceptical 
doubts. We should thus attend to their reading of the sceptical paradox. 
 When we come to the sceptical paradox, it turns out that Baker & Hacker have 
themselves been misread. Commentators argue that Baker & Hacker misinterpret the sceptical 
paradox, because they allegedly fail to see that the sceptical conclusion is both an 
epistemological and a metaphysical challenge:80 the paradox questions how we can be                                                                                                                                                                              to Baker & Hacker’s reading. But I shall not go through them for two reasons. One reason is that my reading of Kripkenstein’s position differs from Kusch’s (as I have argued above). The other reason is that I do not need it for the dialectic of the present chapter. 78 Cf. Baker & Hacker 1984c:4/37 79 Op. cit. pp. 75‐6 80 Two recent commentators who make this mistake are Kusch (2006:240) and Hattiangadi (2007:173). 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justified to mean addition by ‘+’ and it also questions whether there is anything at all that 
constitutes that ‘+’ means addition. Baker & Hacker are aware that Kripkenstein’s sceptic 
raises a constitutive challenge as well and they even stress that difference between him and 
the classical sceptic: 
 But Kripke’s sceptic, unlike the classical sceptic, saws off the branch on which he is 
sitting. For he is not claiming that certain given knowledge fails to support other 
commonly accepted cognitive claims. […] Rather he concludes with “the paradox” that 
there is no such thing as meaning, so language cannot be possible. But this is not 
scepticism at all, it is conceptual nihilism[.]81 
On pages 27 and 28 Baker & Hacker again explicitly mention the constitutive challenge. That 
should sufficiently corroborate the claim that Baker & Hacker are fully aware of the scope of 
the challenge. 
 There is, however, one misreading of Kripkenstein’s views in Baker & Hacker, which 
makes its first appearance on the same page. They write: 
 Kripke in effect shifts Wittgenstein’s problem of how, in what sense, a rule determines 
its application, to a problem of the relation between my past and present intentions, my 
 meaning addition by ‘plus’ (and not a different arithmetical operation christened 
 ‘quaddition’).82 
The reading of the sceptical scenario proposed above does not leave room for such a shift. 
Wittgenstein’s problem of how a rule determines its application finds its counterpart in 
Kripkenstein’s focus on grasping as extrapolating. Posing the problem in terms of an 
allegedly dubious relation between past and present intentions marks merely a stage in 
Kripke’s exposition of the problem––and not the problem itself.83 Furthermore, Kripke’s 
discussion of dispositionalism and sui generis states shows clearly that we do not deal with a 
problem about how past and present intentions are related, but with how an indefinite number 
of new applications of a rule can be extrapolated from a finite set of applications at hand. 
 Still, Baker & Hacker agree with Kripkenstein’s sceptic on what the target is. As we 
have argued in the section on Kripke’s discussion of dispositions, internal relations constitute 
their relata whereas external relations require a further element to mediate between the relata. 
The particular constitutiveness of an internal relation is tightly bound up with the immediacy 
of the relation, because internal relations constitute and justify correct relations at the same 
time. The constitution of anything externally related is, on the other hand, not intelligible 
without the mediating element. The target, according to Kripkenstein and Wittgenstein, is a                                                         81 Baker & Hacker 1984c:6 82 Op. cit. p. 27   83 Cf. Kripke 1982:21 
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conception of rule-following which construes the relation between the rule and its application 
as an external relation. Baker & Hacker also agree with the sceptic that assuming that the 
meaning of a word and its use are externally related––which is an entirely natural, but 
misleading, assumption––is subject to serious doubt. They write, echoing PI §201: 
 [W]e are inclined to fall back on the idea that an interpretation mediates between the 
rule and what accords with it. And the rule-sceptic correctly insists that with these 
assumptions no one’s interpretation can ward off corrosive doubt. But the sceptical 
solution does not fare any better.84 
It is partially because the communitarianism of Kripkenstein’s sceptical solution is not viable 
that Baker & Hacker emphasise the importance of understanding as internal relations the 
relations between rules and their applications on the one hand and the relations between the 
meaning of words and their uses on the other. When the sceptic asks for a fact which 
constitutes and justifies an internal relation, Baker & Hacker hold that this is not the sort of 
question one can ask about internal relations if one understands what internal relations are at 
all. This does not mean that they abandon objectivity. They hold fast, as we have seen in an 
earlier quote above, that how rules are applied and words are used exhibits a certain constancy 
and that this involves the obtaining of perfectly objective regularities. If such regularities 
would not obtain or fluctuate significantly, there would be neither rules, meaning nor 
concepts. 
 In order to bring out this point, it is instructive to discuss how the proposal has been 
misread. Anandi Hattiangadi, for one, completely misses what Baker & Hacker are after here. 
Not only does she take them to misconstrue the sceptic as a merely epistemological sceptic, 
she also misunderstands what internal relations are, because she explicitly claims that the 
sceptic questions them: 
 The sceptic can grant that the relation between the plus-rule and its extension, and the 
 relation between the quus-rule and its extension are internal. The sceptic can then ask 
what makes it true that addition is the concept I grasp, rather than quaddition.85 
For Baker & Hacker (and, arguably, for Wittgenstein) grasping a concept––which is an 
entirely epistemological achievement––is internally related to applying the concept. That I 
grasp and apply both, the rule and the concept of addition, shows itself in me identifying 
‘125’ as the correct answer. So assuming a further conceptual link between rules and 
concepts, as Hattiangadi does, is uncalled for. But, if we grant some unqualified conceptual 
link between rules and concepts to Hattiangadi, the answer to her sceptic would be that one                                                         84 Baker & Hacker 1984c:95 85 Hattiangadi 2007:172‐3 
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grasps the concept because one follows the rule and one follows the rule because one does 
what counts as following the rule. Hattiangadi’s objection has no target unless there must be a 
further fact for an internal relation to obtain. ‘Internal relation’ in her mouth stands for an 
external relation between a concept, its extension and a speaker.86 That is, obviously, a 
fundamental mistake, because, on the one hand, there is a well defined difference between 
external and internal relations and, on the other hand, external relations are the sceptic’s target 
whereas internal relations are (if properly conceived of) not. 
 Hattiangadi does point out that she merely questioned how Baker & Hacker may claim 
that to understand or grasp a rule is to know how to act in accordance with it in new cases.87 
But is the problem she wants to raise for Baker & Hacker’s account not also a problem for 
herself? At the very beginning of her book, Hattiangadi commits herself to the view that to 
understand a proposition is to know what would be the case if it were true––even if I found 
myself in a situation never encountered before.88 Ironically enough, Baker & Hacker make a 
similar point: 
 It is widely held to be a conceptual truth that to understand a proposition is to know 
what would be the case if it were true. The parallel for rules is at least as plausible, 
namely that to understand a rule is to know what would count as acting in accord with 
it. What this truism rules out as unintelligible is the supposition that a rule can be 
grasped in ignorance of how it is to be applied.89 
Baker & Hacker hence build on the very same intuitions about understanding which are also 
definitive for Hattiangadi. Without being aware of it, Hattiangadi also makes use of internal 
relations. This makes Baker & Hacker immune to her attacks, as any argument against Baker 
& Hacker’s conception of understanding will turn against her as well, but any argument for it 
may also be grist to her mill. 
 Baker & Hacker do, however, fail to make clear that the sceptical paradox can be used 
to argue for a perfectly Wittgensteinian point. The point is––given that we call the rules, 
which make up a distinct area of language use or discourse, ‘grammar’––that grammar does 
not require independent justification. Grammar merely requires that internal relations 
presuppose certain regularities and that these regularities are stable. To ask for any further 
justification for grammar means succumbing to a metaphysical picture which construes the 
relation between meaning and use as externally related through, for example, some mental 
state or some state of affairs independent of thought and talk. Baker & Hacker write about                                                         86 See Hattiangadi 2007:174 for the explicit claim. 87 Op. cit. pp. 174‐6 88 Op. cit. pp.1‐2 89 Baker & Hacker 1984c:101 
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Wittgenstein’s views on facts and truth: 
 He does not deny that what makes the proposition that p true is the fact that p. He does 
not repudiate the claim that the proposition determines in advance what will make it true 
(what fact must obtain to make it true). Rather, he rejects the metaphysical picture that 
goes with these claims. For these are grammatical statements, not metaphysical 
profundities. They concern intralinguistic articulations, not the ultimate connections 
between language and reality. It is a convention of grammar that ‘The proposition that 
p’ = ‘The proposition that the fact that p makes true’. And so too ‘The fact that p’ = 
‘The fact that makes the proposition that p true’. Like everything metaphysical the 
harmony between thought and reality is to be found in the grammar of the language.90 
This picture––the myth that grammar requires grounding in metaphysical profundities––is 
also attacked in the sceptical paradox and the sceptical solution is an attempt to overcome it 
without searching for ultimate connections between language and reality. A next question is 
how my alternative sceptical solution fares if it is compared to the orthodox Wittgensteinian 
point of view. 
 
Orthodox Wittgensteinians and the Alternative Sceptical Solution 
 
When it comes to sceptical solutions, it may go unnoticed that such solutions can also make 
use of internal relations. Some passages in Baker & Hacker’s book prove that they succumb 
to this temptation.91 But neither the original sceptical solution nor my alternative are, pace 
Baker & Hacker, committed to the view that there are external relations between meaning and 
use (or rules and their applications). 
 The Berkeleyan trick of inverted conditionals must be read as proposing that the 
conditions in the antecedent are defeasibility criteria, which falsify (if they are fulfilled) 
ascriptions of concept-possession, rule-following or meaningful language use. 
 General Inverted Rule: If A- is the case, S cannot be said to φ. 
If the defeasibility-criteria A- are not fulfilled, S can be said to φ. This way of introducing 
criteria does not specify whether we should take the relations, for which they are criteria, to 
be external or internal. Baker & Hacker are right in pointing out that if the relations are 
external, the sceptical paradox will not be overcome by the sceptical solution.92 External 
relations require some sort of grounding through a third element, which mediates between the                                                         90 Op. cit. p. 35 91 Op. cit. p. 37 92 Ibid. Note that the section on Kripke’s discussion of dispositionalism above makes it clear that Kripke himself is concerned to show that external relations cannot be defended against the sceptic. 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two relata. But it is exactly that sort of grounding which the sceptical paradox rejects as illicit 
and it would be perverse to suppose that a sceptical solution must reintroduce it.  
 Let us focus on my alternative sceptical solution. According to it, the sceptic is 
silenced only if we have an appropriate conception of internal relations. An internal relation 
obtains if it is possible for a person S to claim that he is φ-ing because he does not behave, 
speak or reason in a way that rules it out. Note that mere possibility suffices here, because 
self-ascriptions of meaning, rule-following and concept-possession have a defining status, for 
these claims are positive-presumptive: we may assume that some S is φ-ing, whenever there 
is no evidence which rules it out. This does not downplay the status of rules as Baker & 
Hacker understand it. If we understand what follows if ‘behaviour is correctly identified as 
violating a rule[, i]t confirms rather than falsifies the hypothesis that there is such-and-such a 
rule’.93 Therefore, my alternative sceptical solution is in that respect perfectly compatible with 
Baker’s & Hacker’s orthodoxy. 
 An independent point that can be brought up against the original sceptical solution is 
that it forwards a modus ponens model of rule-following. Kripke indeed thinks that it is 
essential to our concept of a rule that it contains a conditional.94 Unfortunately, our concept of 
a rule is somewhat broader than the modus ponens model suggests.  
 The modus ponens model requires that we follow rules for reasons, but Wittgenstein 
(PI §219) argues that we sometimes follow rules blindly.95 We sometimes follow rules 
without any preceding reasoning or inferring and such immediate applications of rules are still 
perfectly rational and objective. In other words, having a reason means possibly having a 
warrant and when I claim to mean addition by ‘+’, nobody may ask me for a reason to support 
the claim if normal circumstances prevail––so, there is no need for warranting such claims 
once a claim has been made and no defeasibility-criteria have been met. The idea behind blind 
rule-following is that there is a variety of claims which have this default-epistemology. We 
can only appreciate the full impact of this idea if we reconsider the following biconditional: 
‘It is not the case that P’ is true if and only if it is not the case that ‘P’ is true. 
Consider any rule which we often follow blindly and which we cite to explain, for some 
proposition P, that it is not the case that P. The law of non-contradiction ~(p&~p) is such a 
rule. The rule can be cited to explain that ‘It is not the case that this table exists and does not                                                         93 Baker & Hacker 1984c:92 94 This is also a cornerstone of Kripkenstein’s bogus private language argument, because premises 2 and 3 explicitly state that it remains unexplained on what basis such conditionals can be justified; cf. Kripke 1982:94/107‐9. 95 This point originally stems from Wright 2007, but I use it here, to support my alternative sceptical solution. 
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exist’ is true, but only based on the falsity of ‘This table exists and does not exist’––a falsity 
for which it is constitutive. The rule does not enter a classically valid reasoning or inferring to 
warrant a proposition, because it is constitutive of what would count as reasoning and 
inferring in the first place. Any inference in the classical sense presupposes that ~(p&~p) 
holds and so does, by extension, any proposition available for inferring. So there cannot be a 
classically valid inference which adduces the law of non-contradiction as an optional principle 
to warrant a proposition––even though there are many invalid propositions that are invalid 
precisely because they violate the law. In such a case ‘is true’ cannot be replaced by ‘is 
warrantedly assertible’ for there is––and need not be––any further warrant buttressing some 
claim which only instantiates the law of non-contradiction.  
 Now consider the case of a rule which we do not follow blindly and which tells us to 
hold that ‘It is not the case that P’ based on some warrant. Take the statement ‘It is not the 
case that I have enough white blood cells’. The claim requires empirical warrant and we may 
have the following rule: 
 If S has less than 5000 white blood cells per microliter, then S has not enough white 
blood cells. 
So, if I only have 2000 white blood cells per microliter, the rule tells me that I do not have 
enough. I obtain warrant for my claim by plugging the result of my white blood cell count 
into the rule. In such a case, the rule is construed as containing a conditional. And for such 
cases, the modus ponens model holds and there is always a reason or inference which 
warrants rule-following. In these cases we may replace ‘is true’ with ‘is warrantedly 
assertible’, because the extensions of the two predicates are congruent. 
 Blind rule-following is a concept which Baker & Hacker’s Wittgensteinian perspective 
also employs. And because Baker & Hacker employ it, they can make sense of my alternative 
sceptical solution, for it becomes conceivable (as the examples above show) how the 
extensions of the predicates ‘is true’ and ‘is warrantedly assertible’ diverge. They write: 
 Wittgenstein’s rhetorical remark ‘I follow the rule blindly’, quoted out of context, 
suggests that normative behaviour is irrational, or non-rational. But in context it 
signifies not the blindness of ignorance, but the blindness of certitude. I know exactly 
what to do. I do not choose, after reflection and deliberation, I just ACT––in accord 
with the rule. The rule ‘always tells us the same, and we do what it tells us’, ‘we look to 
the rule for instruction and do something, without appealing to anything else for 
guidance’, ‘it is my last court of appeal for the way I am to go’, ‘I draw its 
consequences as a matter of course’. On this confident exercise of normative skills, on 
the certain, unwavering understanding of what counts as following rules, are our 
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language-games built. One follows rules blindly, but not mindlessly.96 
In the context of Kripkenstein’s scepticism, these positive remarks require some pruning. As 
we have seen, Baker & Hacker have a tendency to illicitly underestimate Kripkenstein. Blind 
rule-following must be reserved for cases in which the blindness of certitude is licensed by 
the sheer possibility of positive-presumptive self-ascriptions of rule-following. For otherwise, 
rule-following becomes subject to Kripkenstein’s sceptical doubts. This restricted picture of 
blind rule-following is, of course, exactly what my alternative sceptical solution argues for. 
All that is needed for it to work is the insight that blind rule-following has defeasibility-
criteria and that self-ascriptions of rule-following, meaning or concept-possession are 
positive-presumptive. 
 This is of course not a harmless concession. It does amount to breaching 
Wittgensteinian orthodoxy to some extent, because Wittgenstein is, for example, usually 
thought to make the law of non-contradiction a cornerstone of any admissible practice of 
inferring.97 This piece of orthodoxy must be rejected if my alternative sceptical solution is 
adopted. When talking with a paraconsistent logician (or a radical relativist), who thinks that 
some instances of claiming that (p&~p) are true, I may not blindly infer anything I want from 
a contradiction. The reason for this is that if the paraconsistent logician claims to follow rules 
which allow him to infer some true claim of the form (p&~p) and if there is no positive 
evidence that he is subject to a cognitive or rational shortcoming––apart from a silly prejudice 
in favour of classical logic on my part––then he counts as following his paraconsistent rules 
blindly. So, what counts as reasoning and inferring in such discourses must not necessarily 
involve that we may validly infer anything from a contradiction or that the law of non-
contradiction is always true. 
 Apart from this disagreement on what counts as inferring, my reading of Kripkenstein 
also raises a substantial challenge for Wittgensteinian orthodoxy. It is hard to see how 
appealing to internal relations can explain grasping as extrapolating. After all, internal 
relations only determine which extrapolations from a finite set of previous language uses 
count as meaningful, i.e. count as semantically correct. But we should also ask how they 
determine what counts as an extrapolation at all, for which the question of semantic 
correctness (as opposed to factual, arithmetical or epistemological correctness) can be raised. 
The problem is that syntactically well-formed expressions can be correctly––in a semantic 
sense––or incorrectly used and that (syntactically correct) word-order need not be determined 
by the internal relations governing meaning. So, how are the syntactically well-formed                                                         96 Baker & Hacker 1984c:84  97 Cf. Glock 1996:49 
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expressions (strings of sounds and signs, words, phrases etc.) constituted which are available 
for use and how may they, given some internal relation, count as semantically correct or 
incorrect? 
 Orthodox Wittgensteinians can of course claim that this is not a philosophical question 
in the first place, because philosophy is primarily concerned with what is meaningful, i.e. with 
the domain where internal relations reign. For them, strings of sounds and signs are not 
relevant as long as they are not meaningful, even though they may be subject to some non-
philosophical research. That may be so, but if it is, they should nevertheless be able to say 
more about whether such non-philosophical enquiries are constrained methodologically by 
philosophy. After all, the most natural answers to the question about how expressions are 
constituted invoke dispositions and thus seem to rely on illicit external relations. Such natural 
answers entail that dispositions––and maybe also some external relations––are appropriate 
objects of non-philosophical research. 
 This issue will be fully discussed in part C, as it involves a variety of questions 
surrounding the concept of linguistic competence. But I shall nevertheless say something 
more about dispositions, abilities and normativity in the next two sections below to shed a bit 
more light on this. 
 
Abilities and Dispositions 
 
Baker & Hacker speak of blind rule-following as the confident exercise of a skill. It is surely 
useful to mention that language users exercise abilities as well, because understanding a 
language is strikingly like having an ability.98 Let us define one-way powers as those powers 
of a human being which are not subject to volition. Take one-way powers to be basic human 
proclivities. And let us define two-way powers as those powers of a human being, which are 
subject to volition. Two-way powers are therefore exercised when it is normally possible to 
choose. With these two definitions in place, we find that abilities are two-way powers, 
because they are subject to human volition.99 Dispositions, by contrast, are one-way powers. 
They determine what a subject can do or conceive of, but they are not subject to volition. So, 
the exercise of my ability to juggle is obviously subject to whether I want to. The 
actualisation of my disposition to sweat when I am too hot is not. But what exactly is the 
difference between an ability and a disposition? More specifically, can abilities provide the                                                         98 Baker & Hacker 1984c:17‐8 99 This take on powers is drawn from Hacker 2007, who adopts it from Kenny 1976. 
 
-57- 
sort of justification for correct extrapolations that, according to Kripke, dispositions cannot? If 
blind rule-following is an exercise of abilities, abilities must not be subject to Kripke’s 
objections to dispositions. Otherwise, the prospects of a Wittgensteinian take on language 
use––be it orthodox or along the lines of my alternative sceptical solution––are also bleak. 
 It is crucial to recall that Kripke, as was argued above, understands dispositions to be 
the mediating elements of external relations. A flat-footed dispositional account of why one 
replies with the result of adding x and y when asked to compute ‘x+y’ has three elements: A 
disposition to compute problems of the form ‘x+y’, the problem itself and the result. There is, 
however, a more sophisticated way of construing the notion of a disposition. 
 Consider again salt’s disposition to dissolve under some circumstances and not to 
dissolve under other circumstances. Salt’s disposition to dissolve in water, for example, is 
readily actualised when temperature is increased, but it is not actualised if it is too cold, 
because the water will have a lower capacity to dissolve salt. And if we put the salt into 
benzene, it will never dissolve. Now, there are two ways of construing salt’s solubility. First, 
there is salt, its solubility and the actualisation of the disposition under some circumstances; 
this is an external relation. Second, there is salt’s disposition to dissolve under some 
circumstances––its solubility––and what counts as an actualisation of it; this is an internal 
relation. In the second case––where we only have salt’s solubility and what counts as salt 
dissolving in a suitable agent––, both relata are constituted by their relation. Furthermore, 
either relatum can be explained most naturally in terms of the other. 
 There is an analogous conception of the dispositions of people. Consider a person’s 
disposition to get angry when the train is too crowded or when dogs foul his garden. We may 
conceive of his anger as being internally related to what counts as manifestations of it: heavy 
breathing, a flush or the clenching of his teeth and fists whenever he is in a crowded train or 
whenever his neighbours’ best friends foul his garden. The signs may be highly diverse, but it 
is nevertheless easy to see that his disposition to get angry and getting angry are internally 
related. There are also other character traits which we may call dispositions and which are 
also internally related to what counts as manifestations of them. But are there also linguistic 
dispositions along these lines? 
 There are certainly numerous borderline cases. A person’s disposition to say ‘ouch!’ 
when stung by an insect, or when hurt in another way, belongs here. There is, one might want 
to claim, an internal relation between the disposition to say ‘outch!’ on the one hand and what 
counts as a person being moderately hurt, possibly in a (for her) surprising way. This is, 
however, not really a linguistic disposition in the sense required here. The disposition to say 
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‘ouch!’ under some circumstances does neither constitute an extrapolation from a finite set of 
saying ‘outch!’ nor does it justify an utterance of ‘ouch!’ as semantically correct. The 
disposition can be cited, of course, to excuse somebody who has said ‘outch!’ in inappropriate 
circumstances. Somebody stung by a been in the cinema may cry out ‘outch!’ and disturb 
everybody else at the film. She may then, if it does not take too much time, refer to the fact 
that she had been stung by a bee in order to excuse herself. But an excuse is not a 
justification. 
 A more interesting case, one dear to Wittgenstein, is the case of reading. It seems that 
the capacity to read is more like a disposition than like an ability. It is almost impossible to 
look at something written in a familiar language without reading it: if the eye movements 
correspond to the sort of movements required for reading, one reads nolens volens. 
Wittgenstein discusses these ideas in PI §§143-184. He holds that there are many different 
things that we call ‘reading’ (§§164 and 165) and that there was no feeling, remembering or 
consciousness that is the defining mark of reading. Wittgenstein also argues against the idea 
that reading is a mechanical process, for he thought it an illusion that we feel forced to latch a 
particular string of signs onto a particular sequence of sounds (§170). 
The concept of reading is of course internally related to what counts as producing 
speech from text or symbols. Wittgenstein does, at least as far as I can see, not say anything 
that allows us to determine whether he took the capacity to read as a one-way or as a two-way 
power. But consider that it is almost impossible to look at familiar letters in a familiar 
sequence without actually reading them. This suggests that the capacity to read is more like a 
disposition than like an ability after all. 
 That the capacity to read is more like a disposition than like an ability is also brought 
out nicely by garden path sentences: 
 The old man the boat 
 The author wrote the novel was likely to be a bestseller. 
 We painted the wall with cracks. 
 The man pushed through the door fell. 
In each of these examples, we are disposed to read at least one word as having a syntactical 
function which it has not: we read ‘man’ as a noun and not as a verb; we read ‘the novel’ as 
an accusative object and not as the subject of a declarative content clause; we read ‘with 
cracks’ not as an attribute modifying ‘the wall,’ but as an indirect object; we read ‘pushed’ as 
a preterite and not as a past participle. 
 Garden path sentences suggest that there are linguistic dispositions governing word 
order. The dispositions can only be overwritten if we find that they lead us to nonsensical 
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sentences, i.e. when they lead us down the garden path. So it appears that we are disposed to 
expect certain word orders when we read new sentences, but that we may also acquire the 
ability to correct our expectations when a first reading has no meaning. It is therefore 
perfectly natural to speak of dispositions determining extrapolations in these cases, the 
semantic correctness of which is determined in a second step and only if the reader has the 
appropriate abilities to do so. 
 I do not want to spell out here what sort of linguistic dispositions there are and how 
exactly they are related to linguistic abilities. All I want to draw attention to is the natural 
assumption that human linguistic powers are divided into two categories. The first category 
contains two-way powers subject to volition: abilities constituting understanding. The second 
category contains one-way powers not subject to volition, but internal relations nevertheless: 
here we have dispositions which possibly enable some extrapolations for which our abilities 
will sort out whether they are semantically correct in a second step. 
 One might worry that this approach to linguistic dispositions is also subject to 
Kripke’s worries. After all, even if those alternatively construed linguistic dispositions 
constitute some aspects of language use, they can still not justify it. This is true, but not a 
problem. Consider self-ascriptions of character traits. When I claim that I get angry whenever 
my neighbour’s dogs foul my garden, the correctness of that claim is positive-presumptive. 
Unless there is evidence that I do not get angry when my neighbour’s dogs foul my garden, I 
must henceforth be regarded as having the emotional disposition of getting angry in these 
circumstances. No further justification is need in such cases. But it is not the disposition itself 
which provides justification, it is the positive-presumptive status of the self-ascription of the 
disposition that secures the grounds. 
 Something similar seems, at least prima facie, conceivable for the case of linguistic 
dispositions. Consider a native speaker of German who learns English. Due to his linguistic 
dispositions, he might be inclined to incorrectly say ‘The police is coming’, because ‘die 
Polizei’ is singular in German. Now, self-ascribing such a linguistic disposition makes perfect 
sense and such self-ascriptions are certainly positive-presumptive. And it is obviously not the 
case that such dispositions do justify semantically correct language use––they may excuse 
some cases of incorrect use at best. All of this amounts to conceding that, while dispositions 
might determine what counts as linguistic extrapolations, appropriate abilities are required for 
settling issues of semantic correctness. 
 So, I have argued here that it is indeed useful to distinguish between linguistic abilities 
and linguistic dispositions. But whereas orthodox Wittgensteinians do not consider the 
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possibility that linguistic dispositions may explain important aspects of language use, I have 
suggested that they might determine what counts as an extrapolation at all. I shall discuss this 
issue between orthodox Wittgensteinians and my alternative sceptical solution in part C of the 
present thesis. I have only inserted it here to make clearer in what respect my proposal is 
heterodox. The next section will provide a quick overview of three different conceptions of 
normativity. It will serve as a basis for discussing anti-normativist proposals which appear 
later on. 
 
Varieties of Normativism: A Quick Survey 
 
Let me recapitulate some ideas from Kripke’s take on normativity. Recall that Kripke himself 
suggests that once what one should say or do is accounted for in terms of epistemic 
entitlement, the relevant aspects of his normativity claim are captured. This must, as had been 
argued, not be taken to imply an unbridgeable difference between normative and descriptive 
accounts of something. All that Kripke is after is that semantically correct language use 
requires justification in a way that purely descriptive accounts cannot supply.100 
 My alternative sceptical solution has brought in a new take on justification. It has been 
argued that the only sort of justification that passes muster in the context of Kripkenstein’s 
sceptic is the sort of default justification bound up with self-ascriptions of meaning, intention, 
rule-following or concept-possession when there is no evidence that actually topples the self-
ascription. Self-ascriptions in circumstances where defeasibility-criteria have not been 
fulfilled are positive-presumptive claims: no further warrant is required for them. 
 Wittgensteinian orthodoxy distinguishes two conceptions of semantic normativity 
which are meant to account not only for justification, but also for meaning. Both conceptions 
are meant to fully explain what one ought to count as a semantically correct extrapolation. I 
shall now introduce the two conceptions and assess them from my heterodox point of view 
developed so far. This will then complete my survey of Wittgensteinian views. 
 Hans-Johann Glock has distinguished three dimensions of normativity: the first is bare 
normativity, the second is rule-based normativity and the third is prescriptive normativity.101 
According to Wittgensteinian orthodoxy, only bare normativity and rule-based normativity 
                                                        100 I suspect that this is also motivated by his well‐known worries about descriptions. I can, however, not explore this idea here. 101 The list is from Glock 2009:162‐3, there are also two conceptions of content‐normativity. Issues surrounding content normativity will not concern us until the chapter on the varieties of realism (2.2). 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can possibly account for meaning and semantic correctness.102 Prescriptive normativity is 
thrown into the mix here in order to explain what Wittgensteinians do not regard as a good 
conception of semantic normativity. Let me start with bare normativity of meaning: 
 Bare normativity of meaning 
 (BNM)  p is meaningful → there are conditions for the correct use of p. 
Any proposal committed to some sort of semantic normativity is automatically committed to 
bare normativity of meaning. Even if one holds that normativity is basically about 
justification and that there is no such thing as meaning without justification, one still connects 
meaningfulness with conditions under which expressions are used. So, Kripkenstein’s 
sceptical solution, my alternative and the orthodox position endorsed by Baker & Hacker 
subscribe to some version of this. There are, however, two potential pitfalls here. First, the 
conditions mentioned in the definition must be construed broadly enough to allow for 
conditions under which an utterance counts as incorrectly used, because some defeasibility-
criteria have been fulfilled. Often enough, correctness-conditions are supposed to sum up and 
constitute an account of the conditions under which language use can be regarded as grounded 
in extra-linguistic reality. This is obviously not a view that a sceptical solution can subscribe 
to and it is also something orthodox Wittgensteinians abhor. It therefore appears that the 
sceptical paradox restricts how bare normativity may be understood by restricting the sense in 
which the term ‘condition’ is applicable. 
 The second potential pitfall is a bit more substantial. Apart from the worries about 
correctness-conditions which I have just mentioned, it may be asked what explanatory work 
the term ‘correct’ does in the definition anyway. After all, the only circumstances in which we 
normally call a particular language use correct is when we want to explicitly counter (or pre-
empt) a claim to the contrary. In ordinary circumstances, it is much more natural to hold that 
an utterance is meaningful if conditions for its use have been fulfilled. This is especially true 
for proposals which explain meaningful language use in terms of internal relations. Internal 
relations are thought to hold between what a linguistic expression means and what counts as 
using it. If we take them to hold between meaning and correct use instead, we leave 
unexplained what the relation between meaning and use is in the first place. And that is 
something no viable account of meaning can afford to leave unexplained. Even worse is the 
idea that correctness-conditions mediate between what an expression means and how it is 
used. On that construal, appealing to correctness-conditions leads directly into the sceptic’s 
fangs, as it bring in pernicious external relations through the backdoor. It therefore appears                                                         102 Cf. Baker & Hacker 2005:140 
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that appealing to correctness is redundant––and potentially pernicious. This does, however, 
not lessen the importance of bare normativity––Kripke’s discussion of normativity and 
dispositions has conclusively shown that it is a pivotal concept. 
 Bare normativity is, however, not the only proposal on the market. Especially 
orthodox Wittgensteinians are fond of explaining semantic normativity in terms of rules. So, 
let us turn now to rule-based normativity, which is quite controversial: 
 Rule-based normativity of meaning 
 (RNM)  p is meaningful → there are rules for the use of p. 
Note that the definition of rule-based normativity does neither appeal to conditions of use nor 
to correctness. It therefore has two important advantages over bare normativity. We have seen 
that rules must not necessarily be construed as containing a conditional. Orthodox 
Wittgensteinians can allow blind rule-following which do not require appealing to explicit 
rules. It may well be that two users of the same language use an expression in exactly the 
same way, but still disagree on how the rule for the expression’s use is to be spelled out in 
detail. This is admissible if the disagreement is about which expression of the rule provides a 
better explanation of their practice. If their disagreement is about which expression of the rule 
explains their practice at all, then there is a confusion about what the practice is and not only 
about how the salient rules are to be put into words. 
 It is, nevertheless, important to observe that the concept of a rule of language use (qua 
determining meaning) is tightly connected with the concept of an ability. Rule-following is 
volitional and, therefore, requires the ability to follow the rule. Blind rule-following is 
volitional in the sense that we may decide to breach the rule. I may, for example, voluntarily 
breach the rule ‘a coloured patch is not red and green at the same time’, even though I and 
others normally follow this rule blindly. But if I breach the rule, what I say will of course not 
make sense anymore. 
 It is important to distinguish between voluntarily breaching a rule and overcoming a 
disposition. If I voluntarily breach a rule, I refuse to partake in a practice. If I overcome the 
disposition to read ‘men’ in ‘the old man the boat’ as a noun, I voluntarily invoke rules 
determining meaningful language use in order to correct the distorting effect of my 
disposition. Breaching rules, therefore, amounts to not making sense and overcoming 
dispositions is driven by a decision to make sense. This should make clear that my alternative 
sceptical solution subscribes to rule-based normativity just as much as orthodox 
Wittgensteinians do––albeit for different reasons. 
 As far as my alternative sceptical solution and the orthodox Wittgensteinians are 
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concerned, the explanatory role of the concept of a rule should be clear by now. We will see 
below what non-Wittgensteinians object to rule-based normativity.103 In order to prepare the 
grounds for this, I shall rehearse a point about prescriptive rules which I have already 
mentioned in the section on Kripke’s take on dispositions and normativity, but which cannot 
be emphasised enough. The most straightforward definition of prescriptive normativity runs 
as follows: 
 Prescriptive normativity of meaning 
 (PNM)  p is meaningful → there are prescriptions for the use of p. 
Prescriptive normativity must be distinguished from rule-based normativity, because not all 
rules are prescriptions. Prescriptions ‘advise one on how to pursue in an optimal fashion an 
activity that can be specified independently of the rule’.104 The crux is that this entails that 
every prescription can be paraphrased in accord with the modus ponens model of rule-
following. Recall that the modus ponens model has it that any admissible rule contains criteria 
(or defeasibility-criteria), fulfilment of which governs language use or action. So, a 
prescriptive rule setting down the criteria for the usage of the word ‘thirsty’ is admissible if it 
can be brought into a conditional form like this: 
 The word ‘thirsty’ is used meaningfully if one ought to apply it to persons and animals 
with low body fluid levels and a desire to drink potable fluids. 
The conditional expressed by such a paraphrase always specifies how one ought to use 
language if one wants to use it meaningfully. If no paraphrase along these lines can be given, 
the requirement that the optimal fashion of pursuing an activity can be specified 
independently of the rule will not have been met.  
 It is important to distinguish prescriptive rules from constitutive rules. Constitutive 
rules define (at least in part) an activity (like castling in chess) or a thing (as the EU norms 
settling what counts as chocolate do). One rule of that sort is the law of non-contradiction 
~(p&~p). It does not prescribe that one should not violate it when dealing with classical logic. 
Rather, whenever one violates it one cannot be said to infer according to classical logic, for 
the law of non-contradiction partly defines classical logic. Furthermore, it is also important to 
bear in mind that constitutive rules are often followed blindly if one engages in the activity 
they (partly) define, as they do usually not fit into Kripke’s modus ponens model of rule-
following. 
 For Wittgenstein himself (cf. PG pp. 184-5 and PI §496), grammatical rules (those                                                         103 Boghossian 1989b/2003a/2005, Hattiangadi 2007, Glüer & Wikforss 2009 and Glock 2003/2009 have extensively discussed rule‐based normativity and these discussions merit their own section below. 104 Cf. Glock 2009:171 
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which determine language use and concept possession) are constitutive rules and not 
prescriptive ones.105 And because internal relations are constitutive of their relata and 
because, as we have seen, grammar does not require extra-linguistic justification, constitutive 
rules can be employed to describe or express internal relations. The law of non-contradiction 
thus partly determines, being a constitutive rule, what counts as inferring in accord with 
classical logic and, hence, understanding classical logic. 
 It therefore appears that prescriptive rules do not play an important role here. It is not a 
concept with which Wittgensteinians account for language use. Furthermore, Kripke’s 
commitment to the modus ponens model does not necessarily entail that he is committed to 
prescriptive rules as well. After all, the inverted rules of Kripkenstein’s original sceptical 
solution do not contain prescriptions, even though they still justify in accord with the modus 
ponens model. By abandoning Kripkenstein’s sceptical solution, however, we have also come 
to abandon the modus ponens model in order to introduce the concept of blind rule-following. 
So, we are left with rule-based normativity of meaning, which my alternative sceptical 
solution employs just as much as more orthodox Wittgensteinians.  
 
2.2) Varieties of Realism 
 
Kripkenstein’s paradox introduces the following problem: how is it possible and justifiable to 
extrapolate an indefinite number of new correct language uses from a definite number of 
language uses which already count as correct? Kripke himself understands ‘correct’ here as 
referring to semantic correctness: an extrapolation is semantically correct if its correctness 
only depends on what the words involved mean. Semantic correctness may be contrasted with 
factual and epistemological correctness. An extrapolation is factually correct if its correctness 
depends on what facts obtain and an extrapolation is epistemologically correct if it is suitably 
warranted. 
 Wittgensteinians separate semantic correctness from factual and epistemological 
matters, because they regard semantic issues as conceptually prior to factual and 
epistemological issues. They argue for this view by insisting that rules of language, which 
determine meaning, need no justification independent of linguistic practices––for them, 
correct extrapolations of new language uses are an entirely intralinguistic affair. 
 An interesting alternative is based on the intuition that semantically correct 
extrapolating always already involves getting the facts right: applying the predicate ‘is green’                                                         105 Cf. Glock 2009:172 
-65- 
in accord with what it means always involves saying something true and understanding ‘is 
green’ involves knowing whether the expression applies to a given object. Whereas 
Wittgensteinians hold that questions about whether the application of a predicate to things 
accords with the facts always presuppose that semantic questions have already been solved, 
the alternative view rejects this and claims that factual matters are possibly independent of 
human thought and talk. Proponents of this alternative view usually go on to claim that we 
must explain how language latches onto reality, precisely because factual matters are possibly 
independent of thought and talk. The view is commonly called ‘semantic realism’. 
 In what comes below, I want to distinguish two varieties of semantic realism. First, 
there is what Boghossian calls ‘robust realism’. According to this view, we must explain how 
language latches onto reality by invoking epistemic rules. So, a correct extrapolation of new 
language uses involves getting the facts right as far as epistemic rules require me to and it also 
involves expressing these facts. Boghossian’s proposal is a moderate version of semantic 
realism: his epistemic rules may allow me to count some extrapolations as correct even 
though they are not factually correct. A good example for this is the weather forecast. When I 
forecast the weather, I extrapolate what is going to happen according to the specific principles 
governing state-of-the-art weather forecasts. And even if the weather turns out to differ from 
what had been forecasted, the forecast itself counts as correct, because it was made in full 
accord with the relevant epistemic rules. 
 A more austere version of semantic realism informs Anandi Hattiangadi’s 
contributions to the debate. She argues that we must explain how language latches onto reality 
through truth-conditions for sentences and through correctness-conditions for particular 
words. There are, for her, no epistemic rules which are required to explain the word-world 
interface. ‘Bob has a green shirt’ is true if and only if Bob has a green shirt, no matter whether 
the correct use of this sentence in a new situation has been extrapolated from what it meant in 
other situations or from what some epistemic rule entitles me to extrapolate. This is also why 
she argues that no sort of normativity plays a role in a good answer to Kripkenstein’s sceptic. 
 The remaining sections of the present part of the thesis introduce the views of 
Boghossian and Hattiangadi in a more detailed fashion. I shall abstain, at least for the 
moment, from trying to decide between their views and the opposing views pertaining in the 
Wittgensteinian camp. The sections below merely set the stage for an extended confrontation 
between the two camps, which is the topic of the next part of the thesis, part B. 
 
Paul Boghossian’s Contributions to the Rule-Following Debate 
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Paul Boghossian’s paper ‘The Rule-Following Considerations’ can be regarded as one of the 
most important contributions to the rule-following debate as initiated by Saul Kripke. It is 
very useful for finding one’s way into the debate, as the paper provides an overview of the 
important issues addressed up until 1989––many of which still are discussed today. As such, 
it is also an essential reading for anybody who is interested in the nature of meaning, 
especially those aspects of it, which have to do with its reality, reducibility and privacy. It is 
important to note, however, what the paper is not meant to deliver. It is not a paper about 
exegetical matters, but it is a purely ‘philosophical assessment’.106 Boghossian adds (in a 
footnote) a reason for separating Kripke’s take on rule-following from Wittgenstein’s and not 
to count the latter’s views as forming part of the relevant philosophical contributions: ‘I have 
actually come to despair of a satisfactory interpretation of Wittgenstein’s views.’107 And 
because the philosophical assessment he proposes does not start with a consideration of 
Wittgenstein’s contributions, the assessment does not introduce one in the end either: 
The moral will not be recognizably Wittgensteinian: I shall argue that, pace Kripke’s 
intent, the conception of meaning that emerges is a realist, non-reductionist, and 
judgement-independent conception, one which, moreover, sustains no obvious animus 
against private language.108 
One may question whether it is wise to shove Wittgenstein under the carpet like that and to 
ignore the bump it leaves. It is, however, interesting for the present dialectical situation, as the 
only viable conception of semantically correct language use available so far is 
Wittgensteinian and it will prove instructive to subject it to the issues Boghossian raises.  
 Boghossian’s views on Kripke’s sceptical solution, his defence of Kripke’s arguments 
against dispositionalism and his assessment of other non-reductionist proposals will not, 
despite their influence, play a role here. What will play a role is his understanding of how 
rule-following relates to meaning and intention, how this gives rise to questions of 
semantically correct language use, what normativity is meant to be and what perspective on 
meaning this leaves us with. Boghossian himself first discusses the concept of correctness, 
goes on to normativity and then turns to how meaning, content and rule-following are related. 
For present purposes a reversed order of these issues seems more suitable. 
 
Boghossian on Rule-Following and Meaning                                                         106 Boghossian 1989b: 142 107 In Boghossian 2008: 9 he adds that this reason is developed in his unpublished manuscript 1988. 108 Boghossian 1989b: 142 
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So, how do meaning and content on the one hand and rule-following on the other hang 
together? For Boghossian, the right answer is that they do, strictly speaking, not hang together 
at all and the problem we are talking about is in an important respect not a problem about 
rule-following, but rather one about the constitution and the epistemology of meaning and, 
hence, a problem about meaningful contents as manifest in thought and talk.109 The reason 
why many writers wrongly assume that there is a deep connection between rule-following and 
meaning (plus meaningful contents) is that they think that people first follow rules and that, as 
a result of this antecedent rule-following, meaningful contents somehow ensue. An antecedent 
rule-following will then also determine what is to count as semantically correct language use 
or as an epistemically correct belief, because the contents of thought and talk acquire their 
meaning, and hence their applicability, from it. 
 If we start a discussion on how rules and meaning are related like this, we find 
ourselves compelled to decide on which has priority over the other. Boghossian obviously did 
see an issue of priority here and decided that meaningful contents enjoy priority over rules, 
because construing rules––which themselves have a meaningful content after all––as 
conceptually prior to meaningful contents seemed paradoxical to him. What is downplayed by 
this perspective is that linguistic rules and language use are on a par, because one can usually 
be explained in terms of the other. I can cite the rule ‘English verbs requires the suffix –s in 
the first person singular’ to explain why speakers of English add the suffix –s to verbs in the 
first person singular. Similarly, that there is a rule––and that we usually regard the casual 
omission of the suffix as an exception to a general rule––can be explained by saying that this 
is how people use language.  
 Furthermore, we can hold that rules and meaning are on a par, because I can cite the 
rule ‘vixens are female foxes’ in order to explain what somebody means by the word ‘vixen’. 
I can, conversely, also explain the rule by pointing out that speakers of English apply the 
word ‘vixen’ to female foxes. I take this to be the standard Wittgensteinian way of construing 
the relation between rules and meaning. But in order to see what Boghossian is after, we have 
to suppress this possibility for a moment. 
 So, we assume that rules and meaning are independent enough to make sense of 
questions of priority between them. In recent years, it has become fashionable to discuss two 
bizarre positions about normativity which can be derived from this view. The first position is 
committed to the idea that both linguistic and mental content have conceptual primacy and                                                         109 Boghossian  1989b: §8 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that oughts depend on it. This approach is sometimes called ‘CE normativism’, because 
normativity according to it is assumed to be content-engendered.110 The second position 
construes content as being determined by preceding rules or norms and is called ‘CD 
normativism’, as it takes normativity to be content-determining. What is important here is 
that, for both position, rules are taken to be prescriptive. Rules are meant to provide a 
standard for how language ought to be used.111   
 In connection with the rule-following debate, CD normativism does not arouse great 
sympathies. The reason is that it requires, on the one hand, that whatever determines content 
must be independent of it and still license a derivation of an ascription of obligations from an 
ascription of meaning or belief. Based on their reading of Wittgenstein, several authors have 
rejected that sort of approach.112 One may, for example, motivate the rejection of CD 
normativism with the worry that we have an epistemological problem if we attempt to explain 
how autonomous norms and rules are internalised in training so as to guide successful 
partaking in practices of various kinds. 113  The worry is that it is hard to see how something 
independent of meaningful content can determine such a content. One might now try to argue 
for the autonomy of the norms and rules in question while rejecting the need for their 
internalisation in training. 
 The classical Platonist way of doing this is to adopt a nativism about the norms and 
rules in question. According to such a proposal, the norms and rules need not be available to 
the average conscious thinker and speaker while they guide her; and because those norms and 
rules are innate, we tend to find their manifestations in regularities of how thinkers do think 
and speakers do speak. Internalisation, on such a view, is not necessary; rather, the innate 
potential to develop linguistic abilities and other powers is actualised in a natural way: innate 
powers develop much like other biological features of humans (viz. the spine, the brain, the 
skin, the immune system). The problem in the present context is obvious: average thinkers 
and speakers usually do know what they believe and mean and they can also explain it––                                                        110 Glüer & Wikforss 2009 111 This calls for an aside. If looked at from a Wittgensteinian perspective, the opposition between CE normativism and CD normativism is not very helpful. First of all, the issues of priority it plays on is a pseudo‐problem. Second, each normativism invokes prescriptions of some sort. We have, however, found several reasons to reject prescriptions as a basis for normativity claims. But because these labels are currently fashionable, I present the issue in these terms as well. But I assume that it will become clear that the more convincing aspects of semantic realism do not require attacking strawman positions such as CE and CD normativism. It is surprising and sad that some philosophers think that this is one of the better lines of reasoning that semantic realists have available. 112 Some of these authors are: Kripke 1982, McDowell 1984 and Wright 1980 and 1989a. See Hattiangadi 2007:161‐168 and her 2003 for an insightful and convincing rejection of Robert Brandom’s version of CD normativism. 113  Wright 1989a: 127 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usually by citing rules. Furthermore, unless exceptional circumstances pertain, one can 
usually take them to be authoritative about self-ascriptions of beliefs and meaning and that 
authority requires no assumptions about human biological endowment to be compelling. A 
flat-footed nativism will hence not do, simply because it cannot account for the sort of 
phenomenon we are after when we ask for an internalisation. In other words, a flat-footed 
nativism does not acknowledge that there is any epistemological question at all and that 
simply amounts to refusing to engage with Kripkenstein’s justification question.  
 So, we are left with CE normativism, i.e. the idea that meaningful content has priority 
over semantic normativity. But that approach does not lead far either. Boghossian writes 
against CE normativism: 
 The point is that the ordinary concept of following a rule––as opposed to that of merely 
 conforming to one–– is the concept of an intentional act: it involves the intentional 
attempt to bring one’s behaviour in line with the dictates of some grasped rule. [...] As 
such, however, the ordinary concept of following a rule is the concept of an act among 
whose causal antecedents lie contentful mental states; consequently, it is a concept that 
presupposes the idea of a correctness condition, not one that can, in full generality, help 
explain it. Since it makes essential play with the idea of a propositional attitude, which 
in turn makes essential play with the idea of content, rule-following in this sense 
presupposes that mental expressions have conditions of correct application. On pain of 
regress, then, it cannot be true that mental expressions themselves acquire meaning as a 
result of anyone following rules in respect of them.114 
According to this view, rule-following does not explain meaning, but presupposes it, and that 
is wrong. So, now that neither CE nor CD normativism appear viable, what should a semantic 
realist conclude from this? Anti-normativists like Hattiangadi conclude that there is no such 
thing as semantic normativity. Boghossian agrees, but adds (as we shall explain in more detail 
below) that there is epistemic normativity. But note that both reactions tacitly presuppose that 
we can make sense of the question whether semantic normativity is prior to meaningful 
content or vice versa. 
 An alternative reaction to the failure of CE and CD normativism consists in objecting 
that such questions of priority are nonsense. This amounts to arguing that, as I have explained 
above, rules can be used to explain what counts as language use and that those rules only 
count as rules if language users comply with them, if they explain their practices through 
them and if they are also prepared to agree to any of the rules in question when presented with 
them. Such an appeal to rules does, pace CE and CD normativism, not construe them as                                                         114 Boghossian 1989b: 151‐152 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prescriptions. It is precisely this view that true proponents of rule-based normativity of 
meaning defend. For them, the question of priority that impresses Boghossian and Hattiangadi 
is malformed. 
 So, is there a third view apart from the Wittgensteinians and the semantic realists? 
Alexander Miller suggests such a third view on how rule-following and meaning are related. 
Meaning something, for him, is analogous to intending to follow a rule. This also amounts to 
rejecting the sort of priority presupposition that fuels anti-normativism, but it does not imply a 
Wittgensteinian notion of explanation. The point of the alternative understanding is that 
grasping a rule and grasping a meaningful content allegedly license extrapolations in the same 
way. Miller writes: 
 Suppose I intend to follow the rule ‘add 2’ when writing out the following arithmetical 
series: 2, 4, 6, 8, 10,.... Intuitively, later on in the series, certain continuations (e.g. 24, 
26, 28) are determined to be correct by the rule which I intend to follow, and certain 
continuations are determined to be incorrect by that rule (e.g. 34, 35, 37). This is the 
analogue of the applications of a predicate being determined as correct or incorrect by 
the meaning of the predicate.115 
In applying a predicate to objects, we do so in accord with the meaning of the predicate. The 
meaning of the predicate should allow us to apply the same predicate to the same objects over 
and over again for each object we examine, just as the intention to follow the rule ‘add 2’ 
allows to expand the series ‘2, 4, 6, 8, 10’ over and over again for each stage of the series to 
which we happen to apply the rule. Meaning on the one hand and intention in rule-following 
on the other thus determine correctness in the same way as long as they prevail. 
 So, Miller holds that intending to follow a rule is analogous to meaning something by 
an utterance. Just as an intention to continue with an action determines a series of particular 
deeds––like wanting to bake a cake determines the steps necessary to prepare the dough, form 
it and put it into the oven––meaning can be seen as determining a series of semantically 
correct applications of a predicate like ‘is brown’ to brown things. The price for this, Miller 
argues, is that one has to give up the explanatory claim ‘that expressions acquire meaning in 
virtue of our following rules in respect of them’.116 Miller’s view, then, is that rule-following 
does not presuppose meaning, but that it does not explain it either. This eventually amounts to 
a rejection of semantic normativity, because we cannot cite rules to explain that grasping a 
meaningful expression determines how it should be used, i.e. what extrapolations we are 
allowed to make from it. Extrapolating new uses of language can, then, not be correct in a                                                         115 Miller & Wright 2004: 15 116 Ibid. 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semantic sense. What extrapolations count as correct must be settled by other––presumably 
factual or epistemological––features intervening in language use. Language, on that view, 
cannot fully take care of itself. 
 The view that Miller puts forward here is mistaken. There is an asymmetry between 
how intentions and meaning determine extrapolations within a series. If I intend to bake a 
cake, then my intention determines which steps in the baking-process can be assessed as 
correct, i.e. as conducive to the end of baking a cake. The intention therefore determines what 
will count as instrumentally correct for me. If you intend to bake a cake, something else may 
count as instrumentally correct for you. But even if you bake the cake in exactly the same way 
as I do, my intention will not determine instrumental correctness for you. Only your own 
intention can determine instrumental correctness for you.  
 The case of semantically correct extrapolations of any sort is fundamentally different. 
If I extrapolate new applications of the word ‘green’ to things never encountered hitherto, my 
meaning green––and not dark yellow––by ‘green’ must count as semantically correct or 
incorrect for anybody who speaks the same language. 
 I have, of course, already introduced the asymmetry between how intention and 
meaning determine extrapolations when I discussed my conception of objectivity in section 
1.3 above. Still, it is important to see that Miller’s alleged alternative does not work, precisely 
because of this important asymmetry. 
 Let me recapitulate the situation. As things stand now, we have to choose. The first 
view is Hattiangadi’s anti-normativism. The second one is the rule-based normativity of 
meaning that Wittgensteinians defend. The third view is a view that does not allow semantic 
normativity, but which allows that correct language use is regulated by epistemological or 
factual features intervening in language use. 
 Boghossian (eventually) adopts the third view. We shall see below that he allows that 
some rules govern grasping as extrapolating and it seems that worries surrounding CE and CD 
normativism are not intended to apply to such rules; that might indeed work, because those 
rules are not supposed––as will be shown––to fully determine meaning and intention in all 
cases. The rules in question are mainly logical rules like modus ponens, induction and 
epistemic rules like observation. They secure the epistemological correctness of 
extrapolations in language use, because there is––in Boghossian’s eyes––no such thing as 
pure semantic correctness. Here are the definitions he proposes, note that the rules constitute a 
prima facie permission117:                                                         117 Boghossian 2008:109 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(Observation) 
If it visually seems to you that p, then you are prima facie rationally permitted to believe 
that p. 
 
(Induction) 
For appropriate Fs and Gs, if you have observed n (for some sufficiently large n) Fs and 
they all have been Gs, then you are prima facie rationally permitted to believe that all Fs 
are Gs. 
 
(Modus Ponens) 
If you are rationally permitted to believe both that p and that ‘If p, then q’, then, you are 
prima facie rationally permitted to believe that q. 
With that caveat in place, how is Boghossian’s concept of meaning supposed to be brought 
together with a suitable conception of correct language use and normativity? He writes: 
Suppose the expression ‘green’ means green. It follows immediately that the expression 
‘green’ applies correctly only to these things (the green ones) and not to those (the non-
greens). The fact that the expression means something implies, that is, a whole set of 
normative truths about my behaviour with that expression: namely, that my use of it is 
correct in application to certain objects and not in application to others.118 
We should highlight a few points that Boghossian takes for granted here: (1) truths can be 
normative in the sense that extrapolations in language use should also be factually (and not 
merely semantically) correct, (2) a whole set of normative truths is implied by the fact that an 
expression means something, (3) the particular set of normative truths which is implied by a 
particular meaning are about how somebody uses that expression, (4) paradigmatic for the use 
of an expression is its application to objects, (5) applying an expression to an object can be 
factually correct or not. Boghossian does not argue for these five points, but goes on to 
explain his notion of correctness by relating it to truth-theoretic and assertion-theoretic 
approaches to meaning and states what he takes to be Kripke’s most important insight: 
The normativity of meaning turns out to be, in other words, simply a new name for the 
familiar fact that, regardless of whether one thinks of meaning in truth-theoretic or 
assertion-theoretic terms, meaningful expressions possess conditions of correct use. (On 
the one construal, correctness consists in true use, on the other, in warranted use.) 
Kripke’s insight was to realize that this observation may be converted into a condition of 
adequacy on theories of the determination of meaning: any proposed candidate for the 
property in virtue of which an expression has meaning must be such as to ground the                                                         118 Boghossian 1989b: 148 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‘normativity’ of meaning––it ought to be possible to read off from any alleged meaning-
constituting property of a word what is the correct use of that word.119 
The way he tells the story here, rule-following scepticism is only concerned with point (5) and 
how that can be grounded. But we can easily ask how (1)-(3) are to work in detail. After all, it 
is not clear whether all truths are normative or not. We also do not know in detail how the 
obtaining of a fact can imply an ought for one’s thought and talk. Are we supposed to think 
and talk in accord with facts which obtain, but which we do not know and, maybe, can never 
know? Doubts arise as to how (and whether) Boghossian can adequately meet the justification 
question––the major obstacle for dispositionalism. Worries concerning these points did, as we 
will see soon, prompt Boghossian to enquire into these assumptions. 
 An assumption which Boghossian never questions is (4): paradigmatic for the use of 
an expression is its application to objects. Together with (5) it forms the core of Boghossian’s 
conception of the right approach to meaning: 
Let robust realism designate the view that judgements about meaning are factual, 
irreducible, and judgement-independent. Then the moral of this paper––if it has one––is 
that the major alternatives to robust realism are beset by very serious difficulties.120  
As Boghossian rejects, more or less, the proposals that I have already ruled out above––
including further varieties of dispositionalism––reconsidering them seems not called for. But 
we should still ask what precisely his robust realism commits him to. 
 The first mark is its factualism: there are facts which constitute and justify meaning. 
The second mark is its non-reductionism: meaning and understanding cannot be explained in 
terms which do not refer to semantic phenomena. The third mark is its judgement-
independence: facts about meaningful content can never be based on what people judge to be 
such facts, because any judgement has a meaningful content––which in turn is to be specified 
in terms of the correctness-condition for an expression’s application to objects before it can 
figure as the content of any judgement. It will be shown in the next section that his realism 
eventually involves, in addition to the points just mentioned, further epistemological 
considerations. 
 
Boghossian’s Robust Realism and Normativity 
 
Kripke claims that the facts fixing meaningful content must also enable an understanding of 
the relation between meaning and future use as normative––not as descriptive. How exactly                                                         119 Ibid. 120 Loc .cit. p. 185 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does Boghossian, in his recent writings, construe Kripke’s distinction between dispositional 
and normative analyses of meaning? 
[...] the two leading naturalistic theories for the fixation of content – informational 
semantics and inferential role semantics – are both versions of a dispositional theory in 
the relevant sense. 
 Against this popular idea about naturalizing meaning, Kripke deploys a number of 
considerations: that our dispositions are finite; that one cannot read off our dispositions 
what we mean because our dispositions may include dispositions to make errors; and so 
forth. However, even if it were possible to overcome these objections, Kripke argues, one 
could still not identify meaning facts with dispositional facts because at bottom the 
relation between meaning and future use is normative, whereas the dispositionalist 
construes it descriptively.121 
The question Boghossian now asks on his readers’ behalf is whether there is an intuitive sense 
in which meaning is normative. For, after all, we may only argue that every theory of 
meaning has to respect it if we had strong pre-theoretical intuitions about this sort of 
normativity. And only if that was established, the normativity of meaning could be employed 
for anti-naturalistic purposes. 
 First of all, we need a new distinction here. Boghossian tells us that, despite the fact 
that Kripke assumes that linguistic content and mental content are both normative, his own 
argument requires treating linguistic and mental content in a different way.122 We have 
discussed above that we should neither say that meaningful linguistic content antecedes 
normativity (CE normativity) nor that normativity antecedes meaningful linguistic content 
(CD normativity). This already suggests that Boghossian’s distinction is interesting. There are 
indeed reasons to suppose that linguistic content and mental content are not necessarily the 
same. It is possible that the content of, for example, a belief and the content of an utterance 
can come apart. A skilled blacksmith may believe, based on experience, that he has to 
hammer an incandescent piece of metal for so-and-so long and in such-and-such a fashion, 
but he may not be able to articulate this believe simply because the mental content informing 
his action is more fine-grained than any linguistic content he could possibly express. A dog 
may believe that a cat is in a particular tree and acts accordingly, even though it would be 
bizarre to tacitly suppose that the dog can articulate this (or that his barking counts as an 
articulation of the belief). We should, therefore, distinguish linguistic from mental content. 
We should then also bear in mind that content is not always to be conflated with meaning,                                                         121 Boghossian 2005:205. Note that Boghossian 2003a is an old version of his 2005 and I shall refer to the latter only, even though his 2003a is sometimes discussed independently of his revised 2005. 122 Loc. cit. pp. 206‐207 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because only those contents which can be expressed through words do count as meaningful. 
Meaning, as we discuss it here, is a linguistic concept. 
 Now, Kripke holds that if one means plus (i.e. the addition function) when one asks 
‘57+68=?’ one should take ‘125’ to be the correct answer to the question. The relation 
between meaning and future use seems normative in a semantic sense.123 What does that 
come to? Well, the normative relation must, for example, not be one of politeness, which is a 
moral obligation, and it must not involve some auxiliary desires. The first is obviously not a 
genuine case of semantic normativity, as it is a moral constraint on good language use. The 
second approach is also unhelpful, as auxiliary desires yield a merely hypothetical 
normativity. Boghossian reminds us that, given some appropriate auxiliary desires, every fact 
can turn out normative in that sense.124 Take the fact that most trees are not green in autumn. 
Together with the auxiliary desire that I want to speak of green trees only if the surface colour 
of their leaves are green (and not if they have green leaves at other times of the year or if 
somebody has painted the leaves green), the fact becomes normative for my language use. I 
ought only speak of a green tree if the tree in question actually has green leaves. This ought is 
not required by what ‘green’ or ‘tree’ (or both) mean, but it is required by a fact plus an 
auxiliary desire. The hypothetical normativity we get from this is hence not a suitable model 
for semantic normativity, because it allows any conceivable prescription. Boghossian goes on 
to emphasise that semantic normativity, the normativity of linguistic content, must be 
derivable from the mere attribution of meaning to somebody in a straightaway manner. 
Additional standards and desires cannot play a role. 
 The notion of derivability Boghossian has in mind also leads him to reject CD and CE 
normativity. Recall that he is inclined to dissociate linguistic content from linguistic 
normativity and that questions of priority ensue for him––which commits him to hold that 
either CE or CD normativity must be correct. If one holds that linguistic content is inherently 
normative, attributions of meaning to somebody must lead to attributions what one should say 
and the reason for those further attributions must lie in how one construes content. The 
derivation of a linguistic ought will draw on necessary properties of linguistic content. But if 
one holds that linguistic content adopts its normative force from some autonomous normative 
properties or relations, the derivation must show how some such property or relation can 
bring it about that one is straightaway licensed to attribute to somebody what she should say                                                         123 Cf. Kripke 1982:37; recall, however, that I have argued that Kripke is not after a categorical distinction between the normative and the descriptive––he is only committed to the weaker claim that language use is justifiable. 124 Boghossian 2005:207 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based on what she means. If it turns out––as it indeed did––that derivability can neither be 
guaranteed for CD nor for CE normativity, linguistic normativity can either be seen as a mere 
philosophical phantasm or, less starkly, as an umbrella term for a variety of phenomena which 
merely enjoy a family-resemblance to each other.  
 If we switch from attributions of meaning, which allegedly license attributions of 
oughts without a need for satisfaction of further conditions, to attributions of beliefs, 
intentions and other mental states (which are sometimes said to license attributions of oughts 
in a similar vein) the same problem can be raised for the normativity of mental content. Thus, 
any sort of content normativity seems to require a good account of how the derivation of 
oughts, given some specific content, is to be brought about. If it turns out that such a 
derivation cannot be guaranteed, we should at least be prepared to accept the verdict that 
content normativity is an umbrella term for a variety of similar, but distinct, phenomena––or 
reject the notion of mental content altogether. 
 Boghossian is convinced that the failure of CE and CD normativity conclusively 
shows that there is no such thing as semantic normativity, because the derivability 
requirement cannot be fulfilled for linguistic content. But he wants to retain normativity for 
mental content. How does he argue for it? Consider that it is correct to believe that Obama has 
won the Nobel price if and only if Obama has won the Nobel price. Can we not argue here 
that correctness implies an obligation, that one ought to believe that Obama has won the 
Nobel price if and only if he has won the Nobel price? The obligation here is conditional on 
the obtaining of a fact and we may argue that we must not generally license inferences from 
‘it is correct to believe that p’ to ‘one ought to believe that p’. But correctly believing requires 
correctness in a factual sense and we hence ought to believe that Obama has won the Nobel 
price only if he actually has, i.e. only if there is a fact that makes the belief correct. 
 While it is not contentious for realists to grant that beliefs are geared to truth and that 
that yields a notion of correctness for all sorts of beliefs, the idea that the mere obtaining of a 
fact entails that one ought to believe it is silly. There are many facts which obtain, but 
knowledge of which can hardly be seen as mandatory in any sense. No realist will want to 
know all the facts about Charlie Sheen’s private life and neither will he want to know how 
many grains of sand his feet will have touched after a 10 min walk at the beach––there is no 
good reason for wanting to know these things. We need not believe irrelevant facts simply 
because there is a truth up for takes. 
 For Boghossian, this yields the following view of the normativity of mental content, 
he accepts N1 and rejects N2: 
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(N1) 
One ought to believe p only if p 
(N2) 
One ought to believe p if and only if p125 
N2 is clearly ruled out by what I have just said above: the example of irrelevant facts shows 
that we need not believe all facts simply because they obtain. But in N1, the ought is required 
by the obtaining of the fact in the weaker sense that some fact may obtain (and guarantee the 
factual correctness of the corresponding belief) while there need not be a corresponding 
ought. If there is a belief we ought to have, that belief must, according to N1, be grounded in 
the obtaining of the appropriate fact––but, on the other hand, the mere obtaining of the fact 
does not put us under an obligation whatsoever. 
 It is not clear at all how the “robust realism” Boghossian proposes in his 1989b paper, 
even if read together with the qualifications in his later papers, can be a realism in a 
traditional sense. Realism about correct language use in a traditional sense merely requires 
that semantic and factual correctness be tightly forged together, it is the realism that anti-
normativists support. But Boghossian’s take on content normativity suggests that factual 
correctness be tightly forged together with epistemological correctness.126 Boghossian hence 
claims that belief formation is subject to epistemic rules and that it is those rules which exert 
normative force and ensure, like N1, that the objectivity of content is rooted in objective facts. 
The resulting picture is that objectively correct language use involves a variety of semantic, 
factual and epistemological elements in order to enable grasping as extrapolating. 
Boghossian’s current writings confirm this: 
[O]ur internalization of general epistemic rules––like Modus Ponens and Induction––
explain and rationalize why we form the beliefs that we form. And that seems intuitively 
correct.  
 As in the case of our linguistic and conceptual abilities, our ability to form rational 
beliefs is productive: on the basis of finite learning, we are able to form rational beliefs 
under a potential infinity of novel circumstances. The only plausible explanation for this 
is that we have somehow internalized a rule that tells us, in some general way, what it 
would be rational to believe under varying epistemic circumstance.127 
He is aware that this picture is not yet precise enough. A first question he mentions is: ‘What 
is a rule such that following it is necessary for rational belief?’128 A second issue is that it                                                         125 Boghossian 2003a and 2005 126 This is most obvious in Boghossian’s Fear of Knowledge (2006). 127 Boghossian 2008:119 128 Loc. cit. p. 134 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remains difficult to explain how rule-following is possible at all. He writes that he does not 
know how to answer the first question, but concerning the second he writes: 
 It would involve a primitivism about rule-following or rule-application itself: we would 
 have to take as primitive a general (often conditional) content serving as the reason for 
which one believes something, without this being mediated by inference of any kind. It 
is not obvious that we can make sense of this, but the matter clearly deserves greater 
consideration.129 
It seems to me that this is interesting competition for my Wittgensteinian solution to 
Kripkenstein’s sceptic problem. This is mainly so, because Boghossian has a good sense of 
what is at stake and sees that grasping as extrapolating is the primary explanandum in the 
debates surrounding rule-following scepticism. And when he suggests a primitivism, he is 
perfectly aware that he must still either explain grasping as extrapolating or reject it as an 
explanandum.  
 So, to what extent do Wittgensteinians and Boghossian propose a different conception 
of normativity? Consider again some of the approaches one may take on the normativity of 
meaning mentioned above: 
 Bare normativity of meaning 
 (BNM)  p is meaningful → there are conditions for the correct use of p. 
 Rule-based normativity of meaning 
 (RNM)  p is meaningful → there are rules for the use of p. 
Add to these conceptions the following two, which appear as new possibilities: 
 Bare normativity of rules 
 (BNR)  r is a rule → there are conditions for the correct application of r. 
 Rule-based normativity of rules 
 (RNR)  r is a rule → there are rules for the application of r. 
It seems clear that Boghossian adopts some sort of RNM, granted that the relevant rules are 
epistemic rules. What is not clear is whether he would adopt BNR or the potentially circular 
RNR and if the relevant rules on the right-hand side of RNR are always to be construed as 
epistemic rules. His proposed primitivism suggests that he prefers BNR and that would 
require him to supply a corresponding reading of ‘conditions for the correct application’, so 
that a rule also specifies the conditions for its correct application.130 Boghossian has, at least 
one time, also toyed with the concept of rule-circularity, according to which the rules in 
question are self-constituting and self-justifying; that would suggest adopting RNR (with a                                                         129 Ibid. 130 Ibid. 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few additional specifications) instead of BNR.131 In part B of the thesis we will discuss 
Boghossian’s views on BNR and RNR, but it has been established already that his epistemic 
rules commit him to a non-Wittgensteinian variety of RNM.   
 We must add a rider to this reading of Boghossian’s position. Whereas N1 and N2 are 
prescriptions, the epistemic rules Boghossian actually cites do not contain prescriptions but, 
rather, rational permissions. So, the rules he is after entitle and need not compel. It is not clear 
what exactly happens if epistemic rules are breached. If I breach modus ponens I certainly 
have failed to infer. And if I breach Boghossian’s rule for observation I certainly have failed 
to observe. From this we may perhaps infer that Boghossian is after constitutive rules. For if 
he was after mere prescriptions, breaching epistemic rules would mean that one has inferred 
or observed badly. And that is obviously not the case.  
 It is important to bear in mind that conservative Wittgensteinians argue for rule-based 
normativity of meaning and that that involves the concept of internal relations. Wittgenstein 
seems to suggest that invoking internal relations entails a commitment to say that the relata 
constituted by the relations are “governed” by a constitutive rule and orthodox 
Wittgesteinians insist that such a view is still mandatory to make sense of correct language 
use.132 I have put the term ‘governed’ in shudder quotes, because it is not clear to me what it 
is supposed to mean here. 
 My preferred construal of internal relations––which is informed by how I read 
Kripke’s views on normativity and dispositions––makes ‘governed’ redundant and thereby 
implies that constitutive rules are descriptions of internal relations, i.e. that those rules only 
have a practical value in explanations and justifications drawing on the obtaining of some 
specific internal relations. How so? It is certainly true that some rules constitute correct 
language use. The rule ‘male ducks are drakes’ and the rule ‘female foxes are vixens’ 
establish how ‘drake’ and ‘vixen’ are to be used, they set up an internal relation between the 
words and their use. But there are internal relations which are not set up by constitutive rules. 
The internal relation between salt’s disposition to dissolve in water (but not in benzene) and 
its actual behaviour in water is not constituted by a rule, but it is itself constitutive of a natural 
law and that natural law explains and justifies factually correct talk about salt and its 
solubility.133  
 A more complicated example is the relation between being stung by an insect and 
saying ‘outch’. That relation is internal, for saying ‘outch’ is to be explained in reference to a                                                         131 Boghossian 2008: ch. 12 132 Glock 2003:234 and 2009:163‐165 133 This example is from Graeme Forbes’s 1983‐4. 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moderate pain that is inflicted upon the speaker and a moderate pain is to be explained in 
terms of pain behaviour such as saying ‘outch’. If saying ‘outch’ loudly is inappropriate in 
some situation (viz. at a funeral), one can refer to the fact that one has just been stung to 
excuse oneself. Being excused in such a case involves that other people regard the inapposite 
‘outch’ as inevitable, but the excuse will not amount to a justification under those 
circumstances. The upshot is that internal relations often constitute semantic correctness and 
that rules do often describe them. Sometimes, however, internal relations are better explained 
in terms of natural laws (as in the case of salt’s solubility) which in turn govern factual 
correctness.  
 This obviously matches my reading of the sceptical solution, for any sceptical solution 
allows that an indefinitely wide variety of rules can be made to accord with semantically 
correct language use as long as the relevant defeasibility criteria (which define by exclusion 
the correctness-conditions of bare normativity) are fulfilled. Any explicit stipulation of 
defeasibility criteria––for practical purposes––are then effected through providing constitutive 
rules. So rules are then merely used to draw an interlocutor’s attention to the internal relations 
relevant for semantic correctness. Laws, on the other hand, describe internal relations relevant 
for factual correctness. Unlike Boghossian, however, I have no special conception of 
epistemic rules. This leads to a disagreement between us about how the status of logic is to be 
construed, for logical validity––qua logical correctness––can (at least potentially) be analysed 
as semantic, factual or epistemological correctness. By adding an epistemic rule for belief-
formation modus ponens to his list of epistemic rules, Boghossian suggests that logically 
correct reasoning is, first and foremost, epistemologically correct. I, on the other hand, only 
have internal relations to explain logical correctness. In part B, I shall say more about this and 
I shall also try to settle the disagreement. 
 Apart from Boghossian, there are other realists who purport to have genuine 
alternatives to a Wittgensteinian construal of grasping as extrapolating. I shall continue by 
introducing the views of Anandi Hattiangadi. 
 
Anti-Normativism 
 
Anandi Hattiangadi’s position is a variety of a realist conception of correct language use. She 
holds that there is no such thing as the normativity of mental content and she is committed to 
the idea that semantically and factually correct language use are basically the same. Semantic 
realism, on Hattiangadi’s understanding, comprises a commitment to three claims:  
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1. What someone means or understands by a word (mental representation) can be given by 
the correctness conditions of the word (mental representation) as it is understood. 
2. What someone means or understands by a sentence (mental representation) can be given 
by the truth conditions of the sentence (mental representation) as it is understood.  
3. Ascriptions of meaning to linguistic utterances and mental states are “factual”, that is, 
they can be either true or false, and when true, are true in virtue of objective (i.e. 
judgement independent) facts.134 
New here is that Hattiangadi allows correctness-conditions for words. She does neither 
associate, pace Boghossian, correct believing nor, pace the definition of bare normativity of 
meaning, semantic correctness with normativity and her notion of correctness is realist in a 
traditional sense: 
The ‘correct’ in ‘correctness condition’ is not obviously an evaluative notion [...]. For the 
semantic realist, the conditions for the correct use of an expression must be understood as 
the conditions that must obtain in order for the expression to refer, denote, or be truly 
predicated of something. The expression ‘applies correctly’ is a placeholder for the 
various semantic relations an expression can have to the world: it stands for either ‘x 
refers to a’, ‘x denotes a’, or ‘x is true of a’. Thus, if we substitute into the above 
semantic realist thesis one of the semantic relations for which ‘applies [correctly]’ stands, 
there should be no normativity bells ringing: Semantic Realism (reference): x means F → 
(a) (x refers to a ↔ a is f).135 
The notion of correctness Hattiangadi assumes for single words has it that ‘applied correctly 
to’ is synonymous with ‘refers to’. On that level, she simply requires factual correctness. 
Objectivity is hence given, because reference connects a word with an object in the external 
world, which is generally assumed to contain truths possibly independent of human thought 
and talk. Epistemic entitlement thus centrally involves successfully tracking those possibly 
independent facts, but does not affect at all what counts as semantically correct.  
 How does that compare to competing proposals? She does not, pace Boghossian, 
assume that there are specific epistemic rules which secure epistemic entitlement in belief 
formation and which yield, therefore, a notion of the objectivity of content which is only 
partially footed in external reality. For Boghossian, epistemic rules sufficiently buttress 
meaning and language use. For Hattiangadi, only facts alone can provide a suitable 
buttressing. She also finds herself in opposition to Wittgensteinians, because she does not 
allow correctness and objectivity to be intralinguistic affairs, i.e. correct language use is not 
only a matter of language or meaning. For her ‘what makes the proposition that p true is the                                                         134 Hattiangadi 2007:6‐7 135 Loc. cit. p. 52  
-82- 
fact that p’ is itself a true claim, that is so because the proposition that p reflects (or tracks 
down) a fact obtaining in the external world. For Wittgensteinians who allow propositions, 
the proposition that p is true just is the same as the proposition that p and the statement ‘what 
makes the proposition that p true is the fact that p’ is a conceptual truth by virtue of the 
conceptual relations between the concept of a proposition and the concept of a fact. 
 In order to settle the issues between Hattiangadi, Boghossian and the Wittgensteinians, 
we need to examine semantic realism and the concept of objectivity in much more detail. 
Without an adequate overview of these issues, the three candidate responses to Kripkenstein’s 
sceptic must be considered to be equal competitors. Establishing such an overview and 
deciding between the competitors are the tasks of the next part. 
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The Objective Grounds of Correct Language Use 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
-84- 
1) Objective Grounds 
 
In part A, the problem of correct language use has been introduced. Often, talk of correct 
language use is ambiguous and different notions of correctness must be kept apart. There is 
semantic correctness, which stands for correct language use based on what particular 
expressions mean. Factual correctness stands for correct language use based on getting the 
facts right. Epistemological correctness stands for correct language use based on having a 
suitable warrant or justification for one’s language use. Starting with Kripkenstein we took 
semantic correctness to be the central notion of the debate.136 Arguably, accounting for 
correct language use centrally involves explaining how an indefinite number of new language 
uses can be based on a finite number of preceding ones. From that proposal, the more general 
notion of grasping as extrapolating was extracted as the primary explanandum: 
 (Grasping as Extrapolating) 
 Grasping a rule, a meaning of a word or a concept centrally involves extrapolating a 
 possibly indefinite number of new applications based on a finite number of known 
cases. 
Correctly extrapolating new languages uses need not be a matter of semantic correctness only. 
Kripkenstein’s sceptic insists, as we have seen, that correctly extrapolating is also a matter of 
epistemological correctness (we must be justified in extrapolating as we do) and that factual 
correctness also matters (we must get some facts right). 
 The discussion of Kripkenstein’s sceptical paradox (and of some contributions to the 
debate it provoked) let to the conclusion that there are three competing approaches to the 
issue––one Wittgensteinian, the other two based on semantic realism. The semantic realist 
proposals subscribe to a conception of correct language use that takes the factually correct 
application of linguistic expressions to certain objects to be paradigmatic for semantic 
correctness. Such realists hence run together factual and semantic correctness: 
 Suppose the expression ‘green’ means green. It follows immediately that the expression 
 ‘green’ applies correctly only to these things (the green ones) and not to those (the non-
 greens). […][M]y use of it is correct in application to certain objects and not in 
application to others.137 
The semantic realist approaches to correct language use hence suppose that such a 
paradigmatic relation between certain terms and their referents is intuitively intelligible and 
that it provides a stable foundation for explaining correct language use and grasping as                                                         136 Kripke 1982:8 137 First introduced by Boghossian 1989b:148. 
-85- 
extrapolating. They therefore claim that running together semantic and factual correctness is 
not only the default option, but also provides the best approach to correct language use. More 
specifically, the paradigmatic relation is seen as either providing facts, which constitute and 
justify semantically correct language use, or it is seen as guiding language users (in some 
sense yet to be specified) to such facts. What is the alternative to this? 
 My Wittgensteinian approach, which rejects that there is a paradigmatic relation 
between words and objects, is basically a variety of Kripkenstein’s sceptical solution. The 
approach I propose construes correct extrapolations in language use as an entirely semantic 
matter, because meaning alone is thought to settle what counts as a correct extrapolation of 
new language uses. Questioning whether a specific extrapolation is semantically correct 
requires that there be some sort of evidence justifying the question. This requirement is called 
for, because any semantically correct extrapolation becomes straightaway epistemologically 
correct unless there is evidence which excludes the extrapolation as incorrect in a semantic 
(and, pari passu, in an epistemological) sense. The proposal takes for granted that 
extrapolations are normally correct, once meaningful expressions are available at all. And the 
proposal also takes for granted that explaining what correct extrapolations are involves 
showing samples of such extrapolations and pointing out what sort of evidence can topple an 
extrapolation’s status as warranted by default (hence excluding the extrapolation as incorrect). 
 Grasping as extrapolating––at least as far as Kripkenstein’s sceptic attacks it––is 
therefore to be explained in terms of defeasibility, i.e. grasping as extrapolating is to be 
explained in terms of what does not count as a semantically (and, pari passu, as an 
epistemologically) correct extrapolation. Understanding what an expression means already 
requires the ability to make semantically correct extrapolations in language use and that 
ability cannot itself be acquired through explanations, because understanding any explanation 
already presupposes the ability. This is why all sensible explanations of grasping as 
extrapolating we can give to counter the sceptic are to be given by drawing on defeasibility 
criteria for extrapolations warranted by default. The perspective requires a corresponding 
notion of objectivity, one which does not entail specific metaphysical commitments of the sort 
that Kripkenstein and Wittgenstein argue against. But how does this contrast with the 
semantic realists? 
 First, there is Paul Boghossian’s approach. He commends a semantic realism by 
proposing to conceive of the application of words to objects as paradigmatic for correct 
language use. Grasping as extrapolating is, however, not fully explained by a general intuition 
about how words are applied to objects. Boghossian introduces epistemic rules which govern 
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rational belief formation and those rules secure grasping as extrapolating. Boghossian 
therefore combines semantic, epistemological and factual considerations to account for 
correct language use. 
 Second, there is the position spearheaded by Anandi Hattiangadi who recommends a 
classical semantic realism. Truth-conditions constitute the meaning of sentences and 
correctness-conditions constitute the meaning of words. Justification is based on truth. There 
are no normative properties or relations and, furthermore, rules and their applications have no 
special role in explaining grasping as extrapolating. Grasping as extrapolating involves 
successfully tracking truths via the truth-conditions of sentences and correct extrapolations 
are correct both in a semantic and in a factual sense. 
 The three positions––Boghossian’s, Hattiangadi’s and mine––hence disagree about 
what sort of correctness (semantic, epistemological or factual) determines language use and 
how different conceptions of correctness ought to (or ought not to) be combined. The three 
positions do not, however, differ in their explanatory goal: all three seek to explain correct 
language use in a way that allows us to distinguish between an individual’s correctly using 
language and an individual’s merely thinking that she uses language correctly. In other words, 
the three accounts attempt to explain how language use can be objectively correct: for my 
Wittgensteinian proposal, this is merely a matter of semantic correctness; for Boghossian, 
epistemic rules settle what facts determine semantic correctness; Hattiangadi equates semantic 
and factual correctness and assumes that this automatically takes care of objectivity. 
 The most prominent disagreement concerns the role of reality and the import factual 
correctness has. And here we can distinguish two primary camps by asking whether factual 
correctness plays a role at all. The question allows us to put my Wittgensteinian proposal on 
one side and the two semantic realist proposals on the other. So we can assess the notion of 
factual correctness in isolation before taking on considerations independent of factual 
correctness. The leading question will therefore be whether the concept of objectivity requires 
that objectively correct language use be accounted for in terms of factual correctness. 
 It is sensible to start with setting up a framework of concepts that allows us to compare 
and assess the competitors’ proposals more thoroughly. A first concept we must specify more 
clearly is the concept of objectivity, because everybody agrees that there is a difference 
between merely thinking that one gets things right and objectively getting things right. To 
clarify the concept of objectivity, we can start with a platitude. Naturally, objectivity requires 
that 
the opinions which we form are in no sense optional or variable as a function of 
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permissible idiosyncrasy, but are demanded of us––[objectivity requires] that there will 
be a robust sense in which a particular point of view ought to be held, and a failure to 
hold which can be understood only as a rational/cognitive failure.138 
Note that we are not speaking about opinions in general here. We are considering opinions 
about any sort of correctness (viz. semantic, factual or epistemological). What opinions we 
form about any sort of correctness must not be arbitrary and it must not be rigid either. 
 Objections to this platitude are not difficult to meet. If our opinions were arbitrary, we 
would never count as recognising or understanding anything, because what we recognise or 
understand must be communicable and it must be fit to guide our actions in the world. An 
arbitrary opinion cannot be communicated or guide actions, because it is neither a reliable 
information nor a reliable basis for deciding or acting. Holding arbitrary opinions rightly 
counts as a rational or cognitive failure, as it does not involve any sort of recognition or 
understanding of what actually is. It follows that at least some opinions that rational––or 
merely cognitively operational––creatures entertain must not be arbitrary. 
 Another unsuccessful strategy to reject the platitude about objectivity requires arguing 
that opinions are rigidly formed, that we form them willy-nilly. But if our opinions were 
formed rigidly, how come that they possibly diverge from other people’s opinions? How 
come that we sometimes reconsider opinions based on a comparison with other people’s 
opinions? Why would we speak of rational or cognitive failures at all if opinions are formed 
rigidly? We should reject the idea that opinions are formed rigidly, simply because people 
form wrong opinions about something and others form right opinions about the very same 
thing and based on the same information.  
 Even if we held that some opinions are formed rigidly and that others are formed 
arbitrarily, we still could not make sense of the possibility that people can have right and 
wrong opinions about the very same thing. The platitude about objectivity is obligatory, as 
soon as we admit that there is such a thing as a rational or cognitive failure––i.e. as soon as 
we admit that there is a difference between merely thinking that one gets things right and 
actually getting things right. We can therefore add that the conception of what counts as 
getting things rationally or cognitively right forms the basis for determining what opinions are 
to be formed. This rationalist approach to forming opinions is rather natural and it is hard to 
see how any serious approach to explaining any sort of correctness (and, thus, grasping as 
extrapolating) can do without it. 
 Drawing on the general perspective on objectivity just given, I would like to propose a                                                         138 I borrow this from Crispin Wright 1992:146 who puts the platitude to a (slightly) different use. He also writes ‘commanded’ where I have ‘demanded’. 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particular starting point by asking a question that should concern all parties. Why should 
language use be correct or incorrect at all? First, there are grounds for saying what one says: 
we can inform, ask, claim, command or request by saying things in the right circumstances. If 
there are grounds for saying something, we can hold that what we have said has meaning. If 
not, there would be no difference between saying something and merely emitting noises. But 
why should we suppose that there is a difference between correctly and incorrectly saying 
something? If there were no such distinction, there would be no distinction between actually 
informing somebody or not, between actually asking something or not, and so on. This does, 
however, not imply that the distinction is all about succeeding in fulfilling anybody’s 
intention in saying something; the distinction is simply meant to convey the idea that a saying 
has meaning. When we talk about objectively correct and incorrect sayings, we must be aware 
that meaning must not straightaway be associated with what speakers intend or what hearers 
understand. Nevertheless, if there are objective grounds on which we distinguish meaningful 
sayings from merely emitting noises, these objective grounds might also allow a distinction 
between correct and incorrect language use. And because a failure to meet what is demanded 
by objective grounds is a rational or cognitive failure, understanding for a language user––
who is rational or (at least) cognitively operational––might already require that one can 
distinguish correct from incorrect language use on objective grounds. 
 We are still free to choose with which notion of correctness (viz. semantic, factual or 
epistemological) we want to associate that conception of understanding. But no matter which 
one it will be, the requirements on understanding just mentioned are mandatory as long as 
there is a distinction between merely thinking that a particular language use is correct and it 
actually being correct. It is therefore absolutely crucial to maintain that there being objective 
grounds for saying something must not be confused with the idea that anybody’s intentions, 
expectations or motives play a constitutive role for what counts as a saying.  
 One can say, and that is perfectly ordinary language use, that there are objective 
grounds that explain why some chemical reaction takes place and these are the very same 
objective grounds which constitute the difference between regarding one chemical reaction as 
a whole and as regarding it as a finite number of molecules coincidentally undergoing some 
changes within a specific time at a specific place. We must look at the difference between 
sayings proper and the mere emission of noises the same way. 
 What we get, then, is a rather subtle way of approaching the difference. We speak of 
sayings having objective grounds, but we must not allow ourselves to admit any constitutive 
role to some psychological, social, biological, physical or other factors without further 
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argument. The price we pay for this is that certain sayings will only count as sayings once 
such further factors are admitted. A good example are the noises some people make while 
sleeping: unless we have admitted some further criteria, fulfilment of which are warrantedly 
correlated with ordinary sayings, we cannot claim that some of those noises emitted during 
sleep have objective grounds and are, thus, sayings. 
 Sleep talking may hence have objective grounds in an extended sense, because they 
require further criteria. The objective grounds at hand in this special case might possibly be 
causal if they have been identified through scientific theorising and evidence gathering. But 
when we normally say something, we are aware that we are saying it and that we are not 
merely emitting noises. Such objective grounds of which speakers are aware can be called 
reasons. Just like objective grounds in general, reasons can be cited in explanations. It is 
because reasons go together with awareness that any meaningful saying can normally be 
explained in terms of them. And as saying anything meaningful can be explained, we expect 
that reasons can be given for saying it. Such expectations are, however, not always fulfilled. 
Somebody might produce meaningful sayings while sleep talking, in a fever or under shock, 
but that person need then not have reasons for saying anything at all. It is because of such 
special cases that I shall prefer to speak of objective grounds only and avoid the concept of a 
reason.  
 Objective grounds and explanations are here regarded as interdependent. Again, just as 
much as there is an explanation for why there is any difference between one chemical reaction 
as a whole process and a series of coincidental changes in molecules, there should also be an 
explanation for why something counts as a saying rather than merely emitting noise. And both 
sorts of explanations are to be given on objective grounds. 
 We should, however, specify that it is not usually the case that objective grounds are 
given by citing causal relations. And even where we may adduce causal relations, the 
platitude about objectivity restricts the causal explanations which are available: the only 
causal explanations available are those which either presuppose or constitute a viable 
conception of rational or cognitive failure. As long as the platitude about objectivity remains 
decisive for what counts as objective grounds, any account of objective grounds is prima facie 
admissible. 
 The particular starting point which I hence propose in order to enquire into the notion 
of objectively correct language use can be condensed into a tentative definition of saying: 
saying something is not merely emitting a noise and the difference between saying something 
and emitting a noise can be explained based on objective grounds. If construed along these 
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lines, saying something is not the same as asserting something or as making an utterance. We 
say ‘hello’ or ‘good bye’ without thereby asserting anything. We may also utter a sigh or a 
groan without counting as saying anything. 
 This provides us with a starting point which only insanely strong nihilists cannot 
accept. Apart from that, (almost) anything goes. Keeping in mind that we refuse to spell out 
talk of sayings having objective grounds without further argument, scepticism about the 
possibility of such further arguments is as much a contender as any other proposal. 
 This leads, despite its minimal requirements, naturally to a platitude about objectively 
correct language use which is a straightforward application of the platitude about objectivity 
to the case of language use: language use is objectively correct or incorrect, because the 
difference between saying something and talking gibberish is not only important for speakers 
in order to actually say anything at all, it is also important for anybody who hears it as 
something said, for otherwise she could not distinguish whether something has actually been 
said or whether she merely heard a noise. This means that all languages can be understood––
that there is no language nobody can understand––and it entails that our opinions about what 
is to count as objectively correct or incorrect language use are not in any sense optional, but 
demanded of us. A failure to comply with such demands counts as a linguistic failure––one 
did not say anything at all. 
 Consider that semantic correctness may be thought to inherit its objectivity from 
factual or epistemological correctness. Hattiangadi and Boghossian hold views along these 
lines. The platitude about objectively correct language use is therefore not necessarily 
committed to semantic normativity. Normativity is bound up with objectivity, because it 
provides a standard for assessing what opinions about (any sort of) correctness count as a 
rational or cognitive failure. In that sense, obtaining facts may turn out to settle what counts as 
a cognitive failure, just as much as epistemological rules may determine what counts as a 
rational failure. The way objectivity enters the picture here is not meant to suggest anything 
specific about the concept of semantic normativity. 
 Of course, we may not straightaway apply all elements of the platitude about 
objectivity to the case of language use. We would need further arguments if we wanted to 
equate a linguistic failure with a rational or cognitive failure. Nevertheless, what has been said 
so far provides us with a first account of how objectivity affects language users: a language 
user’s opinions about what counts as objectively correct or incorrect language use are not 
optional, but demanded. A failure to meet linguistic demands is commonly associated with a 
rational or cognitive failure. 
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 Again, we should refuse to spell out the term ‘demanded’ in any way without further 
argument, for that directly turns on whether one wants to spell out correctness in a semantic, a 
factual or an epistemological sense. It must hence also remain open whether the objective 
grounds on which sayings are distinguished from mere noises are semantic, factual or 
epistemological grounds. It is of utmost importance for what follows below that these 
boundaries are not breached thoughtlessly. 
 Now, it seems that all three competing conceptions of correct language use––my 
Wittgensteinian proposal and the two varieties of semantic realism––can indeed accept the 
points just gathered. All three are committed to the idea that language use can be explained 
and that what counts as objectively correct or incorrect is based on objective grounds of some 
sort. Their interpretation of the details, however, differs.  
 My Wittgensteinian approach holds that we must take our explanatory practices at face 
value and that, once we have the concept of an internal relation available, such explanations 
can usually count as justifying language use, rule applications and concept applications 
without any further requirement to ground it in anything else. Due to the internal relations 
constituting meaning and language use, the conception of objectivity relevant for language 
use collapses into semantic normativity. Boghossian disagrees and points out that our 
explanatory practices must instead be grounded in epistemic rules and facts about the external 
world in order to count as justifying. Hattiangadi concurs with the second part of 
Boghossian’s rejoinder: facts about the external world justify the application of a term, but 
epistemic rules are not necessary to make sense of that. 
 It now appears that Hattiangadi has a heavy explanatory burden when objectivity 
comes into play. Any semantic realist rejecting semantic normativity cannot afford to 
straightaway reject the importance of objectivity in language use––and the notions of rational 
and cognitive failures and demands that come with it. Why is that so? Assume that language 
users have objective grounds they are aware of for how they use their language and that those 
grounds justify their use. Then, it is sensible to suppose that being justified in using language 
in a particular way entails that it is objectively the case that this particular use is semantically 
correct. Language use is justifiably correct if and only if such a justification ought to be 
acceptable by all other language users––the justification would not be objective otherwise. 
 If this holds for Hattiangadi’s proposal, then the epistemology of meaning necessarily 
requires the normative notions of a failure and of a demand in order to explain objectively 
correct language use (in a semantic sense of ‘correct’). It now becomes hard to see how a 
proponent of the view that meaningful content is not normative can accommodate the idea 
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that the epistemology of meaning requires objectivity without jeopardising the platitude that 
the epistemology of meaning is an important aspect of the meaning of ‘meaning’. In other 
words, as long as Kripkenstein’s justification question––as introduced as an integral 
requirement on viable conceptions of correct language use in part A––is to be answered, the 
objectivity constraint is mandatory and anti-normativists must explain how accounting for 
that need not involve notions connected with semantic normativity. 
 I think, however, that anti-normativists are prepared to pay a high price to get out of 
that sort of trouble. They might claim that getting things right is not something that is 
demanded from us, because there are neither rational, cognitive nor linguistic requirements to 
be met at all. This bizarre claim dissociates factual correctness of language use from human 
cognition, rationality and, paradoxically, from language use itself! Although such a claim 
must sound crazy to anybody concerned with the distinction between sense and nonsense in 
language use, anti-normativists might be prepared to argue for it in order to dodge the sort of 
objections from objectivity just mentioned. Arguments against anti-normativism as a 
candidate account of correct language use must therefore be independent of objections from 
objectivity. They will not be watertight otherwise. 
 Note that only flat-footed anti-normativists have difficulties with the concept of 
objectivity. Boghossian turns out to be fully aware of what objectivity requires and caters for 
it by introducing epistemic rules. For him, semantic correctness inherits objectivity from 
factual correctness which, in turn, is mediated by epistemic rules. There is, therefore, nothing 
harmful for him in the notion of objectivity that was introduced above. 
 In what follows, I shall first focus on the anti-normativist who wants to bypass 
objections from objectivity by claiming that there are no rational, cognitive or linguistic 
requirements on what can count as objectively correct language use. In order to do so, we 
shall turn to Michael Dummett’s views on how meaning and factual correctness hang 
together. This will allow us to assess semantic realist proposals more thoroughly. 
 
2) Dummett on Realism and Antirealism 
 
With these general considerations in the background, we can start enquiring into objectivity in 
a more direct manner. We have to consider strategies for developing the starting point which I 
have summarised in the following way: saying something is not merely emitting a noise and it 
can be explained on objective grounds. Recall that I have supplied it with an objectivity 
constraint: a language user’s opinions about what counts as objectively correct or incorrect 
-93- 
language use are not optional, but demanded. 
 On might want to gather from this that there is an asymmetry between factual and 
semantic correctness, because objectivity concerning opinions about facts is distinct from 
objectivity concerning opinions about meaning. After all, a whole community might be wrong 
about what facts obtain, but––being speakers of a language––they can hardly be wrong about 
meaning. So, what exactly is the explanatory surplus of factual correctness? Does objectively 
correct language use require that certain facts obtain autonomously of human language (and, 
possibly, thought)? Asking such questions means to engage in a debate between realists and 
antirealists about the facts in question; the former are taken to argue for the autonomy of the 
facts, while the latter deny this. If facts are not autonomous, issues of factual correctness in 
language use collapse into issues about epistemological or semantic correctness. 
 Note that approaching factual correctness along these lines may be thought to miss out 
a position which was to be included in the debate. Scepticism about the possibility to spell out 
the conception of a saying as having objective grounds by introducing some further concepts 
cannot accept any question which leads to realism-antirealism disputes. Facts about language 
use––linguistic facts––are to be accounted for only in terms of sayings having objective 
grounds; engaging in a realism-antirealism dispute is, according to that approach, not required 
to distinguish between a language user’s opinions about language use and linguistic facts. All 
that is required, so the story goes, is a firm grasp on the concept of sayings having objective 
grounds. 
 Some find motivation in Wittgenstein’s later works to claim that there is a difference 
between semantically correct and incorrect language use, but deny that metaphysical 
considerations play any decisive role in those works. They may take that as a reason to reject 
realism-antirealism disputes altogether and argue that linguistic facts are merely facts about 
how language is used. For them, there is nothing more to be said about linguistic facts than 
that. Such a reading of Wittgenstein is an instance of the sort of scepticism I wanted to allow 
when I established the starting point just recalled above. Here is a prominent voice: 
 [P] articipants in the current disputes about realism and anti-realism make much of the 
claim that casting (or more accurately, miscasting) as many philosophical problems as 
possible in the framework of ‘realism’ and ‘anti-realism’ has far-reaching metaphysical 
implications. The achievement of this re-arrangement is held to be that it shows that the 
theory of meaning underlies metaphysics. This contention alone should have sufficed to 
show that something is deeply awry with presenting Wittgenstein in this setting. For he 
thought that the very idea of a theory of meaning is an absurdity, and adamantly denied 
that he was propounding one. Furthermore, he thought that metaphysics was at best 
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disguised grammatical trivialities, and more commonly simply nonsense. Any 
suggestion that Wittgenstein’s philosophical clarifications have metaphysical 
consequences is a sure sign that they have been misconstrued.139 
It should be clear that Wittgenstein’s views may have metaphysical consequences even if he 
did not intend them to. But I shall not explicitly deal with the exegetical question of whether 
the very idea of linguistic facts (and the realist or antirealist ways of spelling them out) is 
compatible with Wittgenstein’s reflections on meaning and rule-following. What I shall do 
instead is introduce Michael Dummett’s views on understanding and what it is for a speaker 
to know a language, how that relates to realism-antirealism debates and why remaining close 
to the starting point I have introduced is a genuine alternative.  
 Below I shall provide arguments for being sceptical about the relevance of realism-
antirealism debates to explaining semantic correctness and grasping as extrapolating. It will 
turn out that factual correctness cannot sufficiently ground semantic correctness. I shall also 
express worries about the very possibility of theories of meaning. But nevertheless, the 
arguments presented below are mainly meant to put pressure on any semantic realist’s view 
that factual correctness explains something crucial about objectively correct language use. 
The following dissection of Dummett’s views is hence supposed to merely aid the exposition 
of those arguments. 
 Achieving the goals just mentioned is not an easy task. We should bear firmly in mind 
that there is a loophole for the realist which sceptics about the value of realism-antirealism 
disputes notoriously downplay. The idea that there is an internal relation between 
understanding a proposition on the one hand and knowing what would be the case if it were 
true, on the other hand, is not only available to Wittgensteinians. The idea of such an internal 
relation is also available to those realists who claim that true propositions simply are 
obtaining facts––and that is a classical claim amongst realists interested in language use. Of 
course, propositions must then count as fully expressible by declarative sentences and by that-
clauses. Another constraint is that meaning and understanding be explained in terms of 
internal relations, which propositions and what makes them true merely exemplify without 
assuming a paradigmatic status. If such a view turns out to be available, realism is fully 
compatible with my Wittgensteinian proposal and, as I shall explain, the possibility of 
genuine realism-antirealism debates also ensues. 
 So, the big question is whether a realist is at all committed to hold that factual 
correctness governs (or is to be conflated with) semantic correctness. A further question is                                                         139 Hacker 1986:334‐5 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whether epistemological correctness is, as Boghossian holds, connected with factual 
correctness, because we should aim at believing only what is the case. It is, as will be argued, 
not a trivial matter to conceive of how the boundaries between semantics, epistemology and 
metaphysics are to be drawn. And even if such boundaries can be drawn, will it help to make 
sense of objectively correct language use in general? These difficult issues are the topic of the 
remainder of the present part of thesis. 
 
Language, Truth, and Meaning 
 
Fortunately enough, Dummett’s approach to realism and antirealism needs not be introduced 
and motivated from scratch in the present context. In a way, the rule-following debate and 
how it gave rise to the realist conception of correct language use––which conflates semantic 
and factual correctness––catapults us right into the heart of Dummett’s philosophy. The 
discussion about how meaning-facts are to be construed played the central role in part A of 
the present thesis. According to Dummett, that discussion must eventually become one about 
whether realism about meaning-facts is viable and how a language user can come to objective 
opinions about them. The discussion so far suggests that we should indeed follow Dummett 
here. 
 So, how to approach linguistic understanding? A language user’s understanding of any 
saying, transmitted through whatever medium, is tacit. That is to say that she need not be able 
to explicitly relate this understanding, a simple explanation like ‘that is how utterances in this 
language are understood’ suffices for non-philosophical purposes. Such tacit knowledge 
requires that language users possess a certain competence or practical ability which enables 
them to understand a language and hence informs production and reception of the language. 
Looking back at the starting point proposed above, we should expect an ability to use 
language non-arbitrarily to produce sayings based on objective grounds. We must hold that a 
language user takes her language use to be explainable––even if all that might be produced as 
objective grounds is a simple ‘I’ve always said that’ or, referring to a community of language 
users, ‘That’s just how we speak’. It is the ability to use a language, her linguistic competence 
and understanding, which explains why such simple explanations count as citing objective 
grounds at all. A full account of linguistic competence will be given in part C of the thesis, 
were everything will be centred around these issues, but it is important to bear in mind that 
present discussions already show that a clarification of the concept of linguistic competence is 
mandatory. 
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 We usually say that language users know a language. As the term ‘knowledge’ already 
suggests that such an understanding is objective, all we need to account for is its relation to 
facts, once we have spelled out what that understanding comes to. If we can, that is. For 
Dummett, knowledge of language is practical knowledge, but it is also propositional 
knowledge (which explains the former). In other words, knowing a language means implicitly 
knowing a set of propositions which characterise that language. A theory of meaning, then, 
explicitly relates those propositions and thereby explains what mastery of a language amounts 
to. Dummett writes: 
 Our problem is, therefore: What is it that a speaker knows when he knows a language, 
and what, in particular, does he thereby know about any given sentence of the language? 
Of course, what he has when he knows the language is practical knowledge, knowledge 
how to speak the language: but this is no objection to its representation as propositional 
knowledge; mastery of a procedure, of a conventional practice, can always be so 
represented, and, whenever the practice is complex, such a representation often provides 
the only convenient mode of analysis of it. Thus what we seek is a theoretical 
representation of a practical ability. Such a theoretical representation of the mastery of 
an entire language is what is called by Davidson, and will be called here, ‘a theory of 
meaning’ for the language; Davidson was, perhaps, the first to propose explicitly that 
the philosophical problems concerning meaning ought to be investigated by enquiring 
after the form which such a theory of meaning for a language should take.140 
I shall not discuss Donald Davidson’s proposal about how the practical ability in question can 
be represented. But we must note that the idea that knowledge of language is propositional 
leads Dummett directly to claim that a theory of meaning has to represent a body of 
knowledge that is at the same time propositional and tacit. Propositional knowledge is 
knowledge that something is thus-and-so and if this knowledge is also tacit, speakers tacitly 
know that something is thus-and-so. So speakers do supposedly know that certain things are 
thus-and-so without being aware that they know it. This claim is utterly strange, because it 
makes scant sense that speakers should ever surprise themselves by how they use language. 
So, what is wrong with that take on knowledge of language? 
 Tacit propositional knowledge, tacitly knowing that something is the case and tacitly 
identifying what is the case at the same time, depends on a one-way power to recognise facts. 
One-way powers like that are passive cognitive powers that are not subject to human volition, 
for if they were, they could not be tacit in the sense Dummett requires. But knowledge of 
language, qua ability to use language, is subject to human volition, because speakers can                                                         140 Dummett 1976:36 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intentionally misuse language no matter what the (linguistic) facts are. Speakers can simply 
decide to utter a nonsensical sentence, lie (i.e. utter something factually incorrect) or breach 
standards of politeness––anything goes as long as they are prepared to live with the 
consequences. So, the ability to use language is a two-way power, subject to human 
volition.141 It is presumptuous to assume right from the beginning that a theoretical 
representation, like a theory of meaning, can account for anything that is subject to human 
volition. This is so, because whatever is subject to human volition can be changed on a whim 
and accounting for that possibility would involve giving an account of (at least part of) human 
volition––and that is notoriously difficult. Justifying such an assumption requires, even if it 
was possible, much more than Dummett delivers. As Dummett’s proposal stands, he has 
simply made a category mistake by not distinguishing between one-way and two-way powers.  
 For those not already convinced by this, part C of the present thesis will provide more 
arguments against Dummett’s conception of knowledge of language as propositional. For the 
time being, we should be as generous as possible (for the sake of argument) and assume that a 
theory of meaning is supposed to explain a good deal––but not everything––of what sort of 
ability, qua two-way power, I have if I know a language. Such a theory, then, is not supposed 
anymore to represent the contents of the propositional knowledge of a language that a 
competent speaker has, but is expected to explain some central points of what knowledge of 
language (qua having an ability to use language) comes down to in theoretical terms. 
 Dummett considers three ways of approaching meaning: truth-conditional, 
verificationist and falsificationist. All three give truth and falsity a role to play, but only the 
first takes it that truth and falsity can fully explain knowledge of language. They are great 
specimens with which one can explain the relation of semantic and factual correctness, 
because they clarify the role factual correctness can possibly play in accounting for 
objectively correct language use. 
 
The Truth-Conditional Conception of Meaning and Understanding 
 
How can questions surrounding correct language use lead to the proposal that truth and falsity 
can explain knowledge of language? Dummett thinks that language use may involve an 
operator which requires that what it modifies be true or false.142 John says ‘the cat is on the 
mat’ and Jeff may want to say that that is wrong, because the cat is in the kitchen. He can now 
negate the thought expressed by John and say ‘it is not the case that the cat is on the mat’.                                                         141 This take on powers is drawn from Hacker 2007, who adopts it from Kenny 1976. 142  Dummett 1990:192 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Negation is an operator which requires, according to Dummett, that what it modifies be true 
or false. Hence, any language with negation fulfilling that function will require talk of truth 
and falsity to explain the tacit knowledge involved in the use of, at least some, sayings. I shall 
call anything said which is truth-evaluable a statement. Understanding a statement can hence 
be equated with knowing when the statement is true or false, with knowing, that is, the 
statement’s truth-conditions. This is the first candidate reason one might have to assume that 
truth and falsity can explain knowledge of language. 
 This first idea takes it that negation modifies contents of statements and that those 
contents are fully explained in terms of truth-conditions. Strictly speaking, negation thus 
conceived just reverses truth-conditions of statements. But what if negation in a language can 
also be used to emphasise another negation, as in “I did not do nothing wrong”? It is 
sometimes admissible and perfectly understandable that the speaker of such an utterance 
wants do say that he did nothing wrong and not that he did everything right. So, it is not 
always the case that negation reverses truth-conditions.  
 The problem here is twofold. First, the proposal attempts to explain how truth-
conditions are involved in understanding statements. Nothing is said whether we can deduce 
anything from this for imperatives, questions and other meaningful sayings. Second, there are 
statements containing negations, which do not reverse any truth-conditions. We thus need, 
pace Dummett, a better reason. 
 Here is the second candidate reason. When we first think about cases where we can 
distinguish factually correct from incorrect language use we naturally stumble across 
observation reports and other cases of perception-based assertion. Reporting ‘there is a tree’ 
when seeing one does usually not require much to find out whether uttering that sentence was 
a case of factually correct language use. We simply have to check whether there is a tree. In 
certain more complicated cases, we may also want to check whether there are plastic trees, 
miniature trees, tree-like shapes and the like in the vicinity in order to warrant the report as 
factually correct. We may even want to enquire into the cognitive state of the speaker, the 
meteorological circumstances and other factors to add warrant. At any rate, it appears that 
correctly asserting ‘There is a tree’ means stating something true and incorrectly asserting it 
means stating something false. And as we have already argued that the distinction between 
objectively correct and incorrect language use is mandatory for meaning, we can infer that 
truth and falsity are also mandatory for meaning. Adding that only statements can be true or 
false, we come to hold that truth and falsity are mandatory for the meaning of statements and 
that, for them, semantic and factual correctness go hand in hand. Tout court, we draw a 
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conclusion for meaning in general based on the finding that factual and semantic correctness 
fall together for observation statements and maybe also for other perception-based assertions. 
 We may then go on to formulate a first conjecture about the practical ability to utter 
and understand observation reports. It seems sensible to say that the practical ability solely 
consists in an ability to recognise under which circumstances observation reports like the 
statement ‘There is a tree’ are true and when they are false. We thus reduce the meaningful 
content of the statement to that which makes it truth-apt––its sense––and subtract the force 
with which that content is expressed––its assertoric, imperative, interrogative or subjunctive 
force––in the tokening of the statement. Following Dummett’s reading of Frege, we can then 
use this model to approach whole languages: 
If we apply a Fregean sense/force analysis to our sentences, we see the sentence as falling 
into two parts, that which conveys the sense of the sentence (the thought), and that which 
indicates the force which is being attached to it, assertoric, interrogative, imperatival, etc. 
It is the thought alone which is, from this standpoint, properly said to be true or false, 
whether we are asserting it to be true, asking whether it is true, commanding that it be 
made true, or whatever else. On such a view, therefore, someone who asks a (sentential) 
question or gives a command can be said to be saying something true or false with as 
much right as one who makes an assertion; and it is as much of a solecism to call the 
assertion ‘true’ or ‘false’ as it is to call a question or command.143 
According to this model, any sort of language use, be it asserting, asking or commanding, 
depends on something particular being the case and, maybe, other things not being the case in 
order to make it meaningful language use. Whatever is meaningful about it expresses a 
thought which can be true or false and only expressions of true thoughts will count as 
instances of correct language use. This point can be made more concisely: any meaningful 
saying involves stating something, even though implicitly. This unmasks the seemingly 
innocuous habit of calling assertions true or false: they are as aberrant as calling questions and 
commands true or false. Knowing a language hence eventually boils down to knowing how to 
coordinate sounds and signs on the one side with true thoughts on the other. That also entails 
that for every string of signs and for every sequence of sounds the competent language user 
should be able to decide, based on the occasion, whether it expresses a true thought or not 
and, if not, what it possibly contributes to the truth or falsity of a thought. It now seems that 
this is a simple and useful way of accounting for knowledge of language; call it the truth-
conditional conception of meaning and understanding. 
 Now, according to this view understanding meaningful statements is basically nothing                                                         143 Dummett 1976:47 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else than recognising under what circumstances they are true or false. Such recognising can 
obviously be described in terms of what somebody knows. It is hence appropriate for a 
proponent of truth-conditions, that knowledge of language is construed as propositional 
knowledge. So it could appear that my initial worries about construing knowledge of language 
as propositional language must not necessarily impress somebody who favours a truth-
conditional approach, because a truth-conditional conception of meaning and understanding 
need not be committed to tacit propositional knowledge of the sort I objected to. It seems to 
be enough if a language user recognises whether the circumstances she is in makes a 
statement true or false—a case of non-tacit knowledge. 
 Still, proponents of such a truth-conditional conception of meaning and understanding 
happily affirm that the propositions I know when I know a language can in principle also be 
believed, intended, liked, disliked etc., as such a view naturally flows from the assumption 
that the meaningful content of each of these attitudes can be described in truth-conditional 
terms. But it is precisely here where the pernicious combination of propositional content plus 
tacit knowledge reappears. The propositional (i.e. meaningful) content of these further states 
is also tacit, because the truth-conditions constituting it are usually tacit. After all, it makes 
little sense to suppose that people are aware of the truth-conditions that constitute the 
meaningful contents of their intentions or desires. Even if one holds that people can always, 
and as a matter of principle, come to recognise them, not everybody will be able to recognise 
or formulate the sort of complex theoretical representation that Dummett is after. We are back 
with the question we already put to Dummett: how is it to be explained that language use is 
subject to human volition and that, at the same time, knowledge of language is tacit and 
propositional? My objection hence still stands, a truth-conditional conception of meaning and 
understanding can hardly be said to explain all aspects of human language use. 
 Semantic realists obviously endorse truth-conditional conceptions of meaning and 
understanding, regardless of how they assess content-normativity. Boghossian’s conception of 
language use also reveals a nostalgic attitude towards truth-conditions. For him, the contents 
of statements are given through their truth-conditions and the meanings of words are 
determined by the conditions of their factually correct application, both of which––in turn––
are governed by epistemic rules. The other realist view––Hattiangadi’s anti-normativism––
endorses a more traditional semantic realism, because it does not make use of epistemic rules. 
Any finding about truth-conditions, how they might explain objectively correct language use 
and what their relation to realism is, can thus be expected to have an upshot for the two 
semantic realist conceptions of correct language use. Having said this, what are the standard 
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worries with truth-conditions and their explanatory value regarding language use?  
 One first worry is that we get two notions of correct language use due to the sense-
force distinction. One notion of correctness is used to tag expressions of true thoughts. We 
may call it correctness on the level of sense, which simply is semantic correctness explained 
in terms of truth-conditions. The other notion of correctness is used to tag appropriateness of 
force. We may call it pragmatic correctness. When I ask, pointing at a tree in a garden full of 
beeches and elms, ‘Is that a beech or an elm?’ that question is to be counted as correct in both 
ways. But if I command the tree ‘You be a beech or an elm!’, people would be startled, 
because it is hardly appropriate to talk to trees like that under normal circumstances. 
Nevertheless, whatever thought I have expressed may, according to a proponent of truth-
conditions, be true. ‘You be a beech or an elm!’ may contain a true thought, because the tree 
one is commanding is a beech or an elm. But the utterance will always be incorrect in a 
pragmatic sense. ‘You be a beech or an elm!’ is thus quite a clear case of a saying for which 
the two notions of correctness (i.e. semantic and pragmatic) can come apart. But ‘You be a 
beech or an elm!’ is a nonsensical utterance, it appears meaningless, as it is hard to understand 
how it can be meaningful merely because it contains the true thought that a tree in a garden 
full of beeches and elms is either a beech or an elm. Semantic correctness in truth-conditional 
terms cannot fully determine whether ‘You be a beech or an elm!’ is nonsensical unless 
pragmatic correctness comes to its aid. So, why should we draw a distinction between sense 
and force if, at the end of the day, both are needed to decide whether ‘You be a beech or an 
elm!’ is nonsense or not? It appears that the sense-force distinction does not at all dissect 
language use at its joints. 
 That first worry can be countered by admitting that the term ‘knowledge of language’ 
actually covers two distinct practical abilities; one to express true thoughts and one to express 
them appropriately. The first is investigated under the heading ‘semantics’ and the other is 
investigated under the heading ‘pragmatics’. If simplicity initially seemed to be a virtue of the 
truth-conditional approach, it cannot be said to be one anymore, for we just complicated the 
explanandum. One might even add that making such a distinction between semantics and 
pragmatics does not help at all, that it means missing the real issue, for we do not explain 
what it is to know a language unless we explain how one manages to coordinate the ability to 
express true thoughts and the ability to do so appropriately. Such an objection makes much of 
the idea that knowledge of language does not only––and certainly not centrally––involve 
expressing truth-evaluable thoughts, because pragmatics is just as important as semantics for 
understanding what knowledge of language is. Otherwise, ‘You be a beech or an elm!’ cannot 
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be identified, due to knowledge of English, as a nonsensical speech act. So, the whole 
approach of driving a wedge between semantics and pragmatics seems misconceived. But 
still, that first worry can only be developed into a fully convincing argument if we have an 
alternative conception of knowledge of language, which does not drive a wedge between 
semantics and pragmatics. In that case, we would argue against truth-conditional approaches 
that a better explanation of the phenomena is available.144 
 Dummett himself, because he sees no reason to abandon the sense-force distinction, 
has another sort of objection in mind. Consider whether the following assertions express true 
thoughts and what sort of conditions would make them so: 
1. If nobody likes this place, a city will never be built here. 
2. On the 3rd June 1973, the tree in front of my house had an even number of leaves. 
3. The expansion of Π contains twelve consequent 9s. 
While there might be conditions which make the three statements true or false, Dummett is 
more interested in the fact that we do not know whether they are decidable, because we 
cannot (in a finite time) ‘bring ourselves into a position in which we were justified either in 
asserting or denying’ the statements.145 Truth-conditional conceptions of meaning and 
understanding now seem to entail a puzzling claim about understanding. We can form and 
understand these statements, but there is no way we could actually decide whether they state 
true thoughts, as we cannot possibly apprehend the sort of conditions that could make them 
true or false. The problem is that truth-conditional conceptions demand that every thought 
expressed through a statement be either true or false––that is the principle of bivalence––and 
it also demands that knowledge of a language be explained in terms of the conditions under 
which we assign truth and falsity to statements. But these three examples illustrate a possible 
shortcoming in the case of undecidable statements. According to Dummett, 
there are three principal sentence-forming operations which are responsible for our 
capacity to frame undecidable sentences: the subjunctive conditional; the past tense (or, 
more generally, reference to inaccessible regions of space-time); and quantification over                                                         144 Baker & Hacker 1984a/b have argued at length that Frege’s reasons for introducing the distinction between sense and force are bogus and that the proponent of truth‐conditions, and any other meaning‐theorist who takes the distinction for granted, commit the same mistake by simply taking Frege’s word for it. Defenders of truth‐conditions have argued that it may in fact be possible to spell out the proposal in a way, which is sensitive to appropriate language use (for discussion of the problem, as it was posed in Lewis 1975, see Schiffer 1993 and Kölbel 1998). They claim that they can account for how we coordinate the ability to express true thoughts and the ability to do so in an appropriate way. But if Baker & Hacker are right, this sort of strategy cannot adequately deal with the worry, because it does not tackle the objection that the sense‐force distinction was bogus in the first place. Sophisticated defenders of truth‐conditional meaning‐theories (viz. Lewis, Schiffer and Kölbel) simply assume without further argument that we can live with it. But should we assume that that is enough? This is an important further question that must be asked if any truth‐conditional approach passes muster.  145 Dummett 1978:16 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unsurveyable or infinite totalities. Now the claim that we tend to appeal to the mastery of 
observational sentences as a model for the knowledge of the truth-conditions of a 
sentence is borne out by our surreptitious, or sometimes explicit, appeal to such a model 
when sentences involving these operations are in question. Since the sentences in 
question are not in principle decidable, the observations which we imagine as being made 
by some being with a different spatio-temporal perspective, or whose observational and 
intellectual powers transcend our own, such powers being modelled on those which we 
possess, but extended by analogy.146 
Some realists may be prepared to submit that our understanding of such statements depends 
on our ability to extrapolate from decidable cases in order to come up with a specification of 
the sort of conditions we need to speak of truth and falsehood. They should therefore also 
concede that the truth of a thought and, hence, the correct use of language can possibly 
transcend any speaker’s ability to decide whether that is so––call this principle ‘possible 
verification-transcendence’. This is, of course, merely a different way of expressing the 
problem of grasping as extrapolating. So, here appears a serious difficulty for anybody 
suggesting that truth-conditional conceptions of meaning and understanding are in a good 
position to answer Kripkensteinian scepticism: the concession that our abilities to extrapolate 
are limited and that, at the same time, there is always a correct further extrapolation does not 
at all suggest a solution to Kripkensteinian scepticism, but is an open invitation for such 
sceptical doubts. 
 How precisely does this affect the two realist approaches to semantic correctness? 
Hattiangadi bypasses the issue of possible verification-transcendence, even though it is 
precisely what semantic realists like her must explain to answer Kripkenstein’s justification 
question and to successfully account for objectively correct language use.147 In other words, 
she deliberately neglects discussing the one trait of truth-conditional conceptions of meaning 
and understanding which openly invites sceptical worries of the Kripkensteinian sort! 
Dummett’s way of phrasing the problem makes it clear that semantic realists are not in a 
position to straightaway assume that a truth-conditional approach has the means to 
successfully explain grasping as extrapolating. It is therefore urgent for the anti-normativist 
branch of semantic realism to meet this challenge. But now, pressure does not only come 
from the Kripkensteinian side, but also from Dummettian worries concerning how one can 
understand a statement, the truth-conditions of which are possibly verification transcendent. 
 Boghossian, who is more sensitive to these issues, explicitly claims that there is a                                                         146 Op. cit. p. 60 147 Hattiangadi 2007:2, footnote 2 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possibility that appealing to epistemic rules solves the issue.148 Dummett himself considers 
buttressing a truth-conditional approach with such auxiliary principles. Introducing 
Dummett’s proposal now will allow us to assess Boghossian’s prospects more clearly in a 
later section. 
 
Dummettian Verificationism: Intuitionism Besieges Theories of Meaning 
 
Dummett develops the second approach to meaning from his criticism of the truth-conditional 
conception of meaning and understanding. What, he thinks, is most unsatisfactory about it is 
how it uses the concepts of truth and falsity to explain meaning. On the basis of assigning 
truth-conditions to statements, we classify them, depending on the conditions in which they 
are made, as true or false. But such a classification, he claims, can only explain anything if 
there is a point in making the classification over and above simply recording the conditions in 
which it is true or false: 
Classifications do not exist in the void, but are connected always with some interest 
which we have, so that to assign something to one class or another will have 
consequences connected with this interest. A clear example is the problem of justifying a 
form of argument, deductive or inductive. Classification of arguments into (deductively 
or inductively) valid and invalid ones is not a game played merely for its own sake, 
although it could be taught without reference to any purpose or interest, say as a school 
exercise. Hence there is really a problem of showing that the criteria we employ for 
recognising valid arguments do in fact serve the purpose we intend them to serve: the 
problem is not to be dismissed––as it has long been fashionable to do––by saying that we 
use the criteria we use.149 
In application to meaning theories, we need to ask why we assign truth or falsity to a 
statement and we also need to ask what sort of principles license such classifications in 
general. Simply recording its use in truth-conditional terms will, as we have just argued, not 
do. As meaning theories aim at accounting for tacit knowledge, Dummett assumes that our 
tacit knowledge somehow contains the point of classifying statements. We should thus expect 
that an alternative theory of meaning also explains how we are justified in assuming that our 
words do have the meanings they have. We should, to put Dummett’s point in my 
terminology, ask on what grounds we take language use to be correct or incorrect in an 
epistemological sense, because correctness (i.e. truth for statements) often requires warrant.                                                         148 Boghossian 2008:134 149 Dummet  1959b: 3 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This is most naturally addressed by focusing on how we decide the truth-value of a statement 
and that, in turn, may be addressed by asking how we decide whether a form of argument is 
valid or not. 
 The second approach to knowledge of language to be introduced here operates with 
principles which allow us to decide whether an instance of language use is epistemically 
correct or not. The whole point of the new proposal is that we should adduce epistemological 
considerations about correctness, because merely conflating factual and semantic correctness 
is not sufficient. If we again focus on assertions, we can, for the sake of simplicity, still speak 
of truth and falsity of statements. But on the second approach, truth and falsity will not be 
playing the same centre-stage role as in full-fledged truth-conditional conceptions of meaning, 
for they can only play any role in so far as they are decidable according to the principles we 
decide to operate with. Factual and semantic correctness are thus to be buttressed with 
considerations about epistemological correctness. The model starts out from the intuitionistic 
account of the meaning of mathematical statements: 
The fundamental idea is that a grasp of the meaning of a mathematical statement consists, 
not in a knowledge of what has to be the case, independently of our means of knowing 
whether it is so, for the statement to be true, but in an ability to recognize, for any 
mathematical construction, whether or not it constitutes a proof of the statement; an 
assertion of such a statement is to be construed, not as a claim that it is true, but as a 
claim that a proof of it exists or can be constructed. The understanding of any 
mathematical expression consists in a knowledge of the way in which it contributes to 
determining what is to count as a proof of any statement in which it occurs. In this way, a 
grasp of the meaning of a mathematical sentence or expression is guaranteed to be 
something which is fully  displayed in a mastery of the use of mathematical language, for 
it is directly connected with that practice.150 
Note the role that practice plays here. Understanding an expression means understanding the 
role it plays in constructing a proof for any statement in which it occurs. The practice referred 
to here is a practice of having some particular ways of warranting one’s use of a language and 
it is exactly those ways of warranting which will also explain the formation of statements out 
of more basic expressions. 
 The truth or falsity of a statement will have a different weight as soon as we leave 
mathematics behind and look at other scientific discourses.151 This is easily seen in the case of 
any empirical statement for which we cannot have absolute warrant that it is true, but where                                                         150 Dummett 1976:70 151 Cf. Dummett 1963: 163 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all we can affirm is that it is probably true. A Higgs boson, for example, is the only particle of 
the Standard Model in particle physics that had never been observed directly, but it has been 
claimed recently that the Large Hadron Collider, a particle accelerator, made it possible to 
warrant that at least “higgs-like” bosons exist. But whatever evidence will be produced with 
the accelerator, the statement ‘Higgs bosons exist’ need only be probably true, as not many 
physicists these days will expect the statement to have meaning unless it is determinately true 
or false.152 This is simply because research in particle physics is conducted in probabilistic 
terms and it is highly controversial whether those terms have to be understood in truth-
conditional terms in order to be meaningful at all. A certain particle is normally deemed to 
exist if it occurs with a particular frequency in some specific experimental setting. It suffices 
for practical purposes that the probabilistic terms are useful without any further explanation of 
their meaning in truth-conditional terms. So, would it not be ridiculous if a philosopher of 
language corrected the language use of the physicists operating the Large Hadron Collider 
because it does not comply with his favourite conception of meaning? If you find it 
ridiculous, you may count the example as another objection against truth-conditional 
conceptions of meaning. Otherwise, you will have to argue that understanding and 
meaningfully employing probabilistic terms in particle physics requires that every statement 
in such terms be reducible to a statement in truth-conditional terms for which the principles of 
bivalence and possible verification-transcendence hold. I shall not claim here that such a 
reduction is impossible, but I do think that it shows at how high a price the truth-conditional 
approach has to be bought––and, to boot, what attitude towards non-philosophical research it 
ultimately expresses. 
 There are two possible ways of clarifying the role of the concept of warrant in 
Dummett’s second approach. A first way is to take the role of proof for the meaning of 
mathematical statements seriously and to find something that fulfils an analogous role in 
natural language use. A second way (it will be discussed in the next section) builds on the 
idea that being warranted may simply mean that defeasibility criteria are not fulfilled, i.e. that 
for a statement which counts as default-warranted there is no evidence which shows that it is 
in fact not warranted. 
 Let us concentrate on the first role of the concept of warrant for the moment. 
According to this view, understanding any statement means that we can either decide, in 
principle, if its utterance is correct, if it is not or if we cannot decide it at all. Understanding a                                                         152 Einstein was notorious for insisting that statements in particle physics are determinately true or false, no matter whether we know it or not. Such a perspective, informed by classical determinism, is not something many contemporary physicists adopt. 
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statement, grasping its meaning, means that we know in principle how to verify the 
correctness or incorrectness of its application or, at least, how to verify that we cannot decide 
it. To know in principle how truths are established does not mean that we actually can do so, 
only that we are able to recognise when a truth can be counted as established. This is a 
verificationist approach to meaning commonly associated with Michael Dummett. He writes 
about how to arrive at a verificationist theory of meaning, starting from the intuitionist 
construal of mathematical statements: 
 Proof is the sole means which exists in mathematics for establishing a statement as true: 
the required general notion is, therefore, that of verification. On this account, an 
understanding of a statement consists in a capacity to recognize whatever is counted as 
verifying it, i.e. as conclusively establishing it as true. It is not necessary that we should 
have any means of deciding the truth or falsity of the statement, only that we be capable 
of recognizing when its truth has been established. The advantage of this conception is 
that the condition for a statement's being verified, unlike the condition for its truth under 
the assumption of bivalence, is one which we must be credited with the capacity for 
effectively recognizing when it obtains; hence there is no difficulty in stating what an 
implicit knowledge of such a condition consists in––once again, it is directly displayed 
by our linguistic practice.153 
Consider again the three undecidable statements which pose a challenge for the truth-
conditional approach: 
1. If nobody likes this place, a city will never be built here. 
2. On the 3rd June 1973, the tree in front of my house had an even number of leaves. 
3. The expansion of Π contains twelve consequent 9s. 
How can Dummett’s verificationist deal with them? Well, after considering them carefully he 
may come up with a way of deciding for at least some of such cases that he cannot decide 
whether these sentences are true or false. Nevertheless, he has a way of deciding whether a 
sentence is decidable and, hence, an understanding of those sentences according to 
verificationism. For such sentences, we will have an account of what it is to understand them, 
but the principle of bivalence does not hold, because we have verified their undecidability. 
Now, as the principle of bivalence is part of classical logic, we have to revise our logic if it is 
to remain metaphysically relevant. That is to say that if we want a logic which can adequately 
deal with thought and talk about reality, we cannot adopt any logic which does not allow for 
undecidable statements.154 
 The general strategy for dealing with undecidable statements is adopted, again, from                                                         153 Dummett 1976:70‐71 154 Cf. op. cit. pp. 75‐76  
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intuitionism and how it deals with very large or infinite totalities in mathematics. Dummett 
makes explicit that the intuitionist commits himself to the concept of potential infinity and 
that that concept requires that the mathematician grasps some general principles governing the 
analysis of statements involving infinity: 
[A] proof of a universally quantified statement will be an operation which, applied to 
each natural number, will yield a proof of the corresponding instance; and, if this 
operation is carried out for each natural number, we shall have proof of denumerably 
many statements. The conception of the mental construction which is the fully analysed 
proof as being an infinite structure must, of course, be interpreted in the light of the 
intuitionist view that all infinity is potential infinity: the mental construction consists of a 
grasp of general principles according to which any finite segment of the proof could be 
explicitly constructed. The direction of analysis runs counter to the direction of 
deduction; while one could not be convinced by an actually infinite proof-structure 
(because one would never reach the conclusion), one may be convinced by a potentially 
infinite one, because its infinity consists in our grasp of the principles governing its 
analysis. Indeed, it might reasonably be said that the standard intuitionistic meanings of 
the universal and conditional quantifiers involve that a proof is such a potentially infinite 
structure.155 
The verificationist is thus committed to hold that understanding undecidable statements of the 
form presented will involve that the competent language user grasps some general principles 
which govern the analysis of such statements. The appeal to generality should account, in the 
case of mathematics, for the fact that we understand potential infinitude; in the case of natural 
languages, it can only be meant to account for the fact that we can verify whether any 
statement is potentially decidable. The commitment to general principles results, for the 
verificationist, in a view of the knowledge of language according to which we tacitly know 
how to verify whether any statement we encounter is potentially decidable––and that should 
be, something that happens (given how quickly we understand language) in an astonishingly 
short time. Verificationism hence builds on weighty presuppositions about how much 
cognitive labour lies behind the knowledge of language. 
 For a verificationist, the general principles of verification license an extrapolation of 
new correct language uses based on a finite set of correct language uses. But sceptical doubts 
about whether I grasp the general principles of verification that justify one use rather than 
another are still possible. A Kripkensteinian sceptic may always claim that I grasp an 
alternative principle of verification which is compatible with the finite set of correct language                                                         155 Dummett 1973: 242 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uses from which I extrapolate, but which renders incorrect the answer I deem correct. So, we 
may not want to understand warranted language use in this way, as simply assuming such 
large amounts of cognitive labour going on tacitly may seem hasty (or even preposterous)––
especially since Kripkenstein’s sceptic lurks in the background. There are therefore good 
reasons to suppose that in natural languages, warrant is not obtained by conclusive 
verification even though one may be convinced that, in the case of mathematical statements, it 
is actually obtained by proof. Does Dummett have another option? 
 
Falsificationism as an Alternative? 
 
So far, we have focused on the correctness-conditions of assertions, rather than on their 
incorrectness-conditions, in order to clarify the relation of meaning and truth which exercised 
Dummett so much. The reason for doing so was that the sort of assertions we have in 
observation reports are fully explained by saying under what conditions or based on what 
verification-principles one can warrantedly report what one sees. In the case of assertion, 
then, one warrantedly says what is the case and correct language use depends on that. It is in 
this sense that correctness can be thought to explain assertion. But does it? If that were right, 
somebody who constantly and exclusively asserts what is obvious (because he does not want 
to say anything incorrect) would exhibit a full understanding of assertion. It seems odd to say 
he does, because understanding assertions also involves being aware under which 
circumstances it is inapposite to assert the obvious. The reason is that assertions do not 
exclusively report what is and, sometimes, whether they are correct does not matter much as 
long as they are not incorrect. This latter idea is exemplified by the assertion that there is an 
infinitude of stars. The assertion that there is an infinitude of stars need not be correct to pass 
muster in a conversation as long as it is not (warrantedly) incorrect. So it seems that 
accounting for the correctness conditions of assertions requires more pragmatic considerations 
than supposed so far. Does this indicate anything new concerning correct language use in 
general? It seems, as will be argued, that Dummet thinks so. 
 Dummett reminds us explicitly that ‘[s]aying something false and saying something 
neither true nor false are two distinct ways of making an incorrect assertion’.156 It goes 
without saying that there is only one way of making a correct assertion and that is by saying 
something true. So it seems that the incorrectness-conditions of assertions are more 
informative than the correctness-conditions. Characterising assertions in terms of their                                                         156 Dummett 1991:49 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correctness-conditions only will miss this point and that will of course seem particularly 
interesting (and upsetting) for Dummett’s verificationist for whom undecidable statements 
merit a place in logic. But even if incorrectness-conditions were more informative, does that 
additional information really help clarifying the meaning of assertions? 
 Let me give two examples to boost some intuitions about how assertions are used. 
John expects Jeff to be late and takes his time while getting prepared. I am all ready to go and 
I am also getting upset with John, because he is, I think, intentionally wasting time. Jeff has, 
without my knowing, just left his office, but it is not sure whether he will make it in time. I 
assert ‘Jeff is coming on time’ and am thus saying something neither true nor false, because it 
is not sure that he will make it in time. In that case, I simply want John to get ready faster. It 
is more important for me that John speeds up than that my report was right. 
 If ‘correct’ is to mean ‘serves a legitimate purpose’, my assertion was correct and it 
can be explained in terms of its correctness-conditions. Even though correctness must have 
something to do with what is the case, namely facts about whether Jeff can make it in time, 
the assertion’s correctness will collapse into its serving a legitimate purpose, for there are no 
facts about whether Jeff can make it. But we should not want to explain the meaning of such 
an assertion purely in terms of speakers’ (legitimate) purposes, for that would deprive the 
notion of correctness of its status as marking objectively correct language use.  
 In order to come up with a more refined notion of assertion that safeguards the 
objectivity of correctness through preserving its connection with truth, we can hold that the 
assertion ‘Jeff is coming on time’ is objectively not incorrect if there are no facts about 
whether Jeff can make it, but still serves a legitimate purpose. That refined notion has it that 
my utterance ’Jeff is coming on time’ has a meaning which is determined by objective 
incorrectness-conditions even in cases in which there are no discernible facts about whether 
Jeff can make it. For such cases, the assertion is objectively not incorrect, because it serves a 
legitimate purpose and unless there is evidence suggesting that there is no such purpose, the 
assertion’s status as objectively not incorrect cannot be toppled and making the assertion 
remains warranted by default.  
 The example pushes intuitions, which present the correctness of assertion as a 
borderline case between semantic and pragmatic correctness without letting it collapse into 
language users’ purposes. This is something anybody should welcome who felt that the truth-
conditional conception of meaning illegitimately drove a wedge between semantic and 
pragmatic correctness and who were wary about appeals to principles of verification. Still, 
one might insist that the example just conflates semantic and pragmatic issues and for them it 
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still remains to be shown what this discussion of assertion amounts to.  
 Dummett writes that assertions are not like answers in a quiz programme, which we 
should expect if correctness was the fundamental notion in explaining assertion as a linguistic 
act.157 Assertions are, usually, also guides to action for the hearer (just as, Dummett claims, 
judgements are ‘guides to action on the part of the thinker’) by inducing certain expectations 
in her. Expectations, on the other hand, often have their content determined by what surprises 
us. In other words, expectations are not to be explained by what fulfils them in the most usual 
cases, but by what is not in accord with them. In the example, John’s expectation, induced by 
my assertion, that Jeff comes soon would result in surprise if Jeff took 10 more minutes.  
 Wittgenstein proposes an analogous take on expectations in the Philosophical 
Investigations § 577. He writes that ‘I expect him’ means the same as ‘I would be surprised if 
he did not come’ when we believe that he comes, but are not preoccupied by whether he does. 
The use of the word ‘expect’ in such cases can thus be adequately explained by what would 
surprise us. So it seems that Dummett and Wittgenstein are after an exclusionist account of 
expectation here: listing what would count as a surprise amounts to saying what would count 
as not fulfilling the expectation and if that fully characterises the expectation, the expectation 
has been explained in terms of what the expectation excludes as a surprise or a frustration.
 But how exactly does this help with explaining meaning and, especially, the 
objectivity of language use? The idea is, so Dummett’s line of thought, that we can learn 
something about assertion here, which the other two approaches (viz. truth-conditional and 
verificationist) neglect. Nevertheless, caution is required, because if expectations are meant to 
be more than merely analogous to assertion, we might jeopardise objectivity again, for 
language users’ expectations should not count too much for what correct language use comes 
down to. And even if there is merely an analogy between expectations and assertions, is it not 
problematic that the contents of our expectations are not always transparent to others while 
the contents of assertions must be transparent to others if they are to understand it at all? 
 There is no sign that Dummett wants to throw the notion of objectivity overboard. All 
that he is after is the intuition that there may be an interesting asymmetry between correctness 
and incorrectness. In an early classic paper, Dummett draws on an analogy between asserting 
and obeying a command.158 If the assertion turns out to be incorrect, I have to withdraw it, but 
nothing further happens. As long as it does not turn out to be incorrect I can, as was just 
argued, take as established what it asserts and act on it. Something similar is true in the case 
of obedience. There are no further consequences if I correctly comply with an order, but there                                                         157 Dummett 1976:82 158 Dummet 1959b:8‐12 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are if I disobey. Correctness and incorrectness are asymmetrical in these cases, because 
asserting and obeying are only fully explained by reference to what consequences follow if 
one incorrectly asserts or disobeys. Explaining these concepts in terms of correctness only 
will miss that aspect and as correctness can be introduced in terms of incorrectness, a full 
explanation of these concepts can be made in terms of incorrectness alone. And so we should, 
for the other options cannot accommodate these observations about assertion and 
disobedience. Truth-conditional approaches to meaning and verificationism construe 
correctness either as not requiring any consequences––certain things just have to be true––or, 
in the case of verificationism, as verifiable, which can require that certain consequences 
obtain, but that is not mandatory. So the whole discussion of assertion amounts to arguing that 
there is an asymmetry between correct and incorrect language use and that we should 
investigate further whether we can gain a better analysis of meaning and understanding from 
this, because what we mean by an utterance and how we understand something has 
consequences and these consequences are also (at least in part) constitutive of meaning and 
understanding. How, then, does Dummett characterise this alternative approach to meaning 
and understanding? And more precisely, how must the notion of a consequence be understood 
here? 
 On the assumption that assertion has a central place in language use, we can now 
formulate the third approach to meaning. The remarks about assertion have a clear upshot for 
Dummett: 
These considerations prompt the construction of a different theory of meaning, one which 
agrees with the verificationist theory in making use only of effective rather than 
transcendental notions, but which replaces verification by falsification as the central 
notions of the theory: we know the meaning of a sentence when we know how to 
recognize that it has been falsified.[...] [A] falsification theory does not relate the meaning 
of a sentence directly to the grounds of an assertion made by means of it at all. Instead, it 
links the content of an assertion with the commitment that a speaker undertakes in 
making that assertion; an  assertion is a kind of gamble that the speaker will not be proved 
wrong.159 
In his The Logical Basis of Metaphysics, Dummett calls the falsificationist conception of 
meaning and understanding a pragmatist theory and writes: 
A pragmatist meaning-theory, whose central notion is that of the consequences of a 
statement […], is less readily envisaged [than a verificationist meaning-theory], 
principally because of the dependence of the consequences for a subject of accepting a                                                         159 Dummett 1976:83‐84 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statement as true upon his contingent purposes and wishes. There is, nevertheless, no 
reason to suppose that a suitable notion of consequences, independent of individual 
desire, cannot be disentangled and made the basis of a meaning-theory.160 
Note here that a falsificationist/pragmatist theory offers an account of the sort of knowledge 
we have when we know a language which is rather different from what the other two 
approaches to meaning attempt. The truth-conditional conception makes claims about how we 
tacitly connect statements to conditions in which they are true. Verificationists have to specify 
by what general principles we tacitly decide whether the truth of a statement is established (or 
any linguistic act is appropriate). Falsificationist explanations of what it is to know a language 
will only have to specify under what conditions statements are false––and what it is to thereby 
breach a commitment.161 It does not provide a full representation of what it is to know a 
language, it only marks, so to say, its borders by recording when it fails. It does, however, 
require a suitable notion of consequence independent of individual desires if it is to account 
for objectively incorrect language use as we require it.  
 Nevertheless, the falsificationist approach might provide a simpler way of accounting 
for how undecidable statements are understood––once a suitable notion of consequence has 
been found––as it only has to list situations in which they count as incorrect language use. 
There will be no further claims about the cognitive command of language users or the 
obtaining facts of an external reality in understanding such statements. 
 The falsificationist approach that Dummett suggests here is similar to the exclusionist 
strategy against the sceptical paradox that we have found in Kripkenstein’s sceptical solution 
in part A. The main differences are that Dummett focuses on assertions and that he introduces 
his falsificationism as a possible basis for a theory of meaning which fully explains 
knowledge of language. We should doubt that such a theory can be erected on the 
falsificationist basis Dummett proposes. The main reason for such doubts is that a full 
characterisation of language use (and the meaning of any linguistic expression contained in it) 
cannot be given in terms of what counts as (objectively) incorrect language use, because we 
cannot systematically check every particular instance of language use and we must give up 
the idea that the correctness of language use is directly related to what is the case. Especially 
having to give up the idea that correctness often directly depends on what is the case is a 
deplorable feature of Dummett’s falsificationism. While truth-conditional approaches 
construe reality and language as too tightly interwoven, falsificationism spins in a void,                                                         160 Dummett 1991:320 161 Recall that Dummett introduces falsificationism by examining the difference between correct and incorrect assertions. 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because by only excluding incorrect language uses, we never arrive at linguistic expressions 
which do directly and objectively refer to what is. 
 Recall, the exclusionist strategy was devised to secure self-ascriptions of meaning 
something by a linguistic expression against Kripkenstein’s sceptic. It did not profess that it 
can be the basis for a theory of meaning. But there is, one might argue, something else it can 
do. We may, pace Dummett, find that detailed enquiries into meaning are empirical enquiries 
which are to be conducted within linguistics––and not within philosophy––anyway. The 
exclusionist strategy could perhaps be used to argue that research in linguistics is not subject 
to Kripkensteinian worries if it fulfils a certain requirement. The requirement would be that 
any research programme within linguistics is committed to an exclusionist strategy against the 
sceptical worries and that the same exclusionist strategy can be used to make sense of the 
difference between objectively correct language use and purportedly correct language use. It 
is a philosophical task to show that the requirement can be fulfilled, but it may be an entirely 
linguistic task to give a more detailed analysis of meaning, understanding and knowledge of 
language afterwards. 
 One problem with this way of promoting an exclusionist strategy is that it does not 
explain grasping as extrapolating. There are linguistic extrapolations of language users in 
novel situations and at least some of them can count as correct and others count as incorrect––
that is nothing we can explain in terms of the consequences of taking some extrapolations as 
correct and others as incorrect. The problem is, of course, that exclusionism must presuppose 
that there are already extrapolations available for which we can set out the consequences of 
taking them to be correct or incorrect. In other words, anything that can count as a 
consequence or that can count as having consequences must be characterised independently of 
the consequences.  
 Another problems is that it is not at all clear what ‘consequence’ means here. 
Exclusionists must come up with a suitable notion without presupposing any sort of content 
which can be the consequence of another content (and vice versa). So it seems that 
exclusionism is bound to commit a petition fallacy if no further assumptions about content are 
made. And these further assumptions must necessarily be independent of what can be 
explained by exclusion. 
 We now have gained sufficient background knowledge of Dummett’s views on 
language, truth and meaning and on the problems involved in the sort of knowledge language 
users have because they know a language. This allows us to introduce Dummett’s famous 
approach to realism and antirealism and to achieve a more detailed story about semantic 
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realism. It is, however, already clear that Dummett’s writings, as considered so far, provide 
good reasons to be very sceptical about the viability of semantic realist approaches––it seems 
more plausible that a different proposal is required if issues surrounding objectivity and 
justification come into view. 
 
Meaning, Realism and Antirealism 
 
A dispute between realists and antirealists about a fact is prima facie a dispute in metaphysics. 
It is a dispute about the reality of the fact and about its place in the world. How come that 
Dummett’s theories of meaning are thought to form the background for such metaphysical 
issues? The missing link here is Dummett’s conception of philosophy: 
Only with Frege was the proper object of philosophy finally established: namely, first, 
that the goal of philosophy is the analysis of the structure of thought; secondly, that the 
study of thought is to be sharply distinguished from the study of the psychological 
process of thinking; and, finally, that the only proper method for analysing thought 
consists in the analysis of language. As I have argued, the acceptance of these three tenets 
is common to the entire analytical school; but, during the interval between Frege’s time 
and now, there have been within that school many somewhat wayward misinterpretations 
and distortions of Frege’s basic teaching, and it has taken nearly a half-century since his 
death for us to apprehend clearly what the real task of philosophy, as conceived by him, 
involves.162 
Chances are that Frege did, in fact, not hold this view about philosophy, but that is not to be 
discussed here.163 Dummett’s conception of analytic philosophy has it that scientists, 
mathematicians for example, are interested in establishing the truth or falsity of statements, 
e.g. mathematical statements, whereas philosophers are rather interested in how statements 
are endowed with sense, i.e. meaning.164 It is based on this view that he gives the enquiry into 
meaning a central role in philosophy: 
[T]he theory of meaning is the fundamental part of philosophy which underlies all others. 
Because philosophy has, as its first if not its only task, the analysis of meanings, and 
because, the deeper such analysis goes, the more it is dependent upon a correct general 
account of meaning, a model for what the understanding of an expression consists in, the 
theory of meaning, which is the search for such a model, is the foundation of all 
                                                        162 Dummett 1975c:458 163 Compare Baker & Hacker 1984b where the issue is discussed. 164 Cf. Dummett 1975c:443 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philosophy, and not epistemology as Descartes misled us to believing.165 
I shall not discuss whether Dummett is right about what analytic philosophy is.166 More 
interesting for present purposes is the upshot of this for the metaphysical debates between 
realists and antirealists. As antirealism is defined as any position which does not accept realist 
claims as readily available and true, the characterisation of realism and its prospects will be of 
primary importance. Dummett claims that realism, as a position in metaphysics, produces 
nothing but metaphors unless the realist’s tenets are couched in terms of what she means 
when she makes metaphysical claims. The realist, then, has a specific theory of meaning 
based on which she engages in metaphysical disputes and the antirealist must have an 
opposing theory in order to have any say at all. 
 Now, the realist about the external world, to take a popular example, claims that facts 
about the external world are independent of thought and talk. If there were no such 
independence, it would be nonsense to speak of the world being external. What theory of 
meaning can the realist now employ to live up to Dummett’s standards and become a 
semantic realist? She will have to claim that the understanding of undecidable statements 
about the external world consists in one’s grasp of their truth-conditions, she will, hence, 
adopt a full-blown truth-theoretical conception of meaning and understanding. All disputes 
between realists and antirealists will become disputes about what understanding some class of 
statements, which are not known to be decidable, comes down to. 
 Take the statement ‘The expansion of Π contains twelve consequent 9s’. It makes 
sense to ask whether it is true and, hence, under which conditions it would be so. Still, it is 
undecidable, because we cannot expect to bring ourselves in a finite time into a position in 
which we can justifiably assert or deny it; we can’t even justifiably say that it is impossible to 
decide whether there is such a position. The semantic realist about statements concerning 
properties of Π claims that the statement is determinately either true or false and that the 
truth-conditions are possibly verification-transcendent, for we might indeed have no means to 
decide the matter. A semantic realist about a class of statements does thus commit herself to 
the principle of bivalence and to the principle of possible verification-transcendence. 
 Note that the principle of bivalence is not fully explained unless it is added that any                                                         165 Dummett 1973/81:669 166 But let me say something about why I do not engage with this. Nowadays, many professional philosophers who are considered analytic philosophers do not at all comply with Dummett’s standards, famous examples comprise Robert Stalnaker and Gareth Evans. Furthermore, the very idea that there is or has ever been such a thing as the analytic school has come under attack (cf. Glock 2008). It is far from clear how Dummett’s position can withstand scrutiny if we examine the variety of what philosophers, who are deemed to be analytic philosophers, actually do.  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statement be not only true or false, but be determinately so: 
The principle of bivalence is not fully expressed merely by saying that every statement 
is either true or false: it is the principle that every statement is determinately either true 
or false. What is the force of qualifying a disjunction by the adverb ‘determinately’? [...] 
[T]he idea may be expressed by appeal to the concept of knowledge: if, determinately, 
one of two possibilities holds, then, if someone neither knows that the first possibility 
holds nor knows that the second one does, there is something that he does not know. 
This may be put in terms of God’s omniscience: God must know which of the two 
possibilities holds, that is, must  either know that the first one does or know that the 
second one does.167 
Explained in these terms, we immediately perceive that the principle of possible verification-
transcendence is, according to Dummett, contained within the principle of bivalence. The 
second is sufficient for the first, as the semantic realist holds that whether a statement is true 
or false is determinately so, no matter what we could possibly verify. But is that an entirely 
semantic issue? If the principle of possible verification-transcendence is perceived as an 
epistemological principle and the principle of bivalence is perceived to be a semantic 
principle, we may be led to assume that Dummett’s position views semantics and 
epistemology as tightly interwoven. I do not think that this is a natural way of reading 
Dummett. His insistence on the primacy of meaning-cum-truth theories for all of analytic 
philosophy must imply that the principle of possible verification-transcendence is, at least for 
a semantic realist, a semantic principle and not an epistemological one (even though adopting 
it has epistemological consequences). Making this assumption also allows us to consider the 
exact relation of semantics and epistemology in a second step after the status of metaphysical 
issues has been clarified. The dialectical option of dissociating possible verification-
transcendence from bivalence will be discussed more thoroughly below. 
 In some analogy to the discussion about whether truth-conditions can be the sole basis 
of a viable theory of meaning, the semantic realist has to face two main arguments: 1) the 
acquisition argument and 2) the manifestation argument. The first questions how it is possible 
that we have acquired an understanding of undecidable statements if such an understanding 
involves grasping potentially verification-transcendent truth-conditions which we learn to 
recognize as obtaining when they obtain. The second argument questions how we can 
manifest that understanding in actual language use if our use is only responsive to conditions 
which we recognize as obtaining when they obtain.168                                                         167 Dummett 1991:75 168 Cf. Miller 2006:984‐6 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 In the following sections I shall discuss an objection against Dummett’s 
characterisation of realism-antirealism disputes. One can ask whether it is possible to sever 
the link between Dummett’s conception of philosophy as centrally concerned with theories of 
meaning and his views on realism; this will also involve asking whether semantic 
considerations still contribute to the issue if the relevance of theories of meaning for 
metaphysics is rejected. If theories of meaning prove irrelevant to metaphysics, realist-
antirealist disputes may become entirely metaphysical disputes again. But even in that case 
there are, as I shall argue below, some semantic or epistemological constraints on 
metaphysical disputes that must remain nevertheless. I shall then explore such alternative 
constraints on metaphysical disputes. 
 The overall aim is to argue that we must not conflate meaning-theoretic and 
metaphysical issues. More specifically, I shall argue against realist conceptions of correct 
language use that their semantic realism is of no avail to secure a suitable notion of objectivity 
and that a common sense realism should not require a semantic realist conception of 
correctness either. It will deal the death blow to the anti-normativist realist proposal, because 
they illicitly assume that their appeal to factual-cum-semantic correctness-conditions 
automatically secures objective justification and, conversely, that a common sense realist 
must adopt their particular brand of correctness-conditions. After that, only Boghossian’s 
robust realism plus epistemic rules and my Wittgensteinian proposal remain. 
 
Miller on Truth-Conditions and Reality 
 
The most important worry about Dummett’s characterisation of realism is, of course, that it is 
always to be a semantic realism. This ensues from Dummett’s view that a philosopher’s task 
is to analyse the meaning of statements in metaphysics and other areas. But if we engage in 
metaphysical discussions, we want to talk about what things there are in general and what 
their nature is. To many contemporary metaphysicians, the idea that we merely engage in a 
particular dispute about semantics when arguing about metaphysics is not at all appealing. In 
order to make explicit what goes on behind the curtains, Alexander Miller has introduced the 
notion of a worldview: 
A worldview consists of at least a metaphysics (an account of what there is and its nature 
in general), an epistemology (an account of how we can possess knowledge of the objects 
and properties included in the metaphysics), and a semantics (an account of how we can 
talk and think about objects and properties included in the metaphysics). A plausible 
worldview is a worldview in which each of the components is itself plausible, and in 
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which the components are at least mutually compatible. […] An alternative to Dummett’s 
conception of the relationship between the theory of meaning and metaphysics could be 
spelt out as follows: it is the job of philosophy to find a worldview in which the various 
elements, metaphysical, epistemological, and so on, are individually plausible and 
mutually integrated, and in carrying out this job no one of the various aspects, 
metaphysical, epistemological, semantic,  and so on, has any a priori priority over the 
others.169 
I shall shortly consider arguments to the effect that semantics, construed as being about 
theories of meaning only, has no a priori priority over metaphysics. But I shall also argue that 
there are good reasons to assume that some epistemological or semantic (although not 
meaning-theoretic) considerations still constrain the domain of sensible metaphysical 
discourse. 
 Realism-antirealism debates, if construed as purely metaphysical disputes (within an 
appropriately restricted context), turn out to simply address questions like the old ‘Does a 
falling tree in the forest make a noise if nobody hears it?’ and such debates then appear to be 
debates about what is independently of thought and talk. That is a very natural way to frame 
those debates; whether it is viable is another issue. 
 Alexander Miller’s arguments against Dummett are meant to take a step in that 
direction. He attempts to sever the bonds between truth-conditional theories of meaning and 
realism about the external world by showing that a plausible realism need not be committed to 
such a particular conception of meaning and understanding. Dummett, on the other hand, 
takes any sensible realism to be committed to truth-conditional theories of meaning. If Miller 
can come up with a conception of realism which is intuitively appealing and which is not 
committed to such a theory of meaning, he will have shown that being a realist does not 
require adopting that specific theory of meaning and that not every realist need be a semantic 
realist. The upshot for issues surrounding correct language use––at least as perceived by 
semantic realists like Hattiangadi––will then be that factual and semantic correctness are not 
to be conflated until it has been shown conclusively that one’s realist views license (or even 
necessitate) specific semantic commitments. 
 Instead of considering realism about stones, tress, tables, physical forces, molecules, 
social systems, currencies and governments, we can (for our purposes) just consider a 
forthright realism about the external world. Once that passes muster, it will be a further 
question what we want to be part of that world. Here is Miller’s proposal:                                                         169 Miller 2006:988‐989; there is a stronger position that metaphysics has an a priori priority over the others. Below I argue that metaphysics is subject to semantic constraints and I hope to apply this insight to the stronger position in a future paper. 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(Common-Sense Realism) 
Tokens of most current observable common-sense and scientific physical types 
objectively exist independently of the mental; and they possess some properties which 
may pass altogether unnoticed by human consciousness; and their innermost nomological 
secrets may remain forever hidden from us.170 
Now, the big question is whether a proponent of common-sense realism is committed to a 
truth-conditional conception of meaning and understanding. According to Dummett, the 
answer is ‘yes’. For him, common-sense realism and a truth-conditional conception of 
meaning and understanding form a packet deal which he calls semantic realism and he 
advances arguments against it, namely the acquisition and the manifestation argument. But 
what if they are not necessarily a packet deal, for some proponents of common-sense realism 
turn out not to be committed to such a theory of meaning? What do the acquisition and the 
manifestation argument argue against in such a case? If Dummett’s arguments against 
semantic realism turn out to be compelling, we would have a new option. We could either 
reject common-sense realism or truth-conditional theories of meaning. The mere 
conceivability of rejecting either in such a case shows that Dummett’s arguments against 
semantic realism can be used to argue that an intuitively appealing realism is not committed 
to a truth-conditional theory of meaning. 
 Dummett’s main arguments against semantic realism challenge the idea that the 
following three assumptions––which are all constitutive of Dummettian semantic realism––
cohere:171 
1. Understanding a statement is a matter of grasping its truth-conditions 
2. Truth is epistemically unconstrained 
3. Understanding a statement means possessing a complex of practical abilities to use it 
correctly 
The truth-conditional conception of meaning and understanding commits the semantic realist 
to assumption 1, because it links linguistic understanding with the principle of bivalence. This 
assumption by itself is sufficient for Dummettian semantic realism. To see this, consider that 
at least one reading of assumption 2 follows from assumption 1 due to the possible 
verification-transcendence of truth-conditions that the principle of bivalence implies. And that 
is the big question for anti-realists: is the notion of truth subject to bivalence? Assumption 3 
follows from assumption 1 only if it is read as a platitude constraining how grasping truth-
conditions is related to correct language use––philosopher’s with a different story about                                                         170 Op. cit. p. 990 171 Cf. Miller 2006:1001, who follows Wright 1993. 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understanding will, of course, not associate assumption 3 with assumption 1. 
 Assumption 2 has two readings. It can be taken as ensuing from the principle of 
bivalence and thus as simply expressing the principle of possible verification-transcendence. 
Assumption 2 is then confined to the idea that the truth-conditions of an undecidable 
statement are possibly verification-transcendent. Alternatively, the assumption can be taken to 
express the idea that some truths about the world or facts in the world are as they are 
independently of thought and talk. On that reading, assumption 2 does not follow from 
assumption 1––the principle of bivalence––but must be held for reasons independent of 
assumption 1. Note that a semantic realist will be happy to endorse the first reading (i.e. that 
assumption 2 follows from the principle of bivalence). A common sense realist, however, 
might commit himself to the second reading. He will then endorse assumption 2 because he is 
a realist and not because he also happens to endorse a specific theory of meaning. 
 Assumption 3 is platitudinous within the semantic aspect of any worldview. In the 
discussion of Dummett’s views on theories of meaning, we have seen that the relation 
between the understanding of a statement and its use can be construed in different ways, but 
that any theory of meaning must explain the relation. There are, no matter what theory of 
meaning one endorses, two questions that must be raised about the relation: 
(i) How can we acquire an understanding which allows us to use a statement as we do?  
(ii) How can we manifest such an understanding in language use if it is to be tacit?  
The semantic realist has a problem with both questions, because it is not clear how 
understanding statements can involve grasping truth-conditions which possibly transcend our 
epistemic capacities and how we can nevertheless acquire and manifest such an understanding 
in language use. Therefore, the commitment to all three assumptions leads to serious 
difficulties for semantic realism. With semantic realism thus having bleak prospects, what are 
the consequences? 
 If common-sense realism is joined with the idea that the semantic aspect of a 
worldview has no a priori primacy over the metaphysical aspect, the rejection of truth-
conditional theories of meaning will only involve rejecting assumption 1. This is the view 
Alexander Miller holds, because he argues that a justification of assumption 2 does not 
require appeal to the semantic aspect of a plausible worldview: 
The most natural place to look for [...] a justification of the idea that the truth of ‘There is 
intelligent life elsewhere in the universe’ as potentially evidence-transcendent would be 
in some story about the nature of the universe, its capacity to furnish us with evidential 
traces of intelligent life, and how those evidential traces might dissipate before they ever 
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reach the earth.172 
It is one thing to argue that assumption 2 does not require appeal to a theory of meaning, 
which systematically determines unique semantic values for statement-types. That amounts to 
arguing that it is not the principle of bivalence which leads us to hold that truth is 
epistemically unconstrained, but that there are independent reasons. The more general idea 
that assumption 2 does not require any appeal to the semantic aspect of a plausible worldview 
is very contentious, because anything that can possibly count as true or false (viz. statements, 
propositions, contents of judgements or thoughts) is intimately related to language and 
meaning. It is therefore completely natural to assume that the concept of truth belongs to the 
semantic aspect of a plausible worldview, even if no theory of meaning may assume a 
monopolistic attitude towards the details of the concept’s application. 
 Realists and antirealists can agree on certain facts about how the concept of truth is to 
be applied. Such an agreement can render assumption 2 acceptable for both parties and the 
agreement need not amount to an agreement on a theory of meaning. The particular 
agreement I have in mind here simply consists in acknowledging the fact that the predicates 
‘is true’ and ‘is warrantedly assertible’ do not have the same extension. (Note that the 
antirealist may still hold that ‘is true’ and ‘is potentially warrantedly assertible’ have the same 
extension.) Consider again the following two statement-types: 
- ‘It is not the case that P’ is true if and only if it is not the case that ‘P’ is true. 
- ‘It is not the case that P’ is warrantedly assertible if and only if it is not the case that ‘P’ is 
warrantedly assertible. 
The second statement-type fails, as I have argued in section 1.3 of part A, if read right-to-left. 
When I am in a dark misty alley and I see something moving in front of me, it might not be 
the case that ‘there is a rat’ is warrantedly assertible, because it might be something else. And 
this does of course not necessarily entail that ‘it is not the case that there is a rat’ be 
warrantedly assertible. On the other hand, ‘there is a rat’ being false does indeed entail that ‘it 
is not the case that there is a rat’ is true. So a partial agreement between realists and 
antirealists can consist in conceding that truth is not reducible to warranted assertibility––and 
that is simply a reading of assumption 2 which is not wedded to a specific theory of meaning. 
 This alternative reading of assumption 2 requires some semantic considerations to get 
off the ground, because the partial agreement on truth rests on considerations concerning the 
extension of the predicates ‘is true’ and ‘is warrantedly assertible’. If assumption 2 is retained, 
because realists and antirealists can agree on an at least partially common conception of truth,                                                         172 Op. cit. p. 1003; note that this response is also available to somebody who endorses a realist conception of truth and a verificationist conception of meaning. 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semantics will retain some sort of priority over metaphysics, because it furnishes metaphysics 
with important insights about the concept of truth. But the semantic consideration is not 
wedded to any particular theory of meaning in Dummett’s scheme of things. 
 Is it a problem for anti-realists that ‘is true’ does not always have the same extension 
as ‘is warrantedly assertible’? No, an antirealist can still argue that ‘is true’ has the same 
extension as ‘is possibly warrantedly assertible’. This does, however, not necessarily amount 
to rejecting assumption 2––the idea that truth is epistemically unconstrained. If one knows 
what would possibly warrant a claim, he knows what would in principle justify asserting the 
claim and he knows by what means he might possibly attain it. Taking Miller’s example 
‘There is intelligent life elsewhere in the universe’, an antirealist can hold that there must be 
evidence for settling the truth-value of the statement and that he knows how he could possibly 
attain it. If there is no possible way to attain any evidence which settles the truth-value of the 
statement, he must insist that the statement has no truth-value. This means refining the idea 
that truth is epistemically constrained: one then holds that truth is not constrained by that for 
which one has warrant, but one holds that truth is constrained instead by that for which one 
knows––in principle––how to obtain warrant (even if one cannot actually obtain it for 
practical reasons). This view is obviously not compatible anymore with a weaker conception 
of truth as epistemically constrained, which simply renders the predicates ‘is true’ and ‘is 
warrantedly assertible’ as having the same extension. 
 But where does this lead us? On the one hand, rejecting this new reading of 
assumption 2 is certainly not an option, because it would amount to rejecting common sense 
realism and once that is gone, the best reasons for keeping truth-conditional theories of 
meaning out of doors are gone as well. On the other hand, we still want to allow realism-
antirealism debates about certain matters––but we also want to keep them independent of the 
issues surrounding Dummettian theories of meaning. Luckily enough, an antirealist opposing 
common sense realism can, as we have just seen, put other constraints on the concept truth. 
So we may insist that realism-antirealism debates are possible independently of debates about 
theories of meaning. It is clear that the semantic considerations just introduced provide the 
right grounds and that they are not necessarily meaning-theoretic. But even if assumption 2 
can be motivated by these alternative semantic considerations and if genuine realism-
antirealism debates within metaphysics have indeed become possible again, can issues of 
priority between semantics and metaphysics also be settled by considerations along these 
lines? 
 Let us take a particular case. Think of an argument in metaphysics which, based on a 
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set of premises P1-Pn and an implication (P1-Pn) → C, concludes that C obtains. Assume that 
C is the controversial statement ‘All possible worlds are just as real as the actual world’. The 
argument can be read as a modus ponens which establishes C and it can be turned around and 
be read as a modus tollens which establishes that at least one of the premises P1-Pn is false 
based on the allegedly obvious falsity of C. The second reading will come naturally to a 
metaphysician who eschews realism about possible worlds and the first reading of the 
argument is preferred by such a realist. The semantic observation that the extension of ‘is 
true’ diverges from the extension of ‘is warranted’ does obviously not help with settling this 
disagreement, as it is not at all clear here what cold possibly count as a warrant. And if we 
insist that the issue can be decided, then there must be some grounds for deciding it. But can 
such disagreements be settled on purely metaphysical grounds at all? 
 Of course, a purely metaphysical disagreement must be settled on the basis of what is 
true. That is so, because facts decide metaphysical matters and a logical argument in favour or 
against a contentious proposition is classically valid if it preserves truth from premises to 
conclusion. Assuming classical logic makes sense here, as it arguably is the preferred logic 
for a common sense realist and because there is no convincing prima facie reason why a 
sophisticated antirealist must endorse some sort of logical revisionism. So, we know that we 
either have a valid modus ponens or a valid modus tollens, but we do not know which one is 
in fact sound. How should we approach such epistemological issues about logical validity? 
 Well, an inference is classically valid if it moves us from truths to another truth. And 
we presumably know that whatever warrant makes the premises acceptable will, by virtue of a 
classically valid inference, also make the conclusion acceptable. But we now have to flesh out 
the expression ‘by virtue of a classically valid inference’ in order to be able to settle issues of 
priority within a worldview. So, what exactly secures the transfer of warrant from premises to 
conclusion in any modus ponens or modus tollens argument put to use in metaphysical 
debates? Is the transfer of warrant secured by metaphysical facts? Or is it rather secured by 
what the premises, the conclusion and their constituents mean? Or else, is it about 
psychological powers, epistemic virtues or epistemological rules, which govern what we 
believe or know to be good premises? An explanation of how the transfer of warrant in an 
inference is secured must show whether metaphysical, semantic or epistemological 
considerations will be in a better position to decide whether the conclusion or the set of 
premises should count as acceptable. This is so, because it is natural to expect that whatever 
secures the transfer of warrant within an inference will also be the right source for warranted 
statements about what may count as inferentially valid. After all, the sort of warrant making a 
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statement acceptable as a premise should also be suitable to be transferred through a valid 
inference without loosing any of its acceptability. So, the new big question is how, building 
on the alternative semantic footing for a conception of truth as epistemically unconstrained, 
we can decide these issues.  
 Apart from a new question, we have gained much else from the last section. We have 
argued that semantic realism (comprising common sense realism and a truth-conditional 
theory of meaning) must be rejected, because a natural commitment to common sense realism 
leads us to reject a truth-conditional theory of meaning in order to avoid serious difficulties 
with accounting for linguistic understanding. This does deal the deathblow to Hattiangadi’s 
conception of correct language use because it requires a truth-conditional theory of meaning 
plus realism to make plausible that some word-world relation is paradigmatic for objectively 
correct language use. After all, conflating factual and semantic correctness directly amounts 
to, as Hattiangadi herself admits, the austere variety of semantic realism she endorses.173 And 
there are no further safety nets in what she has proposed in print so far. 
 The arguments do not rule out Boghossian’s proposal, because he can retain a 
common sense realism and insist that his epistemic rules secure that a word-world relation is 
paradigmatic for objectively correct language use. But if he wants to retain a common sense 
realism along the lines presented, his epistemic rules must also account for the transfer of 
warrant in deductive inferences––if they did not, metaphysical issues could be settled on the 
basis of semantics only and no paradigmatic word-world relation could add any explanatory 
surplus concerning objectivity anymore. 
 In the next section, I shall flesh out the alternative semantic footing of the doctrine that 
truth is epistemically unconstrained in terms that should be acceptable for Boghossian and 
which are not in tension with my Wittgensteinian proposal. After that we may ask which of 
the two competing strategies has better prospects to explain the transfer of warrant in 
deductive inferences. The better strategy will then also have the best reasons to adjudicate 
issues of priority within a worldview. 
 
Basic Statements 
 
I have argued that the extensions of the predicates ‘is true’ and ‘is warrantedly assertible’ 
sometimes diverge. This simple observation was introduced as an alternative semantic footing                                                         173 E.g. Hattiangadi 2007:12‐13, where she writes that word‐meaning can be given by correctness‐conditions, that sentence‐meaning can be given by truth‐conditions and that ascriptions of meaning are factual (i.e. true in virtue of objective and judgement independent facts).  
-126- 
for the idea that some truths are epistemically unconstrained, because epistemic constraints on 
truth require it to be warranted in some way or other. We needed that account, because 
realism is wedded to the intuition that not all truths require warrant (or methods of 
verification). For those truths, neither perception (in circumstances optimal for knowledge), 
nor inference from warranted premises, nor testimony of reliable sources will be constitutive. 
A common sense realist might think that there is a definite number of grains of sand on planet 
earth; but he might also think that deciding what that number is is completely beyond our ken. 
It is here where his views clash with antirealism, because antirealists find truths, for which no 
conceivable method can produce evidence, otiose. 
 My reasons for adopting common sense realism are twofold. First, it is common 
sense––that is how we usually talk and how we usually think. And patterns of common talk 
and reasoning (i.e. of common understanding) are not revised easily. Second, adopting 
common sense realism allows me to argue against semantic realism through the familiar 
objections raised by Dummett. I have, therefore, no purely metaphysical motivation to argue 
against antirealism and I do think that what follows below should be acceptable for most 
antirealists. So, how is the semantic footing introduced in the previous section to be fleshed 
out? 
 Some of the truths which do not require further warrant are fathomable, they play a 
role in rational thought and talk. For these cases, realist and antirealist views need not clash. 
As an example, take the truth that a red patch cannot also be green. That truth about colour 
does not require any specific warrant (made available through perception, inference or 
testimony), but it is still fathomable and plays a role in rational thought and talk. Thinking and 
talking about that second sort of truths which do not require warrant can be said to be basic, 
because such thinking or talking does not require an explicit foundation in anything to make 
sense at all––but it does still play a distinct role in rational thought and talk. 
 One way of approaching basic thought and talk is through basic concepts. Boghossian 
has a different way into this and I shall discuss it later on. For the moment, let us stick to basic 
concepts for the sake of simplicity. The idea is that there are some concepts––the basic ones–
–a justified application and linguistic expression of which does not require warrant. Truth, 
then, is a basic concept and the predicate ‘is true’ will also be basic, as it marks the 
application of the basic concept in every situation in which the extension of ‘is true’ diverges 
from the extensions of ‘is warrantedly assertible’ or ‘is warranted’. Crispin Wright has, partly 
in co-operation with Christopher Peacocke, provided the criteria for predicates and relations 
expressing basic concepts: 
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Let us stipulate that a predicate F, or a relation R, is basic just in case it satisfies all the 
following conditions: 
1 F, or R, is capable of featuring in recognition statements.  
2 Nobody counts as understanding F, or R, who lacks the capacity––even when 
perceiving normally in normal circumstances––competently to appraise recognition 
statements which contain them. 
[…]  
3 It is not possible coherently to regard someone both as able to pass all reasonable tests 
for the ability to recognize demonstrative presentations of Fs, or R-relata, and as lacking 
a full understanding of F, or R.  
[…]  
4 F, or R, has no analysis in terms of other predicates, or relations, meeting requirements 
1, 2 and 3.174 
Condition 4, Wright adds, is meant to convey and give substance to the idea that basic 
concepts are primitive concepts. Understanding these concepts is sui generis, as such an 
understanding cannot be analysed in terms which do not already employ them. There are two 
ways in which possession of primitive concepts can be manifested and distinguishing between 
them is important. Primitive concepts can be employed in basic judgements––the paradigm of 
basic thought––and in basic statements––the paradigm of basic talk. In a basic judgement, one 
exercises recognitional capacities which only require employing the primitive concepts 
appropriate for it. Judging, for example, of a blue square that it is not red too means making a 
basic judgement, for the concepts ‘blue’ and ‘red’ cannot be analysed in terms which do not 
already employ them. 
 It now seems that grasping the content of a basic judgement means that one 
straightaway recognises its truth in appropriate circumstances––if one understands it at all. 
For non-basic judgements, the contents of which are partially built from combining primitive 
concepts, we can make sense of the idea that one can grasp a content, judge it to be true and 
then express it through an assertion or believe it. The notion of a non-basic judgement entails, 
thus, that a content can be deployed in an assertion or a belief. This obviously drives a wedge 
between contents and how they figure in thought and talk. We should be wary of a 
commitment to any sort of autonomous content without having good reasons for it. The 
advantage of the proposal is clear: a basic judgement that X suffices to warrant claims to 
knowledge that X. Such knowledge is, then, also basic and claiming that one possesses such 
knowledge is not assailable unless there is evidence to the effect that the corresponding basic                                                         174 Wright 1986a:278‐279 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judgement has not been made. 
 I have, however, argued in section 1.3 of part A––where I first raised issues about 
objectivity––that the appeal to judgements is not necessary and that we should better explain 
the relevant phenomena by appealing simply to facts of language use. Employing primitive 
concepts in statements need not involve an antecedent basic judgement. Rather, a basic 
statement simply employs primitive concepts in language use. Any more specific appeal to 
antecedent judgements or (possibly autonomous) contents of statements is uncalled for. Talk 
of basic statements will still, to be sure, mean that employing primitive concepts involves 
exercising appropriate recognitional capacities, but they will be exercised in actual language 
use and not in an antecedent judgement. Possessing recognitional capacities then boils down 
to being able to make basic statements in which primitive concepts are applied. Of course, 
basic statements associated with logic––like a statement expressing an instance of modus 
ponens––will be naturally explained through the capacity to infer and basic statements 
associated with sight––like the statements that a red patch cannot be blue or that a round 
circle has no edges––will be naturally explained through the capacity to see. The concept of a 
capacity will hence be employed to group basic statements. The bone of contention between 
Boghossian and me is whether transfer of warrant in inferring involves capacities in accord 
with epistemic rules (as Boghossian thinks) or with semantic rules (as I think).  
 There is, however, much that Boghossian and I agree on. First of all, both of us 
subscribe to common sense realism and both of us are worried about how a good conception 
of objectivity can be made to work. I approach objectivity via the notion of a basic statement. 
A basic statement, on my reading, expresses that a recognitional capacity is actually being 
exercised: the statement presupposes that an internal relation between a fact and what counts 
as recognising it actually obtains. But the notion of a basic statement might seem to work just 
as well for Boghossian’s approach, provided that basic statements can be regarded as 
expressing applications of epistemic rules. And how can both approaches have a conception 
of recognitional capacities as required by Wright’s definition of basic concepts? We can both 
say that a basic statement is always true if the recognitional capacities involved are actually 
exercised in normal circumstances and vice versa. But for Boghossian, epistemic rules 
intervene. A statement is basic if and only if it expresses the exercise of a recognitional 
capacity in accord with an epistemic rule. As far as epistemological issues are at stake, the 
speaker can be no more correct than this. And because we focus on epistemological issues 
here, factual issues need not be very important for justification. Boghossian and I assume that 
it is possible to be justified in believing that a factual statement is true without it actually 
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being true. We may be justified to claim that tomorrow’s weather will be splendid––because 
we have employed state of the art meteorology to ascertain that––and even if it turns out bad, 
we will have been justified nevertheless. The important question is, to repeat, whether the 
exercise of recognitional capacities––especially the capacity to recognise whether an 
inference is valid or not––should be construed as involving accord with epistemic rules (as 
Boghossian holds) or with semantic rules (as I think). 
 So what does all of this mean for realism-antirealism disputes? After all, we arrived at 
the notion of a basic statement, because we wanted to safeguard a common sense realism 
about most concrete objects we encounter in everyday life. And if we want to hold that some 
things are real and others are not, we should allow realism-antirealism disputes about things 
like black-holes, neutrinos, countries, money, jokes or artistic values. 
 Note that we must concede that a realism-antirealism dispute about basic statements is 
not possible. It will make no difference whether one says that a basic statement is true or 
(possibly) warrantedely assertible––the predicates ‘is true’ and ‘is (possibly) warrantedly 
assertible’ will be coextensive when applied to them. Realism-antirealism disputes, then, will 
be disputes about whether the truth-predicate and the (possibly-)warrantedly-assertible-
predicate are coextensive for non-basic statements. The realist wins if the two predicates are 
not coextensive for a non-basic statement in metaphysics; otherwise, the antirealist wins. 
 The proposal has it that we can now make sense of the idea that we can be antirealists 
concerning (non-basic) statements about, for example, what is comical while, at the same 
time, be realists concerning (non-basic) statements about, for example, mid-size dry goods 
and still retain truth-conditions for all those statements. We must, however, refrain from 
claiming that those truth-conditions can be systematised through a Dummettian theory of 
meaning, because we have put much effort into showing that we can either have a truth-
conditional theory of meaning or common sense realism and that we should opt for common 
sense realism. We now have a philosophical footing for a piecemeal approach to a wide 
variety of realism-antirealism disputes and nobody has to adopt a crude all-or-nothing-at-all 
attitude anymore. 
 The price for this, as we have seen, is that we forge a close connection between basic 
statements and recognitional capacities: a basic statement is always true if the recognitional 
capacities involved are actually exercised in normal circumstances and vice versa. This idea is 
also the key to understanding the “Wittgensteinian factualism” which drives my take on 
objectivity. For I hold that a basic statement expresses the internal relation between a fact and 
what counts as recognising what actually obtains. Boghossian, on the other hand, defines such 
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relations through specific epistemic principles. 
 This completes the more detailed account of the common ground between Boghossian 
and myself. We have seen that the notion of a basic statement still allows us to make sense of 
the idea that some truths are epistemically unconstrained. We have also seen that substantial 
realism-antirealism disputes remain possible and important for non-basic statements within 
metaphysics. It should also be clear that my Wittgensteinian proposal and Boghossian’s 
proposal can both make use of basic statements in a similar way. All of this clears the ground 
for the assessment that will decide between my Wittgensteinian and Boghossian’s proposal. 
The big question is: who has a better account of transfer of warrant in deductive inferences? 
 
3) Basic Statements and Epistemic Rules 
 
Analyticity Returns 
 
Boghossian has an interesting and insightful account of basic statements. For him, the 
explanation of such cases provides the necessary footing for the claim that objectively correct 
language use is settled by epistemic rules and that linguistic normativity is, if anything, 
epistemic normativity in disguise. What he is after, then, is an account which buttresses the 
assimilation of factual and semantic correctness by adducing a specific conception of 
epistemological correctness. 
 Formal languages provide us with the clearest sort of cases along the lines that interest 
Boghossian. This has several reasons. In formal languages, truth and falsity are objectively 
settled independently of the full-blown truth-conditional theories of meaning that Dummett 
had envisaged for natural languages. And it also looks as if some tautologous statements we 
encounter in formal languages do have the status of basic statements in natural language 
use.175 Furthermore, formally valid inferences can be thought to provide at least a model for 
objectively correct extrapolations in language use. It may turn out that correct extrapolations 
of new language uses can sometimes be reduced to validly inferring. In addition to that, we 
have seen that a clear account of the transfer of warrant from premises to conclusion in 
formally valid inferences can be expected to conclusively settle open issues surrounding 
priorities in a worldview. 
 Focusing on classical statement logic, we can introduce atomic statements, negation as 
a unary operator on them and some binary connective (viz. conjunction, disjunction or                                                         175 Cf. Dummett 1991 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conditional) through truth-tables.176 This provides us with the obvious tautologies. They are 
basic statements, the truth of which is defining of classical statement logic: 
1. p v ~p 
2. p → p 
3. p → (q → p) 
4. ~ (p & ~p) 
The truth-tables will also provide us with statements the necessary falsity of which is defining 
of classical statement logic, among those contradictions we find: 
1. ~ (p v ~p) 
2. p & ~p 
3. ~ (( p v q) ↔ (q v p)) 
4. ~ ((p & (q v r)) ↔ ((p & q) v (p & r))) 
These findings cannot be straightaway deployed for Boghossian’s purposes. First of all, 
statements like, for example, 1 and 4 amongst the contradictions are true for some varieties of 
non-classical logic. Intuitionistic logic accepts ~ (p v ~p) as a provable theorem and quantum 
logic accepts ~ ((p & (q v r)) ↔ ((p & q) v (p & r))). Modelling objectively correct 
extrapolations in language use on formal validity hence requires criteria for distinguishing and 
evaluating different formal languages. A second, but related, question concerns the precise 
relation of formal to natural languages. It is not clear exactly to which extend formal validity 
and objectively correct extrapolations in language use are the same––or whether they are 
related at all. It seems, however, prima facie plausible that logic determines some 
extrapolations of correct language use (based on a finite set of language uses which already 
count as correct) in new situations. 
 There are, however, also statements in natural language which are sometimes said to 
count as cases of the required sort. Amongst English statements which are supposedly always 
true we find: 
1. Vixens are female foxes. 
2. Bachelors are unmarried men. 
3. Nothing can be at the same time green and red all over. 
4. Whatever has shape is extended. 
5. If x is longer than y, then y is not longer than x. 
Such statements have traditionally been labelled with the term ‘analytic truth’ and are usually 
considered to give way to a conception of apriority, because such truths are (also 
                                                        176 I generally follow Partee et al. 1990. 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traditionally) supposed to be known prior to and independent of sensory experience.177 It is 
most interesting for Boghossian that a belief can be justified independently of outer, sensory 
experience, i.e. independently of considerations naturally bound up with common sense 
realism. He distinguishes a minimalist and a strong reading of the idea: 
(Minimalist Apriority) 
To say that the warrant for a given belief is a priori is just to say that it is justified, with a 
strength sufficient for knowledge, without appeal to empirical evidence. Empirical 
evidence may, however, topple the justification. 
(Strong Apriority) 
Minimalist apriority holds and the justification in question cannot be toppled by any 
further empirical evidence. 178 
Note that, in the present context, only the minimalist conception is needed. It already provides 
us with a notion of objectivity which we can, if it proves operational, be forged into accounts 
of correct language use in order to come up with a suitable conception of what objectively 
correct language use comes down to. From that point of view, the strong conception of 
apriority would do no additional work to ground objectivity for everyday language use. 
 The idea of empirical defeasibility embedded in the minimalist conception is on a par 
with my Wittgensteinian proposal. The explanandum for both is how objectively correct 
language use is possible and why basic statements may count as warranted by default. A 
belief which is warranted by default is a priori warranted in the minimalist sense. Basic 
statements, then, can be construed as expressing such beliefs. We may now ask whether 
Boghossian’s appeal to epistemic rules can provide a better explanation for the explanandum 
than my Wittgensteinian proposal. 
 Analytic truths are, if we want to paraphrase a traditional characterisation of a priori 
truths, true in virtue of meaning. There are two ways of understanding this phrase. On a 
metaphysical reading, an analytic truth ‘owes its truth value completely to its meaning, and 
not at all to “the facts”’. This is a very strong claim and sounds queer, because commitment to 
common sense realism is regarded as mandatory in the present context. Why should a realist 
claim that some true statement does not owe its truth-value to (the) facts? After all, an 
objectively true statement expresses a real fact of the matter. Intuitively, the claim that truth 
flows from meaning alone is too strong, because an analytically true statement may have 
constituents the application-conditions of which (or, if we speak about embedded statements, 
the truth-conditions of which) does depend on empirically decidable facts. In that case, the                                                         177 Cf. Ayer 1936: ch. 4 178  Cf. Boghossian 1996:196‐7 
-133- 
particular arrangement of the constituents constitutes analyticity and there remains an indirect 
dependency on facts, because facts determine what the constituents mean. If we can construe 
analytically true statements as also expressing empirical concepts, then there does remain 
some sort of dependency on what facts there are. For employing any empirical concept 
presupposes that certain empirical facts and regularities obtain and if these facts and 
regularities were to change, some analytic truths might also change because the constituents 
(which express the empirical concepts affected by the change) indirectly depend on the facts 
and regularities that changed.  
 So, the metaphysical conception of analyticity commits itself to a view about how 
some truths are constituted which does not respect a realist take on constitutive questions. It is 
thus hard to see how a common sense realist can believe that such analytic truths exist. The 
reason why analyticity has a bad reputation in many realist circles is because it is widely held 
that the metaphysical reading is the only one available and because its upshot concerning the 
import of empirically decidable facts is hardly feasible.179 Boghossian shares these worries 
and repudiates the metaphysical reading. He suggests an alternative notion of analyticity: 
The central impetus behind the analytic explanation of the a priori is a desire to explain 
the possibility of a priori knowledge without having to postulate […] a special faculty, 
one that has never been described in satisfactory terms. The question is: How could a 
factual statement S be known a priori by T, without the help of a special evidence-
gathering faculty? 
  Here, it would seem, is one way: If mere grasp of S’s meaning T sufficed for 
T’s being justified in holding S true. If S were analytic in this sense, then, clearly, its 
apriority would be explainable without appeal to a special faculty of intuition: mere grasp 
of its meaning by T would suffice for explaining T’s justification for holding S true. On 
this understanding, then, ‘analyticity’ is an overtly epistemological notion: a statement is 
‘true by virtue of its meaning’ provided that grasp of its meaning alone suffices for 
justified belief in its truth.180 
We must add here, that it is possible to be justified in believing that a factual statement is true 
without it actually being true. We may be justified to claim that tomorrow’s weather will be 
splendid––because we have employed state of the art meteorology to ascertain that––and even 
if it turns out bad, we will have been justified nevertheless. Boghossian gives a different 
example. He writes that the pre-Aristotelian Greeks were justified in believing that the earth                                                         179 Op. cit. pp. 198‐200; Boghossian identifies Quine 1951 as the source of the bad reputation that the concept of analyticity has. But he goes on to argue that Quine’s worries only affect the metaphysical construal of analyticity and not the alternative, epistemological, construal. 180 Ibid. 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was flat, because the evidence they had available made that judgement rational. But with the 
evidence we have now, we are justified in believing that the earth is spherical.181 It can be 
gleaned from this that Boghossian distinguishes factually correct language use from 
epistemologically correct language use and that his conception of analyticity is meant to 
account for cases of objectively correct language use, where epistemological correctness is at 
stake. 
 Boghossian’s next observation is that the epistemological conception of analytic truths 
is completely innocuous when it comes to formal languages. It is indeed the case that 
understanding any tautology justifies belief in its truth and understanding any contradiction 
justifies belief in its falsity. Such justifications do not entail anything specific about how such 
truths are constituted. If we equate analytic truths in formal languages with tautologies, we 
have obtained a first example of apriority––the apriority of logic. But what does it amount to? 
More specifically, what would be an appropriate way of construing what grasping the 
meaning of logical constants amounts to? Boghossian introduces the notion of implicit 
definition, according to which grasping the meaning of a logical constant means knowing its 
import on the validity of inferences from and to statements containing it.182 That establishes 
that there is a straightforward connection between the epistemological notion of analyticity 
and implicit definitions and that, in turn, directly gives way to what a priori knowledge of 
formal validity amounts to. The a priori knowledge of formal validity is, Boghossian 
proposes, manifest in the correctness of the following reasoning: 
1. If logical constant C is to mean what it does, then argument-form A has to be valid, 
for C means whatever logical object in fact makes A valid. 
2. C means what it does. 
Therefore, 
3. A is valid.183 
Now, the correctness of that reasoning does not yet explain knowledge, it only exemplifies it 
and shows how simple and intuitively appealing reasoning in accord with it becomes. But 
Boghossian goes on to claim that explaining the relation between his epistemic conception of 
analyticity and implicitly defined logical constants is now straightforward: 
Let us consider a particular inference form, A, in a particular thinker’s (T) repertoire; and 
let’s suppose that that inference form is constitutive of the meaning of one of its 
ingredient constants C. How, exactly, might these facts help explain the epistemic 
analyticity of A for T? To say that A is epistemically analytic for T is to say that T’s                                                         181 Cf. Boghossian 2006:15 182 Op. cit. p. 210  183 Ibid. 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knowledge of A’s meaning alone suffices for T’s justification for A, so that empirical 
support is not required.184  
Surprisingly enough, these considerations move Boghossian closer to my Wittgensteinian 
proposal than initially expected. For me, the implicit definition of a logical constant C 
expresses an internal relation between it and how it figures in formally valid inferring. But 
Boghossian goes a bit further than this. He adds that logical constants express logical objects 
and claims that the objects are constituted by the validity of the relevant statements and 
inferences. It thus seems that he takes there to be internal relations between objects and the 
relevant inferences and treats logical constants as expressions denoting those objects. The 
difference between Boghossian’s view and mine comes down to the idea that, for Boghossian, 
the correct use of logical constants can somehow be separated from the internal relations 
between the logical objects they express and the inferences in which they figure. In other 
words, Boghossian seems to assume that internal relations are not to be found in how logical 
constants are used but in the logical objects that they express and the role they play.185 It is 
here where I shall eventually locate the essential disagreement between his and my proposal. 
 So far, Boghossian has only argued for objective grounds in logic. It remains to be 
examined how he spells this idea out in order to come up with a more general notion of 
objective grounds for explaining and rationalising language use. For only that next step 
provides him with a notion of objectively correct language use in accord with the starting 
point of the present part of the thesis: the idea that saying something is not merely emitting a 
noise, because it can be explained on objective grounds. 
 
Objections and Extensions 
 
From my Wittgensteinian point of view, the central worry about Boghossian’s approach is 
this: if analyticity is to be explained through implicit definitions, the correct use of 
expressions cannot, pace Boghossian, be separated from the internal relations they express. In 
order to see how the worry can be turned into a full-fledged objection, consider a general 
template for implicit definitions which may be supposed to work for all analytic sentences.186  
 Let S(f) be analytic then we get  
1. S(f) means that P    (By knowledge of meaning)                                                         184 Op. cit. p. 222 185 I guess that matters are, in a metaphysical sense, much deeper for him than they are for me. 186 This template can be adapted to suit empistemological analyticity only. But Boghossian does not adapt it in that way and I shall remain faithful to how he presents things here––especially since the template serves illustrative purposes only and will be rejected anyway. 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2. If S(f) means that P, S(f) is true   (By the definition of   
      analyticity) 
3. Therefore, S(f) is true 
4. If S(f) means that P, then S(f) is true iff P (By knowledge of the link     
        between meaning and truth) 
5. S(f) is true iff P    from 1 and 4 
6. Therefore, P187     from 3 and 5 
We may plug in a candidate analytic sentence to exemplify the template: 
1. ‘Whatever has shape is extended’ means that whatever has shape is extended 
2. If ‘Whatever has shape is extended’ means that whatever has shape is extended, 
‘Whatever has shape is extended’ is true 
3. Therefore, ‘Whatever has shape is extended’ is true 
4. If ‘Whatever has shape is extended’ means that whatever has shape is extended, then 
‘Whatever has shape is extended’ is true iff whatever has shape is extended 
5. ‘Whatever has shape is extended’ is true iff whatever has shape is extended 
6. Therefore, whatever has shape is extended 
Now, it could be argued that a warranted belief in 1 presupposes a warranted belief that P. In 
other words, the belief that S(f) means P cannot count as warranted if no warranted belief in P 
is already available.188 That is obviously not always the case. The belief that “Gras ist grün” 
means that grass is green does not at all presuppose that the belief that grass is green be 
warranted. But is the objection any good in the special case we consider here? 
 In the case of analytic statements the objection might seem more interesting. The 
objection runs as follows: the warranted belief that ‘Whatever has shape is extended’ means 
that whatever has shape is extended does presuppose another warranted belief, namely the 
belief that whatever has shape is extended. If that presupposition is licit––as it might seem 
required by statement 1 of the argument above––then the concluding statement 6 follows 
trivially, because it had been presupposed by statement 1. 
 Boghossian has tried to argue that statement 1 does not presuppose that believing P is 
warranted. I think he is right about some analytic statements in natural languages. So, 
somebody who knows German understands that ‘Was Form hat, ist ausgedehnt’ means 
‘Whatever has shape is extended’. Now, does the warranted belief that ‘Was Form hat, ist 
ausgedehnt’ means that whatever has shape is extended presuppose any beliefs about shape 
and physical extension? I do not need to have the warranted belief that whatever has shape is 
extended––which is a belief about shape and physical extension––in order to have the                                                         187 The template is from  Boghossian 2003b:230, but I have adapted it a bit to suit the present context. 188 The idea comes from Glüer 2003:57 and Laurence Bojour 1988:50‐1. 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warranted belief that ‘Was Form hat, ist ausgedehnt’ means that whatever has shape is 
extended, because the second belief is not about shape and physical extension at all. The 
second belief is about what a sentence in German means in English. Boghossian is therefore 
right about such analytic statements in natural language: belief that S(f) means P can often 
count as warranted if no warranted belief in P is already available. 
 This does not mean, however, that Boghossian has a watertight conception of implicit 
definition. When it comes to explaining the meaning of logical constants through implicit 
definitions, his intuitions mislead him. Invoking intuitions about expressions of logical 
conjunction like ‘and’, he asks whether we really 
 wish to say that if the meaning of ‘and’ is fixed by a thinker’s being disposed to use it 
according to its standard introduction and elimination rules that he cannot be said to 
know what ‘and’ means without first knowing that ‘A and B’ implies A?189 
If we construe the notion of a disposition in a way that renders it immune to Kripke’s attacks–
–i.e. if we construe dispositions as internally related to what counts as manifesting such a 
disposition––then I should, pace Boghossian’s intuitions, answer ‘yes’. After all, the implicit 
definition of a logical constant like ‘and’ expresses an internal relation between that constant 
and how it affects the validity of certain inferences. And for that reason, the warranted belief 
that ‘(A and B) implies A’ means that A and B together imply A must presuppose the 
warranted belief that A and B together imply A, simply because ‘(A and B) implies A’ is the 
elimination rule which is (partly) defining of what logical conjunction means. We therefore 
do have a counterexample to Boghossian’s template. 
 Boghossian himself seems inclined to deny such a line of reasoning. For him, the 
meaning of ‘and’ is independent in some sense. But if that is so, then a disposition to use 
‘and’ in accord with its standard introduction and elimination rules construes the meaning of 
‘and’ as an external relation. Or, if we do not adopt Boghossian’s talk of disposition here, the 
rules to use ‘and’ require something over and above the rules of inference. For Boghossian, it 
appears, there are three elements to this: the meaning of ‘and’ (conjunction as a logical 
object), the disposition to use it in accord with the rules and the manifestation of such 
dispositions (the symbol ‘and’ and its use). Therefore, he assumes a pernicious construal of 
dispositions here––one which neglects the internal relation between the disposition to use an 
expression and what counts as using it––and that construal, as we have discussed at great 
length in part A, cannot withstand Kripke’s attacks.190 
                                                        189 Boghossian 2003b:232 190 Boghossian himself fully endorses Kripke’s attacks on dispositions in his 2008:chs. 1, 2 and 3. 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 Boghossian’s template does not do the work it is supposed to do.191 He does, however, 
consider an alternative account of implicit definitions, which looks more promising. Implicit 
definitions of logical constants, Boghossian proposes, can be understood to be rule-circular, 
i.e. to be self-constituting and self-justifying.192 Logical laws like modus ponens can––
according to that proposal––be conceived of as self-constituting and self-justifying. And 
because modus ponens is, for him, an epistemic rule guiding good belief formation, epistemic 
rules will turn out to be self-justifying as well.  
 With this strategy, Boghossian comes very close to a Wittgensteinian position. 
Throughout all of his career, Wittgenstein held that logical laws do not require justification, 
because the laws of logic are self-sufficient. He abided by the conviction ever since he had 
announced it in the Tractatus, where he wrote (TLP 5.473) that logic must take care of itself 
and that, in a certain sense, we cannot make mistakes in logic. This approach reinstates the 
Aristotelian conviction that the justification of logical laws must always be circular to some 
degree, because logical laws are presupposed in all reasoning.193 I surmise that Boghossian 
wants to hold in analogy to this that his epistemic rules are presupposed in all reasoning and 
that this is precisely why he announces his approach as a neo-rationalist programme.194 
 
The Problem: Transmitting Justification in Deductive Reasoning195 
 
It will be useful to give a full account of how the present issues about justification led 
Boghossian to endorse rule-circularity. The fundamental question that got us involved in 
issues surrounding basic statements and analyticity was initially this: how shall we construe 
the transfer of warrant through a logical law like modus ponens? Assume that I want to go on 
a hike in the Swiss Alps. I am planning a suitable route and consider the weather; the reports 
for the area are rather unreliable and I reason: 
1) If alpine choughs occur in large groups, the weather in the area will change in the next 2 
days. 
2) Alpine choughs occur in large groups. 
3) The weather in the area will change in the next 2 days. 
And off I am to find a route which suits this conclusion. Now, given that I am justified in 
believing the premises and that my justification for believing the conclusion beforehand does                                                         191 Boghossian himself eventually rejects the template for independent reasons; see his 2003b:232‐233. 192 Boghossian 2003c 193 See the entry on logical inference in Glock 1996. 194 Boghossian 2008:5 195 An earlier version of the sections below has been published as Demont 2008. 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not ground my justification for believing the premises, under what conditions does my 
deductive reasoning transmit warrant from the premises to the conclusion? 
 Boghossian himself formulates the question differently: in order for the inference to 
transfer justification from its premises to its conclusion, the premises must bear an appropriate 
relation to the conclusion they ground—what, then, is that relation?196 My wording asks for 
the right conditions, Boghossian looks for a relation. While an appropriate relation requires at 
least one necessary condition, it might turn out that no necessary condition describes such a 
relation, that there is only a mixed bag of sufficient conditions. Boghossian does not account 
for this possibility and this is ultimately why he could not foresee the alternative position 
proposed below. But let us stay with what Boghossian and I agree on for the moment.  
 A simple account of how warrant is transferred from premises to conclusion––and the 
first one a common sense realist should think of––runs like this: my inference moved me from 
two truths (the conditional about the behaviour of alpine choughs and a proposition about the 
actual occurrence of that kind of bird) to another truth, the proposition that the weather will 
change in the next 2 days. The implicated pattern of inference preserves truth and transfers 
warrant by virtue of its form.  
 The question, which a proponent of this first proposal must answer, is: how can an 
implicated pattern of inference move a thinker from truths to truth i.e. how exactly is warrant 
transferred? Merely pointing out that there is such a fact is not answering questions either 
about the necessary and sufficient conditions of the transfer of warrant from premises to 
conclusion or about the appropriate relation which the premises need to have to the 
conclusion to ground it. Solving these problems means saying how a thinker is moved from 
truths to truth—merely pointing out that a thinker is moved in that way cannot answer the 
question to be pursued here. 
 Boghossian has the same worry and argues that a large number of inferences, which 
we are in no intuitive way justified in performing, satisfy the stipulated conditions. Let us 
consider Boghossian’s counterexample. We know that Andrew Wiles, building on more than 
three centuries of continuous research, has proved the truth of the following conditional: 
If x, y, z, and n are whole numbers and n is greater than 2, then xⁿ + yⁿ is not equal to any 
zⁿ.  
So, together with any true claim of the form 
x, y, z, and n are whole numbers and n is greater than 2 
I can infer that an instance of ‘xⁿ + yⁿ is not equal to any zⁿ’ (for an n greater than 2) is true.                                                         196 Boghossian 2003c:226 
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Suppose now that the only grounds I have to claim that I have inferred correctly are as 
follows: 
a) I am justified in believing the premises 
b) my justification for believing the premises is independent of my justification for 
believing the conclusion 
c) the implicated pattern of inference is valid––necessarily such as to move me from 
truths to truth197 
If these are indeed the only grounds to claim that I have inferred correctly, I do still have no 
good grounds on which to explain how warrant has been transferred from premises to 
conclusion. 
 I might perhaps think that I am justified to take the conditional to be true, because 
proofs of this import are checked thoroughly and I may assume that all the professional 
mathematicians who have worked on this are (at least when taken together) a reliable source 
of mathematical truths. And the truth of the second premise is trivial. Furthermore, the 
justification I have for the premises––provided by reliable testimony and numeracy––is 
independent of the justification I have for the conclusion, because the justification of the 
conclusion is solely based on the validity of modus ponens. These conditions tell me that I 
have inferred correctly, but not how warrant has been transferred. I might add that modus 
ponens reliably transfers warrant from premises to conclusion, but more cannot be gleaned 
from the simple idea that modus ponens is truth-preserving. Whether I can rely on inferences 
in accord with the proof for Fermat’s last theorem is not something I am able to testify. And 
precisely because of this I am not epistemically entitled to claim that warrant has been 
transferred from premises to conclusion (even if my claim is factually correct). 
 It is perfectly standard to take the formal validity of modus ponens (or similar laws) to 
be reliable—this is true for all simple cases and a reliabilist might argue that Boghossian’s 
counterexample is just not simple in the relevant sense. What, then, counts as simple in the 
relevant sense? Just that the formal validity is easy to believe in the case at hand. But then, 
‘easy to believe’ is the salient criterion and ‘is reliable’ is parasitic upon it in the explanations 
needed here. Now, will this revised proposal explain transfer of warrant? Consider an 
counterexample of Laurence Bonjour: 
Norman, under certain conditions which usually obtain, is a completely reliable 
clairvoyant with respect to certain kinds of subject matter. He possesses no evidence or 
reasons of any kind for or against the general possibility of such a cognitive power or for 
or against the thesis that he possesses it. One day Norman comes to believe that the                                                         197 Ibid., where Boghossian calls this proposal ‘Simple Inferential Externalism’. 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President is in New York City, though he has no evidence either for or against this belief. 
In fact the belief is true and results from his clairvoyant power under circumstances in 
which it is completely reliable.198 
Again, we must separate beliefs which are factually correct from beliefs which are 
epistemically correct, because the factual correctness of Norman’s beliefs does not necessarily 
imply that he is aware of their factual correctness. Norman has a true belief, but is not 
justified to believe it, even though the belief results from a reliable cognitive power. This, 
again, shows that reliable mechanisms (such as the formal validity of modus ponens or 
Norman’s clairvoyance) need not justify: holding a belief can be epistemically irresponsible, 
even if it was factually correct. 
 This more general counterexample to reliabilism suggests that epistemically 
responsible reasoning requires a thinker who has some reflectively accessible warrant for his 
beliefs to be justified. Boghossian observes: 
It looks, in other words, as though the counterexamples to Reliabilism motivate an Access 
Internalism about justification: S is justified in having the belief that p only if S is in a 
position to know, by reflection alone, that he has a warrant for the belief that p. If S is to 
have genuine justification, it must be a reflectively transparent justification.199 
This motivates an internalist account of how warrant is transferred, because reliable 
mechanisms––even though they may furnish us with factually correct beliefs––do not 
necessarily furnish us with epistemically correct beliefs. We must, it now seems, have 
an account which admits a reflectively transparent justification for our inferences to be 
good. Assuming that reflectively transparent justifications are justifications apprehended 
by reflection alone, internalists take a deductive inference to be warrant transferring 
only if the follow three conditions are fulfilled: 
a) believing the premises is justified 
b) the justification for believing the premises is independent of the justification for 
believing the conclusion 
c) the person drawing the inference knows by reflection alone that the premises license 
believing the conclusion200 
Let us go back to the first example with me trying to consider weather when planning a hike. 
The new internalist conditions explain the transfer of warrant by stating that through 
reflection on the inference alone, I can come up with a good reason for believing that the 
weather will change. All depends now on how reflection alone secures a transfer of warrant                                                         198 Bonjour 1985:41, as cited in Boghossian 2003c:228 199 Boghossian 2003c:228 200 Op. cit. p. 229 
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from premises to conclusion. 
 Again, there are problems. In the present solution, reflection alone is said to provide a 
good reason to believe (given the premises) that the weather will change. Reflection must, in 
this case, be taken to provide good reasons for believing that the true premises furnish me 
with a justification for believing the conclusion. But then, it is not reflection alone that 
justifies; it must also be about something true. Some truths about the external world upon 
which a thinker reflects must be presupposed for the reflection to reliably generate 
justification for conclusions about whether to take a hike. So it appears that reflection must 
have an experiential basis in order to transfer warrant from premises to conclusion and, 
therefore, to justifying anything. In other words: sometimes, the transfer of warrant through 
an inference depends on there being truths on both ends––the premises must be true and the 
conclusion must be true. If justification through reflection is not good enough to ground a true 
belief, the internalist alternative will have no point. 
 Boghossian approaches knowledge of formal validity according to the internalist 
proposal in a similar way. He asks: ‘How might S be in a position to know by reflection alone 
that p and p→q imply q?’201 There seem to be, at least theoretically, two options for 
internalists: inferentialism––claiming that reflection is confined to drawing inference––and 
non-inferentialism––claiming that reflection does neither involve drawing inference nor that it 
does involve experiences of the external world. 
 The inferentialist commits a petitio principii, as he explains knowing the validity of 
modus ponens by presupposing valid instances of modus ponens as components of the 
explanation of the reasoning in question. When discussing the epistemology of logical laws, 
assuming that knowledge can always be explained through emphasising the central role of 
good inferences cannot be else than viciously circular.  
 The non-inferentialist, on the other hand, can point out that some sort of observation 
brings along the needed justification or that nothing at all justifies it. The second non-
inferentialist option is a form of primitivism: one is simply justified in believing that modus 
ponens transfers warrant. This need not be a feature of all beliefs, but of beliefs about transfer 
of warrant in deductive reasoning. So, the non-inferentialist can just insist that some basic 
beliefs play a decisive role in logic—if you have them, you have them reasonably. Boghossian 
worries that it might be too hard to find conditions which allow us to draw a difference 
between basic and non-basic beliefs in logic. But that is unwarranted. Based on what was said 
earlier above, we can simply hold that basic beliefs about logic are those which can be                                                         201 Ibid. 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expressed through basic statements in logic, whereas the non-basic beliefs can only be 
expressed trough the corresponding non-basic statements. So appealing to basic beliefs seems 
a good option for the internalist. But what about other options? 
 Is there a way to argue that some special sort of observation provides the needed 
justification? Let us examine that non-inferentialist strategy more closely: what kind of 
observation could justify the validity of my inferences? Observing external objects (and states 
of affairs) and reflecting on such observations cannot be a good answer for the internalist, as 
he then has to admit that reliable mechanisms furnishing us with factually correct beliefs are 
more fundamental. The thinker concludes, in that case, by merely reflecting on the fact that he 
has been moved from truths to truth. (Note that it makes no difference here whether this 
reflection happens while the thinker is moved from truths to truth or after.) The internalist 
then becomes a reliabilist in disguise and, pari passu, subject to the corresponding worries. 
So, is there another notion of observation that the internalist could employ? 
 Non-inferential internalists who are wary of basic beliefs require an account of how 
one simply sees that from true modus ponens premises a true conclusion follows 
straightaway—they must assume some rational insight into the validity of modus ponens. 
Suppose there was a useful concept of rational insight.202 How would rational insight explain 
that a thinker inferring through modus ponens is actually justified in believing the validity of 
the inference? As the internalist is after the validity of the form of modus ponens and not after 
the validity of specific instances, rational insight should justify all uses of modus ponens at 
once. But then, the thinker has to make a step from the general validity of modus ponens to 
the validity of any particular instance of modus ponens whenever rational insight justifies an 
instance of the inference. He reasons: 
 1) If an inference is an instance of modus ponens, it is valid. 
 2) This inference is an instance of modus ponens. 
 3) This inference is valid. 
This means that for rational insight to justify the use of modus ponens, transfer of warrant 
through modus ponens must be presupposed to allow for making the step from the general 
validity of modus ponens (vindicated by rational insight) to its specific instances.203  
 A similar problem appears for a rational insight into the validity of a specific instance 
of modus ponens: the thinker needs modus ponens to infer that he is generally justified by his 
singular insight to take the specific instance of modus ponens to be valid—that his use of the 
specific modus ponens is valid not only once, but every time he makes it. Otherwise, rational                                                         202 Cf. Boghossian 2003c: 230‐232 203 Op. cit. p. 233 
-144- 
insight would never allow him to be sure that his inference is valid––and transfers warrant––
until he makes it and the internalist account would not be a good and general explanation, 
because inferring could always turn out differently in the future. 
 After a promising start, the proponent of rational insight commits a petitio principii—
just like the inferentialist did: he must presuppose the validity of modus ponens in general to 
explain the validity of an instance of modus ponens. All the non-inferentialist internalist can 
do now is pointing out that rational insight into the validity of modus ponens justifies the 
thinker’s inferring as his seeing a healthy tree’s leaves in late spring under optimal conditions 
justifies him straightaway in believing that these leaves are green.204 But then again, merely 
having this specific belief is also being justified in having this belief. So, we are back at 
discussing basic beliefs, where the status of a belief being reasonable by default can be seen 
straightaway (at an instance) but is supposed to be warranting in general. It remains unclear 
how an instantanious insight into whether a contingent fact obtains at that instant justifies 
general beliefs concerning that very fact. It is this unclarity which is the primary obstacle for 
internalism. 
 I have shown that reliabilism and internalism, simple and common though they might 
be, cannot explain the transfer of warrant in standard forms of inference like modus ponens in 
a way satisfying for Boghossian’s or my own purposes. This leads us to Boghossian’s own 
account of how the transfer must be explained. After that, I will show that there are 
explanatory needs which Boghossian’s solution cannot satisfy and how my Wittgensteinian 
approach to basic beliefs might solve the problems in a more straightforward way. 
 
Blind Reasoning: Inferences Built into Concepts 
 
According to Boghossian, an important lesson to be learned from the considerations made so 
far is this: certain forms of deliberation must be entitling without needing a thinker who 
knows this or is able to arrive at that knowledge by reliable means.205 Certain inferences must 
be blind but justifying, this means that certain logical rules just underpin themselves, their 
explanation is rule-circular. This is an explicit commitment to a rule-based normativity of 
rules which does not lead to an infinite regress because some pivotal rules, such as modus 
ponens, are self-justifying. For them, the regress is supposed to stop when they are applied to 
themselves. 
 Prima facie, there seems to be a strong tension between this conjecture and the                                                         204 Cf. op. cit. p. 235  205 Op. cit. p. 237 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requirement for a thinker to be epistemically blameless: when it comes to more complicated 
inferential patterns, the thinker must also be able to claim on the very same grounds that he is 
justified; this means that the thinker must at least believe that his inferences are acceptable, 
that he is entitled to infer as he does. But a thinker can also be blameworthy or blameless in 
the eyes of other people and he may be blameworthy in their eyes while remaining convinced 
that he is not––his problem, then, is that he might have to string together a large number of 
applications of modus ponens in order to counter the worries of the others. The number of 
applications of modus ponens that he has to string together may, however, be too large to 
convince others that he is not blameworthy, because his proof is simply not surveyable. This 
ties in with the more general observation that being epistemically blameless or blameworthy 
may have something to do with other people’s reactions to one’s reasoning. 
 How precisely should we understand this dependence on other people’s reactions? It 
seems too quick to conjecture yet that being epistemically blameworthy or blameless has 
something to do with correct language use. So, whence the dependence?  
 I think that it is innocuous to assume that it is reasonable by default to apply a modus 
ponens to warranted premises and to then expect a transfer of warrant to the conclusion. How 
can such a default entitlement be toppled? Heavily imbibed and cognitively impaired persons 
cannot, of course, reasonably apply a modus ponens to warranted premises––if the case is 
severe enough, valid inferences will transfer nothing. This is so, because a statement 
expressing the logical form of modus ponens is a basic statement and with temporally 
impaired language users we do not––if the case is severe enough––distinguish between a 
proper saying and an extended grunt. 
 My take on what counts as reasonable by default does of course rule out that validly 
inferring can be justified by taking modi ponendi to be instances of a general pattern. This 
contrasts with the internalist idea that reflection alone secures a transfer of warrant by 
somehow accessing a general pattern behind the curtains. It is here where internalism goes 
wrong, because the status of being a warranted application of a modus ponens can be toppled 
and it can not only be toppled if there are good reasons to suppose that the premises are false, 
but also when impaired language users try to speak or infer. Normally, empirical evidence 
furnishes us with evidence that the premises of an inference are false or that there is an 
impairment which is severe enough. But there are also cases in which the inference is just not 
surveyable: if we consider a large number of applications of modus ponens stringed together, 
people may very well doubt that something went wrong when the inferences are drawn. Such 
doubts are sufficiently well motivated when these other people find that the string of 
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inferences is not surveyable. In such circumstances, rules of inference like modus ponens are 
not absolutely self-justifying and then it makes a big difference whether other people find 
one’s inferring surveyable––and I count as epistemically blameless only if they find my 
inferring surveyable. It hence appears that other people’s reactions do matter for whether 
warrant is transferred from premises to conclusion, especially if such a transfer requires a vast 
number of particular inferences. And from this we glean that my way of bringing in basic 
beliefs does not suffer from the worries that applied to an internalist story about justification 
through reflection. 
 Every thinker, then, may believe that he is by default entitled to infer as he does as 
long as there is no evidence that (at least) one of his premises is not true, that he is subject to a 
cognitive shortcoming or that his inferences are too complicated. An entitlement to infer 
which does not satisfy these conditions is worthless, because it cannot support any claim that I 
am justified if I do not know that I am justified. And why should we suppose that a worthless 
justification is not simply nonsense? After all, a justification that does not justify anything to 
anybody is simply inconceivable.  
 Discussing the transfer of warrant from premises to conclusion only makes sense if the 
claim for being justified by virtue of the form of a thinker’s inferences seems to be counter-
intuitive, i.e. only when somebody sincerely finds it conceivable to question such transfers of 
warrant. Boghossian does not see these points about claiming that one is justified and 
obviously neglects that these points follow from a closer examination of the concepts of 
blameworthiness and blamelessness that he himself had brought in. That is unfortunate, as 
these findings about blameworthiness and blamelessness would allow him do dodge a knock-
down objection to which we turn now. 
 Boghossian’s rule-circularity builds on a tight connection between meaning and 
entitlement. There is something like an entitlement a priori; one is, in cases of rule-
circularity, justified in inferring such-and-such just through knowing the meaning of the 
words involved, through possessing the concepts they express: 
 Any inferential transitions built into the possession conditions for a [logical] concept are 
eo ipso entitling.206 
This is a more elaborated inferentialist strategy than the one encountered before and it is a 
natural elaboration of Boghossian’s views on analytic truths and implicit definitions. It may, 
however, be asked whether accounting for the transfer of warrant from premises to conclusion                                                         206 Boghossian 2003c:241; note that Boghossian distinguishes between defective and non‐defective concepts. Accounting for logical concepts, however, is possible without the distinction and runs along the lines proposed here (cf. Boghossina 2008:286‐7). I shall therefore not elaborate on the distinction. 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can be answered at all within the idiom of such an inferentialist conception of logical thought 
and meaning. I think the correct answer is ‘no’. 
 Here is how the objection runs. For Boghossian, understanding a word like ‘and’ 
means having the concept of conjunction. Having a concept also means grasping how it 
relates to other concepts (like the concepts of negation, disjunction and the conditional) by 
virtue of grasping how the concept figures in inferential patterns. Timothy Williamson calls 
this inferentialist proposition (Have) and summarises its shortcoming in the following way: 
Unfortunately for inferentialism, the nature of language as a medium of 
communication between individuals who disagree with each other in indefinitely 
various ways undermines attempts to make accepting a given inference a necessary 
condition for understanding a word; therefore, by (Have), it undermines attempts to 
make accepting the inference a necessary condition for having the concept.207 
This is just to say that Boghossian’s conception of entitlement cannot make sense of rational 
thinkers who disagree about logic and still understand what their respective opponents are 
saying. There are knock-down-drag-out arguments between philosophers about whether a 
thinker is justified in applying logical concepts like the concept of negation in one way rather 
than another. And arguing over logical concepts at all requires that it is possible to make 
diverging claims about their possession conditions while still understanding the words which 
express the disputed concepts. Otherwise, there would be, for example, no intelligible 
controversies about the law of excluded middle, distributivity or the law of non-contradiction 
between classical logicians and the various proponents of non-classical logics. 
 Such disputes are also disputes about conditions under which we may retract an 
entitlement about self-ascriptions of concept-possession. Classical logicians, for example, do 
attack deviant logicians’ claims that they reason in accord with deviant rules, because that 
leads them––so the classical logicians argue––to assume a counter-intuitive ontology. They 
can, so the classical logician might continue, not coherently self-ascribe reasoning in accord 
with deviant rules and, at the same time, self-ascribe a rational view of reality. The main 
problem, as I see it, is that entitlement can sometimes be retracted by a community––
especially if the inferential transitions supposed to entitle a thinker are not surveyable or other 
evidence for rational or cognitive failures appear. In severe cases, long disputes––just like 
those between classical and deviant logicians––ensue and for such cases there might be no 
common ground anymore which settles what counts as a rational failure or as a surveyable 
inference. 
 I take this to be a decisive objection and conclude that Boghossian has no viable                                                         207 Williamson 2003:46 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conception of objective grounds flowing from his implicit definitions or his meaning-
entitlement connection which could possibly buttress his conception of objectively correct 
language use. The main reason is that Boghossian’s proposal undermines attempts to make 
sense of the sort of disagreements that are the bread and butter of philosophers of logic.  
 But then, is there any way in which we can hope to explain the transfer of warrant as 
discussed here? More specifically, can my Wittgensteinian approach hope to do better? I shall 
argue that we have basic beliefs about at least some laws of logic and that logical laws 
provide a footing for objectively correct language use, even though the beliefs can be revised 
if the circumstances demand it. It is important, then, to understand how evidence and other 
people’s reactions influence the transfer of warrant when logical laws are applied. In the next 
section I shall, therefore, explain under what conditions transfer of warrant by virtue of the 
internal relation between a logical concept and its use in inferring fails. 
 
Entitlement by Proof, Truth and Common Ground 
 
Consider two points I kept mentioning from the beginning of the present discussion of 
Boghossian’s views: 
1. Proof-Truth Connection: Concerning justified beliefs about inferential validity, justified 
belief in truth should be expected to rest on proof and justified belief through proof 
must move us from truths to truth. 
2. The Blame-Acceptance Connection: Being epistemically blameless or blameworthy 
partially depends on what other people are ready to accept during a conversation. 
The proof-truth connection implies that justification sometimes comes from truth, because 
basic truths about logic enable us to distinguish between valid and invalid proofs. The proof-
truth connection also implies that justification sometimes comes from proof-procedures for 
non-basic truths: when we want to know whether a statement in a formal language is true, we 
employ proofs and infer them from other true statements. In deductive reasoning where we do 
have a transfer of warrant, the proof-procedure must lead us from justified belief about the 
truth of the premises to a newly justified belief about the truth of the conclusion. If deductive 
inferences should be useful outside of formal systems––if they are to be applicable at all––the 
intuition must be preserved that we sometimes know whether a statement is true before we 
have a proof and that we sometimes know first (by invoking some conclusive evidence, 
reliable testimony or verification-principles) how to decide whether a statement is true or 
false. 
 The blame-acceptance connection holds that other people’s reactions––what they are 
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prepared to accept––matter for transfer of warrant. In a specific context in which a thinker 
infers, the justification for believing the conclusion and the justification for believing the 
premises must eventually be grounded in the context in which the thinker claims that the 
inference is acceptable. But note that the justifications already count as grounded in the 
context if nobody objects to them or if a sceptic about these justifications does not provide 
sufficient evidence which determinately topples the justifications. Premises and conclusions 
are therefore still independent enough to make inferences informative. Nevertheless, certain 
assumptions about what is common ground between the participants must be made.  
 In order to prepare the grounds for a new account of transfer of warrant, ‘acceptance’ 
and ‘common ground’, as used here, must be explained. To accept a statement is to treat it as 
true and to ignore (at least temporarily or in a limited context) that it is false, because there is 
no evidence that shows that the statement is false. Of course, not every statement is 
acceptable in that sense. But, as I have argued, self-ascriptions of certain forms of reasoning 
or concept-possession certainly are. The notion of common ground, on the basis of which 
certain statements are acceptable, is a bit more technical: 
(Common Ground) 
It is common ground that φ in a group if all members accept (for the purpose of the 
conversation) that φ, and all believe that all accept that φ.208 
As mentioned above, inferring and discussing or thinking about the validity of an inference 
depends on what one thinks to be entitled to. A thinker is entitled to make a statement if the 
proposition expressed by it is common ground and if this entitlement does not only stem from 
inferential links built into concepts. Entitlement is also based on what other people are 
prepared to accept and it is based on what evidence is available. 
 This, then, is an alternative account of default reasonable belief: beliefs about common 
ground are reasonable by default, as they (they may by factually correct or not) make talking 
to other people possible at all. Any language user bases her linguistic behaviour on 
assumptions about the common ground—that makes her a reasonable language user (no 
matter whether she can make those assumption explicit or not). Even if such a belief was 
wrong, it was at least justified in the context, the speaker thought herself in. Her being 
reasonable demands adjusting her language use to make it acceptable in a given context.  
 Furthermore, if the validity of all instances of modus ponens is common ground (as, 
for example, in an introductory course in formal logic), all participants are committed (in the 
example, by partaking in the course) to take its validity for granted. Correctly believing that                                                         208 The notions of acceptance and common ground are borrowed from Stalnaker 2002:716 and Stalnaker 1984:79‐81, but no further theoretical implications follow from this. 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one is committed to a specific logical law makes it a component of the context, assailing it 
means attempting to change the context. Relative to a specific context, my correct beliefs 
about inferring are as certain––and, pari passu, as objective––as they can be. 
 As common ground is never in the head of any single participant, the account to be 
sketched here is a form of social externalism about warrant for the semantic correctness of 
token language usages (such a specific use is marked by φ in the stipulation of common 
ground): every speaker depends on the reaction of the other participants in order to find out 
whether his estimations about the common ground are acceptable and he must be prepared to 
adjust his linguistic behaviour to match the common ground if his estimations turn out to be 
wrong.  
 The point of the account is that default reasonable beliefs about how one infers are 
good––i.e. one’s inferences transfer warrant from premises to conclusions––as long their 
epistemic status is not toppled because one or several requirements mentioned above have not 
been fulfilled. In summary, a deductive inference performed by a speaker S in a specific 
context C is warrant-transferring just in case the following two conditions are fulfilled: 
1) S’s justification for believing the premises is suitably independent of his 
justification for believing the conclusion, but both––premises and conclusion––
are common ground after the conclusion has been drawn 
2) S is justified in believing that the inference is valid, because the inference can 
be expressed through a basic statement or because S is justified to believe that 
the inference is actually truth-preserving 
The first condition is simply that the blame-acceptance connection must be preserved and the 
second condition is simply that the proof-truth connection must be preserved. Note that these 
conditions do not contain any claims about how the validity of inferences is constituted and 
how their factual correctness (if there is such a thing) should be explained. It only provides an 
explanation of the conditions under which we can have a justified belief that a specific 
inference is warrant-transferring. That is enough for my purposes here, because warrant 
transferring inferences can secure semantic correctness for extrapolations from a finite set of 
language uses to new situations. And this is exactly what was needed all along, as it provides 
us with conditions under which justified beliefs in inferential links secure objective grounds 
on which we may rely in our language use. 
 The new proposal is an extension of Boghossian’s blind reasoning. The arguments that 
led to it showed that the transfer of warrant from premises to conclusion is sensitive to how 
thinkers interact with the world and their peers in specific contexts. Combining these ideas 
with Boghossian’s take on analyticity and a priori knowledge yielded the new conditions 
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under which transfer of warrant from premises to conclusion is guaranteed. 
 
4) Conclusions 
 
Part B of the thesis assessed the answers that realist approaches to correct language use can 
provide when faced with issues surrounding the justification and objectivity of language use. 
That took us through considering general points about theories of meaning, realism-
antirealism debates and objective grounds. We found that semantic realism faces considerable 
difficulties and we were eventually led to dismiss it. It was, however, argued that retaining a 
common sense realism is mandatory. 
 One important upshot of the discussion was that metaphysical debates require an 
account of how warrant is transferred in deductive reasoning. Metaphysics cannot be a 
secluded field of philosophical research, because metaphysical reasoning presupposes that 
warrant is actually transferred in deductive reasoning––and such transfers of warrant cannot 
be explained, as we have seen, in purely metaphysical terms.  
 In order to prepare the grounds for explaining transfers of warrant, the notion of basic 
concepts was introduced and discussed. The upshot was that there is a viable notion of a basic 
statement, i.e. a statement the use of which is immediately warranted. Building on that, we 
moved on to Boghossian’s account of basic statements which in turn led us to consider his 
particular take on analytic truths and a priori knowledge. It was then shown how that is 
supposed to yield a viable conception of objective grounds, which can provide a footing of 
objectively correct language use. 
 Boghossian’s proposal suggested that knowledge of inferential validity is based on 
epistemic principles for which valid rules of inference, such as modus ponens, are defining. 
That rule-circular approach was found to be wanting, as it construes the understanding of 
logical concepts in an illicit inferentialist way. An alternative was proposed. The alternative 
does not make any new suggestions concerning how inferential validity is constituted, but it 
builds on how language users settle disputes about epistemic correctness in an objective way. 
Transfer of warrant is secured by the same considerations that also inform language use. It is 
therefore correct to infer that our linguistic competence, which is the power to use language as 
we do, does secure the transfer of warrant when inferring. 
 This puts us into a new position. The only approach to correct language use from part 
A that remains is my Wittgensteinian proposal. That solution does, however, take for granted 
that speaker have some linguistic expressions readily available. 
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 We have seen in part A that my Wittgensteinian proposal can reject any alleged 
obligation to say something about the constitution of linguistic facts, precisely because it is a 
sceptical solution. Accounting for objectively correct language use does not require appealing 
to facts in the sense that the internal relations between words and their applications need a 
further mediating element in order to be explainable. But apart from that, another constitutive 
question must be raised. How do linguistic expressions become available for use? And how is 
accounting for that related to the idea that explaining transfer of warrant as proposed above 
provides us with the mark of objectively correct language use? After all, we have only 
explained on what grounds an extrapolation may count as objectively correct, but we have not 
explained what constitutes extrapolations, which may be assessed in this way. True, it may 
turn out that questions surrounding the constitution of extrapolations are empirical questions 
about language acquisition and about the acquisition of other cognitive powers–––but whether 
these are empirical issues or not is also a philosophical question. 
 A central aspect of being linguistically competent is that people have means of 
expressing themselves––words, phrases, sentences––available. Dummett, for one, took it for 
granted that questions surrounding linguistic competence, or ‘knowledge of language’ as he 
prefers to call it, are intimately connected with issues surrounding objectivity, inferential 
validity and realism-antirealism debates. We have also seen that our best take on objective 
grounds––and, pari passu, objectively correct language use––presupposes much about how 
language is used. This does also constrain how we are to explain linguistic competence. A 
careful enquiry into how linguistic expressions become available could elucidate linguistic 
competence and explain more precisely how language and logic are related. These are the 
topic of part C. 
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Linguistic Competence and its Proper Study 
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1. Linguistic Competence 
 
The upshot of part A of the present thesis was that there are only three viable accounts of 
correct language use. Part B of the thesis focused on questions surrounding objectivity that 
had arisen in that context. It was mainly concerned with what objectively correct language use 
comes to. Going through a wide range of Dummettian considerations allowed us to seriously 
doubt the anti-normativist approach to correct language use. Further inquiries into the 
epistemology of logical laws revealed that of the two remaining proposals––Boghossian’s 
robust realism plus epistemic rules and my Wittgensteinian proposal––only my proposal 
passes muster. 
 One might assume that this is enough, thus succumbing to the illusion that we have 
established a sufficiently complete view. All that remains to be seen, one might think, is how 
far we can run with it. But the state of affairs is not quite so. As matters stand right now, 
chances are that we stumble over the first obstacle and hit the ground. For it is by no means 
clear what exactly we use, when we use language. Do we use sentences, phrases, words, 
sounds, signs, or symbols? The need for choosing between these options is real, bearing in 
mind that my proposal plays on the idea that we have linguistic expressions available for use 
and that this includes that we can extrapolate new uses from old ones. The capacity to 
extrapolate will also have to be related to how we draw deductive inferences and it is not 
immediately clear how that relation can be fleshed out. Answering questions along these lines 
requires further considerations about what someone can do who can use language. 
 Another related issue stems from our discussion of the epistemology of logical laws. 
My account of how warrant is transferred from premises to conclusion in modus ponens does 
not tell us how logical laws are constituted. It was merely suggested that correctly inferring is 
part and parcel of the ability to use language. But how exactly inferring is related to 
extrapolating new uses of expressions from old ones remains unclear. This requires further 
investigations as well. 
 Michael Dummett and others often write about knowledge of language instead of 
linguistic competence. In an attempt to pry apart those two notions, I shall start by giving a 
short overview of Gareth Evans’ discussion of knowledge of language. This will make 
plausible that a dispositional account of competence can in part explain what the ability to use 
language comes to. It will then be argued that construing linguistic competence along the 
lines suggested by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch (2002) can explain what sort of linguistic 
expressions we have available for language use. Furthermore, it will be argued that such 
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linguistic dispositions can explain how we extrapolate new expressions––strings of sings and 
sequences of sounds that one might employ––from old ones. This is a highly controversial 
claim, as the Wittgensteinian roots of my proposal are traditionally believed to be 
diametrically opposed to anything like a Chomskian approach to linguistic competence.  
 Arguing for such a Chomskian perspective on linguistic competence will also prepare 
the grounds for the pivotal idea that linguistic dispositions constrain logic and inferring. It 
will then be claimed that my account of how warrant is transferred from premises to 
conclusion explains what semantically correct inferring comes to. The final picture has it that 
linguistic dispositions furnish language users with expressions and constrain inferring by 
determining how new strings of signs and sequences of sounds can be extrapolated from old 
ones. The account of transfer of warrant will then settle matters about which extrapolations 
count as semantically correct. 
 
Knowledge of Language 
 
What difference, if any, is there between knowledge of language and linguistic competence? 
An overview over the debate on how to construe the first provides us with the necessary 
elements to make sense of both notions. The discussion of Dummett’s views on theories of 
meaning led us to see that a truth-conditional conception of meaning and understanding 
comes with a set of particular problems. But there is one issue that has not been considered so 
far. The truth-conditional approach comes with a commitment to the idea that an appropriate 
theory of meaning be compositional. What does that amount to? The claim has two parts. On 
the one hand, a compositional theory has a finite set of axioms that are not simply adopted 
from logic. On the other hand, a compositional theory makes clear how the meaning of a 
declarative sentence can be derived from the axioms in a way that exhibits the semantic 
constituents of the sentence and how they are related.209 At the end of the day, meaning is 
thought to be a function of components and structure.210 
 It is sometimes assumed that it is clear that a compositional theory of meaning has 
advantages over any non-compositional explanation of meaning, but that assumption seems 
funny, because language users utter meaningful sentences without having to derive the                                                         209 Cf. Miller 1997: 146 210 The primary difference between a purely truth‐conditional theory of meaning and Dummett’s verificationism consists in a different conception of what the right structure is. So, any theory of meaning (in Dummett’s use of the expression) is a theory that tries to explain meaning as a function of components and structure. Semantic realism envisages a structure in sync with classical logic and Dummettian verificationism envisages a structure in sync with intuitionist logic. 
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composition of their sentences from any axioms. Prima facie, non-compositional explanations 
of meaning could offer better explanations of what people actually do when they use language 
meaningfully. So, why should a compositional semantics be in any better position to explain 
knowledge of language than a non-compositional one?211 
 If we take in considerations of the last two parts of the present thesis, compositionality 
does not look like a promising idea. First of all compositionality does not solve––but rather 
invites––questions concerning the sort of extrapolations language users make. Remember, 
proponents of a truth-conditional approach can, for example, be pressed to provide further 
reasons to defend the claim that they can explain grasping as extrapolating, which runs as 
follows: 
grasping a proposition or the content of a word centrally involves extrapolating a possibly 
indefinite number of new applications based on a finite number of known cases. 
It was Kripkenstein’s sceptic who first taught us that this is a serious challenge, as there is no 
fact which supports the claim that correct language use can be accounted for in terms of 
compositionality. The question compositionalism must answer is: if meaning is a function of 
components and structure, then how can we acquire these components and these structures 
and how do we draw on them to explain and justify language use in novel cases? The only 
possible way to answer for a truth-conditionalist consists in finding components and 
structures which can be fully explained in terms of truth-conditions. Verificationists, on the 
other hand, may adduce facts about how we draw on the relevant components and structures 
and may thus think that they have a better explanation. But Kripkenstein has shown that no 
reference to facts of any kind will provide a satisfactory general answer to these two 
questions. So compositionalism does not look promising, for it plays into the hands of 
Kripkenstein’s sceptic. 
 We shall now turn to Gareth Evans’s work on why compositionality is still relevant. 
Evans argues that a suitable conception of linguistic dispositions can shed light on how to 
construe compositionality––it is supposed to do so, because the relevant dispositions allegedly 
constitute compositionality. There is much to say about this. First and foremost, it must be 
explained how this view can deal with Kripkenstein’s sceptic. 
 Let us begin with knowledge of language by reconsidering that the term ‘knowledge’, 
as it is used here, refers to a propositional attitude-state. What does it mean to conceive of 
knowledge of language as a propositional attitude-state? Michael Dummett makes much of 
the idea that knowing the axioms specifying a theory of meaning are propositions one                                                         211 Wright asks this question in his 1980, 1986a, 1986b and his 2001. 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knows.212 Having, then, the practical ability to use a language specified by these axioms 
allegedly amounts to tacitly knowing the propositions expressing how meaning, being a 
function of components and structure, is constructed behind the curtains of how languages are 
actually used.213 
 It is this view against which Evans raised objections. The view seems to answer 
worries about compositionality, because the acquisition of a language then boils down to 
acquiring tacit knowledge of the relevant axioms. But it is still unclear how a language user 
can draw on this propositional knowledge in order to use a language, especially if faced with 
novel applications of known sentences or completely unfamiliar sentences. After all, a 
language user is supposed to have tacit knowledge of her language and is, thus, not 
immediately supposed to be able to express the relevant axioms of her theory of meaning. So, 
how could one possibly draw on such tacit knowledge? Not in any relevant sense, because 
knowledge of language is only manifested in language use. Normally, what people believe 
and know is of the sort that it can also be desired, wished for or intended. What I know when I 
know that the weather is good is also something that I desire when I wish that the weather be 
good. And my belief that I need to buy bread can give succour to the intention to buy bread. 
What people believe and know can, in principle, also form the basis of a motivation. 
Knowledge of language, however, is different.  
 My knowledge of German can never figure in desires or intentions in the same way. It 
is, nevertheless, true that knowing that ‘Das ist Brot’ is true if and only if this is bread can 
inform some beliefs about German and may help forming an intention to buy the item in front 
of me if the shopkeeper informs me in German that it is indeed bread (and not cake). But 
knowledge of German cannot figure in my desires unless these concern German or its use, 
whereas my knowledge about the weather can. In other words, knowledge of language cannot 
form the basis of a motivation in the same sense as knowledge about what facts obtain in the 
world. 
 The point is that knowledge of language does not inform intentional actions, plans or 
motivations in the same way as propositional knowledge about the world does, because 
knowledge about the world does normally figure in practical reasoning, whereas knowledge 
of language only figures in practical reasoning in exceptional circumstances. More 
importantly, knowledge about the world furnishes me with contents which I can desire to be 
satisfied, intend or wish for and these contents are therefore necessary to bring personal 
motivation into practical reasoning. So there is an obvious asymmetry between knowledge of                                                         212 Especially in Dummett 1976:36 213 Cf. Miller 1997:147 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language and any other knowledge I have.214 
 Gareth Evans says more about the insight that knowledge of language, if it were 
indeed propositional, is inferentially insulated in a way that other kinds of knowledge are not. 
His take on this is best explained through an example. Assume that elliptical sentences are not 
available and that the axioms we tacitly know specify that predicates are satisfied by one 
argument only. In such a language ‘knows’ or ‘John knows Tim’ are not well-formed, 
because they are ruled out by the axioms. Knowing this is constitutive of what counts as using 
that toy language, but it cannot interact in any fruitful way with genuine beliefs. The genuine 
belief that there are relations between entities, such as the relations of John standing left of 
Tim or Tim standing between John and Mary, must be considered independently from the 
axioms constituting the expressibility of those beliefs in the toy language, unless further 
reasons can establish such a dependence. Furthermore, it must remain open whether other 
beliefs, such as the belief that Tim cannot stand at the same time on the left and on the right of 
John, are rendered contentless by the axioms tacitly known. If tacit knowledge were a 
propositional attitude-state, Evans argues, it would be inferentially insulated like that. It 
would, I surmise, be conceivable that we can always believe more than what our tacit 
knowledge of language furnishes us with. A Dummettian meaning-theorist cannot make much 
sense of this, because the meaningful content of beliefs and the content of meaningful 
expressions both obtain their content by virtue of knowledge of language. 
 There is another point which I have already raised when I first discussed Dummett’s 
take on knowledge of language. Propositional knowledge depends on a one-way power to 
recognise facts. One-way powers are, to rehearse that distinction, passive cognitive powers 
that are not subject to human volition. Knowledge of language, on the other hand, is 
necessarily subject to human volition, because it is an essential feature of my knowledge of 
language that I can simply decide to utter a nonsensical sentence, lie or breach other 
proprieties of communication––in those cases, I consciously neglect semantic and pragmatic 
facts because I do know the language which I misuse. It is not clear at all how a theory of 
meaning can handle a phenomenon that is necessarily subject to human volition. Seen from 
that perspective, Dummett has simply made a category mistake by not distinguishing between 
one-way and two-way powers. 
 So, we have seen that tacit knowledge must not be construed as a state of having a 
certain propositional attitude. But how precisely do these points connect to issues surrounding                                                         214 Cf. Evans 1981: 338‐9, who does not recognise that knowing the proposition that ‘Das ist Brot’ is true if and only if that is bread may, in exceptional circumstances, figure in practical inferences. So, for Evans, knowledge of language is more strictly insulated than I have suggested here. 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compositionality? Evans thinks that not every supporter of compositionality is wedded to 
Dummett’s pernicious view about knowledge of language. Let us turn to how Evans 
conceives of an allegedly innocuous conception of dispositions explaining compositionality.  
 According to Evans, the derivational routes from the axioms of a compositional theory 
of meaning to its theorems should, in some sense to be specified, reflect the causal routes 
leading from the dispositions associated with the language’s names and predicates to the 
intentional states associated with the whole sentences available for language use.215 
Motivating this idea involves reference to two distinct ways in which sentences are composed 
from axioms and supplied with meaning. Consider a language L with three predicates (‘likes 
fish’, ‘likes trees’, ‘likes eagles’) and three names (‘John’, ‘Hans’ and ‘Gertrud’). Combining 
the names (‘j’ for ‘John’, ‘h’ for ‘Hans’ and ‘g’ for ‘Gertrud’) with the predicate ‘likes fish’ 
(abbreviated as ‘F’) we can build three sentences: Fj, Fh and Fg. Taking all predicates in (and 
abbreviating ‘likes trees’ with ‘T’ and ‘likes eagles’ with ‘E’), we get 9 sentences in toto: 
 Fj, Fh and Fg; 
 Tj, Th and Tg; 
 Ej, Eh and Eg. 
We make our toy language L meaningful by assigning truth-conditions to our sentences. We 
thus get the following set of truth-conditions: 
 ‘Fj’ is true-in-L iff John likes fish. 
 ‘Fh’ is true-in-L iff Hans likes fish. 
 ‘Fg’ is true-in-L iff Gertrud likes fish. 
 ‘Tj’ is true-in-L iff  John likes trees. 
 ‘Th’ is true-in-L iff Hans likes trees. 
 ‘Tg’ is true-in-L iff Gertrud likes trees. 
 ‘Ej’ is true-in-L iff John likes eagles. 
 ‘Eh’ is true-in-L iff Hans likes eagles. 
 ‘Eg’ is true-in-L iff Getrud likes eagles. 
Now, the set of truth-conditions can be specified in two ways, yielding a listiform 
specification and a recursive specification respectively. And because both specifications 
deliver the same set of truth-conditions, we speak of extensionally equivalent specifications. 
Here they are: 
(T1) 
 The listiform theory lists each of the 9 members of the set (as just done above) and has, 
hence, 9 axioms.                                                         215 The wording is adapted from Miller 1997:155 and is based on Evans 1981:329‐331. 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(T2) 
The recursive theory lists each predicate and each name and supplies those 6 axioms with 
a further axiom specifying in general how to combine subjects and predicates. It has 7 
axioms. 
T2 has less axioms than T1 and still delivers the same set of truth-conditions. For languages 
with many more predicates and names, anything like T1 is hardly of practical value. The 
reason why T2 is more economical lies in the additional axiom which can be spelled out like 
this: a concatenation (°) of any predicate (Φ) and any name (α) results in a true sentence iff 
the object denoted by the name satisfies the predicate. 
 Recall that we started this section by asking why compositional theories are to be 
preferred to non-compositional theories. Counting T2 as a paradigmatic case for 
compositional theories and the listiform specification T1 as paradigmatic for non-
compositional approaches, we are asked for reasons why T2 should be preferred to T1. A 
good and simple answer is that compositional theories are more economical, because listiform 
theories are not practical for richer languages and, often, hardly feasible at all. But Gareth 
Evans, maybe looking for something deeper, claims that we should adopt a criterion for 
deciding between T1 and T2 on empirical grounds. His idea is that viable theories of meaning 
do not only give us the correct meaning-specifications, but are also empirically verifiable 
descriptions of the dispositions governing correct language use. 
 Now, this does not look like a good idea in the context of Kripkenstein’s sceptic. Was 
it not shown, after all, that dispositionalist approaches are futile? Yes, but only if we take 
dispositions as mediating between the meaning of linguistic expressions and how they are 
used correctly. Dispositions governing the use of linguistic expressions were found to be 
admissible if they are simply used to explain that there is an internal relation between a 
disposition to use an expression in such-and-such a way and what counts as using an 
expression in such-and-such a way. The set of truth-conditions that T1 and T2 produce can be 
taken to provide valid descriptions of such dispositions, because they simply express the 
internal relations between 9 propositions (Fj, Fh, Fg, Tj, Th, Tg, Ej, Ea and Eg) and what 
makes them true. 
 This need not amount to a truth-conditional meaning theory in Dummett’s sense, for 
such a theory would presuppose Dummett’s conception of knowledge of language. So, 
common worries about truth-conditional accounts of meaning need not necessarily apply to 
Evans’s proposal. Note, however, that the proposal does still not capture those essential 
aspects of the psychological powers making up linguistic competence which are subject to 
human volition––it only captures those aspects of our psychological powers which provide 
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what human volition plays on. Even if I am disposed to say truthfully that Gertrud likes eagles 
iff Gertrud likes eagles, I may volitionally act against this disposition, lie and say that Gertrud 
does not like eagles. Evans thus provides us with an interesting way of explaining 
dispositional aspects of the psychological powers governing language use, even though we 
should keep them apart from the aspects of our psychological powers that are subject to 
volition.216 We may not infer that reference to dispositions helps with explaining what the 
ability to use a language is. 
 Even if this last point is observed, one must still be extremely vigilant when pursuing 
Evans’s line of thought. Evans claims that empirical investigation should allow us to decide 
between T1 and T2. Such an investigation should therefore allow us to decide between 
descriptions of dispositions. The first sort of evidence that an empirical investigation might 
provide is causal: if the causal explanation of a subject’s V-ing in circumstances C always 
requires reference to some state S, the evidence will suggest choosing T2. But if there are nine 
states causally explaining a subject’s V-ing in circumstances C, the evidence will suggest 
choosing T1. Now, if the causal explanation adduces neurological evidence, we have to be 
careful not to assume that the states just invoked are mediating elements between some 
disposition to use a linguistic expression and its manifest use. That would make the proposal 
straightaway subject to Kripkenstein’s anti-dispositionalist challenges and, pari passu, 
inadmissible as buttressing an account of semantic correctness as questioned by the sceptical 
paradox. Mental or neurological states must count as being correlated with dispositions and 
not as being constitutive of them. 
 There are two other sorts of evidence Evans considers. The more important one is 
evidence from acquisition. If, during acquisition, the child’s mastery of Fj, Fh and Tg does 
neither involve mastery of Tj, Th or Fg (and so on), the child’s competence cannot be 
described with T2, but could be described with T1 (although that would be subject to further 
tests). The last sort of evidence Evans mentions is evidence from loss. If, due to some 
accident or other impairing circumstances, a subject looses mastery of Fj, one would have to 
check whether consequences for other sentences ensue. If mastery of all sentences is gone, T2 
describes the competence the subject had. If mastery of the eight other sentences is still 
displayed, T1 is correct. 
 So, Evans has come up with an empirically respectable notion of linguistic                                                         216 Miller 1997:171 regarded it as an open question whether anything like Evans’s dispositions passes muster when faced with Kripkenstein’s sceptic. But if looked at from a perspective for which the distinction between internal and external relations is admissible, Evans’s dispositions do pass muster. 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dispositions that is not necessarily subject to Kripkensteinian scruples. Knowledge of 
language is just this. Linguistic competence––as I shall call the dispositional aspect of 
language use from now on––will be any coherent set of linguistic disposition along the lines 
Evans suggested, which eschews commitments to a theory of meaning in Dummett’s sense. 
My Wittgensteinian proposal requires some sort of linguistic competence in order to explain 
how linguistic expressions become available for use and Evans provides us with an interesting 
starting point. 
 All would seem well, if there were no objections to Evans’s proposal. We turn to them 
now in order to assess whether the objections threaten the notion of linguistic competence. 
 
From Knowledge to Competence 
 
The previous section established two important results. A first result is that knowledge of 
language, because it is tacit, cannot be a propositional attitude-state. A second result is that 
Gareth Evans has provided an empirically respectable notion of linguistic dispositions which 
is not subject to Kripkensteinian worries and enables a notion of linguistic competence which 
suits my purposes. Crispin Wright has three objections against Evans’s dispositional account 
of knowledge of language to which we should turn now in order to assess Evans’s proposal 
more thoroughly . 
 The first objection Wright mentions, although he does not claim that it is 
insurmountable, has it that Evans’s account is viciously circular.217 Wright builds on the 
prima facie sensible requirement that dispositional accounts explain what the dispositions in 
question do and under what circumstances they are manifest. Turning to knowledge of 
language, Wright supposes, the requirement leads to a worry. Characterising under what 
circumstances a linguistic disposition is manifest involves characterising what those 
dispositions are dispositions to do and vice versa. Wright thinks that this prevents us from 
explaining the disposition after all, for an adequate explanation must characterise what the 
dispositions are to do independently of the circumstances under which they are manifest. The 
worry appears if the circumstances under which dispositions manifest are also to be 
characterised in terms of what the dispositions are to do, for here the allegedly vicious 
circularity gets established. 
 According to Evans, we legitimately explain what it is to use a name like ‘Gertrud’ in 
terms of the linguistic dispositions we have set down in the recursive theory T2. The worry                                                         217 Wright 1986b:233 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appears if we explain what it is to have the disposition described by T2, for it turns out that 
that can only be explained by pointing at the circumstances under which the dispositions 
manifest that are described by T2, i.e. using ‘Gertrud’ correctly. Wright believes that an 
adequate explanation in dispositional terms requires more and argues, pace Evans and me, 
that what a disposition is a disposition to do must be accounted for independently of the 
circumstances in which it will be manifest. 
 Wright’s worry would of course hold sway if dispositions must be characterised in 
terms of external relations: that would involve a relation between a disposition, the 
circumstances under which it manifests and what it is a disposition to do. This is, however, 
not so. Characterising dispositions, abilities or psychological powers in terms of internal 
relations does involve the sort of circularity that Wright has noticed and that is perfectly licit: 
a disposition can be characterised through an internal relation between what it is a disposition 
to do and the circumstances under which it manifests. I have discussed this point at length in 
part A of the present thesis. The circularity in Evans’s account is hence not vicious, but 
virtuous because it preserves perfectly common intuitions about psychological powers 
involved in language use.218 
 Nevertheless, Wright has two more objections. The second objection questions 
whether a specific causal structure is relevant for deciding between the two kinds of semantic 
theories––compositional (i.e. recursive like T2) and non-compositional (i.e. listiform like T1). 
The leading idea is that the causal structure exhibited by T2 dispositions may just as well be 
described in terms of T1. This must be denied, for mere conceivability of both dispositions 
exhibiting the same causal structure in experimental situations does not suffice here.219 Mere 
conceivability does not suffice because of Ockham’s Razor: if we have, given some empirical 
explanation, a more parsimonious one explaining the empirical data, we should opt for the 
more parsimonious one. And because––if we focus on linguistic dispositions––any recursive 
characterisation is (apart from expressively crippled toy languages) always more 
parsimonious than its listiform competitor, Wright’s objection does not apply. The point is, of 
course, that listiform characterisations like T1 have more axioms than recursive 
characterisations like T2 and are therefore easier to survey. 
 Wright’s third objection focuses on Evans’s idea that every axiom of a compositional 
theory describes the disposition governing the use of the expression it corresponds to. If that 
were true, T2 could be reduced to only 6 axioms (three for the names plus three for the 
predicates), because the axiom specifying recursion does not describe the use of a                                                         218 This is similar to the view Miller expresses in his 1997:158‐9. 219 See also Miller 1997:157‐63 who is more patient with Wright. 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corresponding expression. But then again, T2 without the axiom specifying recursion cannot 
fully characterise the use of more complicated languages, as we will have no means for 
deriving the truth-conditions for a much larger number of statements. So, Wright infers, 
something is wrong with Evans’s idea. 
 Consider again the wording chosen above for the axiom specifying recursion: a 
concatenation (°) of any predicate (Φ) and any name (α) results in a true sentence iff the 
object denoted by the name satisfies the predicate. We can now simply apply that schema to 
the specification of each predicate, yielding a new theory T3 which has, if compared with T2, 
three new axioms for the predicates: 
− for all names α, the concatenation (°) of α with F yields a true sentence iff the object denoted 
by α satisfies the predicate ‘likes fish’ 
− for all names α, the concatenation (°) of α with T yields a true sentence iff the object denoted 
by α satisfies the predicate ‘likes trees’ 
− for all names α, the concatenation (°) of α with E yields a true sentence iff the object denoted 
by α satisfies the predicate ‘likes eagles’220 
The idea here is, obviously, that we can build recursion into the specification of each 
predicate. Most commentators take this to take care of the objection at a relatively low cost.221 
But that does not mean that we have reached our goal with T3. Even though Evans’ proposal 
can explain how we are disposed to linguistically respond to facts, T3 takes for granted that 
there are names and predicates and that they can be concatenated to form simple statements 
which can be true or false. Names and predicates have distinct syntactical roles and Evans’s 
dispositionalism just presupposes that. 
 The aim of the present part of the thesis is to explain how linguistic expressions––
strings of sings and sequences of sounds––become available for language use and how we 
extrapolate. That is what an account of linguistic competence was meant to deliver. Evans’s 
proposal can only explain part of it. Theories like T3 can only explain how we are disposed to 
use names and simple predicates to derive new statements and decide whether they are true 
based on what the names and predicates mean. T3 (or anything like it) cannot explain how 
other linguistic expressions become available for use and how words are ordered in 
expressions independently of the expressions’ truth-aptness. There will be no such 
explanation forthcoming, because factual correctness––as captured by truth-conditions––is 
not paradigmatic for semantic correctness. Even though T3 may explain how some factually 
correct extrapolations can be made through recursion, that does not necessarily help                                                         220 This solution follows the spirit of Martin Davis 1987.  221 See Miller 1997:163‐7. 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explaining other cases of correct extrapolations for which truth and falsehood have no role to 
play (but for which meaning still matters). 
 Perhaps we may take recourse to other dispositions, in order to deliver what T3 does 
not. A revised account of linguistic competence (comprising all aspects of language use that 
can be explained dispositionally) will contain Evans’s dispositions, yielding an account of 
how we respond linguistically to obtaining facts, and other dispositions, explaining word-
order in general and extrapolations of new linguistic expression from old ones. The second 
sort of linguistic dispositions supply exactly what my Wittgensteinian proposal needs: 
linguistic expressions (sentences, ellipses, etc.) and principles of deriving new syntactically 
well-formed expressions from them. A revised account of linguistic competence will thus also 
invoke dispositions which govern syntactical correctness (i.e. the grammatical well-
formedness of sentences in natural languages). Dispositional terms will thus be used to 
describe syntactic constraints on language use and correct extrapolations in language use will 
then have two components: syntax governing what counts as an extrapolation at all and 
semantics governing what counts as a correct extrapolation. Approaches along these lines 
have usually drawn on Noam Chomsky’s work on linguistic competence. It is this approach to 
which we turn now. 
 
The Chomskian Perspective 
 
For Noam Chomsky, studying linguistic competence has nothing to do with studying social 
manifestations of it. The central tenet of his approach to theoretical linguistics is that the 
defining aspects of linguistic competence are not in any way related to social conventions or 
the purposes of communication. This is obviously not in accord with a common sense notion 
of language and Chomsky is fully aware of that. In order to distinguish common sense views 
on language from what he perceives as the proper object of study for theoretical linguistics, 
Chomsky has introduced the technical distinction between I-language and E-language. ‘I-
language’ refers to linguistic competence, the language faculty, as far as he finds it suitable as 
an object of scientific enquiry. ‘E-language’ refers to languages as conceived by common 
sense, i.e. shared linguistic practices. 
 Studying the I-language means studying a pre-wired mechanism, the language faculty, 
which comes with a set of toggle switches (also called parameters) that are set depending on 
the environment into which a potential language user is born. The setting of each toggle 
switch and the way the settings of all switches can be combined constitutes the range of 
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possible syntactic dispositions––they are the conditions of possibility Chomsky envisages for 
language. A linguist is supposed to study this mechanism, to find out what the initial setting 
of the switches is, to explain what possible settings can be triggered by the environment 
during first-language acquisition and how such a setting can be triggered.222 
 Chomsky defends the idea that studying the I-language is part of a naturalistic study of 
the human mind and that facts about the mechanism in question are facts about the language 
faculty (i.e. the linguistic competence) of an individual. Facts about the language faculty are 
facts about innate psychological powers which are not sensitive to one’s upbringing or the 
environment in which a first language is acquired. This makes perfect sense if one recalls that 
the language faculty merely contains the conditions of possibility Chomsky envisages for 
language. So, facts about the language faculty are facts about human biological endowment; 
the environment, in which a potential language speaker grows up, only governs how that 
endowment enables individuals to acquire a specific mother tongue.223  
 This suffices already to perceive some important points about Chomsky’s programme. 
First, Chomsky proposes an enquiry into linguistic dispositions which is similar to Evans’s, 
because linguistic dispositions are to be studied empirically and because the dispositions in 
question are (as I shall argue) not necessarily subject to worries bound up with rule-following. 
Secondly, Chomsky is not committed to any truth-conditional conception of meaning, 
because the initial state of the language faculty cannot––due to its insensitivity to what is the 
case in the environment (i.e. the conditions under which sentences are true)––be captured by 
truth-conditions. Thus, the sort of syntax that the language faculty determines is not 
analogous to the logical syntax of classical first-order logic, because that logical syntax is 
most easily introduced through truth-tables and the syntax determined by the language faculty 
is not. If the syntax of classical logic has anything to do with the syntax of natural languages, 
logical syntax defers to what the language faculty provides. 
 From this we can infer that if truth-conditions played any role in Chomsky’s scheme, 
they would defer to parametric settings. And more generally, any plausible account of correct 
language use must defer to parametric settings. This is not to say that semantic correctness is 
fully determined by the language faculty, but simply that the latter is necessary for the former.  
Whether Chomsky’s dispositionalism supplies what my Wittgensteinian proposal requires 
from an account of linguistic competence obviously depends on the details of what the 
language faculty comes down to. 
 It is important to be aware of a caveat Chomsky makes. His talk of a pre-wired                                                         222 Ludlow 2001:419 223 Op. cit. p. 424 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mechanism can be misleading if interpreted in analogy to the sort of mechanism we find in 
artefacts. Especially the idea that a computer model of the language faculty would be a 
desirable research result is something Chomsky rejects. Answering questions about the nature 
of artefacts, he argues, requires explaining the designer’s intent, standard use and similar 
things. And we can only speak of malfunction if we have answers along these lines. Natural 
objects, on the other hand, are not accounted for like this. The computer analogy breaks 
down, because the language faculty is, in Chomsky’s eyes, a natural object just like organic 
molecules and not at all an artefact. It is for this reason that he also rejects the idea that 
computer models can fully capture the nature of the language faculty.224 
 The upshot from this is that we must not read issues known from mechanical artefacts 
into natural, especially biological, objects we describe in mechanistic terms. Doing so would 
require further arguments which show that some issue concerning mechanical artefacts (or 
computer models) is indeed relevant for the study of biological objects. And it is likely that 
such arguments violate the distinction between mechanistic descriptions of objects, which 
need not necessarily have mechanistic natures (but are usefully described so), on the one side 
and the plans determining the design of mechanistic artefacts on the other. Whether the 
distinction can be upheld in the case of the language faculty is controversial. Below, I shall 
argue that it is to be upheld at any price, whereas Chomsky weakens it by equating 
mechanistic properties with computational properties, which he actually does ascribe to 
biological systems. 
 Also interesting for present purposes is the attitude towards semantics that Chomsky’s 
focus on I-language comes with. It leads him to suspicion about semantic realism and, more 
specifically, the requirement that language use be modelled on the application of words to 
objects in the external world. Wittgenstein also rejects that requirement in his Philosophical 
Investigations, where it is a primary target of his attacks.225 Chomsky has the same target but 
argues against it in a different way than Wittgenstein does. For Chomsky, the idea is that if 
the nature of the language faculty is insensitive to the environment of an individual (because 
it is an important part of that individual’s biological endowment) and if the nature of the 
language faculty is the main interest of proper linguistics, then semantics as a linguistic 
project must eschew relational properties like reference, construed as a relation between a 
linguistic expression and some object. Chomsky holds that, as a technical concept, the 
concept of reference is ill-conceived and, in so far as we informally use the term ‘reference’ 
and its cognates, referring is something that individual speakers do––but linguistic                                                         224 Chomsky 2000:105 225 Cf. Baker & Hacker 2005:1‐4 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expressions do not. 226 He explicitly agrees with Peter Strawson on these matters and writes: 
The question, ‘to what does the word X refer?,’ has no clear sense, whether posed for 
Peter, or (more mysteriously) for some “common language.” In general, a word, even of 
the simplest kind, does not pick out an entity of the world, or of our “belief space” […] 
Something is named as a person, a river, a city, with the complexity of understanding that 
goes along with these categories. Language has no logically proper names [i.e. names or 
words that pick out exactly one object without the risk of referential failure; FD], stripped 
of such properties; one must beware of what Peter Strawson called “the myth of the 
logically proper name” (Strawson 1952:216) in natural language, and related myths 
concerning indexicals and pronouns.227 
There are other salient upshots ensuing from Chomsky’s I-language/E-language distinction. 
One is that it allows him to distinguish between purely technical concepts, which can be 
employed in a scientific enquiry into what I-language is, and common sense concepts, on 
which we can draw if engaging in a purely conceptual (or philosophical) investigation. If 
questions about correct language use belong to the domain of E-languages and not to I-
language, they may pose conceptual problems potentially independent of the scientific 
enquiry that Chomsky is interested in. Consequently, Chomsky is committed to insisting that 
Kripkenstein’s scepticism and the whole rule-following debate do not concern his project.  
 To defend this, he may argue that the technical vocabulary he deploys to describe the 
linguistic dispositions he is interested in––viz. ‘parametric settings’, ‘principles’, ‘rules’, and 
‘representations’––are not meant to introduce mediating elements between the possession of a 
linguistic disposition and its manifestation in (those aspects of) language use (which they 
determine). On a superficial reading of Chomsky’s texts, the idea that parametric settings, 
principles, rules or representations belong to the biological endowment could seem 
incompatible with that denial. But Chomsky’s account is not necessarily incompatible with 
the denial, because claiming that some linguistic dispositions adequately describe the internal 
relation between possessing a linguistic disposition and those aspects of language use which 
they determine simply draws on the fact that these dispositions are defining of human nature 
and do, because of that, not require further grounding in metaphysical profundities. Putting 
this into a programmatic slogan, we may say that human language takes care of itself. I shall 
argue below that Chomsky does not always perceive this option clearly and that he sometimes 
fails to commit himself to it, which leads him to musings which are conceptually unsound.                                                         226 Cf. Ludlow 2000:424 and his references to Chomsky 1981 and 1995a. Note that Ludlow’s wording could be taken to mean that Chomsky is merely talking about relations between words and objects in the external environment. But the quote from Chomsky inserted below makes perfectly clear that he rejects 
any relation between words and objects. 227 Chomsky 2000:181 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But I shall also make clear that the option just mentioned is nevertheless Chomskian in spirit. 
 There are influential writings of Chomsky where he does get all this wrong. Initially, 
Chomsky had tried to argue against Kripkenstein’s sceptic that there is indeed a fact of the 
matter about what the workings of the language faculty operate on. He was, in other words, 
tempted to reify technical concepts like ‘parametric setting’, ‘rule’ or ‘representation’.228 We 
have seen in section 1.1 of part A that dispositionalism in general does not have the 
conceptual resources to do that.229 More recently, Chomsky has changed focus and now opts 
for a strategy similar to the one I just suggested.230 He adds, in order to strengthen his case, 
that the concept of semantically correct language use does belong to the study of E-language 
anyway. Clarifying semantic correctness is a project supplementary to enquiries into I-
language, but has no obvious use for it, because semantically correct language use does not 
fall within the domain of I-language, i.e. is not fully determined by the language faculty. A 
language user  
may choose to violate the rules, perhaps using the word “chair” to mean table in a code 
[…] [i]n doing so, he makes use of faculties of mind beyond the language faculty.231  
This is of course very similar to what I have been stressing several times so far: language use 
is volitional––the ability to use language is exercised at will––and dispositions are sometimes 
overruled by will, but cannot be said to be exercised. Therefore, intuitions about correct 
language use in general do not necessarily constrain enquiries into the language faculty. It 
appears now that much hangs on Chomsky’s methodological distinction between I- and E-
language, as it apparently allows him to dodge some widely spread worries. 
 Let us now consider what the faculty of language is in more detail and whether it can 
explain how linguistic expressions become available for use. For that was our motivation to 
take up the issue of linguistic competence and reconsider dispositionalism again, after all. 
Once the more detailed picture is available, further objections against Chomsky’s programme 
can be discussed. In that context, an assessment of the conceptual soundness of Chomsky’s 
methodological perspective––which is to a large part just the distinction between I-language 
and E-language––will claim centre stage. 
 It was mentioned that more recent versions of Chomsky’s dispositionalism have better 
chances of passing muster. Therefore, the summary provided by Hauser, Chomsky and Fitch  
will count as the relevant account of the conceptual framework.232 Hauser et al. argue that a                                                         228 Chomsky 1986:ch. 4 229 Cf. Wright 1989c/2001:ch. 7 for other reasons. 230 Chomsky 1993, 1995b and especially 2000:141‐3 231 Chomsky 2000:143  232 Hauser et al. 2002 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full understanding of the language faculty requires substantial cooperations across several 
academic disciplines. Linguistics, evolutionary biology, psychology, anthropology and 
neuroscience each play a role. It is therefore necessary to become clearer on what a study of 
the language faculty––qua study of I-language––amounts to.233 To that end, Hauser et al. 
distinguish between a broad and a narrow conception of the language faculty, FLB and FLN 
respectively. Whereas FLB contains most things necessary and sufficient for human language 
use, FLN is a computational system which combines words from the lexicon (not part of 
FLN) in order to produce linguistic expressions ready for use. FLN recursively determines 
syntactic composition. FLB determines, together with FLN as its functional kernel, sensory-
motor functions (like speech) and conceptual-intentional functions (like attending to 
something), but does not include some other aspects necessary for language like respiration or 
memory. The reason seems to be that there are many animals which have respiration and 
memory, but nothing like a language faculty. 
 Hauser et al. admit that the precise nature of FLB, especially the sensory-motor and 
the conceptual-intentional functions, is currently subject to debate.234 They do, however, 
claim that the workings of FLN are less controversial. FLN takes a finite set of elements––the 
lexicon––as input and combines the elements into a possibly infinite array of expressions. 
Those expressions are then passed on to the parts of FLB which determine how the 
expressions are to be articulated and what concepts they may express. FLB thus makes the 
expressions obtained from FLN available for language use.235 It is not clear how expressions 
are passed from FLN to FLB or what precisely FLB does with them, but it is quite clear that 
neither FLN, FLB nor the expressions they operate on need be physically identifiable––so it 
appears best to think of either of them as abstractions or idealisations.236 The sort of linguistic 
dispositions associated with the workings of FLN are, on the other hand, relatively well 
described. 
 A word about ‘possibly infinite array of expressions’ might be due here in order to 
dispel misunderstandings. Talk of a possibly infinite large array results from the recursive 
characterisation of how linguistic expressions are derived from a lexicon and from the fact 
that the relevant recursive characterisations do not contain an upper limit, simply because 
such limits are not determined by the formal properties of the characterisations. Of course, 
there are biological boundaries to the length of expressions that can be produced (or                                                         233 Hauser et al. 2002:1570 identify I‐language with the language faculty as studied in theoretical linguistics inspired by Chomsky.  234 Op. cit. pp. 1570‐1 235 Op. cit. p. 1572 236 Cf. Chomsky 2000: 38/184; the claim is most explicit in Chomsky & McGilvray 2012: ch. 7. 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understood), but these boundaries are not a defining mark of FLN; the boundaries may be 
defining marks of FLB, of further capacities such as memory or even of the anatomy and 
physiology of articulation. From that point of view, recursive characterisations of 
grammatically well-formed sentences are just as unproblematic as recursive characterisations 
of natural numbers. All is well, as long as we do not read into this a commitment to saying 
that we thereby grasp (each and every element of) a potentially infinite totality or even an 
actually infinite totality.237 
 It is easy to see how appealing to FLN can explain how linguistic expressions become 
available for use, once there is a lexicon––a part of FLB––that supplies the relevant words 
together with constraints on how to combine them. Verbs like ‘go’ can be combined with 
pronouns like ‘I’, ‘you’ or ‘they’ by putting the pronoun first and concatenating it with the 
verb; the lexicon supplies the verb, the pronouns and constraints on how they are to be put 
together and FLN actually puts them together. The constraints that the lexicon puts on 
concatenations can also be supposed to provide hypothetical uses of linguistic expressions; 
they possibly do that together with memories about situations in which language use was 
falsified or passed muster. The lexicon specifies how the word can be combined with other 
words and memory specifies possible situations in which the word (alone or combined) can be 
uttered. FLN thus might take ‘I’ and ‘go’ from the lexicon, combines them (in accord with the 
lexicon) into ‘I go’ and passes the expression on to FLB where, with the help of memory, it is 
established that I may utter ‘I go’ to say that I go. For a restricted set of simple declarative 
sentences it is possible that something like Evansian dispositions (as specified in T3) are 
partly responsible for entitling me to utter ‘I go’ to say that I go when I do. So there might be 
a disposition specifiable like this: 
For any of the singular personal pronouns ‘I’ or ‘you’, the concatenation of a pronoun with 
the verb ‘go’ yields a true sentence iff the person denoted by the pronoun satisfies the 
predicate ‘go’. 
Such dispositions are––if they exist––part of long-term memory, because they have been 
learned early during first-language acquisition. And because memory is not necessarily 
contained within the language faculty, the formation of hypotheses about correct use may 
prove to lie outside the domain of what Chomsky regards as subject to proper naturalistic 
enquiry. There may, of course, be rules which govern language use by sanctioning, restricting 
or adding to what linguistic dispositions provide. It might therefore very well be that rules 
specify semantically correct (E-)language use much like orthodox Wittgensteinians envisage.                                                         237 Cf. Hauser et al. 2002:1672 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And so it seems that the sort of dispositions that Chomsky takes to be definitive of linguistic 
competence are indeed available for my Wittgensteinian proposal of correct language use. 
 Nevertheless, that result is not something most participants in the rule-following 
debates would have expected, especially not orthodox Wittgensteinians. We should hence 
pause for a moment and consider some of the fervent attacks on Chomsky coming from that 
camp. 
 
Baker & Hacker on Chomsky 
 
In their Language, Sense & Nonsense, Gordon Baker and P.M.S. Hacker argue that a wide 
range of received philosophy of language and theoretical linguistics is conceptually 
confused.238 This strong claim is partly motivated by considerations familiar from the rule-
following debate. Despite the merits their views have, the polemic tone Baker & Hacker have 
chosen has brought it about that the monograph has not had the influence it should have had. 
Their main targets, truth-conditional conceptions of meaning and (pernicious) dispositionalist 
conceptions of linguistic competence, still exist and prosper. 
 Baker & Hacker devote three entire chapters to a criticism of Chomsky’s perspective 
and its influence on linguistics and the philosophy of language.239 Their worries are legion, 
but it will suffice to focus on only a part of them here. First, I shall consider two minor points 
they make concerning central aspects of Chomsky’s programme. Second, I shall take up their 
attack on Evans’s dispositionalism, because they assume that it applies to Chomsky as well. 
Third, the principal worry that Baker & Hacker raise against Chomsky will be assessed. It 
will emerge from that discussion that most of their objections do not apply anymore, since 
Chomsky has explicitly drawn a distinction between I-language (and the technical concepts 
bound up with it) and E-language (and the common sense concepts bound up with it) in 
1986.240 That will eventually lead to a detailed assessment of Chomsky’s methodological 
considerations which buttress the I-/E-language distinction in the next section; even though 
that assessment does not follow the letter (or the tone) of Baker & Hacker, it will reintroduce 
a worry in their spirit.                                                         238 Baker & Hacker 1984a 239 Baker & Hacker 1984a: chs. 7, 8 and 9 240 It is interesting that Hacker never noticed this, for in Baker & Hacker 2005:365/366 he still criticises papers by Chomsky which are more than 40 years old and, hence, completely outdated. Incidentally, Hattiangadi’s cricitism of Chomsky are based on only one work by Chomsky, which was also more than 25 years old when she wrote her 2007. I suspect that this is symptomatic for a curious attitude that many philosophers of language have towards Chomsky’s achievements. On the other hand, Chomsky’s previous writings had achieved the status of orthodoxy, so it is perhaps legitimate to target them in some cases. 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 There are two minor points Baker & Hacker raise against Chomsky which directly 
pertain to what I have said above. A first point criticises the claim that, as they put it, “any 
language has an infinity of sentences”.241 And a second point rejects Chomsky’s claim that 
the language faculty is similar to a physical organ.242 
 Let us turn to the first point. Baker & Hacker write that, according to Chomskians, any 
language has an infinite number of sentences. Not only are there infinitely many of them, they 
can also be infinitely large, as they are derivable by repeatedly embedding any declarative 
sentence s in an opaque context like ‘He said that...’. They write: 
These claims rest on the supposition that the rules of grammar and the lexicon, of their 
own accord, confer meaning on these bizarre objects, even though we, speakers of the 
language, cannot grasp their meanings through purely ‘medical limitations’ (as Russell 
once put it).243 
‘These claims’ refers to Chomsky’s claim explained above, which has it that the faculty of 
language is characterised recursively and that there are no (formally specified) upper limits to 
the derivations it can possibly produce. Baker & Hacker correctly gather that from Chomsky’s 
writings. What is untenable is the semantic supposition they illicitly project into this when 
they claim that the rules of grammar and the lexicon confer meaning. It is hard to pin down 
where exactly they derive this claim from, but any supposition along these lines is not in 
accord with the Chomskian picture.244 In a recently published interview, Chomsky is explicit 
about this point and claims that there might be only syntax and language use: 
So why shouldn’t the meaning side of language work like that: no semantics at all––that 
is, no reference relation––just syntactic instructions to the conceptual apparatus which 
then acts?245 
The point of this is obvious: the dispositions Chomsky is interested in just build syntactically 
well-formed sentences and do not at all confer meaning. Backer & Hacker think not only that 
very large sentences are build by the faculty of language, but that it also ‘confers meaning on 
these bizarre objects’ and that it makes them intelligible. And that is obviously wrong. 
 This is a serious mistake on Baker & Hacker’s part, for that aspect of Chomsky’s 
project has been established since the beginning. Already in the introduction of his 1955 
manuscript, Chomsky insists on taking syntax, which contains the recursive machinery                                                         241 Op. cit. p. 306 242 Op. cit. p. 280 243 Op. cit. p. 306 244 I conjecture that they falsely accuse Chomsky of also endorsing a supposition they found in Katz & Postal 1964 and other proponents of generative semantics. See Ludlow 2011:ch. 1 for an overview of the disagreements between Chomsky and proponents of a generative semantics who actually do endorse what Baker & Hacker mention in the quote. 245 Chomsky & McGilvray 2012:29 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allowing the derivation of a potential infinitude of sentences or very large sentences, as 
conceptually prior to semantics. And on the picture presently at hand, FLN too is a recursive 
system which does not at all confer meanings on sentences but may in principle determine the 
derivation of an inifinitude of sentences or very large sentences. The reason why FLN does 
not actually produce ludicrously large arrays of sentences is, as has been already argued, that 
there are constraints on derivation––imposed by FLB or other biological properties of 
humans––which prevent this.246 It is true that the recursive characterisations which are 
defining of FLN do not have formal upper limits for some derivations, but this does not mean 
that speakers of any language thereby tacitly grasp an infinitude (or any other ludicrously 
large totality) of linguistic expressions––not to mention their meanings or possible usages.  
 The upshot is obvious but worth stressing: the recursive properties of FLN are the 
properties of an abstraction described in computational terms––once we look at other 
biological constraints on language, the possible infinities generated by the descriptive tools 
employed does not at all commit theoretical linguists to the claim that language users tacitly 
grasp an infinitude of sentences. 
 The second minor point I wanted to mention concerns the statement that language is a 
mental organ. Chomsky often compares the language faculty, the kernel of our capacity to use 
any language, to physical organs. This is something that Baker & Hacker find very 
problematic: 
Having compared a capacity to an organ, he then suggests that one can regard the ‘growth 
of language’ (presumably meaning the development of the ability to speak a language) as 
analogous to the development of a bodily organ. But it is as difficult to regard one’s 
increasing mastery of a language thus as it is to regard an athlete’s increasing capacity to 
run fast as analogous to the growth of a third leg! The final self-inflicted blow comes with 
the declaration that language is a mental organ (whose character is guaranteed by genetic 
mechanisms).247 
It is important to note here, that ‘capacity’ does not mean the same for Chomsky as it does for 
Baker & Hacker. For Chomsky, ‘capacity’ is a technical concept referring to a competent 
language user’s dispositions to use the sort of sentences that an account of FLB will predict. 
The aspects of language use not predicted by any account of FLB––viz. all aspects subject to 
human volition––are not part of linguistic capacity, if understood in the technical sense. The 
sort of capacities Baker & Hacker are interested in are, on the other hand, two-way powers 
(abilities) to use language and only of these can we say that they have organs through which                                                         246 Cf. Hauser et al. 2002:1672 247  Baker & Hacker 1984a:280‐1 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they are exercised. The organs of the two-way powers to use language are the organs of 
speech production and reception, our hand when used for writing or signing in sign language 
and our fingertips, which we use when reading braille. These and other organs are the 
vehicles of E-language use and they are, by extension, organs of human will. But of course, 
Baker & Hacker are right about this: it is utter nonsense to suppose that I-language is “used” 
and thus the actualisation of the dispositions constituting I-language does not require anything 
like the organs of E-language use. I-language, unlike E-language, is not expressed and does 
therefore not require an organ. So it is indeed misleading when Chomsky talks about a 
“mental organ”.  
 But the analogy between the development of the language faculty and the development 
of physical organs does not break down because of this. During language acquisition, FLN 
governs the development of FLB by constraining the range of possible extrapolations just as 
the mechanisms of cell-growth constrain (together with the genetic code and the organic 
materials available) the growth of an organ. Chomsky’s hope is to make clear that some 
central aspects of FLB will develop the same way in all healthy individuals as do most 
physical organs in the body.248 Still the claim that the faculty of language does develop much 
like an organ does not entail that we can speak about it as we speak about any organ. That 
there is an interesting analogy cannot license speaking of a “mental organ”.  
 With these minor points clarified, we can move on to an issue that concerns both 
Chomsky and Evans. We have already noted that both have a similar conception of what 
linguistic dispositions are and Baker & Hacker attack that common ground through a criticism 
of Evans’s position.249 So, Baker & Hacker agree with Evans that knowledge of a language 
cannot be a propositional attitude-state when they write that ‘learning a language is not akin 
to learning a corpus of fact and theory’.250 But they neglect that Evans’s dispositionalism does 
not necessarily require posing mediating elements between understanding a linguistic 
expression and using it. Recall, the set of truth-conditions that T1 and T2 produce can be 
taken to provide valid descriptions of the innocuous sort of dispositions, because they simply 
express the internal relations between 9 propositions (Fj, Fh, Fg, Tj, Th, Tg, Ej, Ea and Eg) 
and what makes them true. Furthermore, while a dispositionalist account can adduce other 
factors such as mental or neurological states, these may be regarded as being correlated with 
dispositions and not as being constitutive of them.                                                         248 Put more generally, Chomsky hopes for a unification of theoretical linguistics with biology, chemistry and physics. I devote a section on a more thorough assessment of this hope below. What I say here does, however, already capture the essential point of what I have to say about this. 249 Cf. op. cit. p. 294 ff. 250 Op. cit. p. 276 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 Chomsky has the same strategy available as Evans and he could also insist that his 
dispositional account is innocuous. This is, however, something that Baker & Hacker do not 
see, because they assume that explaining a disposition does necessarily require postulating 
mediating elements between the disposition and what is a manifestation of it: 
 The aim of explaining internal relations by inventing (or discovering?) shared 
intermediate entities is coeval with philosophy itself. It has yielded many noteworthy 
products, ranging from Plato’s theory of forms to Chomsky’s deep structures (and 
innate capacities). But this fact does not justify the strategy. On the contrary, the 
postulation of intermediate entities is gratuitous. It stems from a misguided attempt to 
explain matters which are already perspicuous, to provide some sort of metaphysical 
support for what is already self- supporting. And in doing so, philosophers and linguists 
generate confusions or unclarities.251 
It should be clear that Evans and Chomsky can, pace Baker & Hacker, make sense of internal 
relations and retain their dispositionalism if they reject mediating elements as constitutive of 
the relation between a disposition and what is a manifestation of it. Furthermore, Chomsky 
can (and sometimes does) admit that internal relations govern correct language use and that 
that is, by and large, a fact about E-languages.252 In other words, the idea that internal 
relations are required to explain E-language use need not be foreign to a Chomskian. But FLN 
simply governs those parts of language use related to word order and nothing else. Even FLB 
does not fully determine correct E-language use and is, hence, also not meant to explain all 
internal relations determining correct language use. It is therefore hard to conceive of 
Chomsky or Evans as the best targets for the sort of Wittgensteinian worry Baker & Hacker 
bring up. 
 With these rejoinders in place, Baker & Hacker’s central objection can be assessed. 
Note that Chomsky can fend off most worries mentioned so far by insisting on his 
methodological distinction between I- and E- languages. The distinction is also the best basis 
for a reply to Baker & Hacker’s central objection. 
 Baker & Hacker’s central objection builds on two claims: (i) Chomsky’s conception of 
rules is not the common sense conception of rules; (ii) Chomsky should adopt the common 
sense conception of rules.253 They argue that Chomsky’s project is deeply flawed, because his 
conception of rules is wrong and requires revision on five counts: 
1) No action at a distance: The rules of language have a normative function, but                                                         251 Op. cit. p. 117 252 E.g. Chomsky 2000:143 253 I here summarise Baker & Hacker 1984a:312‐4, the quotes interspersed below are also from these sections. 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Chomsky’s rules cannot fulfil this function, because they are ‘far beyond the 
level of potential consciousness’. ‘Hence to look for such hidden rules, as a 
scientist looks for hypothetical entities, is as senseless as looking for unowned 
sense data on the Costa del Sol’. 
2) No theories: It is because rules have a normative function that ‘no system of 
rules could be a theory about anything’. Rules do not specify what is done––
they do not provide a theory––but rules specify what is to be done, i.e. what 
one should do to use a language or play chess. 
3) No scientific discoveries: It is not a sensible project for empirical sciences to 
discover the rules of language. If one wants to know the rules, one can ask the 
practitioners engaged in the normative conduct. ‘For conduct to be normative, 
the agents must view their own behaviour under the aspect of normativity, 
describe their own actions in terms which they themselves explain by reference 
to particular rules, and criticize and correct their own and other’s behaviour in 
terms of these rules’. 
4)  No invention: Because practitioners must view their conduct as governed by 
rules––and consciously bring their explanations and their deeds in accord with 
them––inventing some rules which coincide with their behaviour would not 
necessarily guarantee that those will be the rules they follow. Baker & Hacker 
write: ‘Were we to invent a set of rules the applications of which coincide with 
the normative activities of rule-followers, or even with what they merely say 
would be correct, it in no way follows that they are following the set of rules 
we concocted’. 
5) No prediction: A grammatical theory, being a ‘calculus of rules’, merely 
entails what linguistic expressions are syntactically licit, it does not make 
predictions about what average speakers accept or reject as syntactically licit. 
Objections 1-5 obviously confuse the E-language rules that Baker & Hacker are interested in 
with the I-language rules that interest Chomsky. I-language rules are very different from what 
Baker & Hacker envisage, but that is perfectly understandable, for the writings they refer to 
do not yet employ this distinction. In earlier writings, Chomsky often drew a distinction 
between competence (the linguistic capacity) and performance (actual language use in 
concrete situation), which did not make clear that there are two distinct sorts of rules.254  
 Nowadays––with a distinction between E-language rules and I-language rules                                                         254 Cf. the influential introduction to Chomsky 1965, especially p.4. 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available––the objections do not hit a target anymore, because the “rules” Chomsky refers to 
are merely part of the technical vocabulary used to describe some linguistic dispositions and 
not at all like the rules Baker & Hacker perceive in rule-governed communal practices. 
Chomsky now is the first to admit that these rules do not govern I-language, because I-
language rules are not normative like  
arithmetical or traffic rules, or those given in grammar books, or others with a normative 
character. A crucial feature of rule-following, then, is that error must be possible in the 
sense of violation of the norm. Whatever the interest of this discussion, it is not to the 
point here.255 
Chomsky focuses on some very specific human linguistic dispositions (which govern word 
order, transformations of word order, how word order affects intonation patters etc.), because 
they appear to be systematic enough to be isolated and idealised in a formal system––and it is 
only within the idealised formal system that we find the sort of rules that Chomsky is 
interested in. Baker & Hacker are interested in the full scope of human linguistic behaviour 
and they do, therefore, talk about something that both they and Chomsky do not find a 
suitable object for empirical enquiry.256  
 This is not simply an old hat. Even recent papers from the Wittgensteinian camp 
neglect these points. McNally & McNally (2012), for example, fail to notice the distinction 
between rules governing I-language and rules governing E-language; they hence also fail to 
notice the consequences of this distinction––even though the writings McNally & McNally 
consider refer to the crucial distinctions.  
In order to make clear how little some people understand the kind of rules governing 
FLN (and presumably large parts of FLB), a more precise definition of the notion of rules at 
play in Chomsky’s works is due. Chomsky has always had an algebraic conception of 
grammar. In that technical sense, a standard grammar is a system consisting of just one axiom 
and rules of inference which generate grammatically well-formed sentences as theorems. The 
single axiom specifies the initial symbol, which is the original string on which the rules 
operate. The rules all have the form ψ→ω, where ψ and ω either are the original string or 
strings derived thereof. These rules have a very specific technical interpretation:  
 Whenever ψ occurs as a substring of any given string, that occurrence may be replaced 
by ω to yield a new string. Thus if a grammar contained the rule AB→CDA, we could 
derive from the string EBABCC the string EBCDACC.257                                                         255 Chomsky 2000:98 256 Chomsky often claims that language as a social practice cannot be studied along the lines he proposes; see, for example, op. cit. p. 50. 257 These canonical definitions are from Partee et al. 1990:437 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Furthermore, strings can be formed from two alphabets––the terminal alphabet and the non-
terminal alphabet––the first can be used to form the sort of strings we want to derive and the 
second contains strings used during certain steps of the derivation, but which do not show up 
at the end of the derivation (i.e. in the terminal string). 
 It is important to note that generative grammars have a formal property not found in 
standard grammars: whereas in standard grammars only terminal strings are derived, 
generative grammars will always produce strings with terminal and non-terminal elements.258 
To see why, consider that FLN produces strings which FLB will take up and make available 
for conceptual-intentional and sensory-motor functions. The Chomskian claim that FLN is the 
kernel of FLB can be made precise by saying that the non-terminal elements in any string that 
FLN produces put constraints on how FLB-functions can further process them. This accounts 
for the phonological fact that, for example, declarative sentences have different intonation 
patterns than questions and that intonation patterns vary with the syntax of uttered sentence.  
 The definitions of terminal and non-terminal alphabets are important to understand the 
technical notion of a Chomsky hierarchy, a formal characterisation of four types of rules 
which are employed in grammars: 
 Use lower-case Greek letters (α, β, γ, δ, ε, …, φ, χ, ψ, ω) for arbitrary strings drawing on 
both alphabets, upper-case Latin letters for non-terminal strings, and ‘x’ as a string of 
terminal symbols. 
 Type 0: each rule is of the form ψ→ω  
 Type 1: each rule is of the form αAβ→αψβ, where ψ is not an empty string 
 Type 2: each rule is of the form A→ψ 
 Type 3: each rule is of the form A→xB or A→x 259 
A level of representation is defined by the rules that produced a specific set of string and the 
rules that may be applied to it. Thus, each type of rule may be regarded as defining a level of 
representation. An algebraic conception of grammar does, hence, make use of the words ‘rule’ 
and ‘representation’ but not in any sense related to what Baker & Hacker associate with 
them.260 These terms do not refer to hidden forms of language use that analysis must discover, 
but they express––first and foremost––precisely defined technical concepts in order to make 
available a description of grammatical well-formedness. As it stands, an algebraic conception 
of grammar is simply a way of describing symbolic transformations. And if descriptions of 
symbolic transformations in these terms prove successful and reliable, one may presume that 
they do actually account for how linguistic dispositions governing word-order work. I do                                                         258 Cf. Ludlow 2011:3‐4 259 The definitions are from Partee et al. 1990:451 260 E.g. Baker & Hacker 1984a:318, compare also Ludlow 2011:3 on this. 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admit, for reasons that I shall discuss in the next section, that there are philosophical pitfalls 
bound up with a careless reading of what ‘account for’ means in that context. But this must 
not amount to denying either that there is an innocuous conception of linguistic disposition or 
that some linguistic dispositions can be adequately described in terms of the algebraic 
conception of grammar. 
 Nevertheless, Baker & Hacker did get the direction of their thrust right. It is true that 
Chomsky, for example in his initial reaction to Kripkenstein’s sceptic, has sometimes argued 
that rules and representations in the technical sense should be reified.261 And that does mean 
that these rules and the different levels of representations are actual parts of minds or brains. 
It is not obvious that more recent statements concerning this are necessarily wedded to such 
pernicious reifications.262 What seems plausible, at any rate, is that a Chomskian 
dispositionalism can do without. 
 In order to come up with a Chomskian dispositionalism which can meet the 
requirements demanded in the present context and still make use of an algebraic conception of 
grammar, we need to take a closer look at the I-/E-language distinction. More precisely, we 
must assess the methodological considerations Chomsky adduces to buttress it. Baker & 
Hacker do express much suspicion about the entire Chomskian project, but it is not possible to 
find convincing arguments against the contemporary manifestation of Chomsky’s project in 
their work. 
 
Methodological Naturalism and Internalism263 
 
As the story was told so far, Chomsky seems to be only interested in what he conceives of as 
proper linguistics. That picture is, however, misleading. Chomsky certainly is interested in the 
philosophical issues in play here. Ever since the publication of his monograph Cartesian 
Linguistics in 1966, he has been eager to show that his vision of psychology in general and 
theoretical linguistics in particular is philosophically sound. The claim has been opposed from 
various sides and Chomsky has, together with his followers, made many efforts to defend his 
methodology in psychology and theoretical linguistics. We have seen that, from a Chomskian 
perspective, the most important goal is to safeguard the I-/E-language distinction from 
philosophical nagging. The present section assesses whether Chomskians can reach their goal.                                                         261 Chomsky 1986:ch. 4 262 Cf. Chomsky 1993, 1995b and 2000:141‐3. 263 An earlier version of the three following section has been published as Demont 2012. I do, however, express a change of heart in what follows below. I now think––contrary to what I said in the 2012 article––that an all‐out rejection of internalism is too crude. 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 The section begins by considering Chomsky’s views on methodology and subjects it to 
a conceptual challenge. The conceptual challenge comes from Bennett & Hacker (2003) and 
was initially raised, under the label ‘mereological fallacy’, to counter conceptual confusion in 
neuroscience. It had, however, been anticipated in a more general form by Anthony Kenny 
and Ludwig Wittgenstein.264 Any version of the challenge can be readily adapted to serve 
present purposes, but Bennett’s & Hacker’s appears particularly suitable for challenging 
Chomsky. The upshot from what follows below is this: whereas Chomsky’s methodological 
naturalism will be found to be sound, his doctrine of internalism will be shown to be 
pernicious. 
 
Chomsky’s Methodological Naturalism 
 
In his paper ‘Language and Nature’, Noam Chomsky starts the discussion by announcing how 
he uses the terms ‘mind’ and ‘mental’: 
 I will be using the terms ‘mind’ and ‘mental’ here with no metaphysical import. Thus I 
understand ‘mental’ to be on a par with ‘chemical’, ‘optical’, or ‘electrical’. Certain phenomena, 
events, processes and states are informally called ‘chemical’ etc., but no metaphysical divide is 
suggested thereby. The terms are used to select certain aspects of the world as a focus of inquiry. 
We do not seek to determine the true criterion of the chemical, or the mark of the electrical, or 
the boundaries of the optical. I will use ‘mental’ the same way, with something like ordinary 
coverage, but no deeper implications. By ‘mind’ I just mean the mental aspects of the world, 
with no more interest in sharpening the boundaries or finding a criterion than in other cases.265 
He then goes on to claim the same about the terms ‘language’ and ‘linguistic’. This point of 
view eschews a particular methodological dualism for scientific enquiries, which demands 
that mental and linguistic properties should be studied by employing methods not germane to 
the natural sciences. It thus holds that mental and linguistic properties, as far as they can be 
studied by science, are on a par with chemical, optical or electrical properties. The terms 
‘mental’ and ‘linguistic’ are hence also ‘used to select certain aspects of the world as a focus 
of inquiry’. It is clear from this what Chomsky’s naturalism amounts to. He defines 
‘methodological naturalism’ as excluding a methodological dualism which attempts––as a 
matter of principle––to study language and mind in ways which differ from how natural 
objects are studied.266 
 Note that Chomsky admits that there are human mental and linguistic properties which                                                         264 Cf. Kenny 1984: 125‐36 and Wittgenstein PI §§281‐4 and §§ 357‐61. 265 Chomsky 1995b:1 266 Op. cit. p. 28 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are not part of the world as it is scrutinised by the sciences: 
The concept human being is part of our common-sense understanding, with properties of 
individuation, psychic persistence, and so on, reflecting particular human concerns, 
attitudes, and perspectives. The same is true of language speaking. Apart from improbable 
accident, such concepts will not fall within explanatory theories of the naturalistic variety; 
not just now, but ever. This is not because of cultural or even intrinsically human 
limitations (though they surely exist), but because of their nature. We may have a good 
deal to say about people, so conceived; even low-level accounts that provide weak 
explanation. But such accounts cannot be integrated into the natural sciences alongside of 
explanatory models for hydrogen atoms, cells, or other entities that we posit in seeking a 
coherent and intelligible explanatory model of the naturalistic variety.267 
So, common sense concepts applied in ordinary discourse are possibly not relevant to a 
naturalisitic enquiry, because the mental and linguistic properties which can be scrutinised by 
the sciences need not be related in any interesting sense to what we commonly talk about. The 
upshot is that ordinary language is too imprecise to capture the reality that naturalistic 
enquiries are scrutinizing: 
It is not that ordinary discourse fails to talk about the world, or that the particulars it 
describes do not exist, or that the accounts are too imprecise. Rather, the categories used 
and principles invoked need not have even loose counterparts in naturalistic inquiry.268 
Based on these two ideas––that only limited domains of language and mind can be studied 
scientifically and that common sense concepts are possibly not relevant for such studies––
Chomsky distinguishes philosophical from empirical enquiries: 
In the study of other aspects of the world, we are satisfied with “best theory” arguments, 
and there is no privileged category of evidence that provides criteria for theoretical 
constructions. In the study of language and mind, naturalistic theory does not suffice: we 
must seek “philosophical explanations,” delimit inquiry in terms of some imposed 
evidence selected by the philosopher, and rely on notions such as “access in principle” 
that have no place in naturalistic inquiry. Whatever all this means, there is a demand 
beyond naturalism, a form of dualism that remains to be explained and justified.269 
 This and similar passages throughout Chomsky’s recent works suggest, and are usually read 
as suggesting, a strict divide between purely conceptual philosophical enquiries on the one 
hand and empirical enquiries as conducted in natural sciences on the other.270 It also suggests 
that he uses the terms ‘mental’ and ‘linguistic’ in a way that associates them with such                                                         267 Chomsky 2000: 20 268 Op. cit. p. 33 269 Chomsky 2000:142 270  Cf. Stainton 2006 and Chomsky 2000:20‐4 and 37‐45. 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empirical enquiries. 
 Incidentally, Chomsky does think that traditional conceptions of philosophy did not 
entail a sharp distinction between philosophy and natural science.271 Peter Hacker finds that 
surprising, because it seems not to go together well with Chomsky’s distinction between 
analytic truths––the domain of purely conceptual philosophical enquiries––and empirical 
truths––the domain of empirical enquiries as conducted in natural sciences.272 The solution to 
this is that Chomsky and Hacker disagree on what traditional philosophy was after. For 
Hacker, they were after analytic truths and for Chomsky, they were after the fundamental and 
often hidden causes and principles. Chomsky thinks that such philosophical goals can also be 
attained by discovering empirical truths––and then we will not have to engage in mapping out 
analytical truths anymore. Hacker thinks that philosophical goals cannot be attained by 
discovering any empirical truth––for him, only clear maps of analytic truths will do, provided 
they can dispel conceptual confusion. I shall eventually argue that Chomsky’s view on 
philosophical goals and empirical truths is not exactly the one we should adopt, but a few 
other issues have to be clarified before we get there. 
 Let us return to the elements of Chomsky’s naturalism. It is because the terms ‘mental’ 
and ‘linguistic’ (as employed in empirical enquiries) select certain aspects of the world that a 
scientific enquiry into mental and linguistic properties will produce theories which explain the 
phenomena rather than merely describe them. And those theories are expected to be in 
principle unifiable with the theories of the hard sciences, viz. physics, chemistry or biology. 
Chomsky is cautious not to demand that the former theories be reducible to the latter; he 
merely claims that one can hope for an eventual unification of the theories. He takes this to be 
a lesson to be learned from the history of science: 
There is, I think, a good deal to learn from the history of the sciences since they 
abandoned common sense foundations, always with some uneasiness about just what they 
were doing. We should by now be able to accept that we can do no more than seek “best 
theories”, with no independent standard for evaluation apart from contribution to 
understanding, and hope for unification but with no advance doctrine about how, or 
whether, it can be achieved.273 
Chomsky does, however, add an important caveat by admitting that the empirical grounds for 
a unification have not been established so far: 
The current situation is that we have good and improving theories of some aspects of 
language and mind, but only rudimentary ideas about the relation of any of this to the                                                         271 Cf. Chomsky 2000:141 272 Hacker 1990:127 273 Chomsky 1995b:7 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brain.274 
The hope for unification of theoretical linguistics with the hard sciences makes sense if one 
accepts Chomsky’s methodological naturalism. After all, if several disciplines study the 
natural order of things by applying the same methods and principles, one may indeed hope 
that the resulting picture of the natural order of things will be consistent. It will be argued 
below, however, that the hope for unification does inform Chomsky’s conception of how one 
ought to study linguistic and mental properties in a way that is illicit for purely philosophical 
reasons. It is therefore important to emphasise that there are no empirical grounds suggesting 
a possible unification. 
 Another idea which plays a role in Chomsky’s methodological naturalism is that 
producing theories which do explain phenomena involves advancing ‘the search into deeper 
principles’.275 At the very least, this must mean that theories are expected to allow for 
predictions and that, therefore, we should appeal to certain principles which enable making 
predictions. But what sort of predictions are we after here? We must distinguish between 
theories which merely describe the relevant phenomena (viz. linguistic dispositions governing 
word-order, intonation patters etc.) and those which also explain first language acquisition, 
i.e. theories which are simple and basic enough to explain how the relevant linguistic 
phenomena can be acquired. It is the second sort of theory that Chomsky is after. 
 That ‘principles’ means ‘algebraic principles’ also appears to be a justified conjecture 
by now. We have seen in the section on Baker’s & Hacker’s attacks on Chomsky that the sort 
of grammar Chomsky is after is characterised algebraically and the only principles that such a 
grammar makes feasible are, of course, algebraic principles. It is, however, hard to pin down 
exactly what ‘deep’ in ‘deeper principles’ can sensibly mean for Chomsky, especially if we 
want to know how he takes algebraic principles to explain first language acquisition. But at 
the end of these sections we shall be in a position to see what it must not mean in order to 
ensure the conceptual soundness of methodological naturalism. Nevertheless, the gist of the 
enquiry in theoretical linguistics clearly is to come up with some general principles by 
abstraction and to come up with an algebraic description of grammar as defined above.276 
Whether these principles are “deep” enough to suggest a unification of theoretical linguistics 
with the hard sciences will be the bone of contention between Chomsky and me. 
 What are the grounds for a disagreement with Chomsky on this? What will be 
questioned below is whether grasp of such principles can be attributed to minds or brains––                                                        274 Chomsky 2000:116 275 Chomsky 1993:41 276 Chomsky 2000:122 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and can be called ‘deeper principles’ in that specific sense, because they are a crucial step 
towards what Chomsky envisages as a unification with the hard sciences. Remember that the 
principles governing computation could alternatively be thought of being deep in the sense 
that they enable making predictions about some strikingly systematic aspects of first language 
acquisition. On that alternative reading, such principles would be certainly deeper than merely 
descriptive principles which do not warrant predictions, but they would count neither as an 
insight into a previously hidden reality nor as an insight into how theoretical linguistics could 
be aligned with the hard sciences. The alternative proposal will, as far as the practice of 
theoretical linguistics is concerned, boil down to the requirement that we seek algebraic 
conceptions of grammar and that those grammars shed light on at least some puzzling facts 
about first language acquisition. Achieving that is tricky enough and we will have done well if 
we can achieve it. 
 In summary, Chomsky’s methodological naturalism, which is also meant to capture 
the principal aspects of enquiries into physical, chemical and biological phenomena, 
comprises the following points: 
- the objects of scientific enquiry are natural phenomena 
- the goal is not merely description (systematic taxonomies are not enough) 
- explanations involve positing deeper principles of some sort 
- there is a strict divide between analytic and empirical truths, but both can in 
principle answer philosophical questions 
It is useful in this context to distinguish, as Chomsky himself does, an internalist from a 
naturalistic methodology: 
I want to distinguish an internalist from a naturalistic approach. By the latter I mean just 
the attempt to study humans as we do anything else in the world. Internalist naturalistic 
inquiry seeks to understand the internal states of an organism. Naturalistic study is of 
course not limited to such bounds […] Internalist studies are commonly presupposed in 
others with broader range, but it should be obvious that the legitimacy of one or another 
kind of inquiry does not arise.277  
So, when it comes to psychology and theoretical linguistics, the methodology that Chomsky 
applies and defends is both naturalistic and internalist. That is to say that his methodological 
naturalism is to be supplemented by a further principle for those disciplines: 
 - mental and linguistic properties are to be explained through the internal states of 
organisms 
The proper explanation of mental and linguistic phenomena, according to an internalist                                                         277 Chomsky 2000:134 
-186- 
methodology, is to be given in terms of internal states of organisms. And as the relevant 
principles to be discovered govern computations––at last in theoretical linguistics à la 
Chomsky––the relevant internal states would be computational states. Chomskian internalism 
thus ascribes such computational states to organisms. It is important to bear in mind that 
internal states are contrasted with relational states. The distinction, as it will be argued below, 
is not necessarily one between states describable in terms of properties of brains versus states 
describable in terms of how a person behaves. One might––and people usually do––bring the 
second distinction in and associate internalism with it, but they do usually not provide reasons 
for employing the stronger conception of internalism. 
 Notice that the internalist principle applies to linguistic and mental properties only and 
not to other properties (viz. electrical or chemical) that Chomsky finds fit for a naturalist 
enquiry. Now, the decision to adopt the internalist principle must not be based on apriori 
demands on empirical enquiry. Chomsky’s internalism can hence not be the outcome of a 
purely conceptual enquiry even though he has produced extensive philosophical arguments 
for it.278 So, it must not be an analytic truth that a naturalistic approach to the mental and 
linguistic properties that interest Chomsky should be restricted to ascribing computational 
states (i.e. internal states) to organisms. But is it an empirical truth that a study of mental and 
linguistic properties should involve ascribing computational states to organisms? 
 Internalism might indeed be based on empirical data which has been gathered and 
which was interpreted in accord with the standards set by methodological naturalism. But if 
the interpretation turns out to be flawed or if enough empirical findings to the contrary were 
available, Chomsky would then have to give up internalism. An alternative option would be to 
claim that the internalist principle is an analytic truth and that would be an apriori demand for 
treating linguistic and mental properties differently from electrical or chemical properties. 
This alternative option would, of course, also exclude Chomskian research programmes from 
the respectable circle of research programmes in accord with methodological naturalism, 
because it introduces again the sort of methodological dualism that is inconsistent with it. 
Hence, if internalism is true, it is so by virtue of empirical fact. 
 In what follows I shall not consider empirical evidence for or against internalism.279 I 
shall mainly focus on whether internalism, as Chomsky conceives of it, is consistent with 
other claims he makes. Most important in that respect will be claims about what counts as an 
explanation if one adopts methodological naturalism. There are prima facie two questions we 
may raise concerning internalism:                                                         278 Cf. Bezuidenhout 2006 279 Cowie 2008 (especially section 2) introduces and discusses evidence for and against internalism. 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1) Is internalism consistent with methodological naturalism? 
2) Does internalism fully explain linguistic and mental properties in terms of 
internal states of organisms? 
The second question is easy to answer. The sort of properties that Chomsky will allow as the 
proper objects of a naturalistic enquiry are those which can be accounted for along the lines 
he envisages. So it may turn out that some properties cannot be explained, even though it 
seemed so at the beginning, and then these properties will not count as proper objects of 
enquiry anymore. A general answer to the second question is therefore easy to give: yes, 
internalism fully explains linguistic and mental properties. But that answer does not allow us 
to determine whether Chomsky’s approach in psychology and theoretical linguistics makes 
sense or not, because the internalist presumption determines both what counts as an 
explanation and what counts as a suitable property for enquiry. It is thus much more fruitful to 
turn to the first question if one wants to find out whether Chomsky’s approach makes sense at 
all.  
 The first question demands more work than the second question. The main problem is 
to decide whether the search for deeper principles, as methodological naturalism envisages 
them, does require an internalist perspective. If it does, internalism becomes an integral part 
of the conceptual foundation of naturalist enquiries into linguistic and mental properties––and 
is rendered vulnerable to the objections that Chomsky himself directs at methodological 
dualism. If the search for deeper principles does not straightaway require internalism, the 
picture changes somewhat. We must then ask whether empirical findings can in principle 
warrant internalism and whether, as a second step, suitable findings could warrant the revision 
of our concepts in such a way as to make internalism mandatory for the study of those mental 
and linguistic properties which can sensibly be studied in a naturalistic way. 
 It is hence important to examine more closely how Chomsky draws the line between 
his naturalism and his internalism. Clarifying what ‘deeper principles’ can amount to means 
asking whether methodological naturalism and internalism are related: does the search for 
deeper principles in psychology and linguistics sensibly involve attributing computational 
states to organisms? 
 
Chomsky and the Mereological Fallacy 
 
Chomsky’s internalism has it that mental and linguistic properties are to be explained via the 
internal states of organisms. Furthermore, these states are thought to be computational states 
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and they are thought to describe deep principles of some sort. Note that these deep principles 
are assumed to be accounted for by ascribing computational states to organisms. Mental and 
linguistic properties must be explained along these lines if they can be explained scientifically 
at all. This is the general tenor in Chomsky’s work and it is also how commentators perceive 
the issue. 280  
 But in everyday life, other explanations of mental properties prevail. We commonly 
say things like ‘John knows Spanish’, ‘Jessica wants more cake’, ‘Sarah means “addition” by 
“plus”’ or ‘Jermaine believes that the microphone is on’. We do not adduce any internal states 
of organisms to talk about mental and linguistic properties. Chomsky, on the contrary, 
explicitly holds that ‘mind and language properties are properties of brains’.281 That is not a 
new idea of his, Chomsky has frequently claimed that linguistic properties are mental 
properties and that one can expect them to be realised in the brain.282 So, what he suggests is 
to explain linguistic and mental properties through ascribing computational states to the brain. 
Notice that internalism requires that the states be ascribed to organisms––the bodies of 
persons––and that Chomsky adds to this that the states be ascribed to brains. Now it appears 
that explaining the properties Chomsky is interested in also requires attributing computational 
states to an organ of persons: the brain. 
 Bennett & Hacker have objected to contemporary neuroscientists (and some associated 
philosophers) that they commit a mereological fallacy by ascribing properties to the parts of 
something which can only be ascribed to the whole.283 More specifically, the objection is that 
mental properties can only be predicated of persons and not of parts or organs of persons, 
such as brains. People can be said to have mental properties and brains cannot, in any sense, 
be said to have mental properties. That is so, because brains are merely parts of persons and 
there is no good reason why neuroscientists should break with common parlance. 
 This flatly contradicts Chomsky’s internalism. What options does Chomsky have to 
defend himself? Recall that internalism must be motivated by empirical findings and not by 
analytic truths, because the latter entails a methodological dualism Chomsky is averse to. But 
if Bennett & Hacker are right, alleged empirical findings must be responsive to conceptual 
scrutiny, since conceptual scrutiny determines the topic of empirical enquiries. Internalism 
can then not be defended on empirical grounds either, because an empirical enquiry cannot be 
based on the mereological fallacy that linguistic or mental properties can be ascribed to                                                         280 Cf. Chomsky 2000:ch. 6 and Bezuidenhout 2006 281 Chomsky 1995b:11 282 Cf. Chomsky 1965 and consider the due objections in Baker &Hacker 1984a: chs. 8.4/8.5 and Wright 1989c/2001:ch.7. 283 Cf. Bennett & Hacker 2003:ch.3 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brains. 
 In part 1 of their book, Bennett & Hacker show how the choice of methodology and 
the way how empirical findings are interpreted require preceding conceptual enquiries. This is 
a view Chomsky is also committed to, because his distinction between empirical enquiries 
and conceptual enquiries is itself the result of a conceptual enquiry which draws heavily on 
the history of science. Chomsky speaks of the canons of methodological naturalism (which 
can be observed or violated) and takes those canons to be the mark of theoretical 
understanding, a ‘particular mode of comprehension’.284 Furthermore, the methodological 
naturalism he envisages is a mark of rationality and the propositions defining naturalism are 
truisms––and such truisms appear rather similar to what Hacker would call an analytic 
truth.285 Bennett & Hacker’s objection from mereological fallacy is argued for through two 
strictly conceptual considerations which should count as admissible from Chomsky’s point of 
view: 
 (i) scientific enquiries into the properties of brains need not identify them with mental    
      properties 
(ii) scientific enquiries should eschew philosophical commitments which they do not need 
These considerations are applied to actual cases. Bennett & Hacker show in detail how 
commitments to Cartesianism informed the methods of the forefathers of modern neuro-
sciences. They show how philosophical commitments, which were neither directly prompted 
by empirical findings nor needed as a conceptual basis for their methods, bedevilled the 
interpretation of neuro-scientists’ work and created a set of problems which were often 
simply taken up by later generations without any further conceptual scrutiny.286 Bennett & 
Hacker’s considerations are important here, because we must raise the question whether 
similar philosophical commitments bedevil theoretical linguistics through Chomsky’s notion 
of internalism. 
 Based on their observations, Bennett & Hacker emphasise the distinction between 
conceptual and empirical enquiries, but, at the same time, uphold the claim that questions 
concerning appropriate topics of empirical enquiry are––by and large––conceptual questions: 
[T]he only ways in which a conceptual investigation can assist an empirical subject are by 
identifying conceptual error (if it obtains) and by providing a map that will help prevent 
empirical researchers from wandering off the high roads of sense.287  
The claim is this: philosophy can decide whether a topic of empirical research makes sense.                                                         284 Cf. Chomsky 2000:77 285 Textual evidence for this abounds, but Chomsky 2000:49‐50 is particularly clear. 286 Cf. Bennett & Hacker 2003:ch. 2 287 Op. cit. p. 7 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But Baker & Hacker do also claim that empirical findings cannot solve philosophical 
problems.288 It is this second claim with which Chomsky would disagree, because he holds 
that empirical findings can answer at least some philosophical questions. But can this allow 
him to overcome the objection that he commits a mereological fallacy? 
 First, observe that there is nothing in the objection from mereological fallacy which 
runs counter to methodological naturalism as such. Actually, naturalism does require that no 
mereological fallacies be committed. If you want to explain a higher level property A 
naturalistically you may try to do that by invoking deeper principles which only concern the 
lower level properties of parts of A, but not A itself. A problem appears, if one ascribes 
properties, which only A as a whole can have, to the parts of A. Explaining the chemical 
properties of iron involves invoking general principles governing electron distribution in iron 
atoms. But speaking of the electrons of iron as having the chemical properties normally 
predicated of iron would be nonsense. 
 Something similar is true of the physical properties of iron. We explain the difference 
between a cool piece of iron and an incandescent piece of iron by saying that photons are 
emitted when electrons switch to a lower energy level and that in a cool piece of iron no 
photons are emitted, because the electrons are at their lowest possible energy levels. Again, if 
we ascribe the physical property to be explained (i.e. incandescence) to the electrons, we have 
produced nonsense. So, methodological naturalism itself requires that no mereological 
fallacies be committed. But it still makes good sense that chemical and physical properties of 
atoms, for example, are explained in terms of the properties of the parts of these atoms. So, 
there is at least one sense of ‘internal’ which is innocuous, because it is actually required for 
naturalistic explanations of some chemical and physical properties. 
 Applied to Chomskian linguistics, one must not be mislead by hopes for a unification 
with the hard sciences. If the hope for such a unification leads one to ascribe mental or 
linguistic properties to brains, one will have produced nonsense just as much as if one 
attributes chemical properties, which naturally belong to atoms, to electrons. So, if internalism 
is motivated by hopes for unification along these lines, it is clearly ill-conceived.  
 Reconsidering the explanations of chemical and physical properties of iron just 
mentioned, one might want to revise the notion of internalism to allow for an analogous 
treatment of mental and linguistic properties. One should then hold that explaining linguistic 
dispositions of persons through the deeper principles of grammar must not only concern parts 
of organisms (viz. brains) or of persons (viz. minds), but must also mention whole organisms                                                         288 Cf. Bennett & Hacker 2003:373 and Hacker 1990 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or persons in order to count as an explanation at all. Given that we cannot study persons 
naturalistically (as Chomsky admits), we must focus on organisms. And here we find that 
Chomsky violates a sensible conception of empirical enquiry even if we stretch the concept of 
an organism on the Procrustean bed of scientific idealisation and abstraction and allow 
organisms to have linguistic dispositions: Chomsky does not relate the deeper principles of 
grammar, which allegedly provide very abstract descriptions of properties of the brain, to any 
organisms which have linguistic dispositions. 289 So, the principles are identified 
computationally rather than neurophysiologically after all. This has important consequences 
for Chomsky’s internalism and for how we should construe the notion of a deeper principle. 
 The search for deeper principles is part and parcel of methodological naturalism. The 
principles governing computation are deeper than purely descriptive principles, because they 
enable predictions and explain some aspects of first language acquisition. And that is all. No 
hope for unification may dictate what counts as ‘deeper’. The objection from mereological 
fallacy severs the bonds between methodological naturalism and Chomsky’s original 
conception of internalism at precisely this point: the search for deeper principles must not 
require ascribing computational properties to parts of an organism if the principles do not also 
refer to the organism as a whole. This establishes that if the search for deeper principles 
involves an a priori hope for unification with the hard sciences and if it is precisely this hope 
which leads to nonsense, then the notion of deeper principles must be revised so as not to 
entail such a hope. 
 A revised conception of deeper principles will also entail a revised conception of 
internalism, because explanation will not come forth from simply ascribing mental properties 
to parts of organisms. So, a revised conception of internalism would only be admissible if the 
following two conditions are fulfilled: 1) if it involved ascribing computational states to parts 
of organisms and made sufficiently clear how these parts relate to the whole organism or 2) if 
it involved ascribing computational states to parts of persons and made sufficiently clear how 
these parts relate to the whole person. Option 2 does not work because it is hard to see what a 
suitable part of a person would be and Chomsky also declares that persons and their 
behaviour are not something he considers a suitable subject of an empirical enquiry. Option 1 
does only work if abstraction licenses speaking of organisms as bearers of linguistic 
dispositions and if it can be made sufficiently clear how the brain is related to the whole 
organism. One must then ask why parts of organisms should be capable of performing the 
computational tasks that parts of persons cannot. And the Chomskian reply to this is, of                                                         289 Cf. Chomsky 2000:116 where he admits that there is no empirical basis for such a relation. 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course, that it is hard to see what could count as a part of a person and that the concept of a 
person (and her behaviour) is not suitable for naturalistic enquiry––even though the concept 
allows us to answer some questions outside of science. 
 But why should one distinguish these two options anyway? After all, the argument 
from mereological fallacy does not directly show that mental properties cannot be reduced to 
brain properties. It merely shows that we must not ascribe properties to parts of things which 
can only be ascribed to things as unities. It makes sense to say that persons have brains and if 
we could explain how ascriptions of computational states to brains do help explaining the 
linguistic dispositions of persons, everything would be fine. 
 One must respond to this that a reduction of mental properties to brain properties––
which Chomsky ultimately hopes for––cannot automatically yield better explanations. And 
one might wonder whether it will provide any explanation at all. Illustrative cases abound. 
Research has shown that brain activities associated with intentions to act precede the subject’s 
thought that they are consciously intending an action.290 If mental properties are reduced to 
brain properties, we still need criteria to distinguish those brain activities, which are 
associated with conscious intentions, from the other brain activities associated with intentions 
to act. More specifically, we need to determine precisely the onset of the conscious intention 
to act in order to be in a position to say to which brain properties the mental properties have 
been reduced to. Once we can determine this, everything will be fine, but Chomsky admits 
himself that there are no empirical grounds for assuming that we can.  
 Is there reason to hope that we will ever be able to achieve a reduction in linguistics? I 
do not see any. Concerning the syntactic rules we supposedly follow unconsciously, we need 
to determine precisely some neurological basis of the strings on which rules operate and the 
neurological functions implementing the algebraic rules of our favourite grammar. Those 
criteria will, quite probably, be based on how subjects behave or what they report anyway––
an algebraic theory of grammar alone cannot deliver such criteria. The resulting explanation 
can thus hardly be said to be a better explanation of the phenomenon at hand, for it has the 
very same ingredients––and entails unnecessary ontological commitments. It is also hard to 
see what sort of empirical evidence can require such reductions. As things stand right now, 
Chomsky’s quest for unification is merely unjustified ideology. And as long as no unification 
is feasible, the prospects of fusing option 1 and option 2 are very bleak. 
 We therefore end up with option 1, which does only work if abstraction licenses 
speaking of organisms as bearers of linguistic dispositions and if it can be made clear how the                                                         290 The locus classicus is Libet et al 1983. 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brain is related to the whole organism. That seems to be the only way to make some sort of 
internalism feasible. Now, option 1 cannot be buttressed conceptually. If it could, then 
internalism would be motivated on a purely philosophical basis and the decision to adopt 
internalism for linguistic and mental properties––but not for other properties of the natural 
world––would be purely conceptual and would, therefore, mark a methodological dualism 
which Chomsky abhors. So, option 1 must be established on empirical grounds. 
 The mereological fallacy that Bennett & Hacker draw attention to is no thread for this 
revised conception of internalism. But from Hacker’s own point of view, this might initially 
still seem a confused project. Internalism is meant to determine more precisely how mental 
and linguistic properties are to be studied and internalism is, therefore, subject to conceptual 
scrutiny. According to option 1, the only viable version of internalism, organisms (and their 
parts) are the bearers of linguistic dispositions. Organisms are, however, not the sort of things 
that can have linguistic dispositions––only persons have dispositions, but the dispositions 
persons have are, at least for Hacker, only dispositions of physiological health, of 
temperament and of character.291 Hacker might be prepared to admit that some linguistic 
dispositions––like the disposition to pronounce English in a certain way––is sufficiently 
similar to dispositions of character. But even if this was granted, Chomsky explicitly admits 
that his approach cannot deal with the linguistic behaviour of persons without a considerable 
amount of idealisation and abstraction.292 Internalism must, therefore, seem ill-conceived as 
long as we do not redefine the notion of a linguistic disposition so that it makes sense to speak 
of the dispositions––qua one-way powers––that Chomsky is interested in.  
 Chomsky takes his and his followers’ research to have shown empirically, that human 
organisms have linguistic dispositions and that linguistic dispositions are more like 
dispositions of physiological health than dispositions of character. He thinks that organisms 
are what biology studies and he also thinks that his grammar explains linguistic properties in 
so far as it is a mark of human biology, i.e. part and parcel of the biological endowment of 
humans.293 The driving intuition seems to be that biology studies, among other things, 
organisms and that such a study involves, among other things, ascribing dispositions to 
organisms. Chomskians might argue that empirical findings can directly trigger a revision of 
our concept of a linguistic disposition so that organisms can have them too. They could think 
that empirical evidence is always evidence for or against something and the most suitable 
candidate of what evidence supports or counts against is that a concept’s application                                                         291 Cf. Hacker 2007:119 292 The first explicit statement of this (at least as far as I am aware of) is in Chomsky 1965:4. 293 Cf. Chomsky 2000:1‐5 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conditions are empirically adequate. But such a view violates the assumption that there is a 
distinction between a factually correct application of a concept and an application of a 
concept in accord with the rules constitutive for it––you can incorrectly apply a concept even 
if you grasp it and one incorrect application does not necessarily mean that you do not grasp 
the concept after all. 
 The whole disagreement between Hacker and Chomsky now boils down to the 
following point: Hacker thinks that empirical truths cannot answer philosophical problems 
and, pari passu, directly trigger a revision of mental or linguistic concepts; Chomsky thinks 
that empirical truths can directly answer philosophical problems. Hacker of course admits that 
mental and, presumably, linguistic concepts can be revised in order to make better sense of 
empirical data.294 But he is not prepared to admit that empirical truths answer philosophical 
problems and thereby trigger conceptual revision. Chomsky, on the other hand, thinks that 
empirical truths can fully answer some philosophical questions and, more specifically, that 
there is no apriori reason why his research cannot count as answering some philosophical 
questions and directly licenses, thereby, conceptual revision.  
 The revised conception of internalism (which construes it as requiring that organisms 
have linguistic dispositions and which builds on some story about how a brain is related to a 
whole organism) can also be made sense of if we admit Hacker’s view of how conceptual 
revision is related to empirical findings. On that view, we may employ the notion of a 
linguistic disposition in accord with a revised internalism, if we make clear what the 
conditions for a correct application of the term is and what logical consequences follow from 
it. This is, pace Chomsky, something which happens within philosophy and to which 
empirical data cannot directly contribute. To see this, we now turn to an invented example. 
 Take the concept of a child’s capacity to read. We explain the concept of a child’s 
capacity to read by describing how expressions such as ‘she can read’, ‘he can read’, ‘she 
reads well’, ‘this is a bit hard for them to read’, ‘she can read music, but letters are still 
difficult for her’, ‘he can read letters, but he cannot read music well’ etc. are actually used. If 
we do this carefully enough, we may extract the following rule from this: a child is capable to 
read if he or she is able to produce fluent speech or sounds from written symbols (e.g. letters, 
music notes or pictograms). Once we have such a rule, the conceptual analysis is complete, 
because we can explain what it is to satisfy the concept and under what circumstances we can 
apply it.  
 Now, a linguist might find that almost all children have difficulties reading the                                                         294 Cf. Bennett & Hacker 2003:384 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sentence ‘the old man the boat’ fluently. Testing a large number of children who read well in 
general, she finds only a few children who read ‘the old man the boat’ fluently. Curiously 
enough, she finds that those children who read the sentence fluently understand that ‘man’ 
can also be a verb. Even though the linguist would say that a child is not capable of reading 
when he or she does not produce fluent speech from letters, she makes an exception for the 
sentence ‘the old man the boat’. She may even make this exception, because the parents (and 
most other people she talked with) insist that a child can read even if fluent speech can 
usually not be produced when a child has to read out ‘the old man the boat’. It is important to 
note that, in this little thought experiment, the linguist changes her use of ‘he or she can read’ 
based on the observation regarding ‘the old man the boat’ and in accordance with a suitable 
sample of common parlance. Does she thereby change the concept of the capacity to read? 
 I think that the example shows that it makes little sense to say that the empirical 
findings did, in and by themselves, change the concept or that they even triggered a specific 
way of changing it. Rather, the linguist examined the data and she examined how she and 
other use language in order to revise the conditions under which the concept of the capacity to 
read is applied. One might assume that she also adjusted the theory and that she thereby made 
clear what logical consequences of applying the revised concept are. So I do think that the 
example makes clear why Hacker’s conception of discovery is better than Chomsky’s: it 
makes little sense to hold that any empirical finding can directly influence how the 
application-conditions of a concept or the logical consequences of applying the concept are 
revised. 
 We should in general be careful regarding claims about what empirical research can 
do to support philosophy. Back in part B of the thesis, I have argued that there is a distinction 
between basic and non-basic concepts. And if we want to retain this distinction, we should not 
allow that empirical findings can always trigger a revision of what counts as applying a 
psychological or linguistic concept. Consider the psychological concept of will. It is 
employed in statements like “I want this” or “he wants that”, nobody has the concept who 
does not understand such statements and it is hard to see in terms of what other concepts the 
concept of will can be analysed. Chomsky admits that the concept of will is not something 
contemporary science can deal with and he thinks that it is entirely possible that it never 
will.295 So,it is hard to see whether any empirical finding can ever assist in clarifying the 
concept of will, it seems that all we can attain can be attained in terms of analytic truths only. 
The upshot from this is that we must have some principled distinction between analytic and                                                         295 Chomsky & McGilvray 2012:97 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empirical truths; that is something Boghossian, Chomsky, Hacker and I agree on.
 Recall that there is just one conceptually sound notion of internalism, which does only 
work if abstraction licenses speaking of organisms as bearers of linguistic dispositions and if 
it can be made clear how the brain is related to the whole organism. Once there is an 
empirical basis for that revised notion of internalism, an internalist research programme can 
be expected to explain some mental and linguistic properties by ascribing internal 
(computational) states to organisms. This will account for some psychological and linguistic 
dispositions of persons and, by virtue of that, it will also inform a revision of the application-
conditions of some common sense concepts like the concept of language mastery in general or 
the concept of the capacity to read in particular. But how can such a research programme help 
with any of the philosophical problems under discussion in the present thesis? 
 Well, there is––as seen in part A––considerable philosophical puzzlement over how 
we can extrapolate sentences we have never used or heard before from a finite stock of 
linguistic expressions. It might be that we attempt to explain the concept of linguistic 
extrapolation in terms of neuronal processes or in terms of a mysterious capacity to access an 
infinite range of linguistic expressions. If empirical research can help with a revision of the 
application-conditions of the concept of linguistic extrapolation in a way that rules out some 
of the philosophical proposals along these lines, empirical research has of course helped us to 
achieve more conceptual clarity––it has solved philosophical problems surrounding the 
proposals that were ruled out. We can hold that work by Chomsky and his colleagues has 
shown what constraints on word order a philosophy of language must respect in order to make 
sense of the systematic aspects of language use which we call syntax. This does, of course, 
also concern claims about how the capacity to recognise and produce syntactically well-
formed sentences is acquired. And this sort of help from empirical research is certainly 
desirable, because it enables a refined conception of linguistic competence. 
 
2. Logic and Language 
 
With a viable conception of linguistic competence in hand, the next question to be dealt with 
is: how can we approach the relation of linguistic competence to logic? We use statements to 
express inferences. We can say ‘John goes to bed if he is tired, and John is tired; so he goes to 
bed’. We also distinguish between valid inferences and invalid inferences. Now, it seems that 
what makes such statements correct uses of language somehow depends on whether the 
inferences they express are valid or not. That is, however, a moot point. Are logical mistakes 
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linguistic mistakes? 
 Logical and linguistic mistakes are mistakes made by people. And if a thinker or 
speaker S makes a logical mistake, his or her inference does not transfer warrant from 
premises to conclusion. At the end of part B, criteria for such transfers of warrant have been 
developed. The idea was that a deductive inference by S in a specific context is warrant-
transferring if the following two criteria are fulfilled: 
1) S’s justification for believing the premises is suitably independent of his justification for 
believing the conclusion, but both––premises and conclusion––are common ground 
after the conclusion has been drawn 
2) S is justified in believing that the inference is valid iff the inference can be expressed 
through a basic statement or S is justified in believing that the inference is actually 
truth-preserving  
This proposal was meant to explain what a logical mistake is. It was not meant to explain how 
the validity of inferences is constituted or how their factual correctness (if there is such a 
thing) should be explained. The present chapter is about the extent to which linguistic 
competence, as explained above, can possibly constrain or perhaps even constitute what 
counts as inferring at all and what deductive inferential validity is. 
 Inferences have a certain structure in virtue of which they are valid or invalid. On the 
other hand, the conception of linguistic competence just developed commits us to say that all 
linguistic expressions available for language use have a certain structure which determines 
word order (and also determines, maybe indirectly, spelling, pronunciation, reading and other 
things)—such a structure is the grammatical form. It is also commonly assumed that 
statements used to express inferences have another sort of structure which determines the 
validity of inferences––that second sort of structure is the logical form of a statement. 
 Logical form determines what role a proposition can assume in inferences. A 
proposition is a claim expressed through a statement (a declarative sentence)––or through a 
part of a linguistic expression which can be paraphrased by a statement––which can usually 
be evaluated as being true or false. A proposition can hence figure as a premise or a 
conclusion of inferences. 
 With grammatical form on the one hand and logical form on the other, we can ask 
ourselves how those forms are related. Because it seems natural to say that grammatically 
well-formed statements can be used to express inferences, the gap between the two sorts of 
form should not be too wide. Even though it appears that logical form presupposes 
grammatical form, it is not clear whether the role linguistic expressions play in inference 
somehow constrains or determines their grammatical function. From a Chomskian point of 
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view, however, inferential roles do not constrain or determine grammatical functions if 
inferential roles are characterised in terms of truth-conditions or in other terms drawing on 
what facts obtain in the environment of an individual. Grammatical functions (at least the 
most basal ones) are part of human genetic endowment and are not acquired in any sense by 
an individual from her or his environment when growing up. 
 Asking how grammatical and logical forms are related is not simply an exclusive 
problem for philosophers of logic with little impact on other issues in science and society. 
After all, human beings reason and that shows up in how they interact by using language and 
in many of their non-linguistic actions. Sound reasoning requires not only judging well and 
inferring validly, but it also requires an appropriate expression. Such an appropriate 
expression may turn out to require human linguistic powers or not, because the capacity to 
express reasoning may obtain or not. Asking how grammatical and logical form are related 
hence means enquiring into certain central aspects of what the concept of reasoning amounts 
to in detail and it specifically means enquiring into whether human linguistic powers and the 
power to reason are to be construed as inherently related. We must, hence, ask whether 
reasoning requires language or not. 
 Paul Pietroski suggests in some of his recent works that there is some considerable 
structural affinity between logical form and grammatical form. His proposal requires, 
however, construing logical form in terms of a classical second-order predicate logic and it 
also requires a refined construal of grammatical form along Chomskian lines. The aims of the 
present chapter are, first, to introduce and explain Pietroski’s proposal and, second, to criticise 
what he takes to be the central upshot of his discussion. Whereas Pietroski favours a 
Davidsonian reading of his purported results, arguments will be presented which suggest a 
preferable alternative. The alternative takes up some of Pietroski’s points but reinterprets 
them along lines first suggested by Friedrich Waismann and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The 
resulting picture I shall argue for takes grammatical forms to be, strictly speaking, the only 
forms there are. I adopt a version of the idea that natural language, as it is commonly used, 
contains everything required for inferential relations. Grammar accounts for what sort of 
structures could possibly matter for inferring by providing principles of word order and their 
transformations. And rules of language use then settle what possible transformations count as 
warrant-transferring, i.e. of which syntactically licit transformations we can know whether 
they are logically valid. The rules of language use fulfil this function by constituting what 
counts as violating the familiar conditions: 
1) S’s justification for believing the premises is suitably independent of his justification for 
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believing the conclusion, but both––premises and conclusion––are common ground 
after the conclusion has been drawn 
2) S is justified in believing that the inference is valid iff the inference can be expressed 
through a basic statement or S is justified in believing that the inference is actually 
truth-preserving. 
The resulting picture might seem to allow for a variety of calculi. The variety is, 
however, restricted by construing the notion of a valid inference as a syntactically licit 
transformation of linguistic expressions which preserves truth––a valid inference hence 
preserves truth and it employs syntactically well-formed expressions throughout. As 
long as we distinguish epistemological issues (i.e. transfer of warrant from premises to 
conclusion) from issues surrounding the notion of formal validity, the variety of logical 
calculi allowed should be manageable. 
 
Medieval Logicians on Logical Form and Grammatical Form 
 
Pietroski (2006/2009) starts out with some historical reflections on the topic and it is 
informative to follow him in this, as it puts the problem introduced above into perspective. It 
also allows us to track down and make up for an important omission in Pietroski’s story. 
 Not all philosophers concede straightaway that grammatical and logical forms are 
distinct. It is the central idea of a mental language common to all thinkers that there is a 
unique language in which thinking is conducted and for the structure of which grammatical 
and logical form fall together. 
 The idea of a mental language common to all thinkers is an old one. Medieval 
logicians enquired into the possibility that all propositions can be composed from categorical 
propositions, propositions with a subject-copula-predicate form, and some combining 
elements called ‘syncategoremata’, which were thought to merge categorical propositions into 
complex propositions. That enquiry was often thought to reveal the structure of a mental 
language common to all thinkers, a language which lies underneath the languages actually in 
use.296 They saw only few differences between the logical forms they found in reasoning and 
the grammar of actual sentences––especially since any proposition was thought to have a 
subject-copula-predicate structure derivable from categorical propositions which have only 
one subject, one copula and one predicate. And as such categorical propositions are 
segmented into the grammatical elements of subject, copula and predicate, logical form––qua                                                         296 Prominent defenders of such views were William of Ockham (cf. Loux 1974) and John Buridan (cf. Klima 2001). 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propositional structure––simply is the grammatical form of present tense indicative sentences. 
Logic appeared to them to be a special branch of grammar. It was thought to be that part of 
grammar which concerns the mental language, because meaningful thoughts are simply 
categorical propositions (or composites of them). 
 William of Ockham and John Buridan both believed that the compositional principles 
of grammatical form will explain central aspects of how logical form and categorical 
propositions–qua meaningful thoughts–are composed, while they also allowed for 
grammatical forms which are not inferentially relevant. They were most interested in those 
aspects of how grammatical and logical form is composed which were expected to shed light 
on ontology. That is why enquiries into singular terms claim centre stage in their writings on 
logic and language. Metaphysical issues (and a nominalist agenda) motivated their quest for 
understanding language and logic. 
 But projects of that sort encountered several problems. One has to do with 
quantification. Medieval logic cannot deal with quantifiers as logically significant 
constituents of what it conceived of as predicates. Some arguments which involve quantifiers 
would turn out valid, although no valid logical form could be found. Consider (1): 
 (1) Some patient respects some doctor, and every doctor is a senator; so some patient      
       respects some senator 
The argument is valid, but does its logical form display the validity? Using variables to denote 
singular terms which can fulfil the grammatical functions of subjects and objects, one could 
analyse (1) as: 
 Some P is T, and every D is an S; so some P is U. 
The analysis does not recognise that there is a logical relation between T and U in the actual 
argument, as the relation between T and D on the one hand and S and U on the other is 
obviously not reflected in the form. Pietroski considers another possible analysis:  
 letting Ř be a variable ranging over relations,  
 some P Ř some D, and every D is an S; so some P Ř some S.297 
This alternative analysis solves the problem in (1), but it does not help with other cases in 
which we want quantifiers as logically significant constituents of predicates. This becomes 
clear if we introduce relative clauses, as in (2): 
 (2) Some patient respects a doctor who frequently eats some vegetables, and every     
       doctor is a senator; so some patient respects some senator who frequently eats some      
       vegetables. 
Unless one’s logic can acknowledge the inferential significance of quantifiers that occur as                                                         297 Pietroski 2006:825 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parts of predicates and allows for inferences from more complicated predicates to simpler 
predicates contained in them (like the inference from ‘some doctor who frequently eats some 
vegetables’ to ‘some doctor’), one cannot find an appropriate logical form for (2). 
 Notice a point Pietroski does not mention. Buridan and Ockham employ a notion of 
signification––both hold that terms may signify things in the world. For Ockham, a term like 
‘tree’ signifies a thing x if ‘This is a tree’ is true when pointing to x, but a term like ‘brave’ 
may signify bravery even though bravery itself is not brave.298 This strongly suggests that 
Ockham regarded “signification” to be independent of predication. A more explicit statement 
along these lines was forwarded by Buridan who held that what a term signifies should be 
specifiable independently of what a proposition means in which it occurs. Buridan’s notion of 
signification seems to be closer to what we understand by ‘reference’, because a term 
signifies by standing for what it ordinarily signifies or by standing for something in a way that 
departs from common usage.299 So we may infer from this that for Ockham and Buridan the 
reference of a singular term can be fixed independently of what a proposition means.300 This 
does, however, jar with Pietroski’s view. He analyses grammatical subjects and objects as 
monadic predicates the reference of which can only be fixed once it is clear what the 
proposition means in which the predicates occur.301 This difference should be held in mind for 
what follows. 
 
Frege’s Innovations and the Separation of Logical Form from Grammatical Form 
 
Gottlob Frege is commonly supposed to have resolved the difficulties of medieval logicians 
(which they themselves had inherited from Aristotle) by taking propositions to have a 
function-argument structure rather than a subject-copula-predicate structure. Frege adopted 
the function-argument structure from analysis and approached inferential validity in terms of 
truth and falsehood. For Frege, the inferentially relevant content that a sentence expresses is 
to be accounted for in terms of truth-conditions. Building on this, he defined semantic values 
for sub-sentential expressions as that feature of them which contributes to the truth-conditions                                                         298 Cf. Ockham Summa of Logic I.33 (translated by Loux 1974). 299 Cf. Klima 2001:253‐6 300 I should probably note here that in part B I merely reject the claim that any world‐word relation is paradigmatic for meaningful language use. This does not rule out that the reference of a singular term can be fixed independetly of what the propositions, in which a singular term occurs, mean. The point is subtle, but I have no objection against the sort of view that I find in works by Buridan and Ockham. 301 Cf. Pietroski 2005:ch. 2; see part 1 of Ben‐Yami 2004 for a comprehensive discussion of the roots of that strategy and the more general problems it gives rise to. 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of the sentences in which they occur.302 
 Based on these ideas, Frege was able to avoid accounts of inferential validity based on 
an analysis of subject and copula. The semantic values of predicates, sentential connectives, 
names and quantifiers could now be defined in terms of truth-values and the new 
mathematical concepts. So, the semantic value of a predicate was construed as a first-level 
function from objects to truth-values––a predicate like ‘is red’ hence maps objects like red 
apples onto truth-values yielding the value ‘true’ for red apples and the value ‘false’ e.g. for 
green apples. 
 Logical concepts like sentential connectives can be handled along these lines. The 
semantic value of a sentential connective is then simply a first-level function from truth-
values to truth-values––a connective like ‘and’ hence maps two true sentences like ‘John is 
big’ and ‘John is male’ onto the value ‘true’. But if either ‘John is big’ or ‘John is male’ is 
false, the truth-value of ‘John is big and John is male’ will also be false. 
 All of this also allows a fresh view of names. The semantic value of a name is the 
object it denotes and names function as arguments for first-level functions. If we thus take the 
name ‘John’, which denotes the big individual male John, we can plug it into either the 
predicate ‘is big’ or into ‘is male’ and the functions expressed by those predicates will 
directly yield the value ‘true’ as the semantic value for either declarative sentence. 
 The biggest advantage of Fregean over medieval logic is, however, the introduction of 
quantifiers. The semantic value of a quantifier is a second-level function from first-level 
functions to truth values. So if we take the semantic value of the predicate ‘is male’––which is 
a first-level function––and ask how that is related to truth-values, we find that a second-level 
function may decide whether truth-value we get for each argument we plug into the first-level 
function. So, the quantifier ‘For all x’ yields the value ‘true’ for the predicate ‘x is male’ if the 
predicate applies to every object; thus one gets the value ‘true’ if every object is male and one 
gets the value ‘false’ otherwise. This allows us to handle in a straightforward way what was 
problematic for medieval logicians; a statements like (3) can now be analysed as (3'): 
 (3) Some patient respects a doctor who frequently eats some vegetables 
(3') Let ∃ denote the first-order quantifier ‘some’, P(   ) denote the predicate ‘is a 
patient’, D( ) denote the predicate ‘is a doctor’, V(    ) denote the predicate 
‘frequently eats some vegetables’, and R(…,     ) denote the relation ‘…respects    ‘; 
 ∃x∃y[P(x) & D(y) & R (x, y) & V(y)] 
That is, however, only the tip of the iceberg. Devised for independent purposes, Frege’s                                                         302 I adopt and adapt all the canonical definitions of Frege’s semantics from the summary in Miller 2007:11/86‐7. 
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second-order quantifiers (qua third-level functions from second-level functions to truth-
values) allowed sentences like  
(4) If a horse and a cow are black, there is at least one property that a horse and a cow 
have in common  
to be analysed as  
 (4') ∃a∃b(Fa & Fb) → ∃X(Xa & Xb)  
The semantic value of the consequent can be captured by:  
(4*) ‘∃X(Xa & Xb)’ is true iff there is a function, X, that maps both the individual a and 
the individual b onto the truth-value true 
Frege uses second-order quantifiers to derive an important technical result in part II of his 
groundbreaking Begriffsschrift (1879), where he introduces a logical notation called 
‘Concept-Script’ (Begriffsschrift in German). He defines the concept of succession (i.e. 
following in a series) with it, which, if combined with his definition of a hereditary property, 
yields a purely logical characterisation of mathematical induction.303 In other words, Frege 
uses second-order quantification to give a characterisation of arithmetically correct 
extrapolations in purely logical terms. This is significant, because the Peano-Dedekind 
axioms for arithmetic include mathematical induction as one of the axioms. It fuelled Frege’s 
hope of accounting for all of arithmetic in purely logical terms by providing characterisations 
of all the axioms in his Concept-Script. This is also the ancestor of the idea that recursion, and 
semantic compositionality with it, can be defined in terms of truth and, hence, within the 
confines of a truth-conditional semantics for natural language. It hence appears that Frege is 
the forefather of truth-conditional semantics and truth-conditional approaches to semantically 
correct language use. 
 With this idea in the background, Frege has provided the means for analysing logical 
form and the inferential links between propositions in a purely mathematical way––and that is 
something which appears to do a good job for mathematical statements and the proofs they 
are used to construct. But does it also work for ordinary language use and the inferences we 
find expressed there? 
 It should be obvious that analysing propositional structure in terms of arguments and 
functions instead of subject, copula and predicate leads to a conception of logical form which 
places it much further away from the actual grammatical forms of sentences. If grammatical 
form does not matter much anymore for logical form, sentences like  
 (5) Someone trusts everyone 
can, if analysed based on Frege’s proposal with T(x, y) denoting the relation ‘x trusts y’, be                                                         303 Cf. Beaney 1997:75‐8 for a concise summary. 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paraphrased either as  
 (6) There is someone who trusts everyone 
 (6*) ∃x∀y[T(x, y)] 
or as  
 (7) Everyone is trusted by someone or other 
 (7*) ∀x∃y[T(x, y)] 
An immediate problem is that (6) is a much more natural way of parsing (5) than (7). But if 
grammatical form does not count much for what the logical form is, there is no reason to 
suppose that (6*) is a better formalisation than (7*), even though it represents the natural 
reading. 
 There is also the more general question of whether an active sentence allows for other 
inferences than its passive counterpart.304 Even if there was a difference in English, there 
certainly is no such difference in all languages. In Sanskrit, for example, one would often 
chose a passive sentence instead of its active counterpart, because present passive forms are 
much easier to form syntactically than most present tense forms. It is for this pragmatic reason 
that a Sanskrit philosopher would usually treat a present passive sentence as conveying just as 
a much as its active counterpart. From that perspective, the natural language sentence 
‘someone trusts everyone’ can be explained by paraphrasing it as ‘there is someone who trusts 
everyone’ or as ‘everyone is trusted by someone or other’. 
 This leads straightaway to the question how formalisations of natural language 
statements are, then, constrained. More precisely, since logical form is thought to have a 
function-argument structure while grammatical form does not, the logical form of (5) can 
equally well be (6*) or (7*). Under this assumption, the statement ‘Someone trusts everyone’ 
can be used to indicate two different propositions and is, pace perfectly normal intuitions 
concerning natural language use, ambiguous. That can be taken as a reason to suppose that 
grammatical form is much less precise than logical form and that natural language is logically 
deficient.305 Of course, anyone sensitive to how English is actually used must find this plain 
wrong, but such a sentiment is a far cry from understanding precisely what is going on here.  
 Frege initially assumed the function-theoretic approach to be sufficient but 
subsequently refined his view by distinguishing between the Bedeutung and the Sinn of 
expressions. While the Bedeutung of an expression was to be the object referred to by a                                                         304 Cf. Glock (2007) who argues that Ben‐Yami’s (2004) reasons for distinguishing inferences drawn from active sentences from inferences drawn from their passive counterparts are not watertight. Concerning this one should bear in mind that Ben‐Yami’s distinction between the inferential import of active sentences on the one hand and passive sentences on the other is not absolute. His generalized rules of transposition (ch. 11) do allow truth‐ and warrant‐preserving active‐passive conversions. 305 Cf. Pietroski 2006:827 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singular term, a particular truth-value for a sentence or a range of truth-values for a function-
expression, the Sinn of an expression, is a way of how its Bedeutung is presented or given 
(Weise des Gegebenseins). 
 The standard example is that the names ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ both denote the 
planet Venus, which is their Bedeutung, but each presents the planet in a different way. 
Similarly, the functions ‘G1(   )= ((   ) x 2) : 3’ and ‘G2(   )= ((   ) : 3) x 2’ present the same 
range of values in a slightly different way, as their treatment of the argument differs without 
any impact on the range of values they produce or the domain from which we can pick 
arguments appropriate for them.  
 For Frege, who thought that all of arithmetic is reducible to what is expressible with 
his logical notation (his Concept-Script), mathematical sentences can also have the same 
Bedeutung while the ways of presenting them differ. The statements ‘5 + 7 = 12’ and ‘8 + 9 = 
17’ both denote the particular truth-value ‘true’, but they present it in a different way. That 
idea is obviously readily extensible to statements like ‘this is Hesperus’ and ‘this is 
Phosphorus’. Different ways of presenting a truth-value signify different ways in which one 
can come to know what is truly the case. 
 In the case of arithmetical statements, and statements in formal languages (viz. Frege’s 
Concept-Script) in general, the way the true and the false are presented by a statement is 
hence thought to be uniquely determined by the inferential relations the statement has to the 
other statements and the denotations of the constituents of statements (i.e. the denotations of 
the relevant functions and arguments). It is less clear how exactly the distinction between Sinn 
and Bedeutung is to be drawn for natural languages and a variety of proposals have been 
made.306  
 The idea that meaningful linguistic content can somehow be described through giving 
the conditions under which a sentence is true, its truth-conditions, has been highly influential 
since Frege’s times––we have already discussed some varieties of the proposal. But together 
with this, the originally Leibnizian idea that natural languages are not as precise as ideal 
languages (such as Leibniz’s calculus ratiocinator or Frege’s Concept-Script), or that they are 
downright logically deficient, has spread as well.  
 The result from this development was the establishment of two camps which are both 
pessimistic about how much we can learn about logical forms from grammatical forms in 
natural language as it stands. One camp followed Frege and promoted ideal languages for the 
purposes of scientific reasoning––on this view, logic provides a language superior to natural                                                         306 Michael Dummett, for one, wrote (1975:118 and 1973/81:ch. 5) that Sinn determines the conditions under which a sentence is true, i.e. under which its Bedeutung is the true. 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language. The other camp took up the idea from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus that logic provides 
a notation which clarifies the logical forms buried underneath the surface structure of natural 
languages––on that view, logic indicates the depth structure of natural language.307 
 Both camps focused on first-order quantification. But Frege, as was mentioned 
already, had allowed second-order quantification, because it made it seem possible for him to 
analyse the Peano-Dedekind axioms for arithmetic in purely logical terms.308 Subsequent 
philosophers advocated a restriction to the first-order fragment of Frege’s logic, because 
Frege’s own proposal generated Russell’s paradox by allowing predicates such as ‘is not a 
member of itself’. The paradox ensues, because ‘is not a member of itself’ may take itself as 
an argument and yield ‘”is not a member of itself” is not a member of itself’. The resulting 
statement is paradoxical, as it can only be true if ‘is not a member of itself’ is not a member of 
itself––but in that case the statement would also be false for it then would be a member of 
itself. 
 The focus on first-order logic was not only motivated by the allegedly paradoxical 
nature of second-order logic. Other reasons were that Gödel had proved the completeness of 
the first-order fragment and that Quine held that second-order quantification illicitly treats 
predicates as names for sets. Pietroski notes: 
On Quine’s view, we should replace ‘(Fa & Fb) → ∃X(Xa & Xb)’ with explicit first-order 
quantification over sets, as in ‘(Fa & Fb) → ∃s(a∈s & b∈s)’; where ‘∈’ stands for ‘is an 
element of’, and this second conditional is not a logical truth, but rather a hypothesis (to 
be evaluated holistically) concerning sets. 
  The preference for first-order regimentations has come to seem unwarranted, or 
at least highly tendentious; see Boolos (1998). But it fuelled the idea that logical form can 
diverge wildly from grammatical form. For as students quickly learn, first-order 
regimentations of natural sentences often turn out to be highly artificial. (And in some 
cases, such regimentations seem to be unavailable.) This was, however, taken to show 
that natural languages are far from ideal for purposes of indicating logical structure.309 
The gist of Pietroski’s own work is that second-order regimentations of natural language 
sentences are much less artificial and may provide us with a basis for finding structural 
affinities between grammatical and logical form. His discussion of Russellian descriptions is a 
case in point. 
 
How Russellian Descriptions Suggest a Separation of Logical Form from Grammatical Form                                                         307 Cf. Hacker 1986:179‐80 308 Cf. Zalta 2010 309 Cf. Pietroski 2009:§6 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Frege did not distinguish names, such as ‘John’, from descriptions, such as ‘the tall boy from 
Canada’, and that makes the specific elements of a description logically irrelevant. This 
turned out to be unsatisfactory. Following Russell (1919), statements (8)-(11) can, if names 
and descriptions remain undistinguished, all be thought to have (12) as their logical form: 
 (8) John sang. 
 (9) The tall boy from Canada sang. 
 (10) The boy from Canada sang. 
 (11) The boy sang. 
 (12) ∃x[Sang(x) & x=b], with ‘b’ denoting the relevant individual, John 
But it is counterintuitive to analyse (8)-(11) as (12), for the logical form in (12) does not 
reflect the inferential significance of the content of each statement. Based on the conception 
of a proposition that Ockham und Buridan favour, one would think that (12) is an inadequate 
rendering of (8)-(11), because, on the one hand, if the tall boy from Canada sang, then, surely, 
the boy from Canada sang and we can also infer that the boy sang, but, on the other hand, we 
cannot infer that the tall boy from Canada sang from the proposition that the boy from Canada 
sang and neither can be inferred from the proposition that the boy sang. Furthermore, none of 
(9)-(11) can be inferred from (8)––or (8) from either of them––unless ‘the’ signifies John. 
Such inferences cannot solely be based on the logical form (12), they require that (8)-(11) are 
understood to be referential propositions. 
 Russell’s strategy is, however, different. A first step towards a solution consists in 
looking more closely at descriptions. The name ‘John’ can be paraphrased by any definite 
description beginning with ‘the’ which also succeeds in picking out John as the relevant 
individual. ‘The’ seems to mark one contextually relevant boy, an intuition which (12) seems 
not to explain adequately: it is not the logical form in (12) which accounts for the (context-
relative) uniqueness, but the fact that ‘b’ denotes John, the relevant individual. Uniqueness, 
marking one contextually relevant boy, should also be accounted for in a way that makes it 
possible to read it off of the logical form. 
 Based on such considerations, Russell argued that we must analyse the content of 
descriptions through a specific first-order regimentation which shows the logical relevance of 
all the elements contained in the description. Russell circumscribed the uniqueness usually 
expressed through ‘the’ and provided logical forms such as (13) for (11): 
 (13) ∃x{Boy(x) & ∀y[Boy(y)  x = y] & Sang (x)} 
(13*) There is at least one x which is a boy and, for all y, if y is a boy, y is identical with 
x and x sang. 
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Thus analysing ‘the’ in terms of an existential quantifier, no particular boy is the constituent 
of the proposition; ‘the boy’ does not, pace the analysis in (12), stand for a particular 
argument that saturates the function Sang(   ).  
 Recall that, in (12) we took b in ‘Sang(b)’ to denote the relevant individual, John. If 
we follow Frege and do not distinguish names from descriptions, ‘the boy’ has to be analysed 
as an argument-expression and, as such, denotes a particular individual. From this Fregean 
perspective, the definite article in natural language misleads us into assuming that there is a 
particular boy, because it treats ‘the’ as having an object for its semantic value, just as a 
proper name does. But Russell’s alternative analysis proposes (by expressing uniqueness with 
first-order quantifiers and identity) that the logical form does not employ a propositional 
constituent which is indicated by ‘the’; for Russell, the semantic value of ‘the’ is hence not 
analogous to the semantic value of a proper name. Neither does the conception of uniqueness 
represented in the logical form allow that uniqueness be associated with the definite article 
‘the’, which is a distinct element of the grammatical form of (11) and, pace Russell’s analysis, 
naturally thought to be firmly associated with a sensible conception of uniqueness. 
 The first-order fragment of Frege’s logic, applied à la Russell, can be used to analyse 
descriptions and distinguish them clearly from Fregean names––the price is that the wedge 
between the grammatical form of natural language statements and their logical form is driven 
yet a bit further. There is, however, a problem with this that Pietroski does––curiously 
enough––never mention. Strawson, who construed the relation between reference and truth 
similarly to Buridan, objected to Russell that his analysis of sentences like ‘the boy sang’ 
yields the truth-value ‘false’ if there is no boy. For Strawson, it would be more natural to say 
that ‘the boy sang’ has no truth-value if there was no boy, because the sentence can only have 
a truth-value if there was a boy. The sentence would be false if the boy did not sing and it 
would only be true if the boy actually sang.310 So, much like Buridan, Strawson thinks that we 
can refer with a referring term independently of the meaning of a proposition or sentence. We 
shall consider below whether omitting this fact about Buridan and Strawson poses a problem 
for what Pietroski is after. 
 
An Alternative Notation 
 
By contrast to Russell’s treatment of descriptions, Pietroski wants to close the gap between 
logical and grammatical form. Taking up cues from Montague (1970) and Boolos (1998), he                                                         310 Cf. Strawson 1950 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provides a logical analysis of descriptions which is as precise as Russell would want to have 
it, while also featuring a notation of quantification which suggests a parallel between 
grammatical and logical form. 
 The important idea of the alternative notation is that second-order quantification, i.e. 
quantification over predicates, can be combined with quantifier restrictions that assign 
particular domains to quantifiers. He thus reintroduces a neglected aspect of Fregean logic to 
analyse logical form and, at the same time, weakens it to avoid Russell’s paradox.  
 Let us quickly review why Russell’s notation is taken to show that logical form does 
differ from grammatical form.  
 (11) The boy sang. 
was analysed as 
 (13) ∃x{Boy(x) & ∀y[Boy(y)  x = y] & Sang (x)} 
because ‘the’ is not taken to designate a unique boy. Note that, due to the fact that the 
semantic value of ‘the’ is not analogous to that of a Fregean name, the definite article does 
not, contrary to ordinary language intuitions, express singular reference. The logical analysis 
in (13) suggests that capturing the inferential significance of the definite article in (11) 
requires an awkward combination of logical constants, that no one element in the logical form 
can capture that one element in the grammatical form which is naturally thought to express 
uniqueness. Furthermore, it is insinuated by this that it does not matter much for the 
inferential significance of the definite article in (11) whether a unique boy is referred to or 
not. 
 Pietroski now claims that an alternative notation presents us with the logical form in 
such way that a structural affinity between logical and grammatical form appears.311 In other 
words, the claim is that once we employ a second-order restricted-quantifier notation, one 
specific element in the logical form can indeed capture the definite article. 
 So, let X and Y denote concepts with objects in their extension (construed as the set of 
things that the function maps onto the true) and let |Y|=n denote a restriction of the extension 
of concept Y to n objects––‘n’ signifies the cardinality of Y. To make things easier, let the 
natural language quantifier ‘some’ be synonymous with ‘at least one’, it is represented by ∃. 
On that background, we can write down a wide range of very specific quantifiers: 
 (14) ∃x:Y(x) 
should be read as 
 (14*) at least one x in the extension of Y                                                         311 Pietroski 2006:833 and 2009:§8 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and, accordingly, 
 (15) ∃x:Y(x) & |Y| = 5 
is to be read as 
 (15*) at least one x in the extension of Y which contains 5 objects 
Now, we can rewrite (13) using the alternative notation and get (16), which can be read as 
(11) or (16*). This does, just as much as Russell’s proposal, neither require that ‘the boy’ or 
‘the’ are propositional constituents, because the new quantifiers do not refer like the natural 
language expressions do. 
 (11) The boy sang 
 (13) ∃x{Boy(x) & ∀y[Boy(y)  x = y] & Sang (x)} 
 (16) ∃x:Boy(x)[Sang (x)] & |Boy| = 1 
 (16*) for some individual x such that x is a boy, x sang, and exactly one (relevant) 
individual is a boy 
We may also stipulate that ‘the’ is relevantly like other quantifiers such as ‘some’, ‘at least 
one’ or ‘all’. If we now let ‘the’ to be denoted by the quantifier ‘!’ in the alternative notation, 
we get (16**), the structure of which captures (11) in a way that makes one element in the 
logical form correspond exactly to the definite article.312 
 (16**) !x:Boy(x)[Sang (x)] 
But what exactly does ‘!’ mean? How does the alternative notation capture the definite article 
‘the’? The answer is given by making clear that the propositional contribution of quantifiers 
can in general be specified in terms of intersections of the extensions of concepts Y and X: 
 (17) ∃x:Y(x) [X(x)] is true iff the extensions of X and Y intersect 
 (17') ∀x:Y(x) [X(x)] is true iff the extension of X includes the extension of Y 
 (17*) !x:Y(x) [X(x)] is true iff the extensions of X and Y intersect, and |Y| = 1 
Pietroski clearly states what he takes to be the advantage of the alternative notation: 
 While there may be a boy one refers to in saying ‘the boy sang’, that boy is not a 
constituent of the quantificational proposition indicated with ‘!x:Boy(x)[Sang(x)]’ […]. 
But far from showing that the logical form of ‘the boy sang’ diverges dramatically from 
its grammatical form, the restricted quantifier notation suggests that the logical form 
closely parallels the grammatical form—‘the boy’ and ‘the’ do correspond to 
constituents of ‘!x:Boy(x)[Sang(x)]’ —at least if [...] we allow for logical forms that 
represent quantificational propositions as claims to the effect that a certain relation 
holds between a pair of (perhaps complex) predicates.313                                                         312 Note that ‘!’ works pretty much like Russell’s iota‐operator. The only difference is that it can be restricted to range over the extension of a predicate like ‘Boy(x)’ in expressions such as ‘!x:Boy(x)’. 313 Pietroski 2009:§7 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According to Pietroski, the story goes somewhat like this: Russell had suggested, based on his 
notational means, that his analysis shows that logical form is to be dissociated from 
grammatical form; but the alternative notation gives us a way of associating logical form with 
grammatical form again without jeopardising Russell’s insight into the inferential roles of the 
constituents of descriptions. 
 That is––without further arguments buttressing the claim––wrong, for that the boy 
sang is prima facie a referring proposition and not a quantificational one. ‘!x:Boy(x)[Sang(x)]’ 
formalises the proposition that there is exactly one object amongst the boys that sang––note 
here that the conditions under which this quantificational proposition counts as true or false 
does not require reference. For the proposition that the boy sang, much is different. There, the 
conditions under which the proposition counts as true or false does require reference. The 
proposition is true iff the boy referred to sang and the proposition is false iff the boy referred 
to did not sing. If there is no boy, the proposition will not have a truth-value at all––even if 
the sentence expressing it is grammatically well-formed. 
 What remains to be assessed now is whether Pietroski can provide further explanations 
which make clearer that the parallels between logical and grammatical form which interest 
him are no coincidence and that there actually is a philosophically interesting affinity between 
grammatical form and logical form in general. In order to do that, Pietroski adduces a refined 
analysis of grammatical form, which allegedly suggests close structural affinities with logical 
form (presented in the alternative notation) for a range of cases which is large enough to be 
interesting. 
 
The Alleged Affinity between Grammar and Logic 
 
Whatever grammatical form is meant to be, appealing to it must somehow bridge the gap 
between the manifest grammatical subject-predicate form of declarative sentences like 
 (11) The boy sang  
and its presumed logical form  
 (16*) !x: Boy(x)[Sang (x)]  
which has a function-argument structure. It should, furthermore, be expected to bridge the gap 
between sentences like ‘The boy liked every doctor’ and logical forms like ‘!x:Boy(x) & 
∃y:Doctor(y) [Likes(x, y)]’, where Pietroski’s notation does not yield logical forms which 
completely parallel grammatical forms. For the sake of argument we should follow Pietroski 
and presume that these sentences do not express referential propositions or that such 
-212- 
propositions can be reduced to quantificational propositions in a Russellian fashion. Once 
Pietroski’s position has been fully explained, I shall return to objections flowing from this 
point. 
 Taking in Pietroski’s ideas about logical form requires refining the conception of 
grammatical form. Pietroski tries to get at such a refined conception by following Noam 
Chomsky’s assumption of specific levels of representation for grammatical forms. Two levels 
of representation––understood in the technical sense––are salient here: we have deep-
structures, from which manifest grammatical form, surface-structures, are developed through 
specific transformations. Those transformations were initially thought to be best described 
with a complicated transformation algebra, but meanwhile it has been claimed that a much 
leaner apparatus can do the job just as well.314 
 It might be in order to say something about deep structures and connect it with the 
introduction to the Chomskian programme given above. Deep structures are composed from a 
lexicon by specific transformations and reflect semantically relevant relations between 
predicates and their arguments. More specifically, a deep structure clarifies (amongst other 
things) what internal and external arguments sentences have. An internal argument is an 
argument which turns relations with n>2 argument-places into relations with n-1 argument-
places and relations with n=2 argument-places into predicates. An external argument saturates 
predicates and turns them into singular terms or statements.  
 Consider, for example, the 3-part relation ‘(   ) lives between x and y’. If ‘y’ is 
exchanged with the name ‘John’, the internal argument ‘John’ turns the 3-part relation into 
the 2-part relation ‘(  )lives between x and John’. By replacing ‘x’ with the internal argument 
‘Mandy’, we get the predicate ‘(   ) lives between Mandy and John’ which, then, can be 
saturated by an appropriate external argument and thus form a statement. Based on this it has 
been proposed that Chomskian deep structures are grammatical forms which can be 
systematically associated with logical forms with function-argument structure.315 
 A (very) crude introduction to the difference between deep and surface structure can 
be given by considering the syntactic relation of ‘who’ and ‘saw’ in (18), its analyses on the 
deep level (18D) and the surface level (18S), and the statement (19) with a gloss on ‘who’. 
The explanandum here is: why can (19), which suggests a relation between the pronoun ‘who’ 
and the verb ‘saw’, count as an acceptable paraphrase of (18), even though that relation is not 
                                                        314  Cf. Chomsky 1955 and 1995a 315 The classical accounts are Larson & Segal 1995 and Heim & Kratzer 1998, but compare also Pietroski 2005 for an alternative. 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obvious in (18)?316 (Note that indices like ‘i’ indicate a structural relation between coindexed 
positions––in the present case, between ’whoi’ and ‘saw(__)i’–the relations in question 
usually being between predicates and their internal arguments.) 
 (18) Mary wondered who John saw 
In order to clarify which parts of the sentence function as internal arguments and which 
function as external arguments, we compose a deep structure (18D) from the lexicon––in 
which the verbs and their arguments are as close together as possible––and rearrange it in 
order to get to the surface structure (18S): 
 (18D) {Mary[wondered{John[saw who]}]} 
 (18S) {Mary[wondered[whoi{John[saw(__)i]}]]} 
Based on the rearrangement of (18D) to get (18S) it appears that ‘who’ is the internal 
argument of ‘saw(__)’ and we can therefore paraphrase (18) by substituting ‘which person is 
such that’ for ‘who’ and ‘that person’ for the blank argument position in ‘saw(__)’: 
 (19) Mary wondered which person is such that John saw that person 
The central claim of any version of a Chomskian approach to grammatical form is that there 
must be a syntactic reason why (19) can provide a gloss on ‘who’, as it figures in (18). 
Puzzling about it is that (19) suggests a structural relation between ‘who’ and ‘saw’ which is 
not obvious in (18). The reason, following Chomskian lines of thought, should not appeal to 
any semantic or pragmatic concepts, but should be expressible in terms of purely syntactic 
transformations. 
 That ‘who’ is an internal argument of the predicate ‘saw(   )’, so the hypothesis goes, 
is explained by assuming (18D) to be the non-manifest deep structure which is then 
transformed into the surface-structure (18S). (19) draws on the structural relation uncovered 
in (18D) and (18S) by replacing ‘who’ by ‘which person’ and filling the gap in ‘saw(__)’ by 
‘that person’. This is why (19) counts as an acceptable paraphrase of (18). 
 What does warrant this and similar hypotheses? Pietroski follows standard Chomskian 
lines when he argues that such hypotheses are required in accounting for a wide range of 
linguistic facts, such as the one that (20)-(22) count as grammatically well-formed 
expressions, while (23) does not:317 
 (20) The boy who sang was happy 
 (21) Was the boy who sang happy 
 (22) The boy who was happy sang 
 (23) *Was the boy who happy sang                                                         316 Cf. Pietroski 2006:834 317 Op. cit. p. 835 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In order to account for the allegedly surprising fact that (23) is not admissible, one needs to 
appeal, so the story goes, to levels of representation in order to give an algebraically viable 
account of it. (23) features, then, an inadmissible word-order because the deep structure (20D) 
does allow (20S)-(22S) as results from permissible transformations, but not (23S)-(26S): 
 (20D) {[the[boy[who sang]]][was happy]} 
 (20S)  {[the[boy[who sang]]][was happy]} 
 (21S) Wasi{[the[boy[who sang]]][(   )i happy]} 
 (22S) {[the[boy[who [was happy]i sang]]][   ]i} 
 (23S) *Wasi{[the[boy[who [(   )i happy]sang]]]} 
 (24S) *{[the[wasi][boy[who [(   )i happy]sang]]]} 
 (25S) *{[the[boy[wasi][who [(   )i happy]sang]]]} 
 (26S) *{[the[boy[who [(   )i happy][wasi]sang]]]} 
The analysis shows that the auxiliary verb ‘was’ cannot be displaced from certain positions, 
because [who sang] seems to be something like a restricted area from within which ‘was’ 
cannot be moved to the front or the back of the statement once [was happy] has been 
embedded between ‘who’ and ‘sang’. 
 There is a wide variety of cases in natural language use which suggest that the appeal 
to such restricted areas explains why certain combinations of words are systematically 
inadmissible. This and similar phenomena, which do suggest a certain systematicity in how 
words can be combined in natural languages, fuel all the different versions of the Chomskian 
programme and have driven theoretical linguists to minimalise the apparatus they employ 
more and more. Another reason to minimalise the apparatus is that the accounts of the 
systematicity in how words can be combined should be as general as possible. A simpler 
apparatus with less rules seems to have better chances to explain features of all natural 
languages. 
 Nowadays, it is often assumed that the notions of deep structure, which reflects the 
semantically relevant relations between predicate and argument, and of surface structure, 
which reflects the relations of the deep structures modulo some further transformations, are 
not needed anymore. 
 As far as Pietroski is concerned, the grammatical structures relevant for inferring are 
called ‘LF’. An LF was initially obtained from surface structures by a transformation called 
‘quantifier raising’ and showed the scope of natural language quantifiers:318 
 (27S) {Pat [trusts [every doctor]]} 
 (27L) {[every doctor]i {Pat [trusts ( _ )i ]}}                                                         318 Cf. May 1985 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LFs are grammatical forms thought to correspond to what emerged as logical form from 
Pietroski’s alternative to Russell’s analysis of descriptive content. If that structural affinity 
between the second-order logical forms and LFs holds generally, Frege’s and Russell’s 
reasons for claiming that natural language is deficient mainly rest on a mistaken analysis of 
natural language quantification, an analysis which has only become available through recent 
developments in theoretical linguistics and a reappraisal of second-order logic. The quantifier 
raising that takes place when moving from surface structures to LFs is semantically 
motivated: Pietroski thinks that it is a syntactic transformation which is required in order to 
speak and think about events. Whether or not an LF is formed correctly is, as will be shown in 
the next section, a matter of meaning. 
 There are two problems with the story Pietroski told us so far. First, Pietroski treats 
referring propositions as quantificational propositions without providing reasons for this 
controversial move. This is especially problematic, since Chomsky himself favours a 
Strawsonian position when it comes to reference and related topics inherited from Frege and 
Russell. Second, Chomsky has argued that there are good reasons to think that there are no 
LFs or other deep structures anymore.319 For him, there is a lexicon––of which we know not 
much and which is not part of the language faculty (if narrowly construed)––and two 
operations merging lexical items together. At the end of the line, there are expressions 
(syntactically) ready for use and not logical forms ready for mentalese soliloquy. This is 
problematic for Pietroski, because he commits himself to a Chomskian perspective without 
rejecting Chomsky’s reasons. As things stand so far, Pietroski’s story about logical forms is 
anything but watertight and his story about grammatical forms is not purely syntactical. 
 There is hence nothing in Pietroski’s account that prevents us from assuming that there 
is a lexicon which specifies that ‘Pat’ is a name that can refer and which can fulfil the 
function of a noun, that ‘trusts’ is a transitive verb with an internal and an external argument 
that ‘every’ modifies nouns and pronouns and that ‘doctor’ is a noun. There is no evidence 
against the supposition that much of this is acquired through training––even though it might 
be biologically constrained what can be trained and what cannot.320 Our innate dispositions––
the language faculty narrowly construed (FLN)––simply assemble items from the lexicon in a 
way that directly yields sentences like: 
 28) Pat trusts every doctor 
According to that picture, which is an admittedly curious Wittgensteinian way of fleshing out                                                         319 Cf. Chomsky 2005 320 Cf. Hinzen & Uriagereka 2006 for a discussion of what sort of general constraints on the lexicon we can expect. 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Chomsky’s views, there is nothing but a lexicon (mostly) acquired through training, 
dispositions to arrange the items in the lexicon and natural language use as manifest in 
everyday life. Pietroski has not produced anything to rule this more straightforward account 
out. 
 Pietroski thinks that his proposal, as introduced so far, opens the door for a variety of 
new questions about how logical form, inferential validity and grammatical structure are 
related. It also suggests new ways of saving the intuitions of medieval logicians, for if it can 
be shown that there are systematic relations between inferring and the syntactic features of all 
languages––such as the general form of derivations of particular LFs from a lexicon––the old 
idea of a mental language appears to be within reach. His story is, as I have argued, not 
watertight (to say the least). But there is more behind Pietroski’s approach. We now turn to 
the considerations which ultimately motivate his views. 
 
Pietroski’s Davidsonian Suggestion 
 
We have seen at the end of the section on Frege that his innovations did not only put 
substance to the Leibnizian idea of an ideal language, but also to the idea that meaningful 
linguistic content can be explained in truth-conditional terms. Based on the alleged success of 
truth-conditional approaches to meaning, Pietroski is led to suggest that Davidson has 
provided the foundations for a promising theory of meaning and understanding.321 This does 
not, as I have argued, chime in with a more natural take on Pietroski’s examples. We should 
thus examine the Davidsonian suggestion in detail and assess its prospects in the present 
context. 
 Pietroski’s suggestion to adopt a broadly Davidsonian point of view in order to 
continue enquiries into the affinity between grammatical form and logical form is rooted in an 
account of the inferential relations between the following sentences:322 
 (29) Juliet kissed Romeo quickly at midnight. 
 (30) Juliet kissed Romeo quickly. 
 (31) Juliet kissed Romeo at midnight. 
 (32) Juliet kissed Romeo. 
Observe that if (29) is true, (30)-(32) are true; and if (30) or (31) is true, (32) is true as well. 
That much is unproblematic. A problem appears, Pietroski argues, if we treat ‘kissed quickly 
at midnight’ as an unstructured transitive predicate just like ‘kissed’. Let ‘kissed quickly at                                                         321 Pietroski 2006:838 322 Op. cit. p. 839, the Davidsonian considerations stem from Davidson’s 1967b. 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midnight’ be denoted by the relation K*(...,___) and ‘kissed’ by the relation K(...,__); in that 
case, the inference from (29) to (32) has the following logical form: 
 (33) K*(x, y), therefore K(x, y) 
On that formalisation, invalid inferences like 
 (34) Juliet kicked Romeo; therefore, Juliet kissed Romeo. 
have the same logical form, since the latter does not distinguish unstructured transitive 
predicates, so the analysis cannot be right. Pietroski maintains that one wants to have an 
explanation why conditionals like  
 (35) If Juliet kissed Romeo quickly at midnight then Juliet kissed Romeo. 
are “tautologous”. Instead of treating this as a problem about formalisation––asking for which 
purposes (33) is a useful formalisation of the inference from (29) to (32)––Pietroski turns this 
into problem about the analyticity of (35). 
 Pietroski’s use of the term ‘tautology’ is put in shudder quotes, because standard 
practice in formal logic has it that tautologies are those statements for which the truth-tables 
make them always true, no matter what semantic value is assigned to its elements.323 (35) 
cannot be displayed as a tautology through a truth-table and therefore the technical notion of 
tautology does not apply. What Pietroski is after diverges from the technical notion, because 
“toutologous” here means that (35) is supposed to be materially analytic. 
 Pietroski is worried that we do not grasp firmly what the analyticity of (35) comes 
down to if we treat ‘kissed quickly at midnight’ as an unstructured transitive predicate like 
‘kissed’. I find it puzzling that Pietroski sees a problem here. After all, we must not treat 
‘kissed quickly at midnight’ as an unstructured transitive predicate like ‘kissed’ exactly 
because that jeopardises the material analyticity of sentences like (35). I would therefore 
suggest that (35) is materially analytic, because ‘Juliet kissed Romeo’ and ‘Juliet kissed 
Romeo quickly at midnight’ are about the same kiss. The puzzle disappears once one sees 
this. 
 So, whence Pietroski’s worries about this? My best guess is that Pietroski illicitly 
projects the point Russell made concerning the distinction between descriptions and names 
into the distinction between structured and unstructured transitive predicates. But the cases 
are not exactly parallel. Recall that not distinguishing between names and descriptions can 
lead one to wonder why (10) can be inferred from (9): 
 (9) The tall boy from Canada sang. 
 (10) The boy from Canada sang. 
Under the controversial presumption that (9) and (10) are quantificational propositions, the                                                         323 Cf. Partee et al. 1990:107/143 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conditional 
 (36) If the tall boy from Canada sang then the boy from Canada sang 
is not always true and given Russell’s analysis of descriptions, (36) cannot be called 
tautologous (formally analytic), as there might always be two boys from Canada (one being 
small and the other being tall)––that was secured by dissociating the semantic value of the 
definite article from the semantic value of proper names.324 
 If we take (9) and (10) to be referential propositions, logical forms do not solely 
determine the truth of (36) either, but truth does, as intuition suggests, depend on what the 
descriptions in (9) and (10) refer to and on whether those unique referents are identical. The 
identity claim is straightforwardly warranted by the fact that both descriptions do refer to a 
unique individual. (36) is, in such cases, materially analytic, because (9) and (10) refer to the 
same tall boy from Canada who is singing. 
 Pietroski’s worry about (35) might now be thought to be somewhat analogous to the 
case of definite descriptions. If we treat structured and unstructured transitive predicates as 
first-order functions, the relevant inferences in (29)-(32) would not flow from the logical form 
and the analysis would hence fail to account for such inferential links or fail to dismiss, as 
Russell’s analysis did, the explicandum. Pietroski thinks that we should analyse transitive 
predicates somewhat along the lines of Russell’s treatment of definite descriptions. According 
to Pietroski, we need a way of explaining the semantic values of those predicates which 
enable a suitable account of the inferential patterns they license; suitability being, for his 
purposes, determined by whether a candidate account treats (35) as analytic. 
 For a proponent of referential propositions, the analyticity of (35) does not require 
formal logical analysis. If ‘Juliet kissed Romeo’ and ‘Juliet kissed Romeo quickly at 
midnight’ are about the same kiss, then ‘’if Juliet kissed Romeo quickly at midnight then 
Juliet kissed Romeo’ is materially analytic––and trivially so. Furthermore, if ‘Juliet kissed 
Romeo’ and ‘Juliet kissed Romeo quickly at midnight’ are not about the same kiss, then no 
amount of logical analysis will show that the conditional ‘if Juliet kissed Romeo quickly at 
midnight then Juliet kissed Romeo’ is analytically true.  
 According to such a story, we can obviously rest content with materially analytic 
truths as they appear in natural language use. But an unnecessarily complicated interpretation 
of the issue might lead one to invent a new deep problem. Pietroski follows Davidson in 
maintaining that sentences like (29)-(32) mask important semantic structure. Davidson 
proposes to understand such sentences in terms of quantification over events, which render,                                                         324 I am indepted to Hanoch Ben‐Yami for helpful comments on this. 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for example, (29) as 
 (37) ∃e[Agent (e, Juliet) & Kissing (e) & Patient (e, Romeo) & Quick (e) & At (e,     
         midnight)] 
which can itself be paraphrased as 
(38) There is an event e, such that Juliet is the agent, that it is a kissing-event, that 
Romeo is the patient and that it happened at midnight. 
Pietroski acknowledges that it remains controversial what those allegedly masked “semantic 
structures” will turn out to be, but he maintains that an enquiry is warranted. He also 
acknowledges that, in the end, logical forms might turn out to be those masked “semantic 
structures” and accounting for the validity of logical inferences will then be determined by 
what our theory of meaning for natural languages comes to be. He writes: 
 This raises the possibility that theories of meaning/understanding for natural languages 
will associate sentences (whose grammatical structures are not obvious) with “semantic 
structures” that are not obvious. Perhaps in the end, talk of logical forms is best 
construed as talk of the structure(s) that speakers impose on words in order to 
understand natural language systematically […] From this perspective, which remains 
tendentious, the phenomenon of valid inference is at least largely a reflection of 
semantic compositionality.325 
This obviously neglects that there is a completely straightforward interpretation of the issue 
which does not magic masked semantic structures into the cases under discussion. 
Furthermore, nothing in Pietroski’s presentation, which is thought to bring out the affinity 
between grammatical form and logical form only, necessitates or even warrants the 
Davidsonian perspective. 
 Let me rehearse the main point: the phenomenon Pietroski is interested in can be 
explained by simply holding that (35) is materially analytic, because ‘Juliet kissed Romeo’ 
and ‘Juliet kissed Romeo quickly at midnight’ are about the same kiss––and formalisations do 
not help us to see this, but may actually presuppose that both sentences are about the same 
kiss. That is a first good reason to reject the Davidsonian suggestion. Another reason is this: 
the Davidsonian suggestion is not mandatory if we want to adopt a Chomskian perspective on 
grammatical forms.  
 There are yet other problems with Pietroski’s proposal. An important one concerns the 
idea that ordinary speakers impose semantic structure on words. That idea gives the 
impression of explaining understanding, but does not really do so. 
 [P]araphrases like (37) depend on nominalizations which are derived from verbs                                                         325 Pietroski 2006:839 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 (‘kisses’-‘kissing’); consequently they presuppose rather than explain our understanding 
of primary constructions like (29) (Strawson 1992: ch.8). More generally, our 
understanding of English sentences cannot be explained by the fact that we can learn to 
translate them into an interpreted formal language. For this is no more plausible than 
explaining our grasp of English by our ability to translate English sentences into Latin. 
Being able to translate from English into either of these two languages is a necessary 
condition of understanding English only for people who already know them.326  
It is hard to see how Pietroski can deal with this objection. He is, after all, committed to the 
idea that there are masked semantic structures. It is also unclear how his interest in truth-
conditional semantics can be squared with the Chomskian portion of his views. After all, 
Chomsky is very sceptical about the explanatory value of truth-conditions and other 
referential approaches to semantics.327 It is, therefore, hard to see how a logical form which 
explicitly refers to events can explain inference patterns in a way compatible with Chomskian 
dispositionalism. Apart from that––and most importantly––the Davidsonian suggestion is a 
twisted interpretation of a phenomenon which merely makes clear that inferential links within 
natural language are material. The prospects for Pietroski’s Davidsonian agenda are therefore 
bleak on many counts. 
 
A Wittgensteinian Perspective 
 
An alternative view, which is more closely related to medieval logic in its prospects, has it 
that logical forms are just the class of grammatical forms which are relevant for inferring. It is 
also an idea Wittgenstein hints at, for example in the Big Typescript: 
 Whether one proposition follows from another must emerge from the grammar of the 
latter–and from that grammar alone.328 
Baker & Hacker go a bit further by explaining inference in terms of transforming symbols: 
 The simplest case of inference is making one assertion after another, linked by a ‘so’ or 
a ‘therefore’, given that the final assertion is (and is intended to be) a transformation of 
the previous assertion or assertions according to certain paradigms. An inference is an 
act of transforming symbols, and hence a rule of inference is a norm governing 
symbolic transformations.329 
But how can these Wittgensteinian ideas be brought together at all with Chomskian grammar? 
We may, following some suggestions Wittgenstein made in the early and mid-Thirties, take                                                         326 Glock 2003:247‐8; my numbering of the examples 327 Cf. Ludlow 2000:424 and Chomsky 2000:181 328 Wittgenstein 2005:239 329 Baker & Hacker 2009:89 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calculi––such as the algebra behind a Chomskian grammar––as good objects of 
comparison.330 Such calculi are good objects of comparison, because linguists have 
successfully used them for decades to capture some surprisingly systematic properties of 
natural languages. After all, that was our take on linguistic dispositions all along. 
 Assume that we have identified the valid arguments in use in a particular discourse. A 
way of arranging the rules which govern those arguments consists in devising an appropriate 
logical calculus, i.e. a self-contained system of rules––a paradigm––as Baker &Hacker would 
maybe have it. Friedrich Waismann thought that such rules are intimately connected to 
ordinary thought: 
 The logical calculus undoubtedly aims at arranging in a clear system the rules of 
inference which govern ordinary thought; its value is judged by how well it performs 
this task, by whether it is broad enough to include all the types of inference which occur 
in ordinary thought, yet sufficiently narrow to exclude those transitions which we do not 
reckon as inferences.331  
So, any system of rules of inference which we come up with to serve as an object of 
comparison will also help us explain ordinary thought, i.e. ordinary reasoning. A calculus 
does presuppose that there are syntactically well-formed sentences on which the rules of 
inference can operate. And for this reason, nothing in such an account runs counter the idea 
that dispositions govern word-order and thus provide the material with which people can 
communicate and reason.  
 The sort of perspective I ultimately argue for has just three elements. First, there is the 
dispositional story about syntactic correctness. Second, there is the story about constitutive 
rules––which are constitutive of meaning and inference––and third, there is the story about 
inferential validity and transfer of warrant from premises to conclusions.  
 Let us start with the dispositional portion of the account. There is a lexicon of which 
we do not know much. Empirical research must show what the constraints on learning it are, 
but I guess that the acquisition of a lexicon only involves learning words and rules for 
combining them syntactically.332 After some time, the faculty of language (narrowly 
construed) starts operating on the lexicon and generates well-formed sentences––it is exactly                                                         330 Cf. Baker & Hacker 2005:54‐7 331 Waismann 1965:382 332 The acquisition of some concrete nouns will certainly require ostensive definition, but the rules on this level are not the sort of rules Chomsky is interested in and it must yet be shown to which extent scientific theorising can make sense of how a lexicon is acquired. I suspect that acquiring a lexicon involves ostensive definition and together with the idea that ostensive definition sets down constitutive rules for language use, large parts of the complexity of natural language use will hence influence what lexicon one acquires. 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these operations on the lexicon that we best explain in dispositional terms. At the beginning, 
the syntactic rules governing the combination of lexical items will have to be refined, but a 
firm grasp of a first language will be achieved in a relatively short time. Following Chomsky, 
we can hope to give a formal description of the initial state of the faculty of language and of 
how well-formed sentences are generated. An account of reference and other aspects of actual 
performance cannot be given in a scientific way. The linguistic dispositions described along 
these lines are called ‘one-way powers’, because they are psychological powers not subject to 
human volition. 
 On top of the linguistic dispositions we have what was called ‘two-way powers’––
psychological powers subject to volition. The distinction between one-way and two-way 
powers does hence coincide with the distinction between syntax and semantics. Possession of 
two-way powers is manifested, for example, when exercising recognitional capacities through 
using basic statements (in which we apply primitive concepts). So, a basic statement 
concerning sight––‘a red patch cannot be green’ or ‘a round circle has no edges’––will be 
most naturally explained through the capacity to see. A basic statement is also taken to 
express a constitutive rule––which is a hallmark of sense and a violation of which counts as 
nonsense. An ostensive definition––pointing at an apple in plain sight and declaring ‘this is an 
apple’––is also taken to express a constitutive rule governing sense. We cannot explain these 
capacities in purely dispositional terms, because we can always decide not to exercise a 
capacity. And that is also the reason why there is no naturalistic account of them. 
 Linguistic dispositions explain how we generate well-formed linguistic expressions 
and constitutive rules explain how we endow them with meaning. Inference, the paradigm of 
semantically correct extrapolation, combines these two. For simple cases, basic statements are 
syntactically well-formed expressions available as premises. Our capacity to make syntactic 
transformations explains how we extrapolate new statements from such premises. Intuitively, 
such transformations are only logically valid if they preserve truth. The commitment to 
common sense realism dictates that truth is epistemologically unconstrained and it is precisely 
this commitment which entails that logic provides an objective basis for semantically correct 
language use. 
 I have, however, also argued that basic statements are, at least potentially, defeasible. 
Following Hacker I have argued that empirical findings may trigger a revision of linguistic 
and psychological concepts. Following Boghossian I have argued that we have weak a priori 
knowledge of inferential validity––that our knowledge of inferential validity can be toppled if 
the right sort of evidence is produced. This led me to develop an account of the conditions 
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under which a transfer of warrant from premises to conclusion is secured. The conditions are: 
1) S’s justification for believing the premises is suitably independent of his justification for 
believing the conclusion, but both––premises and conclusion––are common ground 
after the conclusion has been drawn 
2) S is justified in believing that the inference is valid iff the inference can be expressed 
through a basic statement or S is justified in believing that the inference is actually 
truth-preserving. 
We must now see which calculi we can devise as object of comparison with which we can 
explain inferring as conducted in natural language use. A suitable calculus must have 
syntactically licit transformations and its transformations should preserve truth and transfer of 
warrant from premises to conclusions. I do not think that we can make good prima facie 
conjectures about the variety of calculi we can come up with, but I think that the constraints 
on suitability restrict the domain of enquiry in an appropriate way. 
 The reasoning we encounter in scientific enquiries in accord with methodological 
naturalism has, however, a different status. Natural science need not exclusively utilise the 
principles governing inferences in natural language use. Rather, the sort of abstractions and 
idealisations these enquiries require may necessitate formal calculi, the rules of inference for 
which diverge from the rules of natural language use. Quantum mechanics uses quantum logic 
and theoretical linguistics uses algebraic descriptions of syntactic transformations––in both 
we find inferential patterns not available in natural language use. I submit that this is 
necessary if scientific enquiries are to discover and make new ideas available––even though 
such new ideas may initially seem foreign (and maybe bewildering) if looked at from the 
perspective of natural language use. Common sense realists need not be worried about this. 
As long as scientific ways of inferring preserves truth, all is well. For then we can refine both 
common sense and science by comparing the truths available to common sense to the truths 
available through science.  
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Glossary: 
 
- Anti-Reductionism: facts about language use are not to be explained in terms which 
eschew semantic or intentional vocabulary, they are sui generis. 
- Basic concept: a basic concept is a concept the justified application of which does not 
require warrant. 
- The Berkeleyan proposal: Kripkenstein’s Berkeleyan proposal consists in the claim 
that the search for a metaphysical foundation of semantic correctness (and other cases 
of correct extrapolation) is misconceived. 
- Blame-Acceptance Connection: Being epistemically blameless or blameworthy 
partially depends on what other people are ready to accept during a conversation. 
- Central explanandum, of the present thesis: how can we extrapolate semantically 
correct uses of language in an indefinite number of cases, which we have not 
encountered previously? 
- Common-sense realism: tokens of most current observable common-sense and 
scientific physical types objectively exist independently of the mental. 
- Defeasibility-criteria: defeasibility-criteria warrant, if they obtain, a falsification of 
statements ascribing meaning, intention, mental states or concept-possession to people 
in particular cases. 
- Epistemological correctness: an extrapolation is epistemologically correct if it is 
suitably warranted. 
- Exclusionist accounts, of grasping as extrapolating: exclusionist accounts explain 
grasping as extrapolating in terms of what is not correct. 
- External relation, between thought and fact: an external relation between thought and 
fact construes them as related through a mediating element like a satisfaction or a 
disposition. 
- Factual correctness: an extrapolation is factually correct if its correctness depends on 
what facts obtain. 
- Grasping as Extrapolating: grasping a rule, a meaning of a word or a concept centrally 
involves extrapolating a possibly indefinite number of new applications based on a 
finite number of known cases. 
- Implicit definitions of logical constants: grasping the meaning of a logical constant 
means knowing its import on the validity of inferences from and to statements 
containing it. 
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- Intention to follow a rule: any rule requires that my intention to follow it determines 
what is to count as following that rule for indefinitely many cases in the future, even 
though there may be exceptions. 
- Internal relation, between thought and fact: an internal relation between thought and 
fact construes them as immediately related. An internal relation is also constitutive of 
its relata and there is nothing further which grounds them. It therefore explains and 
justifies what the thought and the fact are in terms of each other. 
- Justification-question: facts constituting language use also justify a speaker’s use, it 
must justify whether somebody means addition by ‘plus’ or quaddition. 
- Modus ponens model of rule-following: every rule implicitly or explicitly contains a 
conditional, satisfaction of which counts as rule-following. 
- Normative assessment of language use: no matter what one is disposed to say, it will 
always be possible to assess what has been said as correct or as incorrect. Such 
assessments are normative and they are especially common in situations where 
somebody says something for the first time. 
- Objectivity in language use: a language user’s opinions about what counts as 
objectively correct or incorrect language use are not optional, but demanded. 
- Platitude about objectivity: objectivity requires that the opinions which we form are in 
no sense optional or variable as a function of permissible idiosyncrasy, but are 
demanded of us––objectivity hence also requires that there will be a robust sense in 
which a particular point of view ought to be held, and a failure to hold which can be 
understood only as a rational/cognitive failure. 
- Proof-Truth Connection: Concerning justified beliefs about formal validity, justified 
belief in truth should be expected to rest on proof and justified belief through proof 
must move us from truths to truth. 
- Saying something: saying something is not merely emitting a noise and it can be 
explained on objective grounds.  
- Sceptical conclusion: there is not fact of the matter about what any linguistic 
expression means. 
- Sceptical Paradox: on the one hand, we are sure that there is an appropriate fact 
determining semantic correctness and that we are authoritative about what we mean, 
yet we cannot, it seems, pin it down. 
- Semantic correctness: semantic correctness is concerned with the correct usage of 
linguistic expressions based on what those linguistic expressions mean. 
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- Semantic realism: according to semantic realism, we must explain how language 
latches onto reality, precisely because factual matters are possibly independent of 
thought and talk. 
- Theory of meaning (in Dummett’s sense): an account of meaning that envisages it as a 
function of components and structure. 
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